HEGEMONY AND CRISIS: SWAZI ROYAL POWER IN TRANSITION

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress of South Africa
BLS	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
CDC	Commonwealth Development Corporation
CGIC	Credit Guarantee Insurance Company (South Africa)
Consas	Confederation of Southern African States
CRDB	Central Rural Development Board
EAC	European Advisory Council
FLS	Frontline States
ILO	International Labour Office
INM	Imbokodvo National Movement
ISA	International Sugar Agreement
NIDCS	National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland
NNLC	Ngwane National Liberatory Congress
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa
RDA	Rural Development Area
RDAP	Rural Development Area Programme
RMA	Rand Monetary Area
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
S.A.R.	South African Republic
SAR	South African Railways
Sarccus	Southern African Regional Commission for Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil
SARTC	Southern African Regional Tourism Council
SCI	Swaziland Chemical Industry
SDP	Swaziland Democratic Party
SEDCO	Small Enterprises Development Company
SLM	Swaziland Liberation Movement
SNA	Swaziland News Agency
S.N.A.	Swaziland National Archive
SNAS	Swaziland National Association of Students
SNC	Swaziland National Council
SNUS	Swaziland National Union of Students
SPP	Swaziland Progressive Party

SSRU	Social Science Research Unit of the University of Swaziland
SWAKI	Swaziland Kirsh Industries
Uniswa	University of Swaziland
USA	United Swaziland Association
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VIF	Vuvulane Irrigated Farms

GLOSSARY

Bayethe! - Royal salutation

Emabutfo - age-regiments, warriors

Emalangeni - Dlamini princes and princessess; currency of Swaziland

Imbokodvo - grinding stone

Incwala - annual first fruits festival and Kingship ritual

Indlovukati - Queen Mother

Indvuna - Governor

Indvuna yenkhundla - Governor of districts assembly

Ingwenyama/Ngwenyama - King of the Swazi

Inkhundla (pl. Tinkhundla) - district assembly

Inkosi - chief, ruler

Kukhonta - to pay allegiance

Kumemeta - to shout

Kuncusa - to request

Libandla (pl. emabandla) - council

Lilima - communal working party

Ligogo - Inner council

Nabomntfwana - Mother of the child (named as heir to the throne)

Sibaya - cattle byre, arena

Tinsila - Officials chosen from non-Royal clans with administrative authority equal to senior Princes, ritual blood brothers

Umemo - Tribute labour working party

Umhlanga - Reed dance

Umntfwana- Child, heir to the throne

Umnumzana - Headman, household head

Umsumphe (pl. imisumphe) - Community elder

SWAZILAND: BASIC STATISTICAL DATA

LAND AREA: 17,107 sq km.

POPULATION: 610,000 (1983).

MAIN TOWNS: Mbabane 23,000 (1976), Manzini 27,000 (1976).

CLIMATE: Sub-Tropical.

LANGUAGES: English and Siswati.

MEASURES: Metric system.

CURRENCY: Lilangeni, plural emalangeni (E) = 100 cents. On a par with the rand. Average exchange rate in 1984: E1.438=$1, at the beginning of June 1985, the exchange rate was about E1.99=$1, E2.55=£1.

Exchange Rates

Swaziland's historical ties to South African currency, has meant that until 1961, it used South Africa's pound. Exchange rates were based on the fixed rates for sterling South African pounds and the London market rates for sterling against other currencies. After 1961, the rand was introduced in South Africa. Exchange rates thereafter were based on the fixed rates for sterling against rands and the London market rates for sterling against other currencies. From 1973, exchange rates were based on the South African Reserve Bank's fixed rates for the US dollar against the rand. When Swaziland introduced its own currency in 1974, it was fixed to the rand and thus exchange rates were similarly based on the South African Reserve Bank's rates for the US dollar against the rand.

Exchange rates from 1950+

1951 SA£1=$2.80=£1

1955 SA£1=$2.80=£1

1960 SA£1=$2.80=£1

1961 R1=$1.40; R2=£1

1965 R1=$1.40; R2=£1

1970 R1=$1.40; R1.71=£1

1973 R1=$1.28; R2.03=£1

1975 E1=$1.45; E1.62=£1

1978 E1=$1.15; E1.74=£1

1979 E1=$1.21; E1.82=£1

1980 E1=1.33; E1.76=£1

1981 E1=$1.03; E1.85=£1

1982 E1=$0.92; E1.76=£1


1983 E1=$0.82; E1.75=£

1984 E1=$0.53; E2.25=£1

+ Exchange Rates as at the beginning of January each year.

Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review for Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Annual Review, (1985). Swaziland Government, Report on the 1976 Swaziland Population Census (Vol. 1). (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976). The Central Bank of Swaziland, Quarterly Review (March 1985). The International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, (June 1985). The International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, (1951-1984).

Map 1 SWAZILAND



ABSTRACT

Today Royal hegemony in Swaziland is threatened by a combination of economic, political and regional crises. This thesis aims to explain why, by examining the trajectory of development of Swazi history and society. The concepts of hegemony and crisis provide the focal point of the analysis, and are explained in the Introduction (CHAPTER ONE) to the thesis. Here it is also stressed that in developing the analysis within the framework of historical materialism, great efforts will be made to avoid the pitfalls of class reductionism. The concept of class will be integrated with other points of reference and explanatory devices, particularly the important role of ideology in Swaziland's development.

In CHAPTER TWO, the character of pre-colonial Swazi society is outlined, and shown to have evolved as an articulation of lineage and tributary society. Here the Swazi aristocracy combined fraternity with the dynastic regime, while the King was a father figure who provided the nation with its unity. This unity was strengthened by the age-regiment system and the important annual incwala - first fruits - ceremony. Capital penetration disrupted the self-sufficiency of pre-colonial Swazi society, and colonialism undermined the authority of the indigenous aristocracy through a land partition which gave over half of the country's fertile pastures to European settlers. CHAPTER THREE outlines the attempts made by the aristocracy to regain their land and to reconstitute their hegemony. They attempted to re-purchase the land by exacting monetary levies on their subjects, and after World War II began to use the control which they had over the land to forge alliances with foreign capital. The rapid post-World War II penetration of capital led to the growth of an export-orientated economy, with an underpaid workforce which embarked on a series of strikes in the early 1960's. The King opposed the strikes, and entered the political arena through the creation of his own political party which eventually led the country to independence. Following independence, King Sobhuza II and his allies allied themselves more strongly with foreign capital, by adopting a comprador role. When the opposition made small gains in the post independence general elections, the King suspended the constitution, banned political parties, introduced preventive detention, and set up a Royal commission to draw up a new constitution for the country. This led to the resuscitation of Royal villages or district assemblies known as Tinkhundla, which became the electoral vehicles for a reconvened Parliament.

In CHAPTER FOUR, a detailed account of the economic basis of Royal hegemony is provided. It is through unequal exchange and the exploitation of Swaziland's workers, that the alliance between the Royal compradors and the multinational companies was cemented. The extreme openness of the Swazi economy has led to an export orientated growth, leading to an uneven growth between the economy's major sectors and a disproportionate distribution of its benefits. While the country's major export markets are external to the Southern African region, 90 per cent of its imports come from South Africa. This reveals a dependency materialised through a customs union and common monetary zone, as well as widespread transportation and energy links.

Swaziland's export orientated growth has led to a trend towards monoculture, and a dependence on sugar production for export earnings. As the price of sugar on the world market began to tumble in the late 1970's, Swaziland found itself engulfed by the world economic crisis. CHAPTER FIVE gives an outline of the major features and causes of the world crisis, and demonstrates how they have spread to Swaziland. The impressive growth rates of the early 1970's have given way to stagnation, rising debt, balance of trade deficits, underutilisation of manufacturing capacity as well as closures and shut downs of industrial enterprises. This has been compounded by the diversion of investment to the South African Bantustans which offer more attractive investment incentives. This has led to growing unemployment, which unfolds in the context of a rapid population growth rate, and the general decline in government services. The state has attempted to alleviate the unemployment problem through a Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP), but as the analysis shows, the level of agricultural production has scarcely risen, and there is little evidence of the uptake of commodity production to which the RDAP is committed. The RDAP's progress is hampered, inter alia, by the sustenance of indigenous forms of land tenure which themselves are a crucial ingredient in the continued success of Royal hegemony. Furthermore, the actual protagonists of rural development, the worker-peasantry and farmer-housewife have little say in the planning and implementation of the RDAP. The effects of the world economic crisis have also been experienced by the working class, who have carried much of the burden of capital's austerity measures.

The world economic crisis was not the only crisis to engulf Swaziland, as the country found itself in the midst of a growing regional confrontation. In CHAPTER SIX, a discussion of South Africa's regional strategy demonstrates how Swaziland was lured into its fold through the 'carrot' of a land deal, which involves the proposed transfer of two parcels of territory to Swaziland. South Africa's offer was made contingent on the signing of a security pact, signed in secret between the two countries in 1982. This led to a crackdown by the Swazi security forces on the ANC, and created much bitterness between black South Africans and Swazis. Although the crackdown has been attributed to a new phase in an ongoing anti-ANC offensive by the Swazi state which succeeded the King's death, it is argued that it is the class and ideological forces which underlie Swazi state power, that have generated hostility between South Africa's national liberation movement and the Swazi state.

What the death of the King did precipitate, was a political crisis, leading to ongoing political in-fighting within the ruling power bloc. The trajectory of these struggles is outlined in CHAPTER SEVEN. Here it is argued that the highly personalised style of rule which characterised Sobhuza's reign, was always a recipe for the conflict which came after his death. Competing individuals and factions jockeyed for power in a succession of struggles over the executive characterised by personal intrigue and cabal within the Royal palace. Ultimately, it was the powerful Prince Mfanasibili and Dr. George Msibi, who emerged as the decisive force, using the Liqoqo, which the King had upgraded as the Supreme Council of State shortly before his death, as the channel for their success. They have been aided by their

allies within the cabinet, particularly Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi and Foreign Minister Mr. M. Mnisi. But King Sobhuza II's style of personal rule relying heavily on the use of myth for communicating Royal ideology, has given way to threat, allegation and an intolerance of any form of dissent. In the context of a growing economic and regional crisis, Royal hegemony itself now faces a crisis of legitimacy.

PREFACE

Essentially, the work for this thesis began when I left South Africa and went to teach in Swaziland in January 1976. It is thus the product of practical experience and participation, as well as academic research. My thanks must therefore initially be extended to the people of Swaziland, and the staff and students of the two schools in which I worked - St. Christopher's High School in Luyengo, and the Salesian High School in Manzini. I owe much to the manner in which I was accepted into Swazi society, particularly by the people of Phonjwane. This I believe, is a factor which in the long run has greatly added to the quality of the final product of this thesis. The thesis was written with humility, in the hope that it will provide a greater understanding of the great tasks facing the Swazi Nation in the present and future, and its notable achievements in the past. My supervisor Barry Munslow provided me with the initial stimulis to pursue research and combine this with my personal experience. He was generous with his time, and his comments on the various drafts have been invaluable. A great debt is owed to John Daniel too, and joint work and discussion with him have played a large part in shaping the analysis contained in the final chapters. Nevertheless, the interpretation and views offered in this thesis are ultimately entirely my own. Nomkhosi Tsela, Zizwe Mazibuko, Hilton Toolo, Glory Gamedze, Thabisile Levin, Simanga and Gundane Sithole devoted a great amount of time and effort in helping me conduct the rural survey. Paul Goodison, Shirley Mashiane, Pete Phillips and Chris Pycroft provided a stimulating atmosphere of debate in which the wider issues of Southern Africa have been discussed. The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdsom granted me an Overseas Research Student

Award, but it is my parents Jack and Joyce Levin who have borne the greatest financial burden; and it is to them that I offer my unbridled gratitude. A word of thanks is also extended to Joanne Brayde, Stephanie Hanlon, Karen Ridsdale and Sandra Ellams who painstakingly typed the final draft; to Sandra Mather who drew up the maps; and to the staff of the Swaziland National Archives and the University of Swaziland's Social Science Research Unit Documentation Centre.

Finally, I would like to thank Thabisile Levin and Nobunye Levin, whose emotional support has considerably reduced the great pressure, strain and rigours of thesis writing.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The secret power of myths, writes Salman Rushdie, lies in the wealth of meaning which is poured into mythological tales.(1) In this way a multiplicity of interpretations and speculations develop around dreams, feeding on the addiction of people who need to define and give meaning to their lives. Great men become both the creators and subject of myths, and grandeur is a transitory experience which depends in part upon the myth-making capacity of those who bear the titles of greatness. Yet, what happens when great men die? Do the people who have bathed in their myths arise from their slumber, thus allowing reality to penetrate their dreams and jolt their consciousness into a reassessment of their lives and the myths which give meaning to them? Or does the harsh real world of the inheritors of greatness plunge the people more deeply into the mythological labyrinths of the past in order to escape the clumsy vicissitudes of the succession?

Pre-colonial Swaziland was nurtured on the grandiose l'etat-c'est-moi delusions of Kingship, which were undermined by capital penetration in the region. But despite a succession of setbacks to Royal hegemony, the Swazi aristocracy proved its resilience against the forces of colonialism, and was eventually able to lead the country to independence. This had an unusual consequence: instead of counterposing the interests of the new nationalist petty-bourgeois classes, the ancien regime in Swaziland became an important

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1. S. Rushdie, 'An Introduction', in T. Ali, The Nehrus and the Gandhis, (London: Picador, 1985).

constituent of the middle class formation, and ultimately became the champion of the nationalist cause. Swazi absolutism thus proved to be far more tenacious than elsewhere in the region, confined as it was territorially. For unlike most African states, the Swazi state contained only one indigenous ethnic group. Borrowing technology and populism from the new world in which it found itself, it synthesized these with its own indigenous inheritance. In this way, the Swazi monarchy survived, although much of its success was owed to the cult of personality which King Sobhuza II was able to develop around himself through a myth-making process which fed on both the local and international communities.

'Myth', says Roland Barthes, 'hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession, it is an inflexion'.(1) As such, myths rely on great orators and communicators for their persistance, because it is through myths that human thought portrays reality by analogy.(2) As Maurice Godelier has put it, mythical thinking 'derives its impulse from the desire to know reality, but in the process it arrives at an illusory explanation for a series of causes and effects which establish the order of things'.(3) Analogous thinking draws heavily on the symbols and images of nature in order to explain

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1. R. Barthes, Mythologies, trans. and ed. A. Lavers, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p.129.

2. M. Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology, (Cambridge: University Press, 1977), p.207.

3. Ibid., p.209, emphasis in the original.

the world and present a vision of the manner in which it changes. In Swaziland, it was King Sobhuza II who was able to present the people with this vision. Nonetheless, when the world's longest reigning monarch, Swaziland's Ngwenyama,[1] died in August 1982, no-one emerged to sustain the vision. Pandora's box was opened, releasing the conflicting forces which Sobhuza II had so skilfully welded together in securing Royal hegemony.

Even before his death, however, the signs were that Royal hegemony was under increasing strain. The world economy and its crisis, and Swaziland's own precarious monocultural trajectory of development, combined to reverse the impressive economic growth rates of the immediate post-independence era. In addition, Swaziland was confronted with the reality of its regional locality, as apartheid South Africa came face to face with the forces of national liberation which had terminated white minority rule elsewhere in the region, and brought the struggle closer to home than ever before. In conjunction with the princely intrigue which succeeded the King's death, this has steadily drawn Swaziland towards a crossroads, calling for a major political initiative to deal with the series of conflicts which now simmer on the surface of Swazi society.

In order to separate the wood from the trees in our analysis of Swazi society, we have elected to focus on two primary concepts, hegemony and crisis, which will become focal points and explanatory devices in

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1. Ngwenyama is the title given to the King of Swaziland. It translates literally as 'the lion'.

unravelling this important chapter of Southern African history. In so doing, we aim to avoid the temptation and to evade the pitfalls of attempting to develop a general theory of the state, economy and society in Swaziland, because it is not possible to evoke one level of theoretical determination capable of explaining this rich and diverse field of analysis. The substance of a theory is realised through its capacity to relate to particular historical conjunctures.(1) Althuser, whose Reading Capital(2) pushed theoreticism to extremes, has himself acknowledged this in his self-criticism. Here he has argued that science should be understood as 'the minimum generality necessary to be able to grasp a concrete object'.(3) This would imply that the adequacy of a theory, is determined by its ability to grasp the problems which it sets forth to analyse according to the criteria established to test its explanatory capacity. For us, the ultimate test of theory lies in its ability to uncover and explain concrete historical processes. Theory can neither be reduced to, nor freed from, history. It can only unfold and develop with history. We have concentrated on the concepts of hegemony and crisis in order to provide a focus for our analysis of Swazi society, and because these concepts go a long way in helping to decipher the complex processes and events which have unfolded in the making of Swazi history. Needless to say, other concepts and

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1. In this connection, see the arguments of S. Hall, B. Lumley and G. MacLennan, "Politics and Ideology: Gramsci", in Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (ed.), On Ideology, (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1983), p.72.

2. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital, (London: New Left Books, 1970).

3. L. Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, (London: New Left Books, 1976), p.112, emphasis in the original.

abstract formulations will be necessary for the analysis as it develops. But at this stage it would be superfluous for instance, to attempt to develop a general theory of the state, despite the fact that the Swazi state provides a major theatre for our analysis. This will become clear when we discuss the current political crisis in Swaziland, for no general theory could adequately account for the unique specificity of historical conditions which have given vent to a succession of highly personalised power struggles within the ruling power bloc.

Hegemony

The historical materialist method has achieved the distinction of shattering the obviousness of immediate appearances in order to disclose the underlying relations between both concepts and historical events. But in developing Marx's discoveries and method, subsequent thought has all too often collapsed into the evocation of necessary links and articulations between events and concepts, and their logical insertion into essentialist models. This has led to a vulgarisation with a number of negative consequences. One of these is class reductionism, which arises from the privileging of the social relations of production as the unique reference point for the analysis of society. If it is true that historical materialism represents a self-critical theory 'capable of explaining its own genesis and metamorphosis',(1) then the setbacks suffered by socialism running diversely through Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Grenada and Mozambique (to name but a

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1. P. Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, (London: Verse, 1983), p.12.

few), demand serious reconceptualisations in the analysis of society. For events in the real world have cast serious doubts on the notion of historical necessity, which views society as a succession of modes of production.(1) This, we would suggest, is because actual events and historical struggles are generated by a multiplicity of causal mechanisms and conflicts which go well beyond the concept of the mode of production. By mode of production, we refer to an articulated combination of forces and relations of production. The relations of production specify a definite mode of appropriation and form of social distribution of the means of production, while the forces of production designate the labour process, or the mode of appropriation of nature.(2) It is necessary to integrate the mutations or contradictions to which the mode of production give rise, with other points of reference and sources of conflict.

Swazi Royal power and its transformation, an understanding of which is so important in the analysis of Swazi society, cannot be explained with class relations as the sole referent. For this reason, the concept of hegemony must be introduced. The genealogy of the concept has been traced elsewhere.(3) It reached its fruition in Gramsci's Prison

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1. See E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (London : Verso Editions, 1985). These ideas are developed at length in the Introduction and Chapters 1 & 2.

2. B. Hindess, and P. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.10-11.

3. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, op. cit., Chapter 1.

Notebooks,[1] where Gramsci transcended the Leninist view, which saw hegemony in terms of a class alliance materialised in the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry. The Gramscian advance saw political leadership merge in unison with the intellectual and moral leadership of a particular group, taking the concept of hegemony beyond the notion of class alliance. Hegemonic projects thus became struggles in which a protagonist 'becomes aware that one's own corporate interests in their present and future development transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too'.[2] This is a lesson which Swaziland's aristocracy learned through its own struggles. Transformation of their class determination through comprador accumulation was in itself insufficient to secure hegemony. This could only be achieved on the terrain of ideology, through the struggle of ideas which enabled King Sobhuza II and his allies to win the hearts and minds of the mass of the Swazi suffering the indignities of colonial oppression.

What follows, is that intellectual and moral leadership constitutes a "collective will", which 'through ideology, becomes the organic cement unifying a "historical bloc".'[3] Ideology here binds together the plurality of structures which together constitute society. It does so

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1. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982). See in particular the piece 'Analysis of Situations, Relations of Force', under the section 'The Modern Prince', pp.175 ff.

2. Ibid. p.181.

3. E. Laclau, and C. Mouffe, op.cit., p.67.

through a collective will which combines and articulates a diverse series of fragmented social forces, achieving 'a "cultural-social" unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogenous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of àn equal and common conception of the world'.(1)

This introduces a new set of specifically ideological relations among groups, which transcend their structural location within the relations of production. One of the chief interpretive threads running through this thesis, is the concrete operation of ideology as a mechanism in the organisation, continuity and transformation of state power in Swaziland. This raises questions as to the relation between ideological processes and relations of class domination, as well as to the articulation between ideology and state power. Jorge Larrain has recently thrown light on these questions by drawing what seems to be a key distinction in the conception of ideology. Ideology, he has argued, has both a negative and positive connotation.(2)

The former deals with the notion of ideology as mystification, one of the prime examples of which was elaborated by Marx in his discussion of the concept of commodity fetishism. Here ideological inversions enabled the exploitative class relation to appear as one of equal exchange between individuals in the sphere of circulation, that 'very

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1. A. Gramsci, op.cit., p.349.

2. J. Larrain, Marxism and Ideology, (London:Macmillan, 1983). This theme runs right through the book and is especially evident in the earlier chapters.

Eden of the innate rights of Man'.(1) Through this inversion, the specific contradictions of capitalist society are concealed behind an ideological world of liberty and equality.(2) In similar fashion, under different historical conditions, the Swazi monarchy was able to synthesise the fraternity of lineage society with the dynastic regime of the emerging absolutist state. Relations of inequality were thus represented as equal relations in a society where the King became 'father of the nation'.

In addition to the process of mystification, ideology has become subsumed under analyses relating to a whole series of forms of social consciousness and the notion of conflicting class and non-class ideologies. Ideological struggle here becomes a conflict between antagonistic class forces and their respective ideologies such as bourgeois and proletarian ideology, or between the ideologies of contradictory social forces such as tradition and modernity. For Gramsci, organic ideologies, or those necessary to a given structure, must be able to organise social groups, and be transposed into particular orientations for action.(3) This provides us with the positive connotation of ideology, and poses the question, that once having distinguished between the negative and positive connotations of

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1. K. Marx, Capital Volume I, (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1976), p.280.

2. One of the most enlightening discussions on commodity fetishism can be found in N. Geras, 'Marx and the Critique of Political Economy', in R. Blackburne, (ed.) Ideology and Science, (London: Fontana, 1972).

3. J. Larrain, op.cit., pp.79-80; A. Gramsci, op.cit., pp.375-377.

ideology, is it possible to conflate the two conceptions into a unified discourse? Althusser has attempted to do this by distinguishing between the theory of ideology in general, and the theory of particular ideologies. The object of the former, is 'an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form' throughout history.(1) Within this problematic, ideology is conceived in functional terms. Its key role is to secure the cohesion and reproduction of the conditions of existence of specific societies. The theory of particular ideologies in contrast, examines societies in their historical contexts. The function of ideology is to secure the conditions of domination and subordination between specific social forces. Both ideas contain negative connotations. Ideology as the cement which secures the cohesiveness of society, is a necessity prescribed by the complexity of social structure and therefore requires a mythical representation of the world. Similarly, the domination of the ruling class is secured through ideology which is a 'representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence'.(2) It is Althusser's concept of 'interpellation', however, which facilitates the reintegration of the positive connotation into ideological theory.

Through 'interpellation', Althusser refers to the process whereby individuals are constituted as subjects.(3) By this, as we understand it,

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1. L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, (London: New Left Books, 1971.

2. Ibid., p.153.

3. Ibid., p.160.

reference is made to the active and operative quality of ideology and its identification with politics: the process through which individuals gain social and popular identities. Here no necessary connotation is ascribed to ideology: the formation of social or popular identities can be either for the maintenance of a system or its transformation. The effect here of ideology, is that individuals relate to their real conditions of existence as if 'they themselves were the autonomous principle of determination of that relation'(1). Thus ideological inversions exist in articulation with the ideological process of the formation of social and popular identities. This re-establishes the link between the negative and positive conceptions of ideology.

The process through which individuals gain social and popular identities denotes the field of ideological struggle, in which both class and non-class forces attempt to articulate the interest of other social groups to their own. This brings us back to the question of hegemony, and establishes the germ of a non-reductionist conception of ideology. According to Gramsci:

> ...the fact of hegemony pre-supposes that one takes into account the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony will be exercised, and it also pre-supposes a certain equilibrium, that is to say, that the hegemonic groups will make some sacrifices of a corporate nature.(2)

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1. E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory,(London: Verso, 1977), p.100.

2. A. Gramsci, op. cit., p.182.

But Gramsci's advances in the field of hegemony are ultimately hamstrung through his insistence that it is a fundamental class and fundamental class ideologies which are the single unifying principles in all hegemonic formations. Classes are identified at the level of production as antagonistic poles, and fundamental classes are constituted by the two sets of contradictory class forces as specified by the production relations. Thus the relations of production and their essential class character remain the necessary structural framework of all struggles, and 'political struggle is still a zero-sum game among classes'.(1)

The criticism is important, for in the case of pre-independent Swaziland, as we shall see, popular identity was never something simply given, but had to be constructed through a logic of hegemony which witnessed the resuscitation and distortion by the Swazi aristocracy of popular indigenous traditions. Within this pre-independence conjuncture, in a country whose social reproduction was dominated by capitalism, the Swazi aristocracy remained a key social force, but could not be construed as a fundamental class. Hegemonic construction, therefore, remains largely indeterminate. It takes place within a rich diversity of social and political spaces and cannot simply be explained through reference to the specific logic of a single social relation. This does not deny causality, but contends that the actual causes in the process of hegemonic formation are indeterminate.

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1. E. Laclau, and C. Mouffe, op. cit., p.69.

There are a multiplicity of casual mechanisms which combine in the development of a hegemonic project. These cannot, however, be predetermined at an abstract theoretical level. It is only through the examination of specific historical conjunctures that causality can be determined. This poses the question that if the actual construction of a historical hegemonic bloc is theoretically indeterminate, what of its degeneration or destruction? How is it that a ruling class loses its consensus? When a hegemonic force no longer leads, but only dominates through the use of coercion, then society at large becomes detached from its traditional ideology. When the old dies, and the new can no longer be born, then a crisis occurs. But crisis, like hegemony, is a complex process brought about by a plurality of causes and determinations.

Crisis

Few would deny that a large section of the underdeveloped world is currently in the throes of a prolonged economic and social crisis. While growing evidence of this is ammassed and processed, very little attention has been devoted to an actual discussion of the concept of 'crisis'. Outside the social sciences, the concept of crisis has been employed both in medicine and in drama.(1) In its medical context, it refers to a phase in an illness where it becomes apparent whether or not the patient's self-healing powers will bring about recovery. Here an objective force 'deprives a subject of some part of his normal sovereignty',(2) providing a concept of crisis in sharp contrast to that

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1. J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (London: Heinemann, 1976), p.1.

2. Ibid.

developed in classical tragedy, where the identities of tragic heroes are threatened by the mythical power of fate which must be overcome through the formation of new identities. The turning point in this context, is not simply an objective force, but depends in part on the identities of the protagonists, and their ability to overcome the fateful process. In contrast, social crises do not relate merely to objective tendencies, but only come about when 'members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened.'(1)

Indeed, as Castells has noted, a major problem with crisis theories developed within the Marxist tradition, is that they subscribe to an essentialism and the necessary nature of crisis as an inevitable outcome of capitalist development.(2) The tendency has been to focus on the economic dimension of the crisis, and thus to ignore the political and ideological aspects which together with the economic characterise the 'structure of social relationships underlying the pattern of capital accumulation'.(3) Crisis we would argue, occurs when a society faces both internal and external pressures which allow for fewer possibilities for the resolution of social contradictions than are necessary for the continued reproduction of social relationships. This is why the objective tendencies towards crisis within capitalism are best viewed in their subjective historical contexts.

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1. Ibid., p.3.

2. M. Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), see Introduction, passim.

3. Ibid., p.5.

Historically, it is not the capitalist system alone which has undergone crisis. In Swaziland, pre-colonial society was faced with a crisis following capital penetration of Southern Africa. But the advent of the capitalist mode of production and its subsequent domination of Swazi society, did not imply a total breakdown of non-capitalist society. This is because the mode of production does not determine other levels and practices constitutive of society, but rather articulates with them. Thus in societies like Swaziland, capital penetration created a fresh social space characterised by an articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production and social practices.(1) With Royal hegemony in crisis, the Swazi aristocracy found it possible to locate itself within the complex of capitalist relations of production to emerge as a new class force, while reasserting its hegemony over Swazi society as a whole through the perpetuation of indigenous non-capitalist practices.

As we will go on to argue, however, this has ultimately involved a contradictory process which has led to the preservation of an indigenous political culture and ideology, ill-suited to the current historical level of Swaziland's development. It is here that the full impact of Swaziland's crisis becomes apparent. The repercussions of the world economic recession have left Swaziland with growing structural problems such as unemployment, rising debt and critical housing shortages. Compounding this level of crisis is the regional crisis, which has witnessed the emergence of white-ruled South Africa

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1. Varying conceptualisations of the question of the articulation of modes of production can be found in H. Wolpe (ed.), The Articulation of Modes of Production, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

as a sub-imperialist power launching a 'carrot and stick' policy of destabilisation in Southern Africa. Although it can be argued that both levels of crisis have had a less destructive impact on Swaziland than on other states in the region, the fact remains that a major political initiative is necessary for the country to deal with its internal and external problems. But in a highly centralised system, with the state executive locked in a succession of personalised power struggles, all indications are that the much needed political initiatives are not forthcoming.

Instead, Swaziland's rulers are fettered to the past, nervously attempting to restore Sobhuza II's vision of the world within Swazi society. But often, these efforts have appeared incongruous. In April 1985, the Queen Regent declared a national fasting day, ordering mothers not to breastfeed their babies, and cattle-owners not to release their cattle for grazing. Everybody present in the country was ordered to observe a weekend of prayer for the 'future of the entire nation', because the Queen Regent had prophesied that 'a dark cloud of misfortune was hovering over the country'.(1)

Swaziland's current leadership faces an uncertain future, yet it does so with its back facing forwards. Overtaken by the rapid turn of events, it remains rooted in the past. This comon thread, this inwardness of nationalist politics, establishes an intimate link with romanticism.(2)

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1. Times of Swaziland, 26 April, 1985.

2. See Nairn's discussion of nationalism and romanticism in T. Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, (London: Verso, 1981), p.104.

It is the latter which provides the cultural language that alone will ensure the survival of the nation, threatened as its leaders would have us believe, by foreign ideologies. Romanticism like myth, thrives on a reference to nature - the divine right of leaders is in the very nature of things. When a King - a lion (ingwenyama) - dies, the interim succession is provided by a Queen Regent - a great she-elephant (indlovukati). Today in Swaziland, there is no room for real lions or elephants - they were all destroyed years ago. As a Swazi youth observed: 'The animals, the subject of countless fables and stories handed down over the generations, nourish the national psyche. Something died in the Swazis when the elephant were shot out'.(1) While the legacy of Sobhuza II fades from memory, and the economic and regional crisis which confronts the Swazi nation grows in dimension, it seems inevitable that the process of demythologising will begin, as Swazis themselves see that is is better to counter myths with facts.

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1. The Star (International Weekly Edition), 8 April 1985.

2. COMMUNAL LABOUR, TRIBUTE LABOUR AND LABOUR-POWER: CAPITAL PENETRATION AND THE CRISIS OF ROYAL HEGEMONY

The chief concern of this chapter is the discussion and analysis of the precise nature of pre-colonial Swazi society, and the ways in which it was transformed following capital penetration in Southern Africa. The aim is by no means to provide a comprehensive account of Swazi history in the nineteenth century - this has been done elsewhere(1). Instead we shall seek to reveal the categories of pre-colonial Swazi society that provide a key to the understanding of Royal hegemony, including the state and ideological institutions which facilitated its transformation.

Pre-colonial society in Swaziland

A number of scholastic contributions enable us to paint a vivid picture of the structure and organisation of Swazi society during the pre-colonial period(2). One of the most important of these, to date, although certainly not free of problems as we shall go on to see, is to be found in the work of Bonner. Bonner focuses on the pre-capitalist

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1. See P. Bonner, Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983); and J.S.M. Matsebula, A History of Swaziland, (Cape Town: Longman, 1980).

2. These are divided between anthropological accounts e.g. H. Kuper, An African Aristocracy, (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1980) and A.J.B. Hughes, Land Tenure, Land Rights and Land Communities on Swazi Nation Land in Swaziland: A discussion of some interrelationships between the Traditional Tenurial system and problems of Agrarian Development, (Durban: Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, 1972); and those written within the discourse of historical materialism. These include Bonner, P. op.cit; J.S. Crush, The Struggle for Swazi Labour, 1890-1920, (D.Phil thesis, University of Sussex, 1978).

mode of production in Swaziland, and characterises it as a tributary mode of production(1). This, he argues, reveals several similarities to the mode of production found in the lineage societies studied by Meillassoux and Dupre and Rey(2). He also says that his conceptualisation of the tributary mode represents a conflation of two separate relations of production: 'those of primitive communities still in possession of land and those of the state that controls essential economic resources and and appropriates directly a portion of the labour and production from the communities it dominates(3).

What is surprising, though, is that having introduced the problematic of articulation, he then proceeds as if the mode of production which characterised pre-capitalist Swazi society, was in fact a 'pure' mode of production. This it would seem, limits an understanding of the way in which specific practices of the lineage or domestic mode of production(4) were transformed into conditions of existence of the tributary mode of production. It can also create the erroneous impression that all relations of production and labour processes were tributary. As we will go on to argue, this was certainly not the case.

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1. P. Bonner, 'Classes, Production and State in Pre-colonial Swaziland', in S. Marks and I.A. Atmore, (eds) Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa, (London: Longmans, 1980), p.82

2. C. Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); E. Dupre and P.P. Rey, 'Reflections on the Relevance of a theory of the history of Exchange' in D. Seddon, (ed.) Relations of Production (London: Frank Cass, 1980).

3. P. Bonner, op.cit. (1980), p.84.

4. C. Meillassoux, op.cit., uses the latter terminology in conceptualising lineage based society.

Within the domestic mode of production, the elders did not exercise control over the juniors in their lineages through co-ercion or control over the means of production which, in any case, were accessible to all. Rather, it was through matrimonial exchanges and control over the elite goods - cattle - for which brides were exchanged, that the elders came to dominate the reproduction of the lineage and thus production as a whole.

Amongst the Nguni aristocracies, the ruling clans were able to dominate the reproduction of the individual homestead : through their ability to redistribute homesteads to new areas; subdivide and allocate chiefdoms themselves; withdraw young men from domestic production and recruit them into the centralised age-regiments; organise work parties (umemo) for either the benefit of the aristocracy or the community as a whole; plan and arrange hunting parties; as well as through witchcraft accusations(1). With respect to the Swazi, the aristocracy was able to monopolise access to cattle, which meant an effective monopoly over a key branch of production. As the elite goods for which brides were exchanged, marriage patterns amongst the Swazi tended 'to effect an accumulation of wealth at the political centre, in particular in the hands of the aristocratic Dlamini clan'(2). Indeed, marriage strategy was tied to other objectives. The extensive polygyny of the King enabled him to extend his influence over the kingdom at two levels: (i) through marriage alliances, and (ii) by

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit. (1980) p.85.

2. P. Derman, "Stock and Aristocracy: The Political Implications of Swazi Marriage", African Studies, Vol.XXXVI, No.2, (1977), p.120.

sending some of his wives to reside in different parts of the kingdom, especially at strategic administrative centres(1). But for Bonner, most important of all was the control which the aristocracy exercised over the age-regiment system. This enabled the dominant Dlamini clan to displace young men and women from the domestic reproductive cycle for considerable periods of their lives. Indeed, he has argued that the age-regiment system:

> ...for Nguni conquest societies as a whole... represented the differentia specia of this particular tributary mode of production - the mechanism through which the dominant relations of production were reproduced over time(2).

The Swazi originate from the Bembo-Nguni group, which was led by a man called Dlamini who settled around the Tembe River (c.1550) near present day Maputo(3). But the Swazi nation as it is known today, is traceable to the Mfecane, where land and population pressure in conjunction with the desire to control trade to the North East of present day Natal and Southern Mozambique, sparked off the consolidation of a number of large chiefdoms(4). By about 1818, three large chiefdoms had emerged: Dingiswayo's Mthethwa, which ultimately formed the nucleus of Shaka's Zulu; Zwide's Ndwandwe; and Sobhuza I's

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1. Ibid.

2. P. Bonner, op.cit., (1980), p.86.

3. J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., p.5 ff.

4. See Bonner's discussion of the Mfecane (as it is known inZulu and Difaqane in Sotho), in P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), Chapters 2 and 3. See also S. Marks and A. Atmore, op.cit., (1983), Chapter 4.

Dlamini or Ngwane. Around this time, Sobhuza I was expelled from the banks of the Pongola river and was forced to move northwards into present day Swaziland where, through conquest of Nguni and Sotho clans, he began to form what was essentially a defensive kingdom. He secured a tenuous, uneasy truce with the belligerent Zwide, King of the Ndwandwe, through marriage to one of his daughters Thandile, who became Sobhuza's senior wife. This Ndwandwe alliance is important since the Swazi adopted a number of important practices from them, including the annual incwala[1] ceremony and the dual monarchy, involving a key role designated to the Queen Mother in the ruling aristocracy. This enduring willingness to incorporate exogenous social practices through synthesis, has proved to be a major cultural strength of the Swazi Nation, as well as a notable ingredient in the durability of Royal hegemony.

While Sobhuza I was able to secure protection from his hostile neighbours, particularly the Zulu to the south, and create an embryonic state, the task of building the Swazi Nation was left to the 'greatest of the Swazi fighting kings', Mswati, who consolidated the Swazi kingdom in the form which we are familiar with today. Initially, Mswati was faced with two problems: a succession dispute, and a menacing Zulu threat from the south. But with the princely rebellions overcome[2], and the Zulu divided into two factions contending for the throne of Mpande, Mswati was relatively secure to begin expanding

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1. The incwala or first fruits ceremony is discussed in greater detail below.

2. See P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), Chapter 4.

the territory which Sobhuza I had controlled. Through the abolition of circumcision and the establishment of a standing army with much emphasis on the age regiment system, the King was able to mobilise his regiments in a systematic fashion, facilitating not only further conquest, but also greater control by the centre of his kingdom over the periphery. The incwala ceremony was enriched and made more comprehensive so that ritual authority amongst subordinate clans was steadily dissolved. Royal princes of the Dlamini clan were dispersed into hitherto self-administering provinces and their positions strengthened through the cementing of marriage alliances. The siting of Royal villages at strategic points throughout the country completed the picture so that by the 1860's, 'some measure of national integration had begun to emerge'(1). This was, moreover, a two-way process, since young men from conquered chiefdoms could grow rich and famous through membership of the army and patronage from the King. Thus membership of the Swazi nation was in the interests of young men, because captives and captured cattle were made available not only to the aristocracy, but to ordinary military conscripts as well. With bridewealth obtainable through the regiments, fresh opportunities were created for the establishment of new homesteads without the intercession of local chiefs and elders. Thus the King's ritual authority which was essential for successful conquest, provided the rewards which established personal ties of loyalty between himself and his subjects.

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit. (1983), p.211.

These developments led to a major change in the organisation of Swazi society. The existing mode of co-operation gradually came into conflict with these new forms of social organisation, and consequently, the social reproductive process was steadily transformed:

> The tributary state was penetrating and rupturing the self-sufficiency of the homesteads setting up new cycles of production in which the organs of the state occupied a pivotal position. The new cycles of reproduction moreover...progressively regularis(ed) and legitimis(ed) the new status quo[1].

Before proceeding with the various implications which these transformations had for the processes of state and class formation in pre-capitalist Swaziland, let us first examine the various practices of production and the relations of production which characterised the tributary state.

Production in pre-colonial Swaziland

The two chief branches of production which can be discerned in pre-colonial Swaziland, are those of agriculture and pastoralism. Before the ascent of the tributary mode, these were orchestrated by lineage elders. In the case of agriculture, for example, the workforce which could correspond to the individual homestead needed to be managed and organised, as did the accumulation, storage and distribution of the product. This management function applied equally to the rearing of stock, which served both as a means of subsistence and store of wealth for the basic exchange transaction necessary for the reproducton of the lineage - marriage. Here, the relations of production established lifelong organic relations between community members, supporting an

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1. Ibid. Our brackets.

age-based hierarchical structure defining membership and the structure of management(1).

It was trade and population pressure which began to systematically change the relationship between individual homesteads and lineages. Control over the means of reproduction, cattle, was dominated by the elders, and juniors could only obtain access to bridewealth in exchange for labour services. But with the advent of trade, cattle could be exchanged against other items. This began to undermine the elders' position of dominance(2). So did the organisation of labour processes which were becoming necessary to both agriculture and pastoralism - hunting and burning. These were necessary to halt the on-going intrusion of wild game, which both destroyed crops, and carried fatal diseases for livestock. But large-scale hunting and burning labour processes could not be organised within the confines of lineage production. The consequence was the evolution of the chiefdom which emerged as 'the crystallisation of lineage society with the dominant lineage guaranteeing both the reproduction and production of subordinate lineages falling under its sway'(3).

It is here that a key distinction began to emerge: that between labour processes directed towards the reproduction of the household (necessary labour), and those directed towards the production of a

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1. C. Meillassoux, op.cit., p.42.
2. P. Bonner, op.cit., 1983, p.14.
3. Ibid.

surplus appropriated by the rulers of a particular chiefdom (surplus labour). It was land that facilitated the extraction of surplus labour by chiefs from their subjects. Land as the basis of economic production and reproduction came to be controlled and allocated both by the aristocracy as well as by local rulers in the subordinate chiefdoms. Hilda Kuper thus argues that: 'The power that they (i.e. the aristocrats and chiefs) wield over their subjects is usually referred back to the control they exercise over the distribution of land'(1).

It should be noted that land thus allocated does not infer property or ownership, but simply control over the land. Access to land was secured through clan membership, and through the allegiance which clan members owed to chiefs. With land constituting a necessary condition of agricultural production, the control which aristocrats and chiefs wielded over the land became a relation of production through which they asserted their dominance over their subjects. Hughes has explained tribute labour as follows:

> In each chiefdom there is usually a field known as the 'field of the great house' (insimi yendlunkulu). This strictly speaking is not the Chief's field, but belongs to the chieftaincy. It should be ploughed, planted, weeded and reaped by the whole chiefdom. Special tribute labour gatherings (imimemo) are called to perform each of these tasks(2).

In theory, the produce of the 'field of the great house' was supposed to be reserved for official visitors, and the chief was not supposed to summon (memeta) his subjects to work on any of his other fields, but just to invite them (kubancusa). In practice however, subjects were

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.149. Our brackets.

2. A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.108.

summoned to work in a number of the chief's fields, as well as to repair his cattle byre, and in certain cases to provide labour for any building work to be done in his own homestead(1).

Control over land allocation was not the only condition of production which established the dominance of chiefs and aristocrats:

> The aristocrats and their leading councillors are responsible for providing suitable conditions for successful effort rather than contributing their own labour. They arrange that ritual specialists treat the land, the seed, the growing fields; they regulate the times of the various stages of garden work; they summon men and women for communal work parties in district and national enterprises; and they supervise the feeding and entertainment of workers when a task is completed. The time taken up in these tasks inevitably leads to the aristocrats performing less manual work than their subjects, and some of the older princes allow their nails to grow long into talons to show that they need not exert themselves and can afford to supervise and talk.(2)

With the penetration and dominance of the tributary relation in the pre-capitalist Swazi formation, the individual homestead continued to constitute the basic unit of production in Swazi society. Yet it was not possible for this unit to perform productive and reproductive functions entirely on its own. The result was a reliance on communal work, a form of production and labour process not alien to the lineage or domestic mode of production. It is here that the question of the articulation of modes of production is raised. It is also where the sine qua non of the tributary relationship is revealed. Commoners could draw on help from their kinsmen and their neighbours,

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1. Ibid. p.109.
2. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.141.

aristocrats and chiefs from their subjects. Furthermore the king and the Queen mother could obtain labour from the whole nation and along with princes and chiefs, were empowered to summon workers both for themselves and for relatives. The distinction is crucial, for:

> Commoners may not demand assistance, they may cela (beg) or ncusa (call for) help; political authorites may memeta (shout) for it. A commoner holds a lilima (from kulima, to hoe), a chief holds an umemo (from ... Kumemeta to shout). A lilima is communal labour, an umemo is essentially tribute labour. A commoner cannot request for help from non-relatives living in other principalities without informing his chief; the chief controls the work of his subjects...(1).

The tributary relation thus secured for the rulers the extraction of surplus labour time from their subjects. The tributary state moreover, provided a further mechanism for the extraction of surplus labour time. A number of the more powerful Dlamini aristocrats and powerful clan chiefs such as the Mamba chief of the Southern Lowveld, had emabutfo or age-regiments permanently resident in their village to provide labour services. Several hundred or even thousand men were stationed permanently at various royal villages countrywide, while others provided periodic services to the king in military activity, building, agriculture, hunting and were also required to participate in rituals which endorsed the kingship(2). The strength of the relationship between local chiefs and the central authority, along with the changing nature both structurally and functionally of the age-regiments, determined the degree to which local appropriation of

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1. Ibid. Brackets in the original.
2. A.J.B. Hughes, p.109.

surplus labour would be over-ridden by the demands of the aristocracy(1).

This dominance which the chiefs and aristocrats exercised in the process of production articulated in a multiplicity of different ways with various economic, as well as ideological and political practices. Through the incwala ceremony for instance, the King regulated agricultural production and consumption by precluding the eating of the new season's fruits(2). It also served to bring the age-regiments together, and in this way, cemented the unity of the nation under the dominance of the King.

Class and State in Nineteenth Century Swaziland

The extension and rationalisation of Mswati's power and economic control over his subjects distinguishes what Bonner conceives of as the beginning of class society and the emergence of the state(3). But this poses the question as to whether classes were absent within the structures of lineage society. Although classes may be identified at the level of the mode of production(4), the actual formation of

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1. J.S. Crush, op.cit., p.16

2. B.A. Marwick, The Swazi, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p.180.

3. P. Bonner, op.cit., 1980, p.91.

4. Throughout Marxist literature, classes are defined in terms of the agent's insertion into a determinate system of relations of production. The problem arises where class position is dissolved into the political and social forces which operate in various societies. This leads to economism and class reductionism. E. Laclau, op.cit., (1977), and C. Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", in C. Mouffe (ed), Gramsci and Marxist Theory, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), both identify classes at the level of mode of production as antagonistic poles.

classes has varied widely according to particular societies and their level of historical development(1). Indeed as Jewsiewicki has argued, the formation of classes does not necessarily imply the division of society into antagonistic poles(2). Lineage society was characterised by a multiplicity of points of conflict and antagonism, which were both class and non-class in character. Insofar as no relation of exploitation existed between the elders and the juniors, theirs was not a class relationship. Rather it was a relation of authority. But the case of women between puberty and menopause was somewhat different: they were effectively subject to two different kinds of exploitation(3). Their produce was appropriated by their husbands who either controlled it or handed it over to the elder. Furthermore, their reproductive capacities were exploited since filiation was established through men. Meillassoux notes that:

> The subordination of women's reproductive capacities to men, the fact that they (were) dispossessed of their children to the benefit of men, their inability to create descent relations, (went) along with women's inability to acquire a status based on the relations of production.(4).

As Terray has argued, as long as there is extortion - the 'forced levy and appropriation of surplus labour by others', irrespective of the aims of this, then exploitation exists(5). In Swaziland, this form of

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1. B. Jewsiewicki, "Lineage Mode of Production: Social Inequalities in Equatorial Central Africa", in D. Crummey and C.C. Stewart (eds.), Modes of Production: The Pre-colonial era, (London: Sage, 1981), p.94.

2. Ibid.

3. Meillassoux, op.cit., pp.75-78.

4. Ibid., p.77 (Emphasis in the original; our brackets).

5. E. Terray, "Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman', in M. Bloch, (ed.) Marxist Analysis and Social Anthropology, (London: Malaby Press, 1975), p.95.

exploitation of pubescent women by men has been perpetuated up to the present. Under the tribituary mode, men could be exploited by chiefs and aristocrats, but within the homestead, the exploitation of women persisted. The result was a complex combination of exploitation within the sphere of agricultural production for subsistence needs, and the extraction of a socially necessary surplus by chiefs and aristocrats through the exploitation of their subjects' labour.

Within lineage society, the fragmentation of communities, and the interdependence of class and social forces, greatly limited the threat and dimension of class and social struggle. But with the establishment by Sobhuza I and Mswati of a degree of national integration, class and social conflict began to extend beyond the limits of local communities. These articulations witnessed the elaboration of a centralised state apparatus and the mechanisms through which the dominant classes were able to reproduce their domination. Tributary society thus saw the evolution of a dominant alliance of chiefs and aristocrats who presided over a community of commoners comprising ranked segments of wives and their children. It should be stressed however, that the dominant class forces were constituted by an alliance, and that alliances are characterised by attempts to fuse a whole variety of particular interests. Often, the latter takes precedence over the general interests, leading to a strained and uneasy alliance. In Swaziland, the case of the Mamba clan springs to mind. To this day, they have their own incwala ceremony, independent of the celebrations at the Royal Kraal at Lobamba.

This raises the question of how the dominant classes were able to reproduce their dominance. The answer is to be sought in the control which they exercised over wives and cattle. This was achieved inter alia though control over highly productive pasturage combinations, variable bridewealth amounts and preferential marriage patterns, all of which restricted the accumulation of cattle to the dominant classes(1). It was marriage arrangements most of all, however, which tended to restrict cattle and other wealth to the dominant classes and to prevent surplus from filtering down to the groups from which it had originally been drained. For one thing, marriage was the primary means through which homestead heads could consolidate the labour force which could facilitate the production of crop surpluses, as well as satisfy the general requirements of the Swazi economy(2). Marriage strategies were thus devised as a means of accumulating and concentrating wealth. Marrying a female cross-cousin from one's father's mother's clan, consolidated an alliance made by one's grandfather; as did marriage to a mother's brother's daughter recreate the alliance with one's daughter(3). Moreover, marriage to female aristocrats invoked magnified demands of cattle, while aristocrats were not liable to such constraints, and were at liberty to take unlimited numbers of wives without corresponding demands being made upon them. Thus whereas every man could claim rights to land, no similar claims could be made to cattle. The consequence was that 'the distribution of livestock further illustrates the correlation of rank

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit., 1980, p.92.
2. P. Derman, op.cit., p.126.
3. Ibid. pp.124-126; Bonner, op.cit., 1980, p.93.

and economic priviledge.'(1)

Cattle as the keynote of wealth were overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the dominant classes. While ownership of cattle was not itself constitutive of class, it was an important condition of existence of class relationships. Jeff Guy in his discussion of the Zulu, conceives of cattle as 'a self-reproducing store of labour-power'(2). Ownership and accumulation of cattle were not only an index of political power, but also of material power, for in increasing his number of wives, the large cattle owner was able to augment the size of his lineage, homestead and number of producers. By restricting the notion of 'surplus' to the tributary relation between aristocrats or chiefs and their subjects, Fransman underestimates the role of marriage and cattle in the reproduction of the dominant classes in Swaziland(3). The exchange of surplus from the spheres of reproduction and production - daughters and cattle respectively - thus became a significant agency of class formation, yet one which was arrested and controlled through the ideology of kingship.(4)

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.150.

2. J. Guy, "Ecological Factors in the Rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom", in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds), op.cit., p.114.

3. M. Fransman, op.cit., especially pp.20-32. The problem seems to stem from Fransman's methodology, through which he tends to refer all analyses of events and development of concepts, to the logic of a single relation - the relations of production. This methodological problem detracts from what is otherwise an extremely valuable contribution to the research effort on Swaziland.

4. The idea comes from B. Jeswiewicki, op.cit., who demonstrates how in lineage society, kinship 'expressed and gave a "natural" form to the ideology of the relations of production and reproduction'. (p.95)

One important question which emerges from this discussion is whether or not the concentration of land and cattle in the hands of the dominant class alliance signifies the beginnings of the process of primitive accummulation. In the Kenyan case, which reveals a certain degree of similarity to the Swazi, Leys following Cowen has argued that it does[1]. But in the case of the Swazi, the time lapse between the consolidation of Mswati's state and capital penetration of Swazi society is so short, that the attempt to reach a definitive answer to the question beyond the affirmation that it signified the beginnings of the process, faces the danger of degenerating into speculation. If the development of Mswati's kingdom heralded the beginnings of primitive accumulation by the dominant class alliance in Swaziland, then the process was interrupted and transformed by capital penetration of the area. Before proceeding directly to the latter, it is necessary to discuss the role of ideology, as well as to elaborate on the institutions of state which evolved during Mswati's reign.

State and Ideology in pre-colonial Swaziland: the Foundations Stone of Royal Hegemony

A major guiding thread of our analysis is the enduring quality of indigenous ideology, which has facilitated the transformation of Royal hegemony over a variety of historical conjunctures. In fact, one of our principal conclusions is that the trajectory of Swazi development

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1. C. Leys, "Capital Accumulation, Class formation and dependency - The significance of the Kenyan case", Socialist Register, (London: Merlin, 1978), pp.247-8.

cannot be understood without recourse to a discussion of ideology. Reductionist analyses would tend to privilege the relations of production of the unique point of reference for the unravelling of historical transformations, the chief agency of social change, and the structuring of mechanism of Swazi politics. But such approaches would surely fail to explain the pervasiveness of the Swazi monarchy. And unless this is rigorously understood Swaziland will remain an obscurity on the Southern African horizon.

During Mswati's reign, ownership of resources such as land and cattle was fetishised and accounted for as being 'held in trust' by the King for the nation. This is important, for the notion of wealth being 'held in trust' by the aristocracy and chiefs, as an ideological concept, has been carried through into Swazi society under the dominance of capital. Indeed, the penetration of the tributary mode of production did not necessarily imply a rupture of the ideological practices and processes of lineage society. Customs and traditions often proved more durable than the processes of production and their corresponding relations. Certainly many of the ideological forms that have persisted to the present day are the residue of an experience typical of lineage society. These would include the concept of the King as the 'father of the nation', the 'herder of the people', and sanctions by the elders of the nation, who in the present conjuncture at least, are an ill-defined amorphous group. Hence a Swazi could say 'a King is a King by his

people'; or 'a King is ruled by his people'(1). In sum, the process of articulation prior to colonisation produced an extension of fidelity to the father of the lineage, with all its intensity, to the father of the nation. Here we see the interaction between the negative and positive concepts of ideology, the complex articulation between ideological inversion and the formation of social and popular identity. While individuals could see themselves as the autonomous principles in their relations with the dominant class, this was contradicted by material reality.

Hilda Kuper has noted that to say that the king and his mother are the wealthiest cattle owners in Swaziland gives a false impression. It is more appropriate to state that the cattle of kingship, the cattle of the

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1. These examples of the ideological interpellation of the King are drawn from H. Kuper, op.cit., p.149 and J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., p.11. Matsebula gives an interesting example from the colonial period which serves powerfully in demonstrating the close identy between the 'private' and 'public' spheres of pre-capitalist Swazi life. Following the death of an important indvuna (headman), the colonizers held an enquiry which centred on the king who as head of the nation was held responsible: Swazi witnesses were questioned:

QUESTIONER: Where is B (name of deceased man)?

SWAZI: He is dead

QUESTIONER: Who killed him?

SWAZI: Sive (Nation)

QUESTIONER: Who is the Nation?

SWAZI: Bakangwane (People of KaNgwane (Swaziland)

QUESTIONER: Who are the BakaNgwane?

SWAZI: The Swazis.

QUESTIONER: I want to know the name of the person who killed B.

SWAZI: I have told you all. It is the nation. That's all." (p.12)

nation, exceed those of any individual.(1)

In effect, however, the king and his relatives were free to dispose of these cattle at whim in the cementing of marriage alliances without the interference of their subjects on behalf of whom the cattle were 'held in trust'. Similarly, during the reign of King Mbandzeni who formally acceeded to the throne in 1881, he was able to pawn out the resources of his country through concessions, without consultation with his subjects. In actual fact, as Bonner has argued, Mbandzeni, by granting sweeping grazing and mineral concessions throughout the country was in reality attempting to 'loosen his councillors and ex-regent's suffocating embrace.(2)

Nonetheless, the ideology of collective ownership was important, and revealed the integration of the individual into the community. This close identification between the public and the private realms was perhaps best illustrated in the incwala ceremony which aimed to reflect the totality of Swazi life. Here, political, ideological and economic discourse merged: the particular and the universal were united along with the individual and the community. This ritual institution of the state demonstrated the identification between political and civil society in Swaziland.

> ...the incwala is first and foremost a ceremony which as the Swazi say, aims at 'strengthening kingship', at 'showing kingship', 'to make stand the nation'. It is not the specific economic, ritual, or political powers of the

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.151.

2. P. Bonner, op.cit., pp.213.

> King that are emphasized, but the sum total of kingship... Sociologically, it serves as the graph of traditional status on which, mapped by ritual are the roles of the king, his mother, the princes, councillors, priests, chiefs, queens, princesses, commoners, old and young...(1)

Participation in this ritual, this paegent of Swazi history and society was open to anyone present, in fact anyone present was supposed to participate in the ceremony which encapsulated the full diversity of social relations in Swazi society.

In contrast to other Nguni societies, political power did not reside solely in the hands of the King (Ingwenyama), but following the Ndwandwe influence, the Queen Mother (Indlovukati) came to occupy a central position of power and influence in Swazi society, ostensibly to off-set the autocratic power of the King. The result was a balance of power between the two vis à vis economic, political, legal and ritual (i.e. ideological) authority. Thus for instance, the King controlled the whole army but the commander-in-chief resided at the Queen Mother's village; he had private regiments stationed at his home, while she had them stationed at the capital under the control of the princes. Similarly, although the Queen Mother was the custodian of the objects sacred to the nation, these were not effective without the King's co-operation in their manipulation. The King might draw cattle from the Royal herds; but the Queen Mother could rebuke him if national wealth was wasted.(2)

We have already noted how Mswati consolidated power in the centre of

1. H. Kuper, op.cit., pp.223-225.
2. Ibid., p.55.

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2. Ibid., p.55.

the kingdom through his dispersion of princes throughout the provinces to oversee the activities of the local chiefs and indvuna (councillors). The power of the princes, who as potential contenders to the crown could thus threaten the King's position, was counterbalanced by tinsila, two officials chosen from the non-royal clans with administrative authority equal to that of the senior princes, as well as the royal village. In administering the national affairs, however, the dual power enjoyed by the King and Queen Mother was off-set by two councils: the Liqoqo and Libandla. Along with the age-regiments and the incwala ceremony, these two bodies constituted key institutions of the emergent Swazi state. Yet as a Memorandum produced by the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) in the run up to independence pointed out, the unwritten nature of the pre-capitalist constitution, meant that it was subject to interpretation 'in any way by anyone with a personal or sectional interest to serve'(1).

The Liqoqo could be viewed as an executive authority, whose members were appointed by the King. As the inner council of the King, it was composed of members of the Malangeni, the ruling Dlamini clan, as well as principal headmen. Its membership was unlimited, but the chairman was always a senior member of the royal clan, or in the case of the absence of all such people in a particular meeting, a senior indvuna. Commoners were generally involved with the Liqoqo, and as Kuper has noted, were on the whole unaware of the composition of its

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1. Memorandum on the Report of the Constitutional Committee concerned with Swaziland. Produced by the Swaziland Progressive Party, in Written Comments by Members of the Public on the Constitutional proposals, (Swaziland Government, July 1962), p.90.

membership and of each member's special qualities.(1)

The Libandla or National Council was a much larger body and probably constituted the most democratic facet of the emergent Swazi state. It was chaired by the chairman of the Liqoqo, and its meetings were attended by the King and Queen Mother, all chiefs, princes, headmen and all male adult Swazis who wished to attend. There was no limit to the number permitted to attend, and anyone present was free to participate in discussion. Although Kuper has claimed that its sanction was required on all important matters, the SPP's memorandum undermines its importance by claiming that:

> (The Libandla's) ... form is unregulated and not subject to strict control in its membership day by day. There can be no formation of concerted opinion in these councils because at meetings the people making up the council may be different from those who attended the meeting before.(2)

The Libandla rarely met more than once a year at a national level. These central structures were, however, mirrored at a local level. Here the principal organs were the lusendvo or family council corresponding to the Liqoqo, and local Libandla's. The chief would have to confer with these councils on various aspects of local importance such as the acceptance of newcomers to an area and the implementation and legislation of new customary laws. The importance of this account of the concrete operation of indigenous ideology and politics in Swaziland will be revealed when we discuss the manner in which these practices have been transformed as an effect of

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1. For Kuper's discussion of the 'Libandla' and 'Liqoqo', see H. Kuper, op.cit., pp.63ff.

2. op.cit., p.91.

capital penetration in the region.

Capital penetration of Swaziland

During the reign of King Mswati (1840-68), increasing numbers of European settlers from Natal and Transvaal began to seek winter grazing rights from the Swazi King. The process was intensified during the time of his successor, Ludvonga's minority, as traders and missionaries joined the herders in their efforts to establish a foothold in Swaziland. By the time King Mbandzeni (1875-89) assumed the throne, he did so within the context of a greatly changed Southern Africa. While Mswati's chief concerns were the Zulu to the south, the quasi feudal Portuguese settlements to the east, and the Boers to the west, this had all changed by the time Mbandzeni was crowned. The discovery of significant mineral deposits beginning with diamonds in the late 1860's in South Africa,(1) meant that Mbandzeni was faced with imperialist Britain (who had dealt a crushing defeat to the Zulu in 1879),(2) along with all the hunters, traders and adventurers that mineral discoveries imply.

The discovery of huge gold deposits in the Transvaal, particularly on the Witwatersrand, but also in the Eastern Transvaal border areas of Swaziland, led inevitably to capital penetration of the country. Within Swaziland, the gold prospecting successes of various settlers,

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1. See S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa, (London: Longman, 1982).

2. J. Guy, "The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu Society", in Ibid.

particularly Messrs. McLachlan, Forbes and Carter began to attract increasing public attention. With the opening of gold fields at Barberton and De Kaap, towns began to appear on Swaziland's North-Western Borders. Prospectors came flocking into the country and despite early attempts to restrict their entry, eventually they were allowed in increasing numbers. Joined by a further surge of farmers and herders attracted by Swaziland's fertile soils and rich pastures, the Royal Kraal was inundated with petitions for land and mineral concessions. The result was that:

> Between 1885 and 1889, the whole country was concessioned away, the simpler rights being followed by absolutely ridiculous monopolies for ludicrous industrial enterprises such for instance as theatres and pawnshops, the inventions of a shoal of speculative concession seekers.(1)

Aware of the impending dangers of overlapping concessions, the mining companies attempted in 1886 to bring in a British Resident. This attempt failed, and as Allister Miller, who later became an adviser to Mbandzeni said, 'the wild orgie of the concession boom followed'(2). Whereas early Swazi diplomacy had succeeded in playing off rival interest groups against each other, the vast numbers of the concessionaires with their own techniques of divisions and manipulation proved disasterous for the Swazi, as hostile factions of the concession hunters in their turn played on the rivalry of members of the Royal Council. In consequence, 'The likes of the King's advisor, Offy Shepstone, turned out as grasping and as self-seeking as their

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1. A.M. Miller, Swaziland: The California of South Africa, (Mbabane: Swaziland Mining, Commercial and Industrial Chamber, 1907), pp. 17-18.

2. Ibid.

more self-avowedly mercenary fellows, and parcelled out rights over every conceivable resource.'(1). These concessionaires were prepared to pay the Swazi aristocracy in return for access to mineral resources as well as trading and production rights. By the end of the 1880's, the King's annual income from rents, transfer dues and obligations from concessionaires was estimated by Kuper to range from between £15,000 to £20,000(2). While the Europeans were satisfied with the rights which this money secured them, the dominant class of Swaziland saw it as a tribute to their King(3). As capital increasingly penetrated the pre-capitalist mode of production in Swaziland, steadily eroding its capacity to reproduce itself, the Government of the South African Republic (S.A.R.), still anxious to secure a route through Swaziland to the sea, cast its greedy eyes towards the 'concession orgie'. Accordingly it obtained concessions which granted to it the sole right to levy customs and licenses, to construct telegraphs and railways, and to supervise and control postal and survey services(4). With the decision of Eckstein and Porges mining house to advance £30,000 on behalf of the Transvaal (SAR), they were able to secure the 'Private Revenue Concession'. This gave them the right to collect all private

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), p.223.

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.25.

3. In this connection it should be noted that through the customs of kukhonta, it is possible for any individual to pay tribute to a chief who can then grant land rights to the individual. The individual may then settle in the chiefdom and make available his surplus labour to the chief. Paying tribute does not however necessarily imply a monetary transaction. Rather it refers to the paying of allegiance. As Kuper has put it: 'Kukhonta is a type of vassalage, involving legal and economic obligations on both parties' (p.67).

4. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories: (Part v) The High Commission Territories : Basutoland, The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. (London: HMSO, 1953), p.362.

revenue of the 'Paramount Chief' - King Mbandzeni derived from rentals on concessions and their duties and transfer. In return for these powers of 'state attorney', the King was paid an annual sum of £12,000 out of the amounts collected. This concession 'effectively mortgaged in Swazi independence to the magnates and the S.A.R., leaving Swaziland effectively ungovernable by any other power. Twist and turn as they might, the Swazi could no longer evade some measure of Republican control.'(1). This unfortunate episode contributed to the regional subordination and dependence which has plagued Swaziland to the present day.

One question which arises is: what affect did this penetration have on the mass of the Swazi population? In its initial phases of expansion, merchant capital integrated the rurally based indigenous inhabitants of Swaziland into the circuit of capital through a process whereby the production processes and relations of production of pre-capitalist Swaziland remained intact. Through the latter half of the nineteenth century, labour mobilisation within the individual homestead remained under the firm control of the elders. With the exception of drought years, Swaziland was a surplus grain producer, although there is no way of measuring just how substantial these surpluses were(2). Maize was introduced in Swaziland around 1850, and according to Allister Miller, in the late 1880's and early 1890's:

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit., 1983, p.223.

2. A.R. Booth, "'The Homestead', The State, and Migrant labour in Twentieth Century Swaziland", Paper for presentation at The African Studies Association Convention, Boston, Massachusets, (10 December, 1983), p.7.

> Swaziland was an exporter of maize. Traders in central and southern Swaziland bought thousands of bags from the Natives - multicoloured maize which was sent to Lourenco Marques and the Transvaal...or sold to the gold mines then operating along the western border.(1)

After the first plough was introduced in central Swaziland in 1890, all homesteads which could muster a few head of surplus cattle, bartered them for a plough(2). A key to successful maize production during this period was the practice of shifting agriculture which was a characteristic of both lineage and tributary production. The pre-capitalist form of land ownership, with usufruct granted to individuals by chiefs, as outlined above, was of great importance to the reproduction and continued success of shifting agriculture.

With the mineral discoveries and especially the large-scale extraction of gold on the Witwatersrand in the late nineteenth century, the dominance of merchants capital in South Africa was rapidly displaced by mining capital in particular, and to a lesser extent by agricultural capital. Mining capital remained dominant until the 1920's, when it was gradually displaced by manufacturing and the rise of South African industry(3). Particularly important for the mushrooming mining and agricultural sectors, was the increasing demand for inputs of labour-power. In the case of the gold mines on the Rand, the low gold content of the ore, precipitated the need for massive applications

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1. Times of Swaziland, 26 February 1942.

2. Times of Swaziland, 14 May 1942.

3. See M. Legassick, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence", in Economy and Society, Vol III, No.3., (1974); and S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), op.cit., "Introduction".

of labour and technology to extract the precious mineral(1). Labour was not only to be abundant, but also cheap and was drawn from local pre-capitalist societies which, as in the case of the Swazi, were largely self-sustaining communities characterised by land allòcation through chiefs who appropriated surplus labour from their subjects through a system of tribute labour. In conjunction with the mine owners, the Boer states and imperialist Britain launched an all-out onslaught on the nascent South African peasantry(2).

But Swaziland became embroiled in a wider Boer-British struggle for hegemony in the gold-bearing Witwatersrand as President Kruger of the S.A.R., anxious to establish an independent outlet to the sea, cast greedy eyes towards the rolling green pastures and the potential mineral wealth of Swaziland. As Rhodes conjured up a vision of a new Rand north of the Limpopo River, and a British-dominated Africa from the Cape to Cairo, the Werner Beit Goldfields and De Beer mining houses pooled their resources to realise this dream: 'Like boardroom Salisburys they drew their lines across the map of Southern Africa, awarding Zambezia to the magnates and Swaziland to the Boers.'(3)

Even the nascent white settler bourgeoisie comprising the independant concessionaries and adventurers found themselves out in the cold as

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1. P. Richardson and J.J. Van-Helten,, "Labour in the South African gold mining industry, 1886-1914", in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), op.cit.

2. Ibid., "Introduction".

3. P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), p.223.

the Boers and British jockeyed for power in a Swaziland now torn apart by a succession crisis following the death of Mbandzeni in 1889. Concessionaire conflict provided the Boers with the excuse for sending in a commission to secure Transvaal claims as the British dashed in to supervise South African Republican action. A triumvirate consisting of the S.A.R., British commissioners and the insidious Offy Shepstone as 'representative' of the Swazi nation, in a series of 'Anglo-Boer Swaziland Conventions' pawned away Swazi independence. By the Third Swaziland Convention of December 1894, Swaziland found itself under the control of a Boer administration as a protectorate of the S.A.R. According to this convention, the Swazi aristocracy would retain political power over their subjects, and were entitled to maintain their indigenous institutions so long as these were consistent with 'civilised practices'(1). It was also agreed that taxation in Swaziland would be deferred for three years, after which the tax rate would not exceed that paid by Africans within the S.A.R. While the social relations of pre-capitalist Swazi society enabled the aristocracy and chiefs to maintain control over their subjects, they greatly resented the overall subordination of their political power to the S.A.R. and British imperialism. The Swazi had few illusions about the imposition of Boer rule:

> (The Boers will) never submit to being considered as beneath us - they will not regard us as their landlords and themselves merely tenants. They will domineer over us; will compel our subjects all over the country to go and work on their respective farms(2).

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit. p.51.

2. "Letter from J. Stuart to Col. Martin", (21 April, 1894), dealing with a meeting held between colonial officials and the Queen Regent and Council. Swaziland National Archives (henceforth S.N.A.), file No.S 13 F.)

The loss by the Swazi of their independence was exacerbated by a series of environmental disasters which befell the Swazi in the 1890's. Accordingly, Swazi producers were confronted with the twin blows of drought and locusts in 1894-5. This was followed in 1896 by late spring rains and a repetition of the locust disaster. The failure of the maize crop in 1895-6, and the incapacity for the Swazi to feed themselves on sorghum, meant that they were forced to purchase sacks of maize for up to 38/-, 'a catastrophic price not equalled again until the post-influenza, malarial, and famine years of 1919-1920, and not consistently matched until the late 1960's'(1). In the wake of these disasters further problems set in, as malaria struck a weakened population. But worst of all were the cattle diseases which raged throughout Southern Africa in the mid-1890's. Rinderpest spread in 1894, having been brought in by Boer transport oxen from the Transvaal, in contravention of the government quarantine. Combined in its effect with the outbreak of East Coast Fever in 1902, the Swazi saw the national herd which had numbered approximately 300,000 before 1894, reduced to under 40,000 by 1904(2).

It was against this background of physical calamity that the Kruger state decided to alleviate the labour shortages on the Rand's mines, by levying the first tax on Swazis, in 1898. Hut and poll taxes were introduced by Johannes Krogh, a SAR special commissioner who took

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1. A.R. Booth, op.cit., p.10

2. Ibid.

charge of Swaziland and imposed an amount of £2 on every male and 10 shillings on each hut(1). While this action served to free labour from the indigenous mode of production, few opportunities existed for local employment. The result was that thousands of Swazi attempted to evade payment in 1899, and crossed over into the SAR in search of work in the Belfast collieries and De Kaap gold mines.

With the defeat of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, Swaziland found itself in the hands of Britain on the grounds that Swaziland was a protectorate of the defeated South African Republic. Following the issuing of the Swaziland Order-in-Council of June 25 1903, this control was formalised. An urgent solution to the nagging land question was high on the new administration's agenda. Settler capital required that legal property rights be conferred on their land as a precondition for capitalist production, while the Swazi aristocracy on the other hand was anxious to have Mbandzeni's concessions nullified. On the ground, the situation was chaotic. In the words of the 'Annual Report of Swaziland' for 1907-8:

> Practically the whole area of the country was covered two, three or even four deep by concessions of all sizes, for different purposes, and for greatly varying periods. In but very few cases were even the boundaries defined; many of the areas had been sub-divided and sold several times, and seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas even co-terminous. In addition to this, concessions were granted for all lands and minerals previously unallotted or which having been allotted, might lapse or become forfeited. Finally, it must be remembered, that over these three or four strata of conflicting interests, boundaries and periods, there had to be preserved the natural rights of the natives to live, move, cultivate, graze and hunt.(2)

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1. N. Parsons, A New History of Southern Africa, (London; McMillan, 1982), P.176.

2. Annual Report of Swaziland for 1907-8, (Mbabane, 1908), pp.11-13.

In the face of protest by the Swazi leadership, the British authorities issued and executed Proclamation No. 3, in 1904, which gave notice of the Governor's intention to delimit land for sole occupation by the Swazi(1). The chief principle of land delimitation, was to be the division of the country into mutually exclusive European and Swazi areas. This was to be achieved through the securing of freehold tenure for Europeans on a portion of concessionary land in exchange for surrender of the remainder. Spearheaded by Queen Regent Labotsibeni, the Swazi leadership was totally opposed to this principle, and petitioned the High Commissioner in December, 1904. They proposed that concessions be invalidated where the concessions 'depended on a yearly or other rental' which had not been paid, but conceded that concessions not be tampered with, 'where a specified sum has been given as a consideration for Concessions'(2).

The British were unyielding however, and in his reply to the petition, Lord Milner bluntly told the Swazi leaders that the concessionaries had very firm rights to the land. The commission, he stated, was aimed at preventing conflict between settlers and the Swazi and to 'ensure to the Swazis absolute and undisputed ownership of an ample amount of land'(3). It was the definition of what constituted 'an ample amount of land' that characterised the various proposals considered by the

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.57.

2. "Petition by Labotsibeni and Royal Councillors to Sir Alfred Milner", 30 December, 1904, S.N.A., J 18 / 1905

3. "Milner to Resident Magistrate, Swaziland", 30 January, 1905. S.N.A., J L" / 1905; also see M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.58-9.

commmission. At the one extreme were the settlers themselves, who under the energetic leadership of Allister Miller, through the Executive Council of the Swaziland Mining, Commercial and Industrial Chamber, proposed that each land grant reserve an area for Swazi settlement. Such an area was not to exceed a quarter of each 6,000 acres of land. Nevertheless, the council did recognise the importance of co-opting the Swazi leadership and recommended that 20 farms of 6,000 acres each be set aside for the King and important chiefs of the Kingdom(1).

At the other end of the spectrum was a scheme proposed by the Queen Regent and which, not surprisingly, came in for bitter attack from the settlers. Here it was suggested that one third of the country be transferred to the Transvaal for settler occupation, in return for an annual rent of £4,000, with the remaining two thirds reserved for the Swazi(2).

Ultimately, it was under the incoming British administrator, Robert Thorne Coryndon, fresh from establishing white settlement in North-West Rhodesia that a settlement was made. High Commissioner's Proclamation no. 8 of 1907, confirmed the rights of concessionary miners, except in areas where these coincided with Swazi burial

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit.

2. J.S. Crush, "The Genesis of Colonial Land Policy in Swaziland", South African Geographical Journal, Vol.62, No.1, (1980), p.84. Crush refers here to a report in the Times of Swaziland 18 May, 1907, although as he points out, Labotsibeni denied having made the suggestion. Nevertheless the Swazi repeated the suggestion in London in December, 1907.

grounds, Royal kraals and other consecrated areas. The settlement was to the decided advantage of land concessionaries who relinquished third of their concessions to the Swazi in return for freehold title to the two thirds which remained(1). This rather cynical settlement sent off a Swazi delegation to London with a petition, led by Prince Malunge and Josiah Vilakazi. Their protests fell on deaf ears, however, and Secretary of State Lord Elgin dispassionately informed them that they would be deceiving themselves if they believed that their deputation would do anything to alter the land partition.

The task of actually affecting the land partition was left to George Grey who was appointed as a Special Commissioner. The Queen Regent, the aristocracy and most Swazi chiefs offered passive resistance, and refused to co-operate with Grey by failing to present information crucial to the actual demarcation of boundaries. Despite this silent protest by the dominating class of the Swazi, Grey endeavoured to delimit the land in a manner that would leave the important aristocrat and chiefs' kraals unaffected. This did not imply that Grey had not given primacy to settler interests in drawing the concession boundaries:

> I have given especial consideration to the wishes of all Concessionairies occupying their land; I have visited every resident owner or held meetings in the neighbourhood which all residents were invited to attend. In almost every instance, I believe, I have framed partition to suit the views of resident Concessionaires and have been able to avoid including

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1. Ibid., p.85
M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.60-63
C.P. Youe, 'Imperial land Policy in Swaziland and the Swazi response' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.VII No.1 (1978) 7, pp.60-63.


> their homesteads or any land they cultivate in the native area.(1)

By the time Grey had finished his work, the Swazi were left with 37 per cent of the total land area of the country, approximately 2,420 square miles out of a total area of 6,553 square miles. This land was divided among over thirty scattered areas and a mere 58 per cent of the population were eventually included in these reserve areas. (See Map 1) The Swazi who remained on settler-held land were given a period of five years grace, dating from the 1st July, 1909, after which they were supposed to move to the reserve areas which were designed to accommodate a 52 per cent population increase, calculated on the basis of existing methods of production(2). Despite Grey's claims that the Swazis had been allocated the most fertile portion of the country, other sources have argued that the demarcations illlustrated clearly that the Swazi had in fact lost about 60 per cent of the fertile land, especially along the main roads, making the marketing of petty produce remarkably difficult(3). Proclamation no.24 of 1913, established the requisite machinery for the removal of the Swazis from settler land following the expiry of the five-year period(4), and although many Swazi preferred to remain on settler land as squatters,

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1. "Grey to Lord Selborne", (7 December, 1908), S.N.A., D O 9/2.
2. Ibid.
3. N. Parsons op.cit., p.222.
4. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.63.

Map 2 THE 1907 LAND PARTITION



exodus from the land proceeded and was completed by November, 1914(1).

A number of clear patterns emerged from the historical processes outlined above. Capital penetration in Southern Africa did not lead to the total destruction of indigenous communities, but to their articulation with the capitalist mode of production(2). While the development of capitalist forces of production resulted in the proletarianisation of local African communities, this process was on the whole partial, and took the form of labour migrancy. The consequence was that the wage labourer was not completely separated from the means of production(3). In the case of Swazi society, two distinct mechanisms were deployed in effecting this partial separation. The one was taxation, which had the objective of forcing labour power out of the household reproductive cycle and on to the mines of the Eastern Transvaal and the Witwatersrand. But the record of Mbandzeni's concessions allowed for the deployment of a further strategy: the enforced expropriation of Swazi land which was handed over to European settlers. One effect of this was a considerable

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1. C.P. Youe, op.cit. p.62. Nevertheless, many Swazi preferred to stay on as squatters on concessionaire land 'on terms to be agreed upon between themselves and the concessionaires'. These agreements were then subject to ratification by the Resident Commissioner. See for example Colonial Report: Swaziland 1954 p.53 (for the above quote), J.C.D. Lawrence Report on Squatters on Farms in Swaziland. (Mbabane: mimeo 1964).

2. B. Munslow and H. Finch (eds.), Proletarianisation in the Third World, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), "Introduction", p.5.

3. Ibid.; S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), op.cit.; R. Cohen, "Workers in Developing Societies", in H. Alavi and T. Shanin (eds.), Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies", (London:Macmillan, 1982).

reduction of land available for cultivation. This served to undermine indigenous modes of shifting agriculture, and ultimately led to the Swazi being unable to grow sufficient crops to meet taxation requirements and still survive. In consequence, community members were forced to migrate and sell their labour power. As early as 1908, Assistant Commissioner B. Nicholson of Hlatikhulu wrote that:

> The natives are becoming more and more dependent on the wages they earn at labour centres for the support of their families, and the ease with which they earn sufficient to support them for the year in some measure accounts for the small amount of land cultivated by them. Personally I have never seen a really good crop of corn in the country since I arrived in 1902(1).

Yet up until this point, many Swazi who entered the capitalist labour market did so in order to obtain cash for food and bridewealth purchase, necessitated by poor harvests and an epidemic of East Coast fever respectively. Only in late 1907, was colonial coercion effective in forcing large numbers of Swazi to work, after having restructured its tax collecting apparatus and having initiated a campaign of prosecution of tax offenders(2). This coincided with efforts by the indigenous ruling alliance to mobilise labour in order to raise funds to challenge colonial land policy(3). This served to speed-up labour migration, as chiefs urged their subjects to leave the land in search of

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1. B. Nicholson, Report of the Assistant Commisioner of Hlatikhulu 1907/8, Commissioner, (April, 1908)

2. J.S. Crush "Staying Alive: Swazi Migrant Workers and the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 1880-1920", Journal of Historical Geography, forthcoming (1986).

3. Ibid.

work, in order to exact compulsory monetary levies on them. The combined pressures of the colonial state and the Swazi ruling class thus led to a surge of migration: the number of Swazi workers in the labour districts increased from 1,726 to 3,743 between the beginning and the end of 1907, while on the Rand mines, the corresponding increase was from 718 to 2,221(1). This heralded the beginning of an enduring relationship between Swaziland and South Africa: Swaziland increasingly became a supplier of cheap labour-power for South African mining and agricultural capital, although of the total mine and agricultural labour forces, Swaziland was relatively insignificant. The Swazi labour reserve was more of an accessible, controllable 'top-up' source of labour-power. Perhaps more important in the context of the growing relationship the two countries, was that Swaziland was a market for relatively expensive South African manufactures. In 1910, through the creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), this relationship was formalised(2).

Within Swaziland itself, capital penetration was restricted and uneven. The primary emphasis as Table 1.1 bears testimony to, was on the extraction of minerals, particularly gold and tin. This was reflected in the 1907 settlement where farming and grazing, although catered for, were relegated to secondary significance. The requirements of mining, which was both labour intensive and water intensive, centred therefore, overwhelmingly on the attraction of a cheap labour force.

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1. J.S. Crush, "Settler-Estate Production, Monopoly Control, and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd." African Economic History, No.8, (Fall 1979), p.188.

2. See Chapter 4.

As we will see, the drive towards recruitment in Swaziland provided the basis for a conflict of interests between South African and Swazi-based mining, and to a lesser extent, between the latter and settler agricultural capital. But what of the Swazi who were forced to sell their labour power in order to cope with the demands of taxation and the effects of the land partition?

This restricted and uneven development of capital was reflected in the articulation of capital with the pre-capitalist mode of production in Swaziland. Labour-power was transferred from the non-capitalist reserve economy through the organisation of rotating migration. Here it was in the interest of both South African and local settler capital to conserve elements of pre-capitalist Swazi society in order to lower the costs of the reproduction of labour-power. The cost of the wage bill was reduced since the working class was able to derive a portion of its means of reproduction from the reserve areas where the mass of Swazi population was based. In this manner, capital was able to increase the proportion of surplus labour time to necessary labour time by ensuring the reciprocal obligations of the pre-capitalist family and homestead structures were maintained(1). This network of reciprocity meant that the agricultural product and social security services, which capital preferred not to provide, were still available in the Swazi reserve areas.

But within the reserve areas, one of the effects of capital penetration was to generate a conflict of interests and terrain of struggle between

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1. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segretation to apartheid', in H. Wolpe, (ed) op.cit., p.299.

TABLE 1.1

Companies With Interests in Swaziland, 1904

Company	Nominal Share Capital (£)
Swazi Goldfields Ltd	250,000
Pigg's Peak Gold Mining Co. Ltd.	200,000
Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co.	150,000
Sd. Mercantile Association	100,000
Acton's Swaziland Ltd.	36,000
Indimba Exploration Co.	16,000
Swaziland Gold and Land Co. Ltd.	15,000
Swaziland Corporation Ltd	500,000
Henderson Consolidated Corporation[1]	2,000,000
Towell Gold Mining Co. Ltd.	250,000
Swazi Coal Mines Ltd.	200,000
S. Swaziland Gold Co. Ltd.	200,000
Swaziland Tin Ltd.	100,000
Anglo Swazi Co. Ltd.[2]	100,000
Consolidated Concessions Ltd.	75,000
Usutu Tin Co. Ltd.	50,000
McCreedy Tins Ltd.	50,000
S.A. Tin Co. Ltd.	
African Mining and Estates Co.[3]	

Source: J.S. Crush, "Settler-Estate Production, Monopoly Control and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd." African Economic History No.8, (Fall 1979). p.188.

[1]The Henderson Corporation also held extensive land holdings in Transvaal. Its Swaziland interests were valued at £160,000 on the Company's books.

[2]Formerly Seaforth Mining Co. Ltd. reconstructed to mine tin.

[3]Owned by Lewis and Marks.

the dominant Swazi classes and capital, over the control over the labour power of the Swazi homestead(1). Crush has argued that the land partition itself could be viewed as a labour partition 'which tried to divide up the potential Swazi workforce, and to immobilise a portion of it on the settler estates of the country'(2). Faced with this erosion of their material base and their control over homestead labour power, the dominant Swazi class were compelled to seek new means of asserting and reproducing their dominance. It was the persistence of indigenous ideological relations such as kinship structures which enabled the dominant Swazi classes to overcome the problem of not being able to extract surplus labour to the extent that was previously possible. The relation of the aristocracy and chiefs to their subjects began to assume the form of the right of the dominant class to a portion of the value received for the sale of labour-power. Thus in their struggle to reassert their dominance in Swazi society, the aristocracy claimed the right to make monetary levies on their subjects for a variety of purposes. This transformed what was previously a relation of production into a relation of distribution as Swaziland came under the sway of capital. It was this distributive relation that enabled the aristocracy to accumulate monetary capital and invest it in the capitalist mode of production. This form of capital, along with the control which the aristocracy exercised over land, would eventually be combined with the labour power which had been forcibly released from indigenous production. Indeed one of the chief guiding threads of this analysis is that it was this means of

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1. J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1983), p.221.
2. Ibid., p.222.

accumulating wealth, which was one of the ways in which the dominant class was able to retain its authority and political power, and hence reconstitute Royal hegemony(1). This process can also be witnessed at a more local level where heads of households, (umnumzana), in the wake of the environmental disasters outlined above, strove to obtain the necessary resources for household reproduction by urging their sons to enter wage employment.

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1. This argument owes much to John Taylor's discussion of imperialist penetration of lineage modes of production in West Africa. See J.G. Taylor, From Modernisation to Modes of Production, (London: Macmillan, 1979), p.229.

Conclusion

Pre-capitalist society in Swaziland was characterised by an articulation of lineage and tributary modes of production, and was dominated by a class alliance of aristocrats and chiefs who extracted surplus labour time from their subjects. They were able to reproduce their dominance through a variety of mechanisms, particularly through the accumulation of wealth secured by a complex system of marriage arrangements.

Under the leadership of King Mswati, an elaborate state apparatus headed by a dual monarchy subject to an intricate system of checks and balances, had evolved. Key state institutions included: the embutfo (age-regiments) the two advisory councils the Liqoqo and the Libandla, and the ritual incwala ceremony which helped cement the unity of the nation under the dominance of the monarchy. The articulation of lineage and tributary modes was revealed, inter alia, through the persistence of lineage ideology, which enabled Swazi rulers to synthesize fraternity with the dynastic regime standing at the apex of Swazi society. Relations of inequality were inverted as relations of equality, through the notion that wealth was 'held in trust' by the rulers on the nation's behalf. In this way, material reality contradicted the fraternal social identities gained by individuals in a society where the ideology of communalism persisted in the face of increasing stratification. But these antagonisms were soon complicated by the intrusion of capitalism in the region.

Capital penetration of Swaziland was largely an effect of the mineral discoveries in the Transvaal and brought in scores of concession

hunters who obtained generous concessions from King Mbandzeni in return for money and gifts. While Mbandzeni and Swazi leadership generally regarded the latter as forms of tribute and believed that the concessions would remain under their own trusteeship(1), the settlers themselves were determined to convert these into freehold holdings and enterprises.

With the defeat of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century, and the transfer of Swaziland to the British, the settlers seized their chance. The land partition was cynically presided over by the colonial state in the face of a united front presented by the Swazi leadership, albeit one weakened by the absence of a King, following the premature death of Bhunu, Mbandzeni's successor(2). The disparate interests of settler mining and agricultural capital(3) were temporarily shelved, in the interests of a united stand against the Swazi leadership in order to ratify the concessions. Ultimately, the partition favoured mining capital in particular, although as Crush had argued, its effects were to immobilise Swazi labour as labour tenants on settler farms. The chief consequence that followed from the partition was that increasingly Swazi labour was 'freed' and compelled to migrate in search of work to subsidise an already desperately

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1. As Kuper put it: The Swazi naively trusted in a clause whereby Mbandzeni specifically reserved his 'sovereign rights' over the land and protected his subjects from 'detrimental interference by concessionaires'. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.25.

2. The role of Bhunu is discussed in Chapter 3.

3. This is most powerfully conveyed in the work of Crush. See also J.S. Crush, "Settler-Estate production, Monopoly Control, and the Imperial Response: The Case of Swaziland Corporation Ltd.", African Economic History, no.8, (Fall, 1979), in addition to the works quoted above.

critical situation in the homestead economy. Whether or not such consequences were intended(1), the pattern of labour migration which evolved as an effect of the articulation of modes of production was one through which the cost of the wage bill was considerably reduced since capital only had to reproduce the worker, while his family continued the struggle to reproduce the homestead in the Swazi reserves.

The crisis faced by the dominant Swazi classes through their loss of land and surplus labour meant that new strategies had to be evolved to ensure the reproduction of their dominance within a Swazi society profoundly transformed by the arrival of capital. As it turned out, it was the continuing resistance of the pre-capitalist mode to capitalist penetration and in particular the enduring quality of indigenous ideology which made the task of the aristrocratic alliance so much easier in reconstituting their dominance within a revolutionised Swaziland. It is to these themes which we now turn.

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1. Crush here questions the Marks and Trapido thesis on the creation of the reserves in Southern Africa (See S. Marks, and A. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", in C. Allen, and E. Williams, (ed.) Sociology of 'Developing Societies': Sub Saharan Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1983). According to Crush, Marks and Trapido only produce 'one piece of circumstantial evidence to show that "the utility of a policy which would maintain the "reserves" in order to subsidise the costs of reproducing a migrant labour force" was a part of colonial thinking on reserve creation' (J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1983), p.222). Without intervening in this debate, it is instructive to note here the necessity of distinguishing between different levels of analysis. In this connection, the level of actual agents and events on the surface, and the level of the specific mechanisms which generate actual agents and events. See B. Jessop, The Capitalist State, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982) p.216 for an elaboration of this line of thought. One also, of course, needs to distinguish between causes and consequences.

3. CLASS FORMATION, NATIONALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZI STATE : ROYAL HEGEMONY RESTORED

Capital penetration, the granting of concessions and the colonization of Swaziland jeopardised the continuance of Royal hegemony, and plunged it into crisis. Initially this led to a struggle amongst the beneficiaries of the ancien regime over what strategy to adopt towards the new forces of imperialism which confronted them. Were they to attempt a violent confrontation, or were they to resecure their hegemony through peaceful co-existence and negotiation? Divisions over strategy inevitably led to conflict, but the strong personality of the Queen Mother, Labotsibeni, guaranteed the prevalence of the passive approach. Her influence also helped to ensure that King Sobhuza II did not pursue the rugged and confrontationist course of his father Bhunu, in dealing with Swaziland's colonisers. Indeed as subsequent events would show, it was Sobhuza II's patient diplomacy which facilitated both a smooth transition to independence, and the reconstitution of Royal hegemony. Royal power was not only threatened by the forces of colonialism, but also by the struggle of those who wished to escape its constraints. On both fronts, Sobhuza II saw the importance of the preservation of popular traditions as a fundamental mechanism to unite the masses behind the throne. This strategy was made all the more easy by the absence of ethnic divisions within Swaziland's national territorial unit. Together with the enduring strength of the Kingship system and the longevity of Sobhuza II, these were the vital ingredients in the restoration of Royal hegemony in the run-up to independence. Yet as the following analysis will demonstrate, the Swazi ruling alliance required a greater economic leverage in transforming Royal power. This was achieved

through the pursuit of a comprador role, and a growing alliance with sections of both foreign and settler capital.

Class Struggle and Class Formation in Colonial Swaziland: The Crisis of Royal Dlamini Hegemony

On the 10th October 1888 Sandlane Zwane, Swaziland's chief councillor was removed from his homestead and beaten to death. Along with other leading councillors, Sandlane had been accused of conspiring to overthrow the King. As the veteran statesman Sandlane met his untimely and violent death, Nkopolo, a rowdy and obstinate brother of Mbandzeni crossed over on horseback to the S.A.R., Nkopolo was married to Sandlane's daughter, and had settled in the latter's home village of Ludzidzini. Concessionaires had come to view Nkopolo as the leader of a group of 'hotheads' among the younger members of the regiments who had become increasingly wary of the stream of settlers to the Royal kraal. Nkopolo himself, 'was openly impatient with Mbandzeni's flabby political leadership, and condemned the influx of whites that this had allowed'(1). Whether or not a plot had actually been hatched is unclear. What is clear is that the concession conquest did not only have economic effects on Swazi society. While rival aristocrats competed for influence through and with individual concessionaires, others became progressively hostile to any dealings with the settlers at all. It was the aristocrats with these leanings, who cast their minds longingly to the golden age of Mswati's

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1. P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), p.192.

reign and provoked the spate of political killings that were conducted between 1888 and 1989.

Mbandzeni himself had no apologies for the lavish manner in which he dealt out concessions. He once remarked to a concerned European:

> I have white men all around me. By force they have taken the countries of all my neighbours. If I don't give them rights here, they will take them. Therefore I give when they pay. Why should we not eat before we die?(1)

In the earlier stages of his reign, which began in 1875, Mbandzeni had come under the restraining influence of the Queen Mother Sisile. But after he had rid himself of her, following a struggle centred on the death of his first born son Mdzabuko, 'a far more accommodating attitude began to prevail towards concessionaires'.(2)

In the wake of Mbandzeni's death in October 1889, political rivalry within the aristocracy persisted. The indvuna Tikhuba, an erstwhile ally of Allister Miller, threw in his lot with the princes Jokovu and Mancibane in openly embracing concessionaire interests. It was this faction which, lured on by Shepstone's enticing bribery, gave evidence in support of existing concessions to the Concessions Court which had been set up after the signing of the First Swaziland Convention in 1890(3). But Bhunu and the Queen Mother Labotsibeni were less

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1. D. Barker, Swaziland, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1965), p.23.

2. P. Bonner, op cit., (1983), p.172.

3. F.J. Mashasha, The Road to Colonialism: Concessions and the Collapse of Swazi Independence 1875-1926, (Ph.D. Thesis, Pembroke College, University of Oxford), 1977, p.198.

compromising towards the concessionaires, and this generated a struggle which culminated in a plot which implicated Shepstone in seeking their assassination(1).

It was not surprising therefore, that when Bhunu acceded to the throne in 1894, a series of political killings ensued. The young King was robust and inviolate, and more at home with hunting, riding and shooting than with state affairs(2). Tensions began to emerge between Bhunu and Labotsibeni, who was uneasy about his activities in his residential retreat at Mampondweni in the mountains. Bhunu himself was suspicious of Labotsibeni's open preference for her younger son Malunge. It was the imposition of taxes which brought these underlying conflicts to a head. It has been alleged that the headstrong Bhunu attempted to mobilise an army intending to resist the collection of taxes(3). These attempts were, however, frustrated by Labotsibeni's loyal governor at Zombodze, Mbhabha Nsibandze who on the night of 9 April 1898 was killed. Bhunu was implicated in the murder, and summoned for trail by the Special Commissioner before the Landdrost's(4) court in Bremersdorp. While for the Commissioner,

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1. Ibid, p.200.

2. H. Kuper, Sobhuza II Ngwenyama of Swaziland, (London: Duckworth, 1978), p.28.

3. According to Allister Miller, in the second year of taxation, 'thousands of natives sought to evade payment' of taxes, and had the Anglo-Boer war not intervened and made the collection of taxes virtually impossible, 'there is little doubt.....that at some later period the heavy taxation would have led to bloodshed between the taxed and the taxers'. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.55.

4. The local magistrate's court for the Bremersdorp (present day Manzini) district.

Bhunu's behaviour had been inconsistent with civilized laws and customs, Bhunu at first refused to appear, claiming that the Swazi had never been party to the signing of the Third Swaziland Convention(1). Tensions rose as the S.A.R. saw this incident as a pretext for dividing Swaziland into a number of chiefdoms and hence undermining the centralised authority of the aristocracy(2). This threat was never carried through, but the underlying tensions among the Swazi led to a near revolt as shops were looted, a few whites killed, and production disrupted as workers disappeared to the safety of their homes in the reserves(3). The Transvaal authorities were adamant that Bhunu be brought before the court, but when he finally did arrive he brought his fully armed regiments with him. Commandoes from the Transvaal were rushed in with artillery, and as rumours spread that Bhunu was to be sentenced to death, confrontation seemed inevitable. But the regiments' calls for war were never heeded, and Bhunu was persuaded by his councillors to seek asylum with the British in Natal. Appearing before the British Resident Magistrate in Ngwavuma, Bhunu explained: 'I have fled my country because the Boers are invading it, and bringing in arms to kill me. I have seen their troops with my own eyes. I have stolen no sheep and shed no white man's blood.'(4)

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.29. See Chapter 2 for details of the Convention.

2. According to Mashasha, President Kruger felt that the Bhunu affair gave the opportunity to 'cut Swaziland into three or four chieftaincies', as the British had done in the case of the Zulu. Se F.J. Mashasha, op.cit., pp.270 ff..

3. M. Fransman, op.cit., (1978), p.56.

4. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.29.

The Boers were keen that Bhunu remain in exile considering that his flight amounted to an abandonment of the throne, but eventually under British pressure, Bhunu returned to Swaziland on condition that he would not be charged with murder. He was found guilty of precipitating violence in the royal homestead after a trial that lasted two weeks and was fined £1,646, which was to be deducted annualy from the Revenue Concession of £12,000.

Although he was re-instated as King, the Boers and the British agreed that a Protocol be added to the 1894 Convention. Signed on 5 October 1898 by the British Agent and the State Secretary of the Republic, this Protocol removed all criminal jurisdiction from the Swazi authorities. In effect, as Matsebula has pointed out, the King of Swaziland was henceforth merely a paramount chief, 'subject like his people to the jurisdiction of the European court at Bremasdorp'(1). But more significantly, as Fransman has noted, this marked an important subordination of the Swazi aristocracy insofar as 'this was the first significant measure limiting the internal power' of the rulers of pre-colonial Swaziland(2). Bhunu's tale of woe was to continue. Many of his people had been alienated by his belligerent stance towards the colonial authorities, and Labotsibeni had gone as far as trying to make Malunge bathe in potions specific to kingship(3). Malunge had refused, and it was left to other forces to dispatch Bhunu. During the incwala

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1. J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., (1980), p.137.
2. M. Fransman, op cit., (1978), p.56.
3. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.30.

ceremony of 1889, Bhunu suddenly collapsed, while receiving the ministrations of the priests, and died shortly thereafter(1). With the appointment by the royal councillors of Nkhotfotsheni who would later assume the title of Sobhuza, as Bhunu's successor, a violent chapter of Swazi history was brought to a close. But Swaziland's aristocracy remained confronted by the problems which had precipitated the violence of Bhunu's reign.

With the defeat of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, all rights and powers held by the S.A.R. passed to the British Government. A Special Commissioner, accompanied by a force of South African Constabulary entered Swaziland and established a provisional administration with headquarters in Mbabane(2). The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1880 facilitated the issuing of an Order-in-Council in 1903 under which the control of the Territory was vested in the Governor of the Transvaal Colony. The Swaziland Administration Proclamation No.3 of 1904 provided for the administration of the territory, though Britain, in the words of Sir Alfred Milner, intended to deal with Swaziland 'as nearly as possible on the same lines as an ordinary district of Transvaal'(3). Transvaal laws were applied mutatis mutandis to Swaziland, and courts were established with the same powers and jurisdiction as those of Britain's new colony. The jurisdiction of the Swazi chiefs was limited to 'civil disputes in which

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1. Ibid.

2. Swaziland: Report for the Year 1962, (London: HMSO, 1963), p.115

3. S.N.A., J62/04, (18 September 1904).

aboriginal natives only are concerned'(1), thus abrogating their criminal jurisdiction which had been curtailed by the 1898 Protocol.

The land partition accounted for earlier, exacerbated the crisis faced by the pre-capitalist ruling alliance, but what options were open to them in their effort to re-assert their dominance within Swazi society? The death of Bhunu would suggest that the option of forceful opposition had been firmly rejected in Royal circles. Was this merely pragmatism in the face of the successful colonial conquest of their powerful Zulu neighbours, or the defeat of Sekhukhune's Pedi, in which the Swazi themselves had played such a decisive role?(2) The dangers of the violent route were further underlined to both the colonists and the Swazi by the Bambatha rebellion which broke out in Natal in 1906. But there was perhaps more than just pragmatism involved in the royal council's choice of a peaceful posture to settle the dispute. To this day, every Swazi knows of the dream which Sobhuza I had on the eve of his death. As yet, no whites had settled in Swaziland, although Sohbuza I knew of their existence as did the whole nation, who considered their presence a potential threat. They were known as Balumbi - the workers of esoteric deeds - and Sobhuza, having been guided by the wisdom of his ancestors in a prophetic dream, warned his people to never shed their blood. He told them that the Balumbi would bring two gifts with them when they arrived in Swaziland, umculu, the

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1. Swaziland: Report for the Year 1962, op.cit., p.113.

2. For accounts of the Swazi role in the subjugation of Sekhukhune, see P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), pp.140 ff.; and J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., pp.56-61. For the Pedi perspective, see P. Delius, "Migrant Labour and the Pedi", in S. Marks and A. Atmore, (eds.), op.cit..

Bible, and indilinga, a round object later identified as money. Sobhuza advised his people to accept the first of these gifts, but to be wary of the second(1). It is impossible to speculate on how seriously the wise advice of a powerful king was taken by the Swazi councils - certainly Mbandzeni had not heeded part of it while peacefully accommodating the concessionaires, for he had accepted gifts in abundance. But mission work was generally encouraged by the Swazi aristocracy, and in dealing with white settlers, the interests of the pacifists prevailed.

The Aristocracy, the Labour Recruiters and the Struggle for Hegemony

The passive response to the land partition, the early deputations and protestations to the British Colonial Authorities brought little joy to the aristocracy. Ultimately they were left with little choice but to accept the finality of the land division. As Prince Malunge put it:

> The land has been divided. We have no power to stop the government or to say do not do this; but all I say now is that the partition is now finished, it is done. The government knew that we did not like this partition....we have no power....we wash our hands of the whole question.(2)

It had become increasingly evident to the Swazi aristocracy that in order to restore their authority over the land, they would have to do so within the framework of the land partition. This involved an acceptance, whether conscious or not, of the dominance of capitalist relations and their corresponding forms of ownership. In its attempts to reconstitute itself as a hegemonic force within a transformed Swazi

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1. See, for example J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit. p.22, as well as H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.20.

2. Quoted by C.P. Youe, op.cit., (1978), p.62.

society, the Swazi aristocracy used its power as a waning pre-capitalist class to attempt to foster the process of primitive accumulation begun on the eve of colonialism and capital penetration.

Within the nexus of the struggle for Swazi labour, the Swazi ruling alliance seized their opportunity. As local settler capital, and South African capital under the aegis of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association started to compete for labour power, the chiefs and aristocracy began to assume a pivotal role in this process. Here, the indigenous ruling alliance stood between the unscrupulous labour recruiters and the labour market. Through the implementation of taxation in Swaziland, capital had issued a strong challenge to the surplus labour supply of the chiefs and aristocracy. But if there was to be any successful diversion of labour in favour of capital, the chiefs and aristocracy were determined that it be paid for. A precedent was set by Bhunu when he entered into a contract with M.J.J. Grobler, a labour recruiter from the Transvaal. According to the agreement, Bhunu undertook:

> ...to deliver to ...Mathias Johannes Jacobus Grobler or his representative or his proxy holder on their demand within fourteen days as many sound, healthy Swazies apparently between the ages of 17 and 45 years as possible (in no case however less than 50 upon each demand)(1).

In return, Grobler was contracted to:

> convey and employ the Swazies to the general labour Agencie, mining companies and such like at his own expense including pass money (and moreover shall pay...(Bhunu)...the sum of 10 shillings per Swazi so delivered...).(2)

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1. Contract between Bhunu and M.J.J. Grobler, dated 3 May 1899., SNA, File No. S.74.

2. Ibid.

The contract was to be effective for a period of fifteen years, and according to Bhunu was signed in order to prevent labour recruiters from 'conveying beyond my realm my Swazi subjects without my knowledge and consent'(1). Finally, the contract provided Grobler with a monopoly over labour recruitment in the country.

Following the Anglo-Boer war, and in the wake of the accummulated effects of the ecological disasters outlined in the previous chapter, a variety of conflicting pressures were brought to bear on the Swazi labour market. At a local level, the dramatic loss of cattle intensified the chiefs' need to extract surplus labour from their subjects. Here, the loss of draught oxen necessitated the resort to more labour intensive methods of soil-breaking, as did the reduction of meat supply require greater grain supplies to offset these losses(2). With a great deal of labour-power being lost to the capitalist labour market, chiefs began to look to alternative modes of tribute extraction. Accordingly, informal arrangments led to cash payments by their subjects in lieue of tribute labour(3). But as discussed earlier, there was also a second mechanism for surplus labour extraction in pre-capitalist Swaziland at a more centralised level - the age-regiments. Crush has suggested

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1. Ibid., A supplementary contract was signed shortly after this one on 9 May 1899, giving Grobler the right to prevent other labour recruiting agents from operating in Swaziland. S.N.A., R.C.S. 23/10. The key clause here was: 'Further I promise and bind myself to give no one else whomsoever any permission to take Swazis as labourers or otherwise out of Swaziland to work on any place.'

2. J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1983), pp.291-292.

3. Ibid.

that the strength of chief-commoner relations, particularly in the southern parts of the country, led certain chiefs to attempt to lure away the labour of their followers from the central control of the aristocrats through the age-regiments(1). In any event, it was the emabutfo which constituted the major obstacle to surplus labour extraction and labour recruitment by chief and labour recruiter alike.

Accordingly, the labour recruiters of the Rand began to look to the aristocracy in order to foster the recruiting drive. This was partially on the advice of a local mine-owner, David Forbes Jr., who was appointed as a recruiter by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in 1903. Although Forbes stressed that it was the necessity to buy food and pay their £2 hut tax which led the Swazi to sell their labour power, he also emphasized that it would be necessary to incorporate the aristocracy and chiefs into the recruiting effort. The Queen Regent as a consequence was provided with concrete incentives to influence Swazis to enter wage employment:

> I explained to the Queen that it was necessary to teach the Swazis that it was in their interest to come up here to work for the white men, and the more they turned out, the more it would be of interest to the country...and I asked the Queen to teach these people this, and I said the Labour Association would allow her £30 a month for teaching her people this...(2).

These efforts were not very successful, and were to a certain extent hampered by the fact that Transvaal legislation prevented African

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1. Ibid., pp.293 ff.

2. Evidence given to the Transvaal Labour Commission, 1904, quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.73-4.

chiefs and recruiters from reaching formal arrangements(1). In the meantime, local capital adopted a similar strategy for labour recruitment and in 1906, Swaziland Tin Ltd. and Prince Malunge entered into an agreement. In a letter to Prince Malunge, the Manager of Swaziland Tin, S.T. Ryan, stated:

> Referring to our recent discussion on the labour question, I am now prepared to pay you the sum of 10/- per boy for the first 500 boys sent to the Swaziland Tin Mine, Mbabane, under the following conditions:
>
> 1st That the boys be engaged to work for not less than six months.
>
> 2nd Their payments be made for every batch of 50 boys delivered on the Company's property.
>
> 3rd That you agree not to divert or supply labour to other companies or individuals without first submitting such labour to the Swaziland Tin Company.(2)

But when a plan was devised by Albert Bremer and Josiah Vilakazi to recruit vast numbers of Swazi for the gold mines on the Rand, the colonial state stepped in. An appeal was made to the Swazi, who were informed that tinkomo takaNgwane tiyemuka (the King's cattle were being looted), and it was their national duty to 'replenish the larder'(3). The Scheme aimed to deliver 5,000 Swazi to the mines at a cost of £2 per head which would go to the aristocracy. With the aristocracy standing to gain £10,000 to finance their opposition to the designs of

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1. J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1983), p.295.

2. "Agreement between Swaziland Tin Ltd. and Prince Malunge," (24 September 1906), S.N.A., R.C.S. 100/15.

3. J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1983), p.296.

the colonial state, Moony, the Swaziland Resident Commissioner vehemently opposed the scheme:

> I have reason to believe that the project of recruiting labour is to be undertaken with the purpose of raising funds by way of capitation monies for the purpose of prosecuting whatever action against the Administration the Chief Regent and her advisers may decide to take.(1)

Eventually in September 1910, the Transvaal Labour Agents' regulations were modified to regulate the competitive environment created by the unscrupulous recruiting agents. Chiefs were henceforth prevented under threat of conviction from entering into contracts with labour recruiters who themselves could face a fine of up to £100 for engaging in such agreements(2).

The aristocracy, reeling under the summary cancellation of the Private Revenue Concession by the colonial state were determined to proceed with their contestation of the land partition. Throughout the 1905-14 period, Labotsibeni and Malunge encouraged labour migration by their subjects. Levies of £3 - £5 per head were set in the interests of repurchasing expropriated lands, an amount which in effect could add up to one quarter of an annual mine wage(3). In fact these efforts did lead to initial success and the acquisition through repurchase of 40,000 acres of Crown Land in 1914. The British Resident Commissioner, Robert Coryndon acceded to this since 'it afforded the chiefs the satisfaction that they have accomplished some real good for

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1. Quoted by Crush, op.cit., (1983), pp.296-7.

2. Ibid., p.301.

3. See for example, 'Enraght-Moony to R.T. Coryndon", (24 October 1905), S.N.A. J294/05.

their people without incurring the hostility of the administration.'(1)

Interestingly enough, the Resident Commissioner had already refused to consider other Swazi applicants without 'any standing beyond the ordinary (sic) native'(2) and in 1914, he awarded the Swazi nation a 'gift' of 28,000 acres of Crown Land on condition that future land transactions were made with the approval of the colonial state. But these initial gains were short-circuited, for in January 1915, High Commissioner Viscount Buxton began to regulate land transactions in a manner favouring European settler interests, a policy which persisted until the 1940's.

The struggle of the Dlamini aristocracy was not simply a struggle to reassert their dominance within Swazi society through regaining control over land and mineral resources of the country. They were also engaged in the struggle to restore the legitimacy of the monarchy and hence their hegemony over the Swazi nation. The disasterous reigns of Mbandzeni and Bhunu had done a great deal to erode this, and Labotsibeni was determined that Sobhuza be well prepared for the kingship in order to stop the rot. She therefore devoted much attention to ensuring that Sohbuza get a good education. As she once said to Robert Grendon, whom she brought from Natal, to tutor Sobhuza: 'In what does the white man's power lie?...It lies in

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1. C.P. Youé, op.cit, (1979), p.64.

2. Ibid.

money and in books. We too will learn; we too will be rich.(1) Learning itself involved money, and in 1911, Lobotsibeni imposed a levy on her people with the aim of promoting the development of education. Part of these funds were used for the education of the future King. A special school was established for Sobhuza and other young aristocrats and notables at Zomobodze, and in 1916 Sobhuza was sent to Lovedale College in the Cape.

The numerous levies exacted on their subjects by the aristocracy gradually began to be regarded with suspicion both by the colonial authorities and the mass of the Swazi population themselves. Booth has argued that:

> As levy followed levy, the mood of acquiescence changed to suspicion and on occasion to outright opposition. It came to be widely believed that a great deal of the money collected stuck to the palms of the collectors and that much of the remainder was used by the royal house for other than the announced purposes.(2).

Efforts by the colonial administration to oversee the books proved fruitless and these were jealously guarded by the aristocracy at Zombodze. But the frustration of the Swazi mounted and they began to dodge their obligations. In extreme cases people retired into hiding in the mountains to avoid royal levy collectors(3).

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit, (1980), p.31.

2. A.R. Booth, Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1983a), p.29.

3. Ibid.

With little headway having been made towards a solution of the land question, it was of no surprise that the early years of Sobhuza's rule were devoted to further efforts to regain lost land. In 1921, Sobhuza was vested with full authority as Ngwenyama of the nation and soon set about attempting to reverse the land partition Proclamation. In 1923, he headed a deputation to London, but Dr. W. Ormsby-Gore, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies made it clear that the British were not prepared to change their stand. In 1924 he engaged the legal services of a founder of the South African, African National Congress, Dr. Pixley Ka Izaka Seme, and petitioned the Special Court of Swaziland to take action against Allister Miller in order to reverse the ejection of some of his subjects from lands which were under the Unallotted Land Concession. While the actual expulsions had taken place on Miller's land, the case was in reality a test of the validity of all the concessions. On 24 May 1924, judgement was given and it was declared that the British Crown had not exceeded its powers in extinguishing Swazi rights to the land through the 1907 Proclamation. As a last resort, Sobhuza decided to appeal to the Privy Council in London. Once again, this required a levy on his subjects, and funds were collected both inside Swaziland and in the Transvaal where large concentrations of Swazi migrants were found. But the Swazis were denied and their appeal was rejected in a judgement of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Haldane on April 15, 1926(1). A bitterly disappointed Sobhuza and his entourage returned to Swaziland

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1. The foregoing events have been accounted for in varying detail in H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), pp.75 ff, J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., pp.165ff and A.R. Booth, op,cit, (1983a) pp.29-30.

and set about building a new administrative headquarters for the nation at Lozithehlezi. The aristocracy was disconsolate but not defeated, as the events of the post-World War II period would prove.

State and Ideology in the Early Phases of British Colonial Rule

Although Swaziland has generally been described as a 'Protectorate', it was never gazetted as such(1). Along with the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Basutoland, in 1906, Swaziland became one of the three High Commission Territories in Southern Africa under the direct control of Britain. At the head of the colonial state established in the country by Britain following the Anglo-Boer war, stood a Resident Commissioner, subject to the direction and instruction of the High Commissioner of the three High Commission Territories, who was stationed in what was to become the Union of South Africa. The Swaziland Administration Proclamation of 1904 defined the power, authority and jurisdiction of the Resident Commissioner for the administration and control of the country(2). He was advised and assisted by a number of administrative officials and specialists in fields such as finance and police services. These officials were selected by a special board in London, although they could also be appointed by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the Resident Commissioner. Gradually, Africans were employed as clerks, policemen, messengers, cattleguards and eventually as teachers and labourers on public works. Roman Dutch common law was introduced,

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1. H. Kuper, The Swazi, (London: International African Institute, 1952), p.39.

2. Swaziland: Report for the Year 1962, op.cit., p.116

based on the laws in force in the Transvaal up to 1907. These laws were amended or elaborated through Orders-in-Council, Proclamations of the High Commissioner, and the High Commissioner's and Government notices(1).

It has been pointed out, however, that having asserted the legality of their right to rule in Swaziland, Britain 'did very little actual ruling'(2). On the whole, day-to-day life continued to be administered by chiefs, and the administrators were principally concerned with their 'magisterial functions in criminal cases and with the affairs of the white community'(3). In the early phases of British colonial rule, with very little money available to the colonial state, no effort was devoted to the provision of social services. As such, there was very little institutional development and internal organisation of the state apparatus. Fransman has argued that on assumption of formal control of the country, 'the British state assumed the role of the guarantor of the conditions for capital accumulation'(4). The problem with this essentially 'black box'(5) view of the state in which outside conditions determine specific state strategies, is that it tends to ignore the multi-dimensional quality of state intervention, as well as the diversity of interests which state power represents. It is true to say

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1952), p.40.

2. J. Halpern, South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland., (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p.334.

3. Ibid.

4. M. Fransman, op.cit, (1978), p.57.

5. See B. Jessop, op.cit., (1982), p.231.

that the colonial state reproduced a variety of general conditions of capitalism, conditions on whose provision individual capitals depended for their continued production. In this connection, the condition of labour power was crucial since it could obviously not be produced within the capitalist enterprise itself. Instead it had to be drained out of Swazi production and incorporated into the labour process as a simple, non-capitalist commodity and exchanged for a wage(1). But in the midst of a series of competing interests in the demand for labour power, the state was forced to intervene on two fronts. Outwardly through the imposition of taxation and the settlement of the land question, but also inwardly through the legislation of new policies aimed at mediating the conflicting interests of various alignments of capital. As Crush has demonstrated, there is a key distinction between the labour policies of the Kruger and British colonial states. While in the case of the former, the policy was clearly to draw in labour to the Rand, the latter case was decidedly ambiguous. Here the colonial state attempted both to generate labour supplies for external industry, as well as for internal capitalist employers(2).

The interests of local capital itself were far from uniform. The major branches of mining and agricultural capital had different labour requirements, while the future of settler agriculture still hinged, in the early stages of British rule, on the corporate control of a potentially large proportion of the land surface of the country. The

Swaziland

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1. Ibid. See also the arguments of S. de Brunhoff, The State, Capital and Economic Policy., (London: Pluto Press, 1978).

2. J.S. Crush, op.cit. (1983), pp.159-60.

Corporation was floated as a public company in London in 1898. Its nominal share capital was £500,000 secured through interests acquired by Allister Miller and John Thorburn, which had been sold off to a syndicate in London in 1889(1). Allister Miller was appointed local manager of the Corporation, and soon found himself in a tussle with competing settler interests and the colonial state. With the impending land settlement in sight, the Corporation sought monopoly control of land. But before ratifying the claimed land holdings of the Corporation, the colonial state required substantive guarantees that it would undertake plantation production. Unless these could be provided, the state feared that capitalist production would stagnate in Swaziland, and the Corporation would merely extract rent from the Swazi based on Corporation land either in the form of cash or produce. With no guarantees forthcoming other than verbal ones, the state sought to restrict the land to which the Corporation would be permitted to lay claim. According to Lord Selbourne:

> I have taken powers upon myself. I want to prevent the land accumulating in the hands of large companies who simply farm kaffirs. I hold that it is in the public interest that large tracts of land should not be held in Swaziland, either by individuals or companies without any beneficial occupation by white men...(2).

Eventually, the Corporation was granted far less land than it claimed, and the state sold off crown land to individual settlers and a private settlement company. These actions in the interests of an emergent settler bourgeoisie at the expense of corporate control, led to the

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1. J.S. Crush, op.cit., (1979), p.184.

2. Selbourne Memorandum, quoted in J.S. Crush, (ibid.) p.193.

eventual demise of the corporation whose interests were bought out in the 1940's.

Initially, British colonial rule proceeded on the assumption that Swaziland would be incorporated into the Union of South Africa(1). Although this was never to occur because of the Union's racial policy, this supposition did much to shape colonial policy. White English-speaking settlement was placed high on the agenda as a means of counterbalancing the dominance of Afrikaners in southern Swaziland. White settlement, according to Milner, was 'important and ...bound to grow' since the country was 'inseperable from adjoining districts of the Transvaal'(2). The Mushroom Land Settlement Company established in 1909, as the brainchild of Allister Miller, and the post World War I Returned Soldiers Settlement Scheme saw the European population double between 1911 and 1921 to 2,200(3). Intensified demand placed on the state for greater intervention to bolster settler production, in the face of crop failure, farm and general mismanagement, led to the creation of a European Advisory Council in 1921, which was to become increasingly formal and effective in securing settler interests.

With respect to the Swazi, as we have noted, the colonial state's policy

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1. The most comprehensive account of initiatives in this direction during the earlier years of colonial rule up until the South African Nationalist Party electoral victory in 1948, is given by R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948, (London: Macmillan, 1972).

2. A.R. Booth, op.cit. (1983a), p.24.

3. Ibid.

was largely one of neglect. Swaziland in the early twentieth century was a country compartmentalised and divided into two worlds inhabited by two different species. As in neighbouring South Africa, the dominant ideology in colonial Swaziland was coloured by racism. Through their connection to the capitalist labour market, Swazis were subject to the ideological inversions of commodity fetishism. But the apparent equality in the exchange of their labour power for wages, which concealed their exploitation as a class in the sphere of capitalist production, was outweighed by the negative "identities" which colonial ideology gave them, as subjects belonging to an inferior race. Here a different inversion was manifest in the melting pot of economic, political and ideological discourse, where cause merged with effect; as Fanon has put it, where 'you are rich because you are white, you are white because are rich'(1). Fanon has described the colonial experience:

> The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessance of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or better still never existed in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values...The customs of the colonised people, their traditions, their myths - above all, their myths - are the very sign of that poverty of spirit and of their constitutional depravity(2).

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1. F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p.31.

2. Ibid., pp.31-32.

Fanon's words have a chilling echo in the evidence of Allister Miller presented before the South African Native Commission. According to Marwick, Miller's evidence provided an accurate guage of the majority of settler thinking on the subject(1). Miller argued that:

> Every act of the legislature that tends to preserve (the Swazi's) oldtime communistic life wields an additional fetter that will bind him hopelessly in the struggle that is ahead of his race... I feel with deepest conviction that if the native problem is to be solved, the solution will only be found when the administration is strong enough to cut itself free from all the trammels of tribal precedent, to ignore the existence of traditions interesting rather than useful, of laws as incongruous and unsuitable in juxtaposition with twentieth century civilisation as the feudalism of Northern England, and customs as moss-grown as the memories of the Hebrew patriarchs. I consider that the perpetuation of the laws and customs of the natives even in modified forms, is fatal to any comprehensive solution of the problem.(2)

Although Miller's policy of 'detribalisation' was never adopted, it is instructive of the ideological world of colonial Swaziland.

Within the dominant ideological discourse of colonial Swaziland, Swazis were viewed as sub-humans lost in a labyrinth of tribal myths and unreality. Disinherited by the colonial scramble in the sub-continent, the Swazi nation at best was reduced to a nation of 'noble savages', at worst to a 'bunch of savages'. Colonial and settler rule was oppresive, and Swazis were 'treated cruelly as 'Emakhafula' (Kafirs)'(3). At an official level they became natives, idle and indolent, who would have to be galvanised into selling their labour-

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1. B. Marwick, op.cit., (1940), p.301.

2. Report of the South African Native Commission, 1903-5. Vol. V, p.250. Quoted by B. Marwick. Ibid., pp.301-302.

3. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.28.

power to the nascent capitalist industries and plantations of the region. But how could these primitive natives who knew little beyond pastoralism, perpetual war, violence and sinister witchcraft(1), adapt to the rigours and discipline of modern industry? For some, it was simple, the native would have to be 'forced slowly, possibly, but certainly and consistently from the exclusiveness of tribal life'(2), for lost in the vegetative rhythm of tribal life,(3) even the 'best type of native never (got) free scope; the web of tribalism (was) around him'(4). But other settlers and colonial functionaries, backed by the 'philanthropists' questioned the wisdom of this strategy to bring to life that sloth prostrate in the heat of the sun. After all, they argued, capital only required the labour-power of the native. There was no necessity of becoming saddled with the responsibility of supporting the native as well. After all, he could survive so well from his simple crops in the reserves where his tribal system would keep him under discipline(5).

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1. D. Barker, op.cit.. Barker writes, the Swazis' 'lives in tribal areas from birth to death are conducted against a belief in lurking evil...most of the witchcraft that, Swazis believe, rules their lives, is preponderantly evil and destructive.' p.98.

2. "Allister Miller to D.O. Malcolm, Private Secretary to the High Commissioner", (21 December 1906). Quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., p.64.

3. F. Fanon, op.cit., p.33. Of the settler/'native' relationship, Fanon writes: 'The settler-native relationship is a mass relationship. The settler pits brute force against the weight of numbers. He is an exhibitionist. His pre-occupation with security makes him remind the native out loud that there he alone is master. The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he deprives of outlet; the native is trapped in the tight links of the chains of colonialsim.' p.42.

4. "Allister Miller to D.O. Malcolm", op.cit..

5. This view has been succinctly expressed by Howard Pim, accountant to one of the mining groups on the Witwatersrand, in 1905. See S. Marks and S. Trapido, op.cit., p.21.

Pragmatism won through and detribalisation gave way to indirect rule: 'the Government had rejected any suggestion by the Swazis that they were sovereign people possessing an independent status, but it had in effect recognised the existence of a native regime'(1). Swaziland was inhabited by two species separated by the wall of 'civilisation', and so long 'as the country was dozing peacefully, and its resources....were hardly being exploited, this seemed to work amicably enough'(2). But was 'the native' dozing as peacefully as the settler believed? Was he overpowered and tamed? Did his silence represent an amicable acceptance of his guilt of inhumanity? Was he content with continually being seen as a non-subject? What did this non-subjection mean in the context of agrarian decay and crisis? And how would this non-subjection influence the course of ideological struggles in the transition to independence?

The Developing Crisis in the Swazi Reserves

In April 1931, Resident Commissioner D. Honey wrote in his 'Annual Report to the Colonial Office' that 'the foodstuffs grown by the natives are only about one fifth of their requirements, the remaining four fifths being supplied by European farmers and by traders who import grain from the Union of south Africa.'(3)

The deteriorating situation in the Swazi reserve areas, led Lord Hailey

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1. Lord Hailey, op.cit., p.383.

2. D. Barker, op.cit., p.70.

3. "D. Honey to Colonial Office", (1 April, 1931), S.N.A., RCS Resident Commissioner's Report for 1931.

to write that by the early thirties, Swaziland was 'the least reputable and most neglected of the British dependencies'(1). Under pressure from the European Advisory Council, and settler farmer organisations which included the Siteki, and Southern and Swaziland farmers' associations, Colonial Secretary L.S. Amery committed himself to the establishment of a contented British settler community in Swaziland. This followed a visit to southern Africa in 1927. Amery was deeply shocked by what he had seen on his tour, and later wrote:

> What I felt most...was that we had done so little for the protectorates ourselves...instead of raising the general standard of their peoples, we had been content to protect them from outside interference, leaving them to carry on under a very unproductive form of indirect tribal rule as museum pieces, human Whipsnades, in an Africa that was being transformed at a breathless pace.(2)

Despite these noble sentiments, however, Amery's aid commitments were directed towards the British settler community, who were given loan guarantees for capital development, credit and administration, amounting to £128,000(3). During the subsequent years, settlement schemes were revived, and the South African Railways introduced hauling services into Swaziland, thus linking the settlers to the nearby railheads of Breyten, Piet Retief and Golela. This also facilitated the

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1. Lord Hailey, op.cit., p.383.

2. Quoted by R. Hyman, op.cit., pp.117-118.

3. A.R. Booth, op.cit, (1983a), p.26; as J.E. Spence points out, however, it is very difficult to arrive at accurate figures during this period, on account of the ambiguity of the financial statement in the colonial reports. Spence estimates the 1929 financial aid from the U.K. to Swaziland at £136,580 in grants, and £75,515 in loans. See J.E. Spence, "British Policy Towards the High Commission Territories", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.II, No.2, (1964), p.233.

development of a road system to connect the settler dominated areas(1).

In the meantime, conditions in the reserves became critical. In the twentieth century, the size of the Swazi population grew rapidly. Between 1904 and 1921, there was an increase of population of 31 per cent, while between 1904 and 1936, the increase was 81 per cent(2). In 1937, Beemer reported an estimated population of 150,000 of which 15,000 - 20,000 lived on settler and Crown Land. This figure left approximately 57 people to the square mile in the Swazi reserves(3). When Sir Alan Pim wrote his report for the Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in 1932, the figure which he gave was 38 Swazi to the square mile on the reserves. The report noted that the 'Native Areas' had become drastically overpopulated, and were victim of 'serious overstocking and erosion', with a cattle count two and a half times that of the human population(4). Needless to say, this led to a rapid deterioration of the quality of land in the reserves. One of the reasons for the rapid increase of Swazi cattle holdings, was the introduction of dipping facilities in 1910. Thus by 1930, Swazi herds had increased in size to 232,614 or 78 per cent of

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1. R. Hyman, op.cit., pp. 121ff.

2. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.66.

3. H. Beemer, 'The Diet of the Swazi in the Protectorate'., Bantu Studies, Volume XIII, (1939), p.201. Note that Beemer is Kuper's maiden name.

4. A. Pim, Financial and Economic situation of Swaziland. Report of Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. (London: HMSO 1932).

the level estimated for 1984(1). Agricultural potential was seriously undermined on account of the overgrazing and soil erosion that followed. According to the Annual Government Reports, it would appear that approximately 21 per cent of the reserve area, or less than one acre per person was under cultivation in the early 1930's. The overwhelming mass of the land was issued for pasture, village sites or was allowed to lie fallow(2). Whereas the settler farms yielded in the region of 420 lbs. per acre for maize, and 340 lbs. per acre for sorghum, the average maize and sorghum yields in the reserve areas was estimated at 200 lbs. per acre(3).

Despite the sharp growth in the size of the Swazi herd, it was extremely difficult for the Swazi to realise this in monetary terms. The main barrier to this lay in the fact that cattle were marketed in South Africa. Here, after World War I, beef prices plummetted, to the extent that by 1923, prices were a mere 65 per cent of their 1918 level. Demand for protection by South African cattle farmers led to South African Government imposed restrictions of the minimum limit of 800 lbs. live weight for cattle exported to South Africa from the High Commission territories. The relatively low quality of the Swazi herd meant that the Swazi had been struck a heavy blow, since their average beast was unexportable(4). Nethertheless, the size of the

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.66.

2. See Annual Reports on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Swaziland, Nos. 1553. 1594 and 1654; for 1930-32. (London: HMSO), S.N.A..

3. H. Beemer, quoting the above reports. op.cit., p.206.

4. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.66.

national herd grew steadily, increasing from 311,240 in 1931, to 343,000 by 1937. With a sheep and goat population of roughly 170,000 and 107,968 respectively, the consequences for the quality of the pasturage was disasterous. In 1930, the Principle Veterinary Officer considered 33% of the national herd fit to pass the 800 lbs. weight embargo imposed by South Africa, by 1933 this had dropped to 11 per cent(1).

The internal market in Swaziland remained highly restricted and commodity production was chiefly for export. Outside of cattle, Swazis were hardly engaged in commodity production at all. Cattle and tin were the major exports from Swaziland in 1924, constituting 45 per cent and 40 per cent respectively, of the total. The other chief exports were cotton and tobacco. But in 1932, Pim noted that cotton production was entirely restricted to settler farms, 'with the single exception of an enterprising native grower'(2). In the 1933-34 season, a mere 25 Swazis grew cotton(3). With cash required for payment of taxes, Swazis were left with little choice but to migrate in search of work, both within Swaziland as well as in South Africa.

The foregoing occured within the context of the great depression of 1929-33. The effect on the region was that the devaluation of currencies made South African exports too expensive to compete on the world market. Combined with a drought during these years, the

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1. See A. Pim, op.cit., as well as H. Beemer, op.cit., p.208.
2. A. Pim, op.cit..
3. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.67.

value of South African agricultural production was drastically reduced, while diamond production suffered, since the main market was in America. The tide turned when South African Prime Minister Hertzog abandoned tne gold standard, giving way to an inflationary boom as the price of gold soared and the value of the manufacturing industry doubled between 1932 and 1938(1). The consequent effects on the Swazi labour market were an initial deflation followed by a dramatic inflation. By 1936, 9,561 Swazi men were employed in the Transvaal, a figure representing 30 per cent of all adult males. With a further 3,229 or 10 per cent working on settler farms, '40 per cent of the most vital element of the homestead labour force was absent for a significant part (probably most) of the time'(2). Average wage earnings in the Transvaal Gold Mines were estimated by Beemer to be slightly under £3 per month, while within Swaziland, most men were earning between 25/- and 30/-per month. The consequence was that the amount of money spent on food was largely dependent on wages and was not dictated by any laws of 'dietetic adequacy'(3). It was estimated in the 1930's that a family of four in the African Townships of Johannesburg required approximately 60/- as the minimum cost of diet adequate for the maintenance of a reasonable standard of

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1. See A. Callinicos, and J. Rogers, Southern Africa after Soweto, (London; Pluto Press, 1978), Chapter 1.

2. A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983), p.11. see also R.R. Kuczynski, A Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire: Vol.II, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p.34; Kuzynski illustrates the fluctuating numbers of external migrants. In 1921, 66 per cent of employed males worked outside Swaziland; in 1936, 74 per cent, in 1946, 61 per cent.

3. H. Beemer, op.cit., p.229.

health(1). In Swaziland, the cost of living was higher than in Johannesburg, enabling Beemer to conclude that:

> ...not only is it necessary for crops to be supplemented by money wages, but if the money wage is not subsidised by the fruits of the field, most of the rural natives would be living below the minimum required for 'reasonable health'. On the other hand urban Natives with no land in the Protectorate have their wages adversely affected because rural Natives are their competitors in the labour market.(2)

What Beemer omits to note in her calculations, is that the size of the average Swazi family was often greater than the four quoted in the Johannesburg example (calculated as two parents and two small children). Estimates in the 1930's gave the average number of occupants in the Matshapha sample of homesteads as 7.2 for commoners' families, and 22.5 in the case of princes and chiefs(3).

Restructuring the Swazi Reserves: The Swaziland Native Land Settlement Scheme.

All indications are that by the outbreak of World War II, the situation on the Swazi reserves had assumed crisis proportions. This was recognised by the colonial authorities themselves. In 1940, the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act allocated a sum of £190,000 for an extensive land settlement scheme which was aimed at providing 4,000 landless Swazi squatters with land, as well as those Swazi soldiers who on demobilization would wish to become farmers on

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1. Beemer here cites A.T. Bryant, A Description of Native Foodstuffs and their preparation. (No further bibliographic details are given), op.cit., p.230.

2. Ibid.

3. H. Kuper, op,cit., (1980), pp.37-8.

controlled allotments(1). In addition, a further 216,000 acres of Crown land were designated for Swazi use(2).

These initiatives were crystallised in the legislation in 1946 of the Swaziland Native Land Settlement Proclamation no.2 of 1946 and the Swaziland Native Land Settlement Rules published in Government Notice No.1 of the same year. The proclamation provided for the appointment of a director who was given control over the land settlement areas. He was vested with the power of allocation of land settlement areas 'for agricultural, residential and garden allotments, for afforestation and for commonage'(3). The land was to be granted under leasehold tenure and could not be alienated, transferred, mortgaged or sublet, either in whole or in part. Nevertheless, there was no rental charged for rights of occupation. Size of allotments was to be determined by the director of the scheme, with the minimum size of an agricultural allotment set at five acres. The director was empowered to:

> ...issue instructions to be obeyed by settlers relating to the manner of cultivation of agricultural and garden allotments, the use of fertilisers thereon, the kind of crops to be grown thereon, or (require) or (prohibit) the planting of any kind of tree or bush thereon(4).

Settlers who failed to obey the rules pertaining to occupancy of land

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1. S.N.A. File No.375A.

2. D. Jones, Aid and Development in Southern Africa, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.525.

3. Swaziland: Proclamation by His Excellency the High Commissioner, Entitled the Swaziland Native Land Settlement Proclamation 1946, Government Notice no.2 of 1946, (Promulgated 1 February 1946)

4. Ibid.

under the scheme could effectively be evicted from the land and have their rights to settlement terminated.

The scheme was actually set in motion before the 1946 proclamation had been legislated. In January 1944, development was started in the north of Swaziland at Pigg's Peak on a block of Land purchased and Crown Land of approximately 30,000 acres in extent on which provision was made for 220 settlers. In January 1945, development of a second settlement was started on an area of Crown Land of about 18,900 acres near Hlatikulu, in the south of the country. The development of a third area in the north east of Swaziland in the Piggs sub-district began in June 1946. This latter settlement area, known as Herefords, covered an area of 65,000 acres.(1)

The settlement schemes were received with mixed feelings by Sobhuza II and his Council, and as its implementation proceeded, the feelings became increasingly hostile. In a meeting held between the Resident Commissioner, the Director of the Land Settlement scheme and the Swazi National Council at Lobamba in May 1945, Alfred Magagula, one of the councillors said:

> We have understood that the land is for the settlement of Swazis. We cannot understand which Swazis will live there. We expected land we could expand on...The laws for the Native Land Settlement scheme show that they are not according to what we are used to and that the land is not for the expansion of the Swazi people... As I understand the settlement scheme I cannot take all my children there and I cannot take all my five wives and I must reduce my stock. People will not agree to reduce their stock to twelve head in order to live on the purchased land. I would only get five acres. This is not enough for even a man and his wife. I cannot see how I

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1. S.N.A. File No. 375 A.

> would live on five acres and keep twelve cattle. Where will I get cattle from to pay lobola for my children?(1)

In reply, the Director Mr. Thornton said that

> ...We are not proposing to cater for the rich man, but (are) trying to help the average man so that he can have a comfortable home and living. Even among the rich men, however, I have found that the total area cultivated is not very large even if he has ten wives. We don't expect such people to become settlers, but even if they did come they would get a nice piece of land. We have provided for the average not the rich. No nation provides for them; they are well able to care for themselves.(2)

It was precisely because the land settlement schemes were not formulated in the interests of the aristocracy and their allies, that they encountered stiff resistance from these quarters. Three leading Swazi National Councillors, Msindazwe Sukati, Chief Gija Nkosi Mgunundvu and Stanley Nxumalo were taken with two colonial officials to visit similar settlement schemes which had been established in the Union of South Africa in the Cape. On their return to Swaziland, they strongly condemned what they had seen. Chief Gija said that it 'would ruin our country if we took home this poison', qualifying his statement by adding that it 'might be good for those people, but not for us. They don't have chiefs there.'(3) Quite clearly the struggle for the return of the land in the eyes of the aristocracy and their allies, was a struggle not merely for the return of the land to

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1. "Meeting of His Honour the Resident Commissioner, Accompanied by D.C. Native Land Settlement, D.C. Central District and Director Native Land Settlement with the Swaziland National Council", (28 May 1945), S.N.A. File No. 468/I.

2. Ibid.

3. S.N.A. File No. 7725, (8 December, 1944).

Swazi people, but a return of the land under their own control and allocation. On this question, 'Native Land Settlement Policy' was unequivocal:

> While the Native authority should, of course, be consulted, the Government is under no obligation to allow the Chiefs at the present juncture any final say in the allocation of the Settlement Lands or any powers to dispossess an occupier without the consent of the Administration... In Swaziland there is not even a proper hierarchy of Native Courts and many Native courts as exist cannot be trusted to deal equitably with land questions(1).

Sobhuza II himself was apparently more open minded about the project, believing that the scheme might be more attractive to the more 'westernised' returning soldiers(2). He therefore sent messages to the soldiers inviting them to express their opinions of the scheme, which should be discussed and 'not just presented to' potential settlers. While the scheme was essentially designed for the younger more progressive and better educated soldier, Sobhuza II resented these distinctions arguing that all former soldiers 'must learn to work together and respect each other'(3).

But the scheme was virtually stillborn. Before much headway could be made, multinational capital that had begun to flow in the country after World War II began to intervene. Formerly settlement designated land was taken over by Peak Timbers in the north, who decided that they required the land upon which the scheme was being developed.

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1. "Minute: The Government Secretary, Mbabane. Native Land Settlement Policy", (undated). S.N.A., File No. 468 F.

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.152.

3. Ibid. p.153.

The colonial state was acquiescant, arguing that the acquisition of the Piggs Peak Settlement by Peak Timbers for afforestation ensures that the land will be put to its most correct and suitable use'(1). The transfer of land that had previously been designated for Swazi use greatly angered the aristocracy. Although the Swazi who had settled on the land required by Peak Timbers were to be reallocated land elsewhere, the move was greatly resented. This resentment was reflected in the heated debate which ensued when the matter was brought before the Swazi National Council. Sobhuza's pragmatic and diplomatic intervention was able to defuse the situation. Arguing in a manner that was to later become a characteristic hallmark of his greatly respected leadership, Sobhuza said that:

> It was hard to compel a man to move without good reason but there were times when the good of the nation and of posterity ought to be given priority over self-interest. The sacrifice of those who would be uprooted would always be remembered.(2)

Far from having made any 'sacrifice', the uprooted Swazi appeared to have had very little choice in the matter of moving.

The Land Settlement Scheme never really took off, and by the mid-fifties it had died a natural death. In the build-up to independence, the Swazi National Council would demand that the settlement areas be handed over to the 'Swazi nation' i.e. that the land revert to the control of the chiefs and aristocracy. By independence, the demand had been met. At one level, the Land Settlement Scheme could be

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1. "Swaziland Land Settlement Scheme", (1948), p.3, quoted by P. Mac Fadden, The State and Agri-business in the Swazi economy, (Unpublished mimeo.: Warwick University, 1983).

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.169.

viewed as an attempt by the colonial authorities to foster the growth of a rich peasantry as part of a revamped strategy which emerged in the colonies after World War II. But in Swaziland, the strategy of seeking alliances with indigenous class and political forces would have to take cognizance of the aristocracy, who in the post World War II period increasingly demonstrated their resilience and adaptive capacities.

The Reconstitution of Aristocratic Power : Class Formation and Transformation

The crisis of royal Dlamini power climaxed in 1944, with the promulgation of the Native Administration Proclamation. The major thrust of the Proclamation was to vest the power of appointing and deposing chiefs, including the Paramount Chief in the British High Commissioner. Needless to say, the Proclamation met with stiff resistance from the Swazi aristocracy. While it was still in its draft stages, before legislation, Sobhuza II submitted a petition drawn up by Seme and a liberal lawyer, H. Basner, one of the three Native Representatives in the South African House of Assembly. For the aristocracy, the proposed laws 'would destroy the foundation of Swazi Kingship and allow the will of the High Commissioner to be made the law of Swaziland so far as the Swazi are concerned'(1). The petition

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1. Ibid., p.142-3.

received the strong support of previous colonial officials(1), but the proposals ultimately became law.

Frustrated by the Proclamation as well as by the progress and orientation of the Land Settlement Scheme, the aristocracy began another systematic effort to secure, through their own devices, control over the land. Rather than issue periodic levies, the aristocracy decided to issue a general levy in order to launch a new National Fund which came to be know as the Lifa Fund. Every adult male was to contribute £5 or one head of cattle which would then be auctioned and the proceeds credited to the fund. Joshua Lukhele, a National Councillor who had worked as a clerk in the District Commissioner's office in Manzini was appointed as the first treasurer and was assisted by one of Sobhuza's sons, Prince Magolwane. Under these efforts, Swazi Nation Land did make some gains although less than the aristocracy had hoped for. By the 1960's, the Swazi had managed to buy back some 268,093 acres of land, bringing the total land 'held by the King in trust for the nation' to 1,907,708 acres(2), representing just over 50 per cent of the country's total land surface.

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1. The retired Resident Commissioner, A.G. Marwick wrote a ten-page letter to Margery Perham on the 25th August 1942. Its contents included: '(Sobhuza) holds, and I believe he is perfectly right in holding, that neither he nor his predecessors have ever given the Protecting power any reason to make any further inroads upon his sovereignty... merely to take away power which we cannot demonstrate had been abused, only because it had been done with no apparent unfortunate consequences elsewhere, seems to me to be indefensible, particularly in the name of that 'Blessed word' 'indirect rule'.... Quoted by H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.114.

2. Ibid., p.204.

The Lifa Fund ran into serious difficulties and was increasingly confronted with charges of maladministration and abuse through corruption. The Fund could not meet payments for farms, and the books were in disarray 'complicated by entries of sporadic cattle sales'(1).

But the aristocracy were more successful in their opposition to the controversial 1944 Proclamation, so much so that it was ultimatley revised to accommodate their interests(2). The Swaziland Native Administration Proclamation No.79 of 1950 removed many of the aristocracy's objections to the 1944 proclamation. Great concessions were made to the King, who was henceforth recognised as the sole authority for the issuing of any orders which were enforcable in the Swazi courts. Section 9 of the Proclamations specified a wide variety of twenty nine different orders which could be issued by the King-in-Council 'to be obeyed by natives within any area of his jursidiction'. These ranged from the prohibition, restriction or regulation of liquor consumption and possession, gambling, arms possession, the cutting and destruction of trees and grass burning, to the prohibition of any act or conduct which might cause a riot or a disturbance of the peace. These orders could be issued provided that they did not 'conflict with

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1. Ibid.

2. It should be noted here that a contributing factor to the success of Swazi opposition to the 1944 Proclamation, was the electoral victory in 1948 in South Africa of the Africkaner National Party. With the inauguration of Apartheid as the basis of South Africa's future racial policy, the incorporation of the High Commission Territories into the Union of South Africa was, as far as Britain was concerned, a dead letter.

any law for the time being in force in the Territory'(1). A penalty not exceeding one hundred pounds or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years was introduced for conspiracy 'against the Paramount chief or a Chief'. The Monarch and the Chiefs were further empowered to 'make rules' providing that these did not conflict with laws already in force in the country. These rules were:

> ...to be obeyed by natives providing for the peace, good order and welfare of such natives, including rules regarding the public services provided by the Paramount Chief in any capacity, and also any matter in respect of which an order under section nine could have been issued.(2)

Another development which strengthened the hand of the aristocracy was the establishment of a Swaziland National Treasury under Proclamation No.81 of 1950. The forerunner of the Treasury was the Swaziland National Fund established by proclamation in 1910, following the arbitrary discontinuation of payment to the aristocracy of the Private Revenue Concession. The National Fund was under the control of the High Commissioner, and its resources were limited to the deduction of 2 shillings from every tax receipt issued to every Swazi male over the age of eighteen years and of the generally small sums paid as rents for trading sites on Swazi nation land. Apart from this, Sobhuza had received 'subsidies' from state revenue amounting to £1,400 per annum and the Queen Mother £100 per annum, while no other chiefs received salaries or other grants. The establishment of the National Treasury meant that the King, Queen Mother, chiefs and

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1. Swaziland: Proclamation by His Excellency the High Commissioner, Entitled the Swaziland Native Administration Proclamation, Law no.79 of 1950 (Promulgated 22nd December, 1950).

2. Ibid.

'Native Administration' officers were to be paid from the National Treasury, whose revenue was dependent upon a proportion of tax paid by Swazis together with all Swazi Court fines and fees.

In 1950, The Native Courts Proclamation was also enacted, giving the King, subject to the ratification of the Resident Commissioner, the authority to establish Swazi courts, to prescribe their rules of procedure and to establish courts of appeal. In 1953, Lord Hailey could write that

> ...it is noteworthy that the most characteristic of the (Swazi) political institutions have undergone little change in the course of the half-century during which they have been under Transvaal or British Administration. There has certainly been less change than is to be observed in many of the African territories...(1)

The 1950 Proclamations did much to secure the political base of the aristocracy and their allies in Swazi society, but could the same be said of a material economic base? Certainly, with the British change of heart on the land issue manifest in the monetary grants issued for the repurchase of land new options had been opened up. It became far easier for Swazis to repurchase land and indeed by the 1960's individual Africans had bought up 22,384 acres of land. Through levy collections, which culminated in the launching of the Lifa Fund, successes were achieved, the first of which was the purchase of a large farm called Thulwane owned by a settler named Carl Todd, who himself was to play an important role during the decolonisation phase.

1. Lord Hailey, op.cit., p.400.

The sale went through in 1948, and Thulwane was registered in the name of the King 'in trust for the nation'(1). A new pattern had emerged, binding the aristocracy and capital together in a strengthening alliance. But more important was another trend set by the Colonial Development Corporation as an extension to their Usuthu Forest project. In procuring the 100,000 acres which the project required, it was necessary that some Swazi families be resettled. Acting on the initiative of High Commissioner Evelyn Baring, the Corporation agreed to plant on behalf of the 'Swazi Nation', in the region of 3,500 acres of land and to credit all profits to the 'Swazi Nation' once planning costs had been met. This constituted a watershed where 'for the first time, the nation received in addition to employment opportunities, a direct share in a major enterprise'(2).

Royal Hegemony and the Emergence of a Comprador Bourgeoisie

That foregoing developments reveal that the Swazi dominant class was a class in the process of transition, an alliance of aristocrats and chiefs steadily attempting to locate itself within the complex of Swazi society under the dominace of capital. Although Fransman acknowledges the qualitative transformation of the class basis of the dominant pre-capitalist alliance over time, he conceptualises them throughout his discussion as the 'Swazi Rulers'. According to Fransman, 'the class membership of the 'Swazi Rulers' during the pre-independence period was determined by their position as a dominant

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), pp.153-54.
2. Ibid., p.169

class' in what he calls the 'Swazi mode of production'(1). This domination was secured through the control of land allocation and the extraction of tribute labour from their subjects. As we have shown however, the tributary relation which was one of the key conditions for the progressive reproduction of Swazi society, was largely displaced in significance following the penetration by capital of Southern Africa. Despite the persistent extraction of surplus labour by chiefs from their subjects, as we noted, this began to take new forms, so that in many cases what had hitherto constituted a relation of production became in effect a relation of distribution. Thus chiefs began to demand cash in lieu of surplus labour, and the aristocracy collected various levies, especially for the repurchase of land. Reproduction of social life in the Swazi reserves which was contingent on the control which the indigenous ruling alliance exercised over land allocation, was an important precondition for a steady supply of cheap labour-power to the capitalist enterprises of the region. In this sense, indigenous relations and social practices, became important conditions of existence for capital. But these relations and practices, along with the actual processes of class formation, were transformed over time.

It is necessary to distinguish between general transhistorical categories, and those contingent on specific historical conditions of

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.101.

existence. While the concept of class itself can be generalised, specific classes are constituted under definite historical conditions. The conceptualisation of the 'Swazi Rulers' as a class representing the aristocrat-chief alliance is acceptable, providing that the concept is developed within the discourse of pre-colonial Swazi society. Nevertheless, the colonial period was characterised by an articulation of the Swazi pre-capitalist and the capitalist mode of production, whereby the latter progressively came to dominate the former and undermine its capacity to reproduce itself. The result was a society dominated by capitalist economic practices. Although classes are located at the level of production relations, this tells us little about class position, or the stance assumed by classes in the process of class struggle. Nor does it inform us of the hold which various ideologies have over discrete class forces. Relations of production provide constraints on the success of specific class projects, but 'they are typically compatible with various configurations of class forces'(2). While it is true that the Swazi aristocracy and chiefs adhered to a multiplicity of pre-colonial social practices, at the level of abstraction of class conceptualisation, there is no simple transposition of classes conceived within the discourse of pre-capitalist Swaziland to the discourse of Swazi society under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production.

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1. B. Jessop, 'The Political Indeterminacy of Democracy', in A. Hunt, (ed.) Marxism and Democracy, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p.64.

It is possible, that the designation of the 'Swazi Rulers' as a class, also stems partially from the Poulantzian problematic within which Fransman has worked. This has led him to assign a 'class belonging' to all ideological elements. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that such elements taken in isolation have no necessary class belonging or connotation. Such connotation 'is only a result of the articulation of these elements in a concrete ideological discourse'(1). The persistence and durability of pre-capitalist ideological and political practices does not necessarily imply the survival of pre-capitalist class forces under capitalism. These are rather transformed. This is why the class struggle in colonial Swaziland was primarily a struggle of the formation of class forces as opposed to a struggle between class forces(2). The relative indeterminacy of class formation from class position(3) is what enabled an intermediate class like the aristocracy and their allies to eventually establish the class hegemony of capital in the post-colonial era. For hegemony, even when viewed in the context of class formation, extends beyond the economic, to include the attainment of political as well as ideological interests. The constitution of the class forces of capital in Swaziland was therefore achieved through the articulation of pre-capitalist ideological, political and social practices with capitalist class interests.

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1. E. Laclau, op.cit., (1977), p.99.

2. See A. Przeworski, 'The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky The Class Struggle to Recent Debates', Politics and Society, Vol. V, No.4., (1977), and B. Jessop, op.cit., (1980).

3. B. Jessop, op.cit., (1980), p.64.

But certainly adherence to pre-colonial social practice did not imply pre-capitalist class belonging. How then can we categorise the erstwhile pre-colonial dominant class on the eve of independence?

Our earlier discussion has illustrated how the Swazi ruling alliance utilised its withering power as a pre-capitalist class to abet the process of primitive accumulation initiated through the creation of Mswati's state. The smaller amount of labour time which the aristocracy and chiefs could extract from their subjects during the colonial era, was partially off-set by the new forms of tribute extraction that we have discussed. Although there is no adequate empirical study available, it is possible that such losses of labour time were also off-set through the development of the forces of production. Moreover, the tendency for commodity production and the development of capitalist relations to arise on Swazi Nation Land favoured the aristocracy and chiefs through their control over land allocation. The right of levy, and the cash which they received as indirect rulers of the colonial state, particularly after the legislation of the 1950 Proclamation, further strengthened the position of the chiefs and aristocracy./ Hence in the post World War II period in particular, we are able to witness the emergence through transition of Swaziland's pre-colonial rulers, a petty-bourgeoisie of owner peasants whose surplus money and means of subsistence secured an annual supply over and above that which was needed for their own reproduction. Commoners were not necessarily excluded from this process, but clearly the chiefs and the aristocracy were in a stronger position to become commodity producers, particularly since in Swaziland as we have seen, the objective conditions did not favour the

evolution of such production. Chiefs like Makhosini Dlamini (who was also an aristocrat), the first Prime Minister of Swaziland and his father were given substantial aid by the colonial authorities. This enabled them, with the use of both surplus labour and other forms of labour to become well-to-do farmers.

As Mao Tse Tung has argued, this petty-bourgeois owner peasant class constantly desires to transform itself into an independent bourgeoisie(1), precisely because it is a transitional class. Here, the erstwhile rulers of pre-colonial Swaziland had a decided advantage over commoners engaged in commodity production. Because they maintained control over land allocation and land use and represented what Mao has called the 'most backward and reactionary relations of production'(2), they were well placed to pursue a comprador route of accumulation. While this route was initially short-circuited through the large-scale alienation of Swazi Nation Land, in the post World War II period, elements of the emergent petty-burgeoisie who were simultaneously aristocrats and/or chiefs were able to ally themselves with the international bourgeoisie. This marked their transition to a more comprador role, characterised by an increasing dependence on imperialsim for their existence and development. This is not just revealed in the transformation of the Swaziland National Fund into the National Treasury. As capital penetration under the aegis of British and South African capital intensified, a new trend which was set in the

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1. Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works Volume I (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p.15.

2. Ibid., p.15.

1960's proved to be none other than the precursor of the familiar pattern in the post-independence conjuncture. The Usuthu Pulp Company eventually bought up the area which had been afforested by the CDC for 'the nation' in 1962, in return for which the emergent comprador bourgeoisie acquired a £50,000 interest in the company(1). This reveals a specific level of comprador accumulation whereby the material basis of this faction of capital is formed 'by a joint investment with foreign capital in units producing for export'(2). It is important to note, however, as Bozzoli has pointed out, that 'the economic identification of classes is not the last word, but merely the first, and that it is the political, social, cultural and ideological character of classes which renders them real and recognisable categories'.(3)

During the colonial period, the Swazi aristocracy and their allies had undergone a two-fold process of disorganisation. They were disorganised as a class but along with the mass of Swazi 'people', they were reconstituted within the nexus of officialdom/people relations. Swazis, as we have argued, were endowed with highly negative social identities, and at the level of the state were regarded as 'natives', and their King as a Paramount Chief. Settlers viewed Swazis even more negatively. When the first Swazi completed a BA degree, through correspondence, considerable controversy arose over the question of his further education. The majority of Europeans questioned on the

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1. J. Halpern, op.cit, p.391.
2. J.G. Taylor, op.cit., p.249.
3. Quoted by S. Marks and R. Rathbone, op.cit., p.7.

issue believed that he should be discouraged 'on the grounds that he would get above himself", that "Kaffirs must not be civilised", that "raw natives are better workers", that he would put "queer ideas" in the heads of the people or create trouble'(1). What follows is that all Swazis had a common interest in the reconstitution of their national identity. The difference would lie in the way that various groups would articulate these popular forces with class forces.

Decolonisation in Swaziland - Class Struggle, the Formation of Political Parties and the Crisis of Colonial State Power

The post World War II period was characterised by an intensification of capital penetration of Swaziland, so that both quantitative and qualitative shifts were manifest in the trajectory of capitalist development in the country. Whereas up to this period, the development of capitalist relations of production had been influenced largely by events in South Africa and the evolution of white settler mining and later agriculture in Swaziland, the pattern changed after World War II. This phase was characterised by a far more linear penetration through the rapid infusion of foreign capital via a more direct form of multinational investment in mining, agriculture and forestry. The passing of the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940, paved the way for such penetration which took place under the aegis of British and South African capital. Here, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) constituted the major co-ordinator of investment and undertook a number of ventures in

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1. H. Kuper, The Uniform of Colour (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 1947), p.32.

conjunction with British and South African based multinationals. This marked an overall trend in the global economy whereby the production of raw materials, insofar as this was possible, was shifted to the metropolitan countries(1). A qualitative shift from 'classical imperialism' to 'late Capitalism' impled, inter alia, the massive export of fixed capital in the form of machines, vehicles and equipment goods leading to intensive production of surplus value in the periphery.

In South Africa itself, World War II witnessed a massive economic boom as problems associated with the importation of goods from Europe led to major advances in manufacturing industry. The large number of conscripts compounded the need for massive labour inputs so that a huge influx of Africans to the Witwatersrand from the South African periphery took place. Within the whole of Southern Africa, the heightening of surplus value production implied a major shift in labour market requirements. Greater quantities of skilled and unskilled workers were demanded as real subsumption of the labour process by capital in Swaziland occured in those sectors dominated by foreign capital. The development of the productive forces was accompanied by the rapid socialisation of labour as increasing numbers of Swazis became proletarianised. The initial impact of rapid capital penetration led to a massive expansion of the labour market, followed towards the beginning of the 1960's by a phase of contraction, as supply began to outstrip demand, leading to a concentration of surplus

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1. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London: New Left Books, 1975), p.65. Mandel gives examples which include the manufacturing of synthetic rubber and the massive outlay on oil drilling in Western Europe and the North Sea.

population and a rise in the industrial reserve army of labour(1). Along with the rise of African Nationalism and the struggle for independence throughout the continent, no less than its resurgence in the form of protracted mass action in neighbouring South Africa during the 1950's, these factors came to produce profound effects on the course of class struggle in Swaziland itself. This took place at the point of production as well as on the political and ideological terrains. But what configurations of classes were present in Swaziland, and how would these interact to determine the outcome of these struggles?

The Dominant Classes

On the eve of decolonisation, the dominant classes were constituted by a heterogeneity of capitals and widely divergent interests. Local capital was divided between productive and commercial capital. The former until the 1960's consisted predominantly of agricultural capital. By 1960, approximatley 50 per cent of Swaziland's land surface was held as Title Deed Land, although of this, 40 per cent was held by absentee landlords, many of whom lived and farmed in South Africa's Eastern Transvaal, using Swaziland for winter grazing(2). The remaining 60 per cent of Title Deed Land was used for the capitalist production of agricultural commodities for the export market, primarily in South Africa. Production in contrast to foreign capital enterprises, was largely labour intensive. Local commercial capital

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1. See. A.R. Booth, 'The Development of the Swazi Labour Market 1900-1968', South African Labour Bulletin, Vol.VI, No.6., (April 1982), p. 51.

2. Swaziland : Report for the Year 1962, (op.cit.)

depended in large measure on South African producers and wholesalers and tended to invest its profits locally. Depending largely on the size of the domestic market, local commercial capital was far more supportive of foreign monopoly capital than was local productive capital, whose existence was to an extent threatened by the massive infusions of foreign capital.

Nevertheless, as Fransman has demonstrated, the circuits of foreign monopoly and settler productive capitals were separate. Very few of foreign capital's inputs were purchased in Swaziland given the overall absence of import substitution industry. This gave local capital a fair amount of independence from foreign capital, and minimised conflict in areas such as the pricing of inputs purchased by one from the other[1]. Moreover, the fact that foreign capital produced for overseas export markets, meant that there was virtually no competition for markets between the two capitals. While there was, therefore, a minimum clash of interests between capitals, they still had different interests. This was manifest in the creation of different institutions to articulate their interests. In 1961, the Swaziland Chamber of Industries was formed, indicating that the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was unable to reflect the interests of foreign capital. That they had common interests, was revealed through the creation of the Federation of Swaziland Employers in August 1964, largely as an outgrowth of the necessity to formulate a common labour strategy following the 1962 and 1963 strikes in Swaziland.

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.97 ff.

A significant contradiction between local and foreign capital emerged at the level of the state which gave greater assistance to foreign capital in distributing its resources. In 1957, Mr. Martin, the secretary for Finance and Development explained to farmers how the state had allocated £810,000 for the development of communications between 1955 and 1960:

> It seemed to us... that the best way of spending it was to ensure that the most important producers were given reasonable import and export facilities. Well now; it was then for decision: what were the most important producers or potential producers? We regard them as being the forestry concerns in the Peak district, the Swaziland Irrigation scheme, Big Bend, and the Malkerns area...(1)

With the exception of farmers in the Malkerns area, all producers mentioned were part of foreign capital.

But above all, clear political differences were to emerge between the colonial state and foreign capital on the one hand, and settler capital on the other. In 1949, the European Advisory Committee had received statutory recognition, with a total of ten elected members for whom every British subject over the age of twenty one could vote. Although the Committee was not given legislative power, it was still able to exercise a significant influence on government policy(2). With decolonisation on the agenda, the settler community felt increasingly threatened, and began to label emergent Swazi political leaders as

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1. "Report of talk given by Mr. Martin to a meeting of farmers and others interested, in the Agricultural Hall, Bemersdorp". (9 May 1957). S.N.A. File SFA Offices of the Federation of Swaziland Employers, quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., p.97.

2. Swaziland: Report for the Year 1959, (London: HMSO), p.126.

'Communist-inspired', 'demagogic' and 'power-grasping'(1). These fears were expressed by Carl Todd, who argued that 'the disproportion of European population to natives in Swaziland should be a matter of great concern to all of us. Whatever development has occured in Swaziland is attributable most exclusively to European enterprise'(2).

The solution that Todd proposed was that:

> The Swaziland Government take active steps to encourage the immigration to Swaziland of British subjects and that incidental thereto, representation should be made to the Colonial Development Corporation to further a settlement scheme on their property known as Swaziland Ranches situated between the Umbeluzi and Komati River.(3)

As the independence struggle unfolded, however, settler capital increasingly saw that its future survival would no longer be secured through numbers, but through an alliance with the emergent comprador class force. Foreign capital and the state on the other hand were more keen to stand aloof while observing the different kinds of political forces which would emerge in the run-up to independence.

The Intermediate Classes - The Petty Bourgeoisie

Having dealt with the evolution of a comprador class from the petty bourgeosie, it is possible to discern a variety of interests within the emergent petty-bourgeoisie in Swaziland. Before World War II, very

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1. R.P. Stevens, 'Swaziland Political Development', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.1, No.3, (1963), p.333.

2. "Motion by C.F. Todd to the Colonial Authorities", S.N.A., File No.3094 K (undated).

3. Ibid.

few Swazis engaged in trading activities. By 1938, there were a mere six trading stores registered in the names of Swazis(1). Permission was required to establish a trading store on Swazi Nation Land from the chiefs and aristocracy, and after World War II, the arrangement was formalised through the creation of the Swazi Commercial Amadoda. At least until independence, these traders operated on a far smaller scale than the commercial bourgeosie and were almost entirely dependent on family labour as opposed to wage labour. The close control wielded by the compradors over the Swazi Commercial Amadoda, tied this faction of the petty bourgeoisie closely to the political interests of the King and his allies.

The failure of land settlement schemes meant that up to the early sixties, the emergence of a rich or 'petty-bourgeois' peasantry was confined to Swazi Nation Land. Nevertheless elements of capital, including settler capital, were keen on fostering the growth of a class of independent small holders on freehold land.

In a meeting in April 1962, Carl Todd urged a greater integration of Swazis into agriculture and industry:

> It is very important to develop a middle class Swazi who can accumulate funds in order to invest in projects in the territory and that is a better and surer way of providing him with a stake, than the system of national ownership of land, which we find practised in Swazi tradition.(2)

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1947), p.137. The 1956 Census showed that by that time, 200 Swazis ran their own business. See Swaziland: Report for the Year 1962, op.cit., p.18.

2. Minutes of the Third Session of the Fourth Reconstituted European Advisory Council of the Territory of Swaziland (Mbabane, 10th and 11th April, 1962), p.25, S.N.A.

These sentiments were echoed by Brian Marwick, the Resident Commissioner, who argued that the Swazi system of land tenure inhibited the 'legitimate aspirations' of enterprising Swazi. Referring specifically to 'individual Swazi farmers', Marwick argued that:

> ...it is important from every point of view to increase the stake of the Swazi people in both (the sugar) and other industries. In the case of sugar, I am convinced that the best way of doing so will be by encouraging the establishment of schemes for Swazi settlers(1).

Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) was accordingly established in 1962, wholly owned and managed by the CDC, as a small holder scheme for Swazi farmers. Most farms ranged between 8 and 16 acres in size and were held on a leasehold basis, although five large farms of 60 acres were also created. Initially approximatley two hundred small holdings were established, and apparently there was a great demand for more. What is significant about the establishment of these farms is that as we shall see, they proved to be a stronghold of opposition to the comprador bourgeoisie and their political allies.

The other important faction of the petty-bourgeoisie, were the 'new petty-bourgeosie', who at a most general level can be defined as functionaries of capital who are entrusted with the control of the labour process. Without entering the debates which have surrounded the conceptualisation of the structural determination and formation of

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1. Ibid., p.7.

various alignments of the 'new petty-bourgeoisie'(1), it can be asserted that the new petty bourgeoisie have a 'contradictory class location.'(2) This contradictory constitution of the new petty bourgeoisie would indicate that their political alignment is largely indeterminate and can only be decided in the concrete processes of class and popular struggle. Included within this faction of the petty-bourgeoisie were the professionals, doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers etc., as well as employees in the state bureaucracy (excluding those at the lowest levels). The numbers in this faction were to swell considerably in the years immediately prior to and following independence, principally as an effect of the rapid expansion of the educational apparatuses of the state.

The Peasantry

In Fransman's view, the chief difference between the peasantry and the working class in Swaziland, is that the former's location in the social division of labour in the 'Swazi mode of production', predominates over their place in the capitalist mode of production. In the case of the working class it is the other way around(3). According to the 1956 Census, there were 25,928 peasant farmers. The 1962

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1. See for example, N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, (London: New Left Books, 1975): G. Carchedi, 'on the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class' Economy and Society, Vol.IV, No.1, (1975); A. Prseworski, op.cit., and E.O. Wright, Class Crisis and the State, (London: Verso Editions, 1978).

2. E.O. Wright, op.cit., especially Chapter 2.

3. M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.102-3.

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report gives a figure of 138,000 for the total working age population, out of which 80,000 were not engaged in wage earning employment or schooling. They also point out that the 'average Swazi man spends about 40 per cent of his time in employment which typically occupies about two years of a five year cycle'(1). The report goes on to state:

> There is undoubtedly under-employment in the rural areas among persons 'resting' between employments and this group constitutes a considerable potential reserve of manpower, which will be realised increasingly as the average Swazi homestead is becoming more dependent on wage earnings as a source of income... The overall percentages of participation in wage employment for rural males are 40 per cent wage earning, 45 per cent not currently employed but had been employed previously and 15 per cent never employed.(2)

If by 'peasants', we refer to small-scale cultivators who rely primarily on household labour to produce both for subsistence and the market(3), then clearly the class composition of the inhabitants of Swazi Nation Land is diverse, and cannot be encapsulated in its totality under the concept of the 'peasantry'. A new category must be introduced in order to adequately conceptualise migrant workers on Swazi Nation Land. This category has been variously described as 'semi-proletariat', 'worker peasant' and 'peasantariat'. All these terms have been employed by different writers to describe the same phenomenon. What is important in the context of Swaziland, is to note that it was from these quarters that the compradors were ultimately able to draw their strongest support.

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1. Swaziland, Report for the Year 1962, (op.cit.), p.19.

2. Ibid.

3. E. Taylor, "Peasants or Proletarians? The Transformation of Agrarian Production Relations in Egypt', in B. Munslow and H. Finch (eds.), op.cit., p.185.

The Working Class

It is arguable even today that few Swazi have totally severed their links with Swazi Nation Land. Nevertheless, there is a sizeable number of workers who are more or less permanently involved in wage employment. Despite continued connections with their family on Swazi Nation Land, 'the great bulk of its (the workers) productive time was spent in the production of surplus-value in the capitalist mode of production'(1). In so far as the reserve areas were incapable of reproducing the homestead, it can be argued that Swazi workers were compelled to seek wage employment. Effectively they had therefore (if not literally, or in ownership terms) been separated from the means of production. But the continuing connections which the working class maintained with Swazi Nation Land drew them into a contradictory and uneasy relationship with the comprador bourgeoisie and their political and ideological projects. While the strongest opposition to both colonial and comprador hegemony has come from these quarters, this opposition has been inconsistent, wavering and sporadic.

Of the total working age population in 1962, of 138,000, there was a total labour force of 38,200 consisting of 24,000 workers in rural areas, 5,400 workers in proclaimed urban and peri-urban areas and 8,000 in industrial settlements. During that year, a total of 8,838 workers were recruited for the gold mines and 400 for the coal mines in south Africa(2). The Holleman Survey revealed that in 1960 wages

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.103. The bracketed insert is ours.

2. Swaziland Report for the Year 1962., (op.cit.), p.19.

constituted nearly 83 per cent of cash income in the rural areas of Swaziland(1).

Having outlined the configuration of classes in Swaziland on the eve of decolonisation, it is now possible to turn to the process of decolonisation itself and the role of emergent political parties in this process.

The Development of Party Politics

Positive steps towards the decolonization of Swaziland began to take place in 1960. In October, Brian Marwick began a series of formal discussions with members of the European Advisory Council (EAC) and the Swazi National Council (SNC). In November, the British Secretary of State agreed to the formal establishment of a constitutional committee. The committee was to comprise representatives of the colonial administration in Swaziland, the EAC and the SNC. Three members of the Swaziland Progessive Party (SPP) were included in the talks, but as members of the SNC and not the SPP(2).

The SPP was formed in 1929 as the Progressive Association with the help of the Resident Commissioner, to represent the interests of educated Swazi both in and out of government. The organisation soon came under fire from the colonial state as well as the aristocracy and

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1. J.F. Holleman (ed), Experiment in Swaziland. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press 1964), p.258.

2. R.P. Stevens, op.cit, p.336.

chiefs, who were suspicious of an organisation established outside the ambit of indigenous institutions. Under pressure from Sobhuza, the colonial state was only too happy to decree that the Progressive Association come under the control of the SNC. In the '1950's, however, the Association began to pursue a more independent line and in 1957, its president, J.J. Nquku, embarked on a visit to Britain, America and Western Europe. In 1960, without Royal approval the Association voted to transform itself into the SPP at a meeting held in Kwaluseni(1).

In October, Sobhuza made clear his views on party politics. He said that political parties could only lead Africans to hardship, and 'had caused the crisis and confusion in the Congo'. He also argued that 'the policy of one man one vote can only lead us into hardship', giving as an example the 'system practised in Russia and Nazi Germany'(2). It was not surprising therefore that differences swiftly emerged within the Swazi delegation to the Constitutional Committee talks. Objecting strongly in February 1962, to the fact that the discussions were to proceed 'within the framework of the Paramount Chief's proposals'(3) as approved by the EAC, Nquku was suspended by the Swazi from their section of the committee. The other two members of the SPP on the committee, A.P. Zwane and O.M. Mabuza also resigned and sought the advice of a constitutional expert, Professor Denis Cowen of Cape Town University, who helped them to draw up their own proposals.

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1. R.P. Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: The Former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp.201-3.

2. The Times of Swaziland, 14 October 1960.

3. R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1963), p.336.

The EAC could only have been delighted by the expulsion of the Nationalist SPP faction from the talks. Sobhuza had already done much to allay their fears of his intentions, when he had invited two EAC members and the Resident Commissioner to his residence at Masundvwini in April 1960. He told them:

> Personally I feel that no man with all his senses and a good citizen could ever think of depriving one of his own property and still remain complacent with somebody else's property. People who try to do such things are those who have had ill-treatment like a child that has been ill-treated from its early stages... That type of person I am referring to now, is such as we have read about in papers who say 'let the Europeans go back overseas' and speak in an unreasonable way like that. But I would like to give an assurance to this house that here and now personally I feel that no true African would think in terms of trying to oust a person from his house or think that he can just chase his neighbours out'.(1)

The Constitutional committee released its report in March 1962, recommending the creation of an Executive Council comprising a Governor, three ex-officio members, one official and four nominated members, four unofficial members (two Swazi and two white), and a Legislative Council. The latter would be comprised of twenty four elected members on a '50-50' basis, by Europeans and Swazis. Section 97 of the proposals was to become the stumbling block to their implementation. It stipulated that 'matters affecting Swazi law and custom, Swazi land and minerals and Swazi institutions should be the responsibility of the Ngwenyama-in-Council and be excluded from the purview of the Council'(2). The control of mineral rights and revenues,

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.212.
2. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.161.

insofar as the British colonial authorities were concerned, could not be vested in the King, and this was to become a central feature of the constitutional tussle that unfolded in the build-up to independence.

In the meantime, significant developments were unfolding in the party political scene. At the end of 1961, a split emerged in the SPP leadership. Nquku was accused by Ambrose Zwane, the secretary general and Dumisa Dlamini the party's youth leader of treating the party as his own property and dictating the course of meetings and the decision-making process. By the end of February 1962, a special general conference had deposed Nquku and installed Zwane as leader, although a small group remained loyal to Nquku and continued to regard him as president. Zwane's ideas were formulated in the mould of militant African politics. Born in Manzini in 1924, Zwane was educated in various Catholic and Protestant mission schools. He was the son of Mdolomba Zwane, whom Sobhuza had sent overseas in the 1920's to contest the land partitions, and was the grandson of Sandlane Zwane. Having matriculated with distinction, Zwane went to South Africa to study medicine at Fort Hare and the University of the Witwatersrand, where he was able to meet leading African Nationalist figures like Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobhukwe. He returned to Swaziland on completion of his studies and worked as a Government Medical Officer, but was angered by the racism that continually confronted him. After the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in March 1961, Zwane decided to resign from the medical service and enter politics on a full time basis.(1).

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1. R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967), pp.203-5.

Following his assumption of the leadership of the SPP, Zwane travelled abroad soliciting support for his cause. His travels took him as far as the Soviet Union, and at the end of May 1962, he attended the All African People's conference in Accra. During the course of his travels he was repeatedly arrested in South Africa and declared a prohibited immigrant, and was released through pressure from the British Embassy.

In August 1962, a further split within the SPP took place and K.T. Samketi and O.A. Mabuza resigned and sought an alliance with the Zwane faction. This was secured in April 1963 when the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) was formed. Despite the splits within the emergent political parties, their existence was believed to be necessary by the majority of the petty-bourgeoisie who on the whole were alienated from the indigenous structures which were purportedly representing them. Thus Timothy Zwane, founder of the Swaziland Students' Union at Pius II College in Basotholand argued that:

> We do not deny that many Swazis still owe allegiance to the traditional institutions, but we resent... that because of this these traditional institutions should be imposed upon everybody.(1)

But differences over strategy and interest began to emerge in the party political development of the country. This was clearly evidenced by the formation of the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP was headed by Sishayi Nxumalo, although it was funded and advised by a handful of white liberals, including Natie Kirsh and V.

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1. Times of Swaziland, 4 May 1962.

Jordan Rozwadoswki, a Polish immigrant to South Africa who had moved to Swaziland on account of South Africa's racial policies. The SDP was deeply critical of Pan Africanism, and called for a class alliance based on the petty-bourgeoisie as opposed to the compradors:

> The SDP believes that the unnecessary extremes of Black Nationalism in other parts of Africa have always been caused by the refusal of the privileged minority to identify itself with the aspirations of its Black compatriots and by its stubborn desire to maintain its social and economic privilege without making it morally acceptable by social and political leadership... The real issue is whether the White elite will have the courage and wisdom to join hands with Africans and Eurafricans and work together for our country's progress and prosperity instead of jeopardising their very survival by a dubious alliance with the forces of tribalism.(1)

This sophisticated talk of alliances and interests contrasted sharply with the populism of the NNLC:

> The Ngwane National Liberatory Congress is symbolic of one thing and one thing only - the sudden awakening of a dispossessed people fully determined to rise to nationhood of equality with other independent and democratic countries of the world...(2)

Another party was formed in July 1962, the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC). It was an amalgamation of Clifford Nkosi's Mbandzeni Party and Dr. George Msibi's Convention Movement. Nkosi allegedly maintained close links with South African lawyers closely tied to the South African Government(3). In January 1963, the MNC articulated its objectives in a Charter signed by George Msibi, placing its emphasis on 'restoration' and the supremacy of the Swazi nation under the monarchy. Their main differences with the Constitutional Committee proposals were over the 50-50 voting conception. They

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1. Times of Swaziland, 6 April 1962.
2. "Letter from Dumisa Dlamini to the Editor", Times of Swaziland., 31 May 1963.
3. R.P. Sevens, op.cit., (1967), p.209.

favoured universal adult franchise, although this contradicted their Charter which stated that

> ...all laws should be valid and legal when they bear the signature of the King, the Ngwenyama of Swaziland, as an expression of the counsel of the Council of Chiefs and the authority of the Swazi people as vested in Parliament.(1)

Despite the ambiguities of the approach, it had considerable appeal to the compradors, but its emphasis on the supremacy of the Swazi Nation stating that 'the human resources of the Swazi Nation will be preferred as priority in all enterprises', undermined the confidence of the settler bourgeoisie.

The Development of Trade Unions and the 1963 Strikes

While the constitutional discussions and the formation of political parties were still trying to get off the ground, the working class entered the arena and made its feelings forcefully known. In May 1960, the F.C. Catchpole Report on Labour Legislation was released. Amongst other things, the report suggested amendments to the Trade Union and Trades Disputes Proclamation No.31 of 1942. Catchpole expressed unease over the existing system of industrial negotiation which was handled by indvunas appointed by the SNC. He pointed out that:

> In practice...workers...look to Ndunas for assistance in domestic problems. Ndunas are paid by the firm to which they are accredited and it is not unlikely that workers have in some cases come to regard them as representatives of the employers rather than of workers and that in consequence complaints are not pressed as

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1. Ibid., p.210.

> vigorously as they might otherwise be... It seems probable that some Ndunas have been appointed for their political rather than their industrial experience.(1)

Trade Unions were not illegal, but neither were they encouraged, and in his recommendations, Catchpole suggested ways of improving the 'Nduna system', for example through the selection of experienced senior workers by the SNC, as their indvuna's.

Workers themselves were growing wise to the importance of trade unionism and in August 1962, a Swaziland Mining Workers Union was formed at Havelock Asbestos mine, the site of Swaziland's first strike in 1948. Altnough the union did not affiliate itself to any political party, it denied that 'it had closed its eyes to the present political struggle'(2). In the meantime, in April, the newly-formed Pulp and Timber Workers' Union called a strike at Usuthu Pulp mill after demands for a minimum wage had not been met and after two union members were dismissed. All of the company's eight hundred mill workers supported the strike, and only returned to work after having been promised higher wages(3). This strike proved to be the tip of the iceberg, and in the following year the whole country experienced a series of strikes.

The first strike in 1963 occured in February when workers of the railway contracting company building the railway that was to carry iron-ore to the port in Mozambique held a one day strike complaining of

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1. F.C. Catchpole, Report on Labour Legislation in Swaziland, (Mbabane, 12 May 1960), pp.6-7, S.N.A.

2. Contact (Cape Town), 6 September 1962,

3. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.201.

low wages and the impotence of the SNC's indvuna who was supposed to be representing them. But a more significant development took place in March at the Ubombo Ranches sugar plantations. What was interesting about this strike was both the level of organisation that facilitated it, as well as the fact that most of the organisation was conducted by leaders and members of the Zwane faction of the SPP later to become the NNLC. Mobilisation for the strike had begun in January, by Dumisa Dlamini and Frank Groening, who after addressing a meeting of workers were restràined by a court order from entering the sugar plantation. Dlamini and his party workers then urged the workers to make demands for a minimum monthly wage of R30 to replace the hopelessly inadequate R7 existing wage. On 18 March, 2,500 sugarcane workers in Big Bend went out on a strike that lasted for nine days(1). The Mobile Force of the Swazi police was called in and seventeen people were prosecuted as a result of the strike. Although the strike failed to procure a substantial wage increase for the workers, 'it served notice on their white employers, who had been stunned by the whole affair', that politics and labour could find a common cause(2). These events served to illustrate that the NNLC was determined to secure for itself a social base amongst the working class in order to emerge as a significant force in Swazi politics.

One important consequence of the strike was the issuing of a proclamation which forbade strikes or lock-outs without three weeks'

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1. R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967), p.233.

2. Ibid., pp.233-4.

notice. In addition, a number of measures were legislated to increase the power of the police. These measures failed, however, to stem the tide of worker militancy, and on the 29th March, 150 saw-mill workers at Peak Timbers went on strike to demand pay increases. Shortly after this in April, the government imposed a ban on the sale of sour milk, porridge and other 'market' foods at the Mbabane market. On 5 April, Dumisa Dlamini addressed sixty market women and with his powerful oratory linked their cause to the national struggle for independence from colonial rule. The meeting turned into a protest march, which was broken up by police intervention and the use of teargas(1). A further strike took place at the Peak Timbers saw mill on 28 May when workers struck in support of five fellow workers who had been retrenched.

But the most dramatic strike of all took place at the Havelock Mine on May 20th. Owned by the British Turner and Newall group, this mine was the fifth largest of its kind in the world at the time of the strike. The miners demanded R2 a day in place of the R1 that they were receiving, and about 1,350 miners came out in support of the strike. The strike dragged on peacefully until 8 June, when the arrest of twelve alleged 'ringleaders' precipitated a violent confrontation. Police used teargas in dispersing the crown of 2,000 that had gathered to witness their leaders being conveyed to Mbabane(2). Most of the

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1. Ibid.

2. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.373.

strike leaders were NNLC members and on 9 June, the NNLC held a protest rally in Mbabane and called for a general strike. The following Monday, saw Mbabane brought to a standstill as the NNLC's general strike call was heeded. Dumisa Dlamini then led a peaceful march through the town demanding to see the Resident Commissioner, who in turn agreed to receive a deputation of fifteen. This was led by Dlamini and Macdonald Maseko, a South African activist who had escaped from house arrest in South Africa. The release of the twelve imprisoned strike leaders, a minimum wage of R2 per day and the scrapping of the proposed constitution were demanded by the deputation. News of these unprecedented events travelled to Mbabane prison where a riot took place, and despite the use of teargas and firing of live rounds, ten prisoners escaped. In the meantime, the strike in Mbabane held solid and ignored a respresentative of the SNC, who was sent by the King to urge striking workers back to work(1). More significantly, workers at Ubombo Ranches, Swazi Plantations and the Piggs Peak area, the Bar Circle Ranch, and cotton pickers on a settler estate joined the Havelock miners in solidarity strikes(2). In order to deal with this crisis, precipitated by widespread worker discontent, meetings of strikers were banned in Mbabane and whites were enlisted into the police force as special constables. An emergency was declared, as police reinforcements were brought in from Bechuanaland to aid Swazialnd's tiny security force of 370 men. With order rapidly breaking down, further external aid was sought and an entire battalion

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1. Ibid., p.374., Halpern writes: 'The weekly Times of Swaziland, came out only in a one-page edition, produced by the two white men on its staff'.

2. Ibid., p.374.

of Gordon Highlanders were airlifted into the country from Kenya.

On 17th June, the troops began their operation by throwing a cordon around the picket lines at the Havelock mine. About 1,000 miners were interrogated and 500 announced their intention to return to work. A further 480 workers were then addressed by the Piggs Peak District Commissioner, following which, all but 153 returned to work. These, along with other suspected strikers hiding in the surrounding hills were arrested and charged. Eventually, 87 were convicted on charges of public violence(1). Dumisa Dlamini and three other NNLC members had sentence postponed on them for 18 months, on similar charges, including inciting a strike. The Gordon Highlanders also pursued a similar strategy in Big Bend at Ubombo Ranches. Here 10 were convicted of public violence, 5 of whom received harsh sentences of three years with hard labour imprisonment. In Mbabane, 7 people were convicted of public violence for the general stay away, Dumisa Dlamini and Macdonald Maseko receiving 6 months each, suspended for 3 years(2).

The strikes had thus ground to halt, and the state had demonstrated its resolve to crush all extra-legal forms of opposition(1). By the end of the strike, 66,000 days of labour time had been forfeited, and the cost of policing the territory rose dramatically from RO.96 per capita in

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.222.

2. R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967) pp.235-6, M. Fransman, op.cit., p.223.

1960/1 to R1.96 per capita in 1964/5. The total cost of policing the actual strikes amounted to R1.7 million(2). What was the Swazi reaction to the strike? Both the SNC and the SDP were critical of the NNLC, although the SDP was far more sympathetic with 'what it regarded as legitimate worker grievances. What they were opposed to was the increasingly political complexion of the strike as it unfolded.

The attitude of the King was summed up in a report in the Times of Swaziland:

> He said he wondered whether there was not more behind the strikes at Mbabane and Havelock than a demand for higher wages. Strikes were usually engineered by people in industry, but the document before him giving the resolution passed at the meeting in Msunduza Township last Sunday came from people in political parties. "What puzzles me is what to call this thing that is happening. Shall we call it a demonstration for a certain purpose? Or shall we call it a strike? What is it? We should make it perfectly clear in this Council what the aim of all this is."
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> The Ngwenyama spoke of the dangers of demonstrations such as those in Mbabane. He said that when people gathered together in such large crowds a small spark could cause a big conflagration, and such damage could be done for no cause whatever..."How are we going to meet the situation? Are we going to have strikes? Or are we going to talk amicably? ...What did they want the King to do? Must he sit down while people were brought in from outside? Is this the way you will get your independence? Do you think the world will consider that you are capable of looking after yourselves if you send outside for help? I think this is a setback for our people."(3)

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1. Fransman writes: "The message was clear: as long as the 'rules of the game' defined by the state were accepted, rules designed to incorporate the members of the dominated classes by setting the state up as the defenders of their 'rights - basically the right that wages should be increased to 'reasonable' level then there will be no problems. But if the dominated classes stepped outside these 'rules' the state would intervene decisively to maintain 'law and order'. op.cit., p.223.

2. Ibid., p.225.

3. The Times of Swaziland, 14 June 1963.

Indeed the strike had illustrated the impotence of the King, both from the point of view of the colonial state and the strikers themselves. The state had actually appealed to the King to send in the regiments to Havelock, to protect workers from 'intimidation'. Likewise the workers, on the arrival of the Gordon Highlanders, had also made vain appeals to the King for the intercession on their behalf(1). But settler capital in particular, had been profoundly impressed by the hostile attitude shown by the King both towards the strike as well as by the development of the trade unions, and this served to propel the compradors and the settlers into an increasingly mutual embrace. The colonial state and foreign capital were more sympathetic towards the creation of trade unions, provided that these steered clear of political involvement, and put forward their demands 'in such a manner as to maintain the prosperity of the existing industries and to keep the investment field attractive to outside capital'(2). Natie Kirsh argued that:

> ...in this day and age there is little opposition from employers to the development of trade unions, and although in earlier years very stiff opposition confronted the establishment of any new trade union, this type of thinking has gone by the board.(3)

But all the above class forces were united in perceiving the threat which the strike had posed to their interests. The central feature of the independence struggle was the contradiction between the mass of the Swazi people and the colonial state. What is unclear was what

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1. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.376.

2. "Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Federation of Swaziland Employers", (12 October 1964), quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., p.257.

3. Ibid.

form the process of national struggle would take; what class forces would be most successful in articulating popular demands. What Dumisa Dlamini, Macdonald Maseko and the NNLC had threatened to achieve, was the articulation of popular democratic forces within a working class discourse. Working class struggles at the point of production in the heat of the strike wave which spread throughout the country, began to be transformed into the embryo of a struggle for working class hegemony. This required decisive state intervention in order to disarticulate the co-ordination of class and popular democratic forces. While the military intervention of the Gordon Highlanders was able to break the back of the strike, the arrest of the entire NNLC executive went a long way towards disorganising a party which was essentially in its infant stages of development. Its leader Ambrose Zwane, was arrested on 'trumped-up' charges of having conspired to burn down the Residency, and ordering the assassination of the Resident(1). Long and costly trials neutralised the NNLC leadership, who were eventually acquitted of the serious charges. Moreover the NNLC was reduced to virtual bankruptcy, placing it in a decidedly disadvantaged position at a time when British constitutional proposals were to lead to the first elections in the country.

Britain's Constitutional Proposals

Britain had reacted somewhat negatively to the proposals of the

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1. R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967), p.236.

Constitutional Committee rejecting the proposed constitutional power of the King, the vesting of mineral rights, and the selection method for the Legislative Council Members. They therefore put forward fresh proposals, which were designed to accommodate the interests of the SNC, the EAC and the emergent political parties, although in effect, they satisfied no-one. The proposals, which the British ultimately imposed upon the country, provided for executive powers to be vested in the Queen's Representative, a Commissioner assisted by an Executive council of three ex-officio members and five members appointed by Her Majesty's Commissioner. The Legislative Council would comprise twenty four elected members, along with four official and nominated members, over whom the Commissioner would preside. Of the twenty-four elected members, eight Swazi were to be elected 'traditionally', through the tinkhundla; eight Europeans were to be elected, four on a separate role and four on a national role, and the remaining eight were to be elected on a national voters' roll(1). Mineral rights, counter to the demands of the SNC were to be vested in the Commissioner, whose appointative powers in the Legislative Council could theoretically neutralise settler and SNC domination. This further cemented the comprador-settler alliance, who were united along with all sections of capital and the state in ensuring that the transition to independence proceeded in an orderly fashion.

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1. See H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), Chapter XIV; R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967), pp.225 ff.; A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.66.)

Royalty on the Offensive : The Formation of the Imbokodvo National Movement

Clearly a smooth transition to independence would best be affected by class forces which could bring about ideological unity in Swaziland by articulating its ideological strategy outside the domain of antagonisms arising from the dominant relations of production. The popular ideology of the compradors, spearheaded by the King, relied heavily on the concepts of 'tradition' and restoration, concepts which served to mystify and abrogate the contradiction in Swazi society, posed at the level of the mode of production. The popular ideology of 'tradition', through its appeal to the mass of the Swazi based on Swazi Nation Land, could ensure that the antagonism of the capital relation remain extraneous to the field of political and ideological struggle that now shifted its centre of gravity towards the resuscitation of popular traditions. These themselves "are the residue of a unique and irreducible historical experience, and as such, constitute a more solid and durable structure of meanings than the social structure itself."(1)

In this way, a nationalism based on revivalism submerged the class dimension of the struggle in its own backwaters. But this was hardly surprising, given the uneven incorporation of the country into the modern capitalist system that dominated its reproduction. Indeed the intensification of Sobhuza II's brand of nationalism corresponded, as Nairn has put it, 'to the absence of a material reality: the economic

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1. E. Laclau, op.cit., (1977), p.167.

and social institutions of modernity'(1).

The strategy of the compradors was influenced by the advice given to Sobhuza by van Wyk de Vries, one of his legal advisers who was a prominent member of the South African Broederbond. In a document leaked to the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail in October 1963, van Wyk de Vries argued in language reminiscent of South African Bantustan strategy, that the proposed British constitution would seriously undermine the position of Swaziland's 'traditional rulers':

> ...once this constitution becomes law, there is no possibility of extending the part of the Ngwenyama and the Swazi Nation in constitutional affairs but every possibility of the speedy extension of the part of the political parties. No one in his sound senses can deny that this constitution is a decisive step towards the extermination (sic) of Ngwenyama, the Swazi Nation as an organic entity, the Swazi language, culture, law and custom.(2)

Van Wyk de vries argued that the King should oppose the implementation of the British government proposals, failing which, he

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1. T. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, (London, Verso, 1981), p.343.

2. "White Paper: Swaziland Constitution" (undated, mimeo.) S.N.A., also quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., p.240. See also R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967) p.231. According to H. Kuper (1978) in mid 1962, Balthazar J. Vorster, then the South African Minister of Justice visited Swaziland 'unofficially', and was given permission to hunt at the King's private lodge at Ehlane. Sobhuza, according to Kuper made 'no political commitment' (p.230). She then quotes Majorie Juta, (Boundless Privilege, 1974, p.194 - no further bibliographic details provided) who quotes Sobhuza as follows on the subject of the dialogue with the South African Government: 'If you have two bulldogs in a Kraal, and you chain them up facing each other they will fly at each other's throat. But if you let them roam about the kraal they will get to know each other and there will be no fight'. Although there is a strong case for the argument that the King did not enter politics under South African governmental pressure it is the fact that Broaderbond advice was well received that is significant.

should form a political party of his own:

> Ngwenyama is the only man in Swaziland who can command the support of the vast majority of Swazi and Europeans and by organising them in a political body he can dominate the political scene and...can secure independence at an early date.(1)

The King made his first move in January 1964, when he called for a referendum on the new constitution. Two symbols were used, a reindeer, to represent the British Queen, and a lion to represent the King. Despite calls for a boycott by the Swazi political parties, the referendum went ahead with 122,000 Swazi rejecting the British proposals, and 154 in favour. Nevertheless, the British were determined to push forward with elections in June. Accordingly, the 'Imbokodvo National Movement' (INM) was launched by the King and his political allies. Imbokodvo which means hard, compact, unbreakable grindstone, 'stood for the continuance of the monarchy, Swazi customs, mineral and land rights, and the perjorative of the Ngwenyama'(2).

All political parties decided to contest the elections, but in May, a joint delegation from the SDP, the NNLC and the SPP, produced a memorandum for presentation to the Colonial Secretary, in which they expressed their grave fears in connection with the formation of the new party:

> The new party is in a position to use directly or indirectly the financial resources of the various organs of the tribal authority and to exert on our predominantly rural population various forms of pressure and intimidation stemming from the control of land allocation by the chiefs.(3)

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1. "White Paper: Swaziland Constitution.", op.cit.

2. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.357.

3. Ibid., p.363.

The NNLC also submitted a memorandum to the King, signed by Dumisa Dlamini, himself a prince, in which they warned of the dangers of the King's participation in party politics:

> The King's participation in party politics shakes royalty to its foundations and threatens the entire nation with strife, disunity and unheard of pandemonium, since the defeat of the party which he, a born King leads, will logically spell the downfall of the royalty...(1)

But these 'dangers' were to be converted by the INM into a source of strength. As yet, the political sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the population, the peasantry on Swazi Nation Land, remained untested. The INM, was able to portray the election to the politically inexperienced electorate as a choice between the survival or destruction of the Swazi nation. The power of the chiefs was by the submission of one of the Imbokodvo members, 'abused to force the people to vote for the Imbokodvo candidates under threat of ejection from land holdings and banishment from the chief's area'(2). Chiefs effectively became the INM's electoral agents, and politicians were banned from entering the Lobamba Royal Kraal.

The NNLC, its base secured among the working class, did make attempts to gain inroads among the peasantry. Its election manifesto called for land reform:

> A National Land Board shall be created to enquire into the whole question appertaining to land such as land tenure... and to effect an equitable redistribution of

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1. Times of Swaziland., 29 May 1964.

2. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.364. Halpern here is quoting Mr. A.K. Hlophe who was at the time the information officer of the SNC and Private Secretary to King Sobhuza.

> land. A new division of the land and conformity with the needs of the rural population that lives on and works on the land shall be the first task of the...Government .(1)

But apart from the evident vagueness of these demands, the actual problem of articulating them to the peasantry remained unsolved.

While settler capital rallied behind the INM, forming the United Swaziland Association (USA), which supported the supremacy of the King and his control over land and minerals, the Resident Sir Brian Marwick, was bitterly opposed to the King's manouvres. Just before his departure from Swaziland, for his next assignment, Marwick prepared a speech, which he had hoped to deliver at his final farewell gathering with Sobhuza and his councillors at Masundvwini. Having browsed through the text, Sobhuza asked him not to deliver the speech, but its contents were made available in the local press. In a rather paternalistic tone, Marwick said:

> I leave Swaziland dissatisfied with the results of my efforts to produce leaders amongst the Swazi people capable of supporting their King with sound, objective and fearless advice, or capable of removing from his shoulders the heavy burden which he has carried for so long. (2)

In one of his last public speeches in April 1964, Marwick more poetically pointed out that:

> There is, I fear, evidence in some quarters of an impenetrable conceit, a clutching at crutches to support limping traditions, a Canutism in the face of the rising tides of new thoughts and experiences which are flooding our Swaziland backwater. (3)

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1. Times of Swaziland, 15 May 1964.
2. Times of Swaziland, 24 April 1964.
3. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.362.

But Marwick was speaking largely in a personal capacity, and other sections of the colonial state preferred to a dopt a wait-and-see attitude as did foreign capital as a whole.

The 1964 elections, the Legislative Council and the Independence Constitution

Not surprisingly, the elections for the eight seats on the National roll, gave a crushing victory to the INM. They won all eight seats and obtained 85.45 of the vote. The only other political party to make an impressive showing was the NNLC which secured 12.3 per cent. of the vote. One consequence of the Imbokodvo victory, as the creation of new political alignments. The MNC and the SDP decided to dissolve and throw in their lot with the INM. Calling for unity for independence in the shortest possible time, the SDP executive stated that:

> It is the conviction of the SDP that any opposition to the Imbokodvo would be meaningless at this stage, and indeed would constitute a complete abandonment of all the SDP has stood and fought for since its inception. (1)

But more important was the reorganisation of the INM/USA alliance. Following the establishment of a Constitutional Committee in August 1965, it became clear that the INM was now pressing for an unequivocal rejection of the concept of reserved voting. Although this did not decisively split the settler/comprador alliance, it did create a certain amount of tension within the USA itself. Two schools of thought emerged. One was articulated by Carl Todd who had actually joined the INM before the 1964 elections and stood and won his seat as

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1. Times of Swaziland, 23 April 1965.

an INM member. Todd, realising that an open alliance between the settlers and the INM would do much to undermine the legitimacy of the INM, which could be accused of being infiltrated and run by settlers, had argued as early as in January 1965, that the settlers

> ...must move unobtrusively and not come to the forefront... European interests could best be served by the Europeans acting through the Imbokodvo as one body... Under no circumstances must the Europeans set themselves up as a separate group protecting their interests.(1)

Nevertheless Todd's unobtrusiveness involved a private communication with the King which fell into the hands of the NNLC. Here, Todd requested alternative protection for the white minority outside of the system of a reserved voters' roll, and suggested a fixed allocation of parliamentary seats for Europeans, with the INM's numerical superiority ensuring that the 'right European candidates are voted into parliament'(2).

But other settlers were far more demanding than Todd. Willie Meyer, a reactionary by any standards, refused to trust any informal arrangement made with the INM outside the constitutional framework. He argued that the INM was changing, having been 'brainwashed' by the British government, and radicalised by Pan-African influence, since it had been 'infiltrated' by members of the SDP. Meyer went as far as arguing that the original '50-50' Swazi/European formula, was essential to adhere to until a black middle class had been created and

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1. "Minutes of the Meeting of Imbokodvo Mblabala", (22 January 1965), p.1. S.N.A.

2. "Letter from Mr. Carl Todd to the Ngwenyama", (22 January 1965), quoted by R.P. Stevens, op.cit., (1967), p.241.

consolidated, a process which could take between five and ten years.

Meyer stated that:

> When this condition is established I will be prepared to live under a black government of Swazi individuals elected on a 'one man one vote majority rule system' without nomination or entrenchment of any group. As long as those who rule the country have as much to lose as I have, I will have complete confidence that the voters will elect a responsible government...(1)

Indeed, while riding the crest of a new wave of success, the SNC could offer few formal guarantees to their settler allies. Sobhuza offered a parable:

> Your guarantee in Swaziland is in your own hands. It is like a necklace with a locket worn around your neck. One side of the locket has a snake, the other jewels. The snake is suspicion and mistrust; the jewels are confidence and collaboration. Up to now, confidence and co-operation have been manifested by your support. This is your greatest guarantee and the Swazi would prefer this type of guarantee, because written guarantees might suffer the same fate as previous written British guarantees.(2)

In reality, however, the posture and statements of the INM leadership was doing much to instil confidence into a broader section of capital than narrow settler interests. The leader of the INM, in his first policy address, delivered to the new legislative council, declared:

> It is our first duty...to re-establish the confidence of the investor in Swaziland...Imbokodvo...advocated rapid and progressive economic development...and the creation through a stable government of a favourable climate for outside capital investment.(3)

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1. Times of Swaziland, 25 December 1965.

2. "King Sobhuza on the Future Constitution of Swaziland - Independence Guarantees for the Minority, Non-Racialism and one man one vote principle", S.N.A., File No. 329, 683 I, (undated, but probably 1965).

3. Times of Swaziland, 18 September 1964.

With the INM having demonstrated its capacity to mobilise a massive social base of support, and its willingness to court the interests of capital-in-general, foreign capital began to take a new interest in its development. This was moreso on account of its amalgamation with the SDP in particular, which had received the backing of certain sections of capital. Accordingly, the Federation of Swaziland Employers debated the question of donations to political parties and resolved 'that this was a matter to be decided by the individual company or person approached for financial donations to the Swazi National Council or Imbokodvo Party funds."(1) This decision was partially a response to an Imbokodvo appeal made by George Msibi, who since joining the INM had become its Treasurer. In an open letter to the Times of Swaziland, Msibi stated that:

> The aim of the Imbokodvo National Movement is to achieve political and economical stability in Swaziland and by this means to create an atmosphere which will inspire confidence in those who would invest in the country, to create industries capable of absorbing our labour force and developing our natural resources. Imbokodvo is taking a very keen interest in national labour relations. The Movement is determined to eliminate labour unrest as inimical to the economic advance to the country, and towards this end to oppose the exploitation of labour through trade unions or otherwise, for political purposes....Imbokodvo calls upon people and business concerns of Swaziland, whether industrial, commercial, agricultural or personal, to subscribe to the INM and by this means invest in the future of our beloved Swaziland...(2).

In the meantime, the NNLC itself was at work to extend and consolidate its own social base. In 1965, the Swaziland Citrus,

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1. Quoted in M. Fransman, op.cit., p.236.
2. Times of Swaziland, 30 July 1965.

Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union, which had been originally under the control of the leaders sympathetic to the S.D.P., following its formation in 1963, was taken over by a NNLC orientated leadership(1). In March 1965, a strike was called on the question of pay and employer recognition of the new leadership. The state, eager to prevent a repetition of the 1963 scenario, intervened stringently, and police broke up a workers' meeting and arrested and charged 58 workers under the Public Order and Industrial Conciliation Proclamations. A similar strike by members of the same union at the Swaziland Canning Factory in Malkerns, was broken in like fashion by the police in December 1965. Realising the overwhelming odds pitted against them by the state and capital, the NNLC sought to broaden their base. At one level, they softened their stand on nationalisation. This was largely the work of their new Acting Secretary General, Arthur Khoza, who declared in 1966:

> If for instance, Government failed to run a nationalised industry so that within a reasonably short period, such an industry would be able to cover its running costs, then nationalisation in such a case would not be an economic proposition and therefore unwise to undertake(2).

But more significantly, at another level, the NNLC attempted to gain inroads to the peasantry and chiefs on Swazi Nation Land. Excluded from the Constitutional Committee at work on the Independence Constitution, the NNLC drew up their own proposals. The Senate, which under their proposals was to advise the sixty member House of

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.264.
2. Times of Swaziland, 4 February, 1966.

Assembly, would comprise fifteen senior chiefs elected by an electoral college of chiefs, and five nominees of the King, who would be a constitutional monarch(1). Here the NNLC hoped to cash in on the support they had been building up among chiefs in the eastern part of the country in particular. In the east, they had solidified a broad base of workers from the sugar plantation belt, small holders at Vuvulane, and a number of chiefs and sections of the peasantry on Swazi Nation Land. In November, 1966, Dr. Zwane sought a meeting with the Queen's Commissioner, Sir Francis Lloyd, and handed him a memorandum dealing with the NNLC's grievances over the process of decolonisation. High on their agenda of complaints, was the role played by the chiefs during the 1964 election, as well as the victimisation of chiefs with Congress sympathies:

> The NNLC deplores the forcible deportation of chief Saphaza of Maphungwane from his home at Ubombo 'by an army of police, and the setting on fire of Maziya's homestead (Saphaza). We are satisfied that Mr. Maziya's offence was that he was a law abiding member of Congress...The NNLC also deplores the intimidation of chiefs in areas that are strongly pro-Congress. It says that Chief Ngudumane was denied his annual stipend 'on the grounds that he had allowed the NNLC to thrive in his area'.(2).

But Lloyd, 'who proved to be ...solicitous in every way of furthering the Ngwenyama's aims(3), pressed on with the constitutional committees work, undeterred by NNLC complaints.

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1. Times of Swaziland, 20 May 1966.
2. Times of Swaziland, 11 November, 1966.
2. A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.68.

The Independence Constitution

The constitution which eventually emerged, was adapted from a British model, but the King was to be more than just a Westminster-style constitutional monarch with little real power. He was empowered to nominate one fifth of the House of Assembly with the remaining twenty four out of a total of thirty members, to be elected by a universal franchise from eight three-member constituencies. He was also given power to nominate half of the twelve-member Senate, the Upper House of Parliament. The Chief Justice and the Prime Minister would be appointed by the King, although the latter on the basis of a parliamentary majority. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet were to act as an advisory body to the King. The constitution had a whole chapter devoted to the 'protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual', including freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly.

Above all, the constitution was a victory for the aristocracy, in their struggle for control over the land and mineral resources of the country, which they had waged since the turn of the century. Chapter VIII of the constitution stated that:

> All land which is vested in the Ngwenyama in trust for the Swazi nation shall continue so to vest subject to the provision of this Constitution...
>
> All minerals and mineral oils in, under or upon any land in Swaziland shall continue to vest in the Ngwenyama in trust for the Swazi nation, subject to any subsisting rights and interests which before (the promulgation of this constitution) by or under any Order of Her Brittanic Majesty in Council or any other law in force in Swaziland, or otherwise, have been granted or recognised as vested in any other person.(1).

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1. The Constitution of Swaziland, Swaziland Statutes, Constitutional Law: Act 50/1968 No.1377

With their material base secure, King Sobhuza II and his INM were ready both to face the NNLC in the impending independence elections, as well as their future in the forefront of capital accumulation in the country.

In the meantime, the NNLC was faced by a number of setbacks. In a dramatic about face, Dumisa Dlamini defected to the INM. In May 1966, Dumisa was convicted for assault and sentenced to nine months imprisonment(1). While serving the sentence, he was visited frequently by his relative, Sishayi Nxumalo, whom he requested to approach the King and 'beg his forgiveness'(2). On his release, while the NNLC arranged a reception for him at Msunduza Hall, Dumisa was whisked into hiding by Nxumalo and a selection of his trusted friends. Finally, on 15 November, Dumisa was received by the SNC at a special sitting in which his case was heard. Dumisa claimed that having travelled abroad, he had become deeply disillusioned with the 'Communist' countries, and he had become homesick and resolved to try to help strengthen the SNC. In answer to a barrage of critical and hostile questions, Dumisa claimed that he had tired of 'policies in which party officials tell us where to live and what to do', and that he now regretted his early 'blind belief and trust'(3). The meeting was

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1. According to C. Potholm, 'During the evening of November 3, Dumisa Dlamini was involved in an assault on some Swazi Women in Mbabane.', C.P. Potholm, Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernisation, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p.116. H. Kuper (1978), p.272 claims that Dumisa was initially held on a charge of assault and 'trying' in his own words 'to increase his knowledge and gain experience of revolutionary methods'.

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.273.

3. Ibid., p.274.

adjourned until 10 December, where amidst 'Shakespearean'(1) ceremony, the King accepted Dumisa back into the fold:

> "The country is not mine, it is for the ancestors. The ancestors see us. To them evil is not acceptable, and those who are evil are not welcomed by them. Dumisa is a child of the home, he allowed himself to be led astray. Now he is begging forgiveness. Can we throw him away? I have finished."(2)

It had also become clear that INM appeals for funds were intended for the creation of a single trade union under the domination of the Imbokodvo. The NNLC countered this through the formation of a Federation of Trade Unions, but by 1966, each trade union was split 'into pro-Imbokodvo, pro-NNLC and apolitical factions'(3).

Because the INM was succeeding so well in disarticulating the NNLC's class projects, the NNLC was forced to turn to whatever political forces remained in the country. All that remained in effect was 'the people', and the NNLC had to articulate their formation as a political force in a manner opposed to the INM. But very little was left - there were no alternative political and economic institutions which the people were familiar with, and the inherited ethnicity, language and folklore of the Swazi had already been appropriated by the INM. As nation triumphed over class, the NNLC attempted to develop a new concept of the nation:

> The current argument of the Imbokodvo is that the people of Swazi are firstly Swazis and secondly Africans. Pan Africanism no doubt shifts the emphasis. We would like to see the people of Swaziland realise that they are firstly Africans and secondly Swazis(4).

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1. Ibid., p.275.
2. Ibid., p.276.
3. C.P. Potholm, op.cit., p.118.
4. "Letter from Mr. N.S. Malaza to the Editor", Times of Swaziland, 22 September 1967.

Dr. Zwane in attempting to show that the NNLC was 'for all people', asserted that 'it was never the intention of the African Revolution not to have our chiefs participating in our struggle'(1). Speaking at Lhhumaneni, near Havelock, he praised Chief Sikuluvo Dlamini under whose auspices the meeting was held, describing him as an 'exemplary man' and a 'gallant son of Africa'(2). Zwane in fact, was making a belated attempt, as Nairn has put it, 'to invite the masses into history', and to write the invitation card 'in a language they understood'(3). But it was too late for the appeal, that the NNLC constituted no threat to the King and the chiefs, to gain mass support. The April 1967 elections, gave the INM over 75 per cent of the vote in seven out of eight constituencies. But in the eastern Mphumalanga constituency, Congress gained 47 per cent of the vote, but this was still not enough to win them a seat in Parliament. All in all, the NNLC had increased its share of the vote to 20 per cent.

All that was left for Zwane and the NNLC was to continue their vain protests against the shortcomings of the odd constitutional arrangements that had resulted in eight three man constituencies. the urban vote was diluted through the overloaded rural vote in each of the constituencies, so that instead of one fifth of the MP's being NNLC, the NNLC remained unrepresented. When the Congress Party attempted to call a stay away in protest against the new constitution, the new Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini, warned that civil servants

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1. Times of Swaziland, 28 July 1967.
2. Ibid.
3. T. Nairn, op.cit., p.340.

who stayed away from work, would be liable to dismissal and a withdrawal of retirement benefits. He stated that apart from the 'political stupidity' of the strike, it:

> ...would cause damage to the good reputation in which Swaziland is held as a peaceful and rational country...The important new responsibilities of internal self-government demand political, moral and physical courage. It is up to all of us to show the world and some of your countrymen that we know this. We call upon our people to defend their rights, knowing that the Government will take firm and appropriate action against those who break the law.(1)

Zwane and the NNLC were eventually forced to call off the strike, and in August, the party stepped up their demands to Prime Minister Makhosini for another Constitutional Conference before the end of the year. But the INM was unyielding. The King had once expressed his unhappiness over the constitutional changes that he saw in Lesotho. These he said were 'unAfrican', and it appeared 'that the Basotho had imported a western culture in toto, with no room for indigenous institutions'. He said that he feared 'that the minds of the people would be confused as to whom to choose between the political and traditional leaders'(2). As far as the INM was concerned, the people had chosen. The NNLC would not be given another chance. The NNLC pressed on, and sent a deputation to see the British Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs on his visit to Mbabane in October. A memorandum was presented, saying that the constitution was a 'tragic parting gift from Britain'(3). The appeals all failed, and in

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1. Times of Swaziland, 26 May 1867.

2. "An informal meeting between the Ngwenyama and councillors, and the Resident Commissioner B.A. Marwick", (5 February 1960), S.N.A., File No. 3012 D, Vol.V.

3. Times of Swaziland, 13 Octber 1967.

September 1968, Sobhuza received the instruments of government, marking Swaziland's formal transition to independence.

Independence and the Consolidation of the Material Basis of Comprador Accumulation

It has been argued that at independence, state power in Swaziland was assumed not by class forces within the capitalist mode of production, but by the traditional rulers from the non-capitalist mode, who, moreover, lacked any material base within the 'capitalist sector'(1). This assertion is belied, however, by a closer examination of the composition of the cabinet. Of the nine members, one was a businessman and trader, two were significant commercial farmers on Swazi Nation Land, one was a practising medical doctor and one was a licensed speculator and dealer in livestock. The transformation of the class determination of the indigenous pre-capitalist ruling alliance is seen in the fact that of the nine cabinet members, six had occupied positions of importance on the SNC, seven had fathers who had held important positions on the SNC, and the Prime Minister Makhosini, was both prince and chief in his own right(2). Here we should stress that our foregoing analysis does not imply an instrumental transposition of class categories: membership of the Royal Dlamini clan does not imply petty-bourgeois or comprador class belonging; nor does comprador in any way suggest membership of a Royal or chiefly

1. J. Daniel, 'The Political Economy of Colonial and Post-Colonial Swaziland', South African Labour Bulletin, Vol.VIII, No.6, (April 1982), p.91. Daniel here writes that he is following Fransman: 'the decolonization process produced a situation which Martin Fransman claims was virtually unequalled elsewhere in Africa...'

2. I. Winter, op.cit., p.31.

lineage. What is important, is that the political, social, cultural and ideological character of the compradors, was under the moral and intellectual sway of Swazi Royalty, which emerged as the hegemonic force in the post-colonial era.

Significant too was the presence of Leo Lovell in the cabinet. As Minister of Finance, this member of the settler bourgeoisie was able to act as a safeguard for the interests of settler capital as well as foreign capital. This reflected the cementation of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the compradors, whose very class character drove them into a position of dependence on capital. Indeed beyond independence, Swaziland has witnessed a growing relationship between the state, the compradors and foreign capital whose organisational form had increasingly taken the form of the multinational company. Such signals had been received in 1967, when the King opened the Swaziland Associated Brewery at the Matshapha Industrial Estate, in May. The King recalled an occasion when he was asked what he thought the nation would gain from the development of the industrial estate, and whether he thought his people would be satisfied with employment alone. The King then announced that the brewery company 'was giving the Swazi the opportunity of investing in the business', and he was 'grateful that his people would be able to...get 50 per cent of the shares in the long run(1). In October, Mr. David Lewis, the chairman of the amalgamated Hotels Ltd., said that 'the King has thrown his full support behind our efforts to make Royal Swazi Hotel a focal point for tourism in the territory'(2). The

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1. Times of Swaziland, 5 May 1967.
2. Times of Swaziland, 20 October 1967.

attitude of the independent Swazi state was articulated clearly by the Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Industry, Sishayi Nxumalo: 'We have no illusions about the source of investment in Swaziland. It is clear that large-scale developments in the private sector must be financed from outside and that this pattern will continue for many years to come'(1).

Tibiyo and Domestic Capital Formation

Control over the state apparatus by the compradors and their allies under the leadership of King Sobhuza, considerably strengthened their hand. State-directed accumulation was thereby ensured not to run counter to, but rather to complement comprador accummulation. Indeed, the latter through the establishment of Tibiyo Takangwane, soon came to eclipse the former. Tibiyo was established in August 1968, by King Sobhuza, through a Royal Charter. In this charter, the King entrusted Tibiyo with the task of promoting:

> ...harmonious relations between the different races of his country and to ensure that the material welfare, standard of living and education of his people be advanced as rapidly as possible so that the Swazi people would be equipped to play this proper role in the development of Swaziland(2).

He also warned of the need:

> ...to preserve in co-operation with such progressive local leadership as is essential to the development of a modern state, the customs and traditional institutions

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1. S.S. Nxumalo, 'Political and Economic Development in Swaziland'. African Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand, (mimeo), (26 July 1968), p.16.

2. A Nation in Progress, Tibiyo Takangwane. A Charter for Progress. (Undated Pamphlet.)

> of the Swazi people so as to prevent the disillusionment and instability which has followed from their rapid breakdown in other parts of the world[1].

In practice however, these lofty ideals have dissolved under the imperatives of domestic capital formation. Initially established following the re-investment of mineral rights to the King 'in trust for the nation', through section 91 of the independence constitution, the first Tibiyo Committee appointed by the King and entrusted with the task of administering the fund, soon realised that more finance was required than royalties and mineral fees could provide. Henceforth, the Committee embarked on a policy of joint investment with foreign capital and the acquisition of shares in major companies. Strategies were formulated to obtain loan arrangements with potential foreign investment partners, and following negotiations involving UN and Commonwealth-backed legal assistance, deals were clinched with Lonrho, Turner and Newall and Spa Holdings[2]. The cash flow that followed, enabled Tibiyo to enter the field of land purchase and development. By the late 1970's, Tibiyo had spent in the region of E5 million on the purchase of freehold land thus boosting the percentage of Swazi Nation Land to 55 per cent.[3] As we will see in the following chapter, much of this land is now utilised for the production of sugar. Furthermore, despite the fact that at an ideological level, the land purchased is said to be 'held in trust' for the nation, the relations of production and exchange prevalent on much of the land are those of capital.

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1. Ibid.
2. Swazi Observer, 27 August 1983.
3. J. Daniel, op.cit., p.105.

It has been stated that:

> Tibiyo is owned by the Swazi Nation. Every Swazi National is an owner in Tibiyo - even those born today. All Swazis have the right to know about Tibiyo activities - how it works and what it does. As in all national matters, all Swazis have the right to appeal to the King with any query about the activities of Tibiyo.(1)

These ideological inversions not withstanding, the revenues accruing to the fund have been managed by a board of directors appointed personally by the King. This has meant that the fund has remained firmly under comprador control, indeed Tibiyo's operations are not publically accountable to parliament(2). The idea of the King holding the fund 'in trust for the nation', demonstrates how non-capitalist practices have articulated with the capitalist mode of production. This has facilitated both the accumulation and hegemony of the compradors under the political leadership of the King. Sobhuza II has said that:

> Tibiyo is neither a competitor, nor the duplicate of government's activities and programmes, but a complimentary organisation to fill some gaps (sic) left behind by colonial rule and to give a hand to the government in the great task of nation building(3).

The position of the compradors henceforth grew from strength to strength, since it was not only the Tibiyo fund which enabled their accumulation of capital 'in the private sector', but their control over the state apparatus facilitated the further accumulation in the 'public sector'. Thus the Tibiyo effort was matched by a strategy for securing state revenues by the explicit inducement of foreign

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1. Times of Swaziland, 1 October 1976.
2. J. Daniel, op.cit., p.104.
3. Swazi Observer, 27 August 1983.

investment. This has been partially dependent on securing the condition of existence of capital which would allow for a high rate of exploitation. The 1972 Imbokodvo National Movement election manifesto declared that:

> The movement lays emphasis on the production and not on redistribution of wealth. For this reason, it does not support nationalisation. The Imbokodvo on the contrary, supports the fair distribution of income. The ownership of firms by private individuals will be protected, provided the operation of such firms is in the general interest of Swaziland. The INM prefers a policy of partnership and a policy of willing seller willing buyer, provided the partnership is not that of a rider and a horse, but a partnership which is mutually beneficial.(1)

The state created National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS), established in 1971, as the agency for the attraction of foreign investment, has used the allurement of cheap labour-power in its pamphlets to solicit investment:

> Strikes, absenteeism and other work stoppages that plague industry in many countries are virtually non-existent in Swaziland. An ample labour force is available...There is little unionised labour...Wages are modest by South African and European standards...(2).

This approach was accompanied by a 'new' state strategy in the field of industrial relations.

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1. The Philosophy, Policies and Objectives of the Imbokodvo National Movement by His Excellency, The Right Honourable M.J. Dlamini, (27 April 1972). University of Swaziland Social Science Research Unit Documentation Centre (Uniswa S.S.R.U. Doc. Centre), p.16.

2. National Industrial Development corporation of Swaziland, Pamphlet on Labour in the Kingdom of Swaziland, Uniswa S.S.R.U. Doc. Centre.

The State and the Working Class

By the end of 1969, the number of trade unions registered had decreased by six to a total of nine. Despite the elaborate labour legislation established in the wake of the strikes, employers preferred to deal with Works Committees. At the same time, as we have noted, the compradors had revealed their deep mistrust of trade unionism and favoured the Nduna system. Whitson, who investigated the system of wage negotiation and regulation in Swaziland recorded in 1964, that:

> The most unfortunate and, to my mind regretable difficulty...arises from the attitude of the Swazi National Council towards trade unions. I think it is ill-advised and certainly not in the interest of the workers who will be sufferers from the present situation(1).

Although trade unions were formally legalised in 1966, they were actively discouraged by the state, which favoured the plant level elected Works Council system of negotiation(2). Comprador efforts to form an Imbokodvo affiliated trade union on a national level were abandoned, in favour of a transformed Nduna system. In 1971, a model constitution for a Works Council was drawn up by the Deputy Prime Minister's Office. The Works Council was to consist of four representatives of management, nominated by the management, and four worker representatives, elected by the workers themselves. The chairman of the Works Council was to be appointed by management.

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1. F.C. Whitson, Whitson Report on Methods of Regulating Wages in Swaziland in 1964, (Mbabane, 10 June 1963), S.N.A.

2. This was effected through Law No. 12 of 1966. See N.G. Simelane, 'The State and Working Class in Swaziland', Southern African Studies - Retrospect and Prospect, Conference held at the University of Edinburgh, (30 May - 1 June 1983), p.5.

Provision was also made for the appointment of a King's representative or Ndabazabantu nominated by the King-in-Council, who was to liaise with the Works Council which were also sometimes called libandla's. The role of the Ndabazabantu was spelled out as follows:

> He is the eye, the ear and the mouthpiece of the workers when making representations on their behalf to management regarding complaints or requests or anything which is a source of worry on the part of the workers...He will advise Management on all matters (a) pertaining to Swazi law and custom...and cultivate a spirit of co-operation and belonging which is conducive to economic progress by affording the workers equal opportunity in order to narrow the gap between the 'haves' and the 'havenots'.(1)

The Ndabazabantu was to be the King's representative of the workers, and the King would speak to the workers and indeed to management through the Ndabazabantu. The Ndabazantu's role also embraced that of encouraging the workers and 'building a sound sense of responsibility, respect and discipline', while inspiring them to view their industry in terms of a partnership by 'teaching the workers to realise that any realisation of profits will result in better wages and better social conditions in their village'(2). But another element of the strategy was for the Ndabazabantu to combat and destroy the notion that there was anything like 'cheap labour' in the territory.

Hand in hand with this aspect of the state's labour policy went the establishment of a National Wage Board, whose task it was to set up

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1. "Some of the Duties for the King's Representative", Prince Masitsela for the Swaziland National Council, (19 August 1971), (mimeo). Quoted by M. Fransman, op.cit., p.306.

2. Ibid.

minimum wages for different sectors of industry. Here, an attempt to facilitate accumulation through the revitalization of specifically pre-capitalist practices was accompanied by the effort to mollify workers, by meeting their basic needs through the introduction of statutory minimum wage rates. Speaking in September 1971, the King said that:

> For the good of the employee and for the good of the country, there should be co-operation between the employer and the workers. The relationship between them was that between a father and mother. They worked together for the child, knowing that their future security depends on that child. Inevitably, there would be family quarrels - but these should be solved by restrained and calm discussion not by banging tables and shouting - that was foreign to the Swazi way of life(1).

But what was the state thinking behind these interventions in the labour process? Did they constitute an astutely disguised form of repression, dressed up in the robes of Swazi tradition, which was functional to capital? Were they a measure of the state's instrumentality, as guarantor par excellence of the conditions of existence of the capital relation? Or were they an element of comprador strategy in the struggle to maintain their hegemony?

These moves, it should be emphasised, were undertaken against a background of the impending post independence general election in 1972. In 1971, there was a rising concern in the office of the Deputy Prime Minister, of a possible outbreak of strikes. These developments were closely monitored, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Committee of the Royal Swaziland Police. In April 1971, the Commissioner of Police warned of the rising cost of living and the

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1. Times of Swaziland, 24 September 1971.

possible repercussions from wage increases that had been granted by a number of companies. These it was warned, 'might lead to a general demand for higher wages, with the possibility of resultant labour troubles'(1). This followed the build-up of employee-worker tension in a number of different parts of the country, including the iron ore mine in Ngwenya, Crook's plantation in Big Bend and the Matsapha industrial sites. The Permanent Secretary in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office warned that 'with the elections approaching, labour strikes are going to be the tools that will be used by instigators in order to put Government into bad light.'(2) He therefore urged the Deputy Prime Minister's Assistant Minister to 'visit all the major employers in Swaziland, and address the employees without necessarily making them aware of Government's concern about the 'wild cat' strikes'. The importance of such action was evidenced by 'the cry outside that employees are never visited by Ministers and Members of Parliament...They see a lot of civil servants but nothing of their lords and masters, the politicians.'(3)

That the state was <u>not</u> simply acting in the interests of capital-in-general, through the implementation of the Ndabazabantu/Ibandla negotiating system, is revealed by the reaction of the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company to their introduction at their mine in

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1. "Extract from the minutes of the Central Intelligence Committee", (1 April 1971), <u>S.N.A.</u>, DPMC, 615, 1977.

2. "Permanent Secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister's Assistant Minister", (2 February 1971), <u>S.N.A.</u>, DPMC 615, 1977.

3. <u>Ibid.</u>

Ngwenya. This is worth quoting in some detail:

> While it is this company's policy to abide by Government policy, we respectfully wish to record the following difficulties which we feel would result if this policy was enforced:
>
> 1) As a result of an agreement with the Swaziland Miners and General Workers Union (SMGWU), we are legally obligated to negotiate with their committee on all industrial matters. It is possible and indeed probable, that the situation will arise when the company will be required to negotiate with the Ibandla and the Union Committee on identical subjects, e.g. wages, leave etc.
> At present the two committees are in conflict with each other and such negotiations will take place separately with each committee. In such an event, management will be placed in an almost impossible position and it will be most difficult to arrive at any sort of finality, as identical agreements with two separate Committees on any particular subject will be necessary; an event not likely to occur.
>
> 2) The relationship between the Ibandla and the Union Committee is not harmonious at present, but the majority of our workers have not yet 'taken sides'. We feel there is a very real possibility that, once Management commences industrial negotiations with the Ibandla, our employees will split into two opposing sections, and this can only result in labour unrest.
>
> In view of the critical situation regarding our mining operations...labour unrest of any sort could have a serious adverse effect on the successful solution of our production problems...While it is realised that industrial negotiations between employees and the Company are an essential management function, we feel that negotiating with two separate Committees is going to result in considerable duplication and place an excessive burden on Senior Management Officials, to the detriment of achieving our production targets.....(1).

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1. "J.O. Richards, Mine Manager, to the Honourable Assistant Minister of Labour, (7 June 1973), S.N.A. DPMC 615, 1977.

This reaction by a particular capital to state intervention in the labour process and the attempted implementation of a new institutional apparatus of industrial negotiation, demonstrates how state action can contradict both the interests of the working class and those of capital. But in altering aspects of the conditions of production in a particular manner, the state revealed its bias towards the fulfilment of comprador interests. The influence of the King within the labour department of the state apparatus was strengthened when a major reshuffle of civil servants, in July 1971, saw the appointment of Sobhuza's son-in-law, Zonke Khumalo as Deputy Prime Minister. In May 1972, Mr. Khumalo addressed workers in Havelock, and stressed that 'trade unionism is a foreign ideology to the Swazi'(1). He then went on to say that 'all workers in this kingdom are His Majesty's regiments. .The workers' council or Libandla, should embrace every worker'(2). The Ndabazabantu strategy must therefore be viewed in the context of a concerted drive by the King and the compradors to construct a unified hegemonic project that would carry the INM to victory in the impending general elections. The lessons of the sixties and the potential threat posed by the working class around which the NNLC had attempted to construct a different hegemonic project, had been well learnt by the INM. But in constructing a viable hegemonic strategy, the compradors had to take into account the interests of intermediate as well as subordinate groups. These moves were thus accompanied by legislation aimed at extending the basis of a

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1. Times of Swaziland, 15 December 1972.
2. Ibid.

comprador led alliance with the Swazi petty bourgeoisie.

The Land Speculation Act-1972

The crystallisation of the latter effort was the introduction of the Land Speculation Control Bill in Parliament, during its final session in 1971. By this time, the price of land had increased dramatically, with several significant land deals being negotiated by South African land speculators. Following long private discussions with various cabinet members, the King agreed that a law be introduced to control land transactions involving non-Swazi citizens(1). This step, designed to bring down the price of land (which had been pushed up by foreign land speculation) in the interests of potential Swazi buyers, was the initial cause for much alarm among certain sectors of capital. The situation was exacerbated by the secretive way in which the Bill was introduced to Parliament for discussion. The most sympathetic members of cabinet to the interests of capital, Leo Lovell, Mfundza Sukati and Sishayi Nxumalo, were all out of the country when the Bill came before Parliament(2). While most of the Swazi parliamentarians had been briefed about the Bill, their European colleagues apparently had not, and were consequently largely taken by surprise(3). Tne consequence was that the debate became a nasty confrontation between the two racial groups in parliament.

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.312.
2. Ibid., p.314.
3. Ibid.

Introducing the Bill, the Minister for Agriculture, Mr. A.K. Hlophe, said that:

> In the past few years, Swaziland has been beseiged by land-hungry speculators from outside our borders. Attracted by our beautiful landscape and political stability, the land speculator has found a paradise here. He has bought large farms, chopped them into little plots and resold them to more outsiders who are also interested in speculation. Buying and selling land in Swaziland has become big business making profits for the select few, but causing galloping inflation of land prices that is totally disproportionate to the overall economy of this country. Swazis who are interested in buying plots of title deed land are finding that all the desirable land is priced far beyond their means(1).

But the Minister went on to add that:

> We must distinguish between land speculation and legitimate investment. Nothing in this Bill will affect legitimate investment...All of us in Swaziland want foreign investors who will contribute to the development of the country. Section 11 of the Bill contains a firm assurance to all foreign investors that their land requirement will be respected(2).

This careful distinction between 'land speculation' and 'genuine investment', aimed to avoid any undermining of the state's efforts to forge closer links with metropolitan capital. This was well understood by Mr. R.P. Stevens, the future Minister of Finance, who argued that:

> ...the cornerstone at the moment of Swaziland investment, should be the Prime Minister's statement that all genuine investors who are prepared to develop their investments are not only welcome, but we require them desperately. Now what could be fairer or more attractive than that? And I would like to assure such intending investors that in my twenty five years in Swaziland, I have come to learn that a Swazi's word is his bond(3).

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1. Official Report of the Debates of the House of Assembly, Third Meeting of the Fourth Session, 22 November 1971 to 16 December 1971 (Mbabane: Swaziland Government, 1972), pp.123ff.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.152.

Hence while some settlers were so perturbed by the Bill that they went as far as petitioning the King for its removal, others were confident that it posed no serious threats to the general interests of capital. Indeed, the state had continued to oppose all forms of nationalisation while simultaneously stressing the advantages of having more land under Swazi private ownership in order to prevent a new upsurge of nationalism. The Prime Minister thus pointed out that 'whilst a well-to-do Swazi is unable to find a home, meanwhile that Swazi sees more and more land being sold to more and more citizens for speculating purposes. If this process is allowed to continue increasing, dissatisfaction of the Swazi people may call for drastic action that even a legitimate real investor might not be attracted'(1). The validity of the Prime Minister's pragmatism was aptly pointed out by a senator who later became a Cabinet Minister, Dr. V.S. Leibrandt:

> ...the demand for land and land reform have formed the backbone of revolution through all history, and our government is wise to tackle these problems timeously (sic)...A healthy economy will only be achieved when sufficient Swazis are investing here. The small businessman and farmer are the large investor's insurance policy and ally(2).

In the event, pragmatism prevailed and the Bill passed the final reading without amendment in December 1971. The King gave assent in February, following the Incwala ceremony, and the Bill became law in December 1972. In effect, the Act ultimately failed to confirm the greatest fears of both its most ardent supporters and detractors. The Land Control Board, established as a result of the Act has continued to

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1. Ibid., p.126.
2. Times of Swaziland, 27 July 1973.

allow land sales to non-Swazis, while foreign capital continued to flow into the country. At the same time, the Act has not led to the return of the land to the Swazi 'people'. Rather it has been Tibiyo in particular which has benefited from the Act. As R.P. Stevens had noted: 'I do not think that prices will drop so much that it will be within the grasp of the average Swazi....to acquire land'(1).

The strategy to broaden the support of the INM within the ranks of the petty-bourgeoisie had begun in the post independence period, through the rapid expansion of the state's educational apparatuses. Education here was linked to the policy of localisation, in an attempt to consolidate a large petty bourgeoisie. The number of secondary schools doubled between 1967 and 1972, by which time there were a total of 62. During this time, the number of secondary students increased almost threefold, from 3,792 to 10,681(2). While at the time of independence, the total number of established posts within the state apparatuses (excluding the Police) was 3,582, the corresponding figure in 1974 was 6,828 (excluding the Police, as well as the Defence force). Salary expenditure on government posts increased during this period from E4,603,118 to E24,764,911(3). As we will see, these strategies aimed

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1. Official Report of the debates of the House of Assembly, op.cit., p.152.

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976).

3. Ibid and Swaziland Government: Annual Statistical Bulletins, 1966 and 1970. Note the salary expenditure figures include the police and defence force- there were no figures for the number of established posts in these state apparatuses in the post-independence Bulletins.

at the incorporation of the petty-bourgeoisie within the Royal hegemonic project have proved themselves to be contradictory.

The 1972 General Election and the Suspension of the Independence Constitution

The 1972 general elections took place against a changing socio-economic background. In addition to the transformation which accompanied the enactment of the foregoing strategies, there were significant economic developments which were to influence the outcome of the elections. In the pre-independence election, the INM had come to power on the wave of relative economic prosperity. During this period, Swaziland had received 97 per cent of the CDC's total aid to the High Commission Territories(1). One consequence was that the number of wage earners (as a proportion of the economically active population had risen from 22 per cent to over 31 per cent. The resulting increase in production, sent exports rocketing upwards. In 1966, the production of animal products rose sharply following the 1965 outbreak of foot and mouth disease, and apart from asbestos production, production records were set in all major exporting sectors. The value of exports tripled between 1960 and 1966, rising from E12,050,400 to E38,619,600(2). In the post independence period, this atmosphere of optimism generated by the rapid expansion of the economy was reversed insofar as the working class was concerned. As Fransman has demonstrated, between 1969 and 1972, the real standard

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1. United National Agricultural and Rural Development Survey, Selected Agricultural Statistics, (Mbabane: Government Printer, 1966), p.1.

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1970).

of living of the working class entered a significant decline. In agriculture for example, which employed 53 per cent of the total number of unskilled workers, male wages declined from E16 to E15 and female wages from E9 toE8. While male wages in manufacturing which employed 13 per cent of the total workforce increased from E26 to E34, female wages declined in this sector from E15 to E11. With male wages in forestry remaining constant, while those of females declined by E1, this meant that more than half of the workforce was faced with constant or declining money wages. Over and above this, the retail price index for unskilled workers increased by 6 per cent (1). This would help to account for the increased 'labour unrest' as the election approached, and attempts of the compradors to neutralise it with the implementation of the Ndabazabantu initiative.

In the year preceeding the 1972 elections, the NNLC had been weakened by a serious split. The deputy leader, K.M. Samketi, and three district representatives, opposed plans to centralise the leadership and to appoint Ambrose Zwane as president for life of the party. Zwane was nevertheless able to regain control over the majority of the NNLC by the May 1972 elections. Despite this setback, the NNLC was able to win the Mphumalanga constituency, thus giving it three out of twenty four elected seats in Parliament. This constituency contained a high proportion of sugar plantation and estate workers from the Lubombo sugar belt, as well as the small holder farmers from Vuvulane, and reflected a growing frustration

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.328 ff. Fransman's figures are obtained from the Annual Statistical Bulletin of 1975.

with comprador rule on the part of the working class and sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Shortly after the election on 25 May, one of the victorious NNLC MP's, Thomas Ngwenya, a smallholder from Vuvulane, was served with a deportation order by the Deputy Prime Minister, Zonke Khumalo, acting under section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1964(1). Ngwenya was accordingly deported, but following an application to the High Court, was declared a Swazi citizen by birth, and the deportation order was set aside. Nevertheless, Ngwenya was subsequently rearrested and restricted, and in November, the Swaziland Parliament passed the Immigration Amendment Act 22 of 1972. A new section was introduced to section 10 of the 1964 Act, establishing a Tribunal consisting of five persons to be appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to deal with the thorny issue of citizenship disputes(2). A Tribunal was then appointed and set to determine the Ngwenya case on 9 January 1973. In the meantime, Ngwenya applied to the High Court to have the provisions of the Immigration Amendment Act declared inapplicable to him and/or ultra vires the constitution(3). His claim was based on sections 14 and 17 of the constitution dealing with the 'protection of freedom of movement' and the 'enforcement of protective provisions' respectively. Both of these

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1. W.A. Ramsden, 'Judicial Protection in Swaziland', The Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa, (November 1973), p.379.

2. The question of citizenship in Swaziland has always been rendered problematic by the fact that the drawing of the colonial boundaries left vast numbers of ethnic Swazis in South Africa.

3. Ibid, p.380.

sections were entrenched in the constitution, requiring both a three quarters majority in a joint sitting of the House of Assembly, and a two thirds majority in a referendum for their alteration. Chief Justice Hill ruled against Ngwenya however, and his fate was thus left in the hands of the Tribunal. On 29th January, the Tribunal's chairman, Mr. Troughton, delivered its unanimous decision:

> Ngwenya is not a citizen of Swaziland. Although his ancestors may have been resident in Swaziland, he himself was born in South Africa and therefore is not a person who belongs to Swaziland in terms of the present law(1).

Undeterred, Ngwenya appealed against Judge Hill's verdict to the Court of Appeal. His advocate, David Soggot, argued that 'it is trite law that Parliament is supreme and a sovereign body. This however, does not mean that it must not act in terms of its own rules and the laws upon which its existence in law is founded'(2). Justice Schreiner, pointed to the inconsistencies of the Act in delivering his judgement.

He considered:

> ...What would be the result of the High Court's continuing to have jurisdiction to declare a person a citizen so as to be eligible for Parliament, while the Special Tribunal would have jurisdiction to decide that he was not a citizen for immigration purposes and must be deported accordingly. It is inconceivable that in enacting the Amending Act Parliament intended to leave this obvious source of conflict unresolved(3).

The Appeal Court dissolved the Act as unconstitutional, leaving the state uneasy, and a lot of questions unanswered. As the Foreign

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., p.334.
2. Times of Swaziland, 30 March 1973.
3. W.A. Ramsden, op.cit., p.385.

Minister M.S. Matsebula pointed out:

> In terms of our Electoral Act and indeed of our constitution, persons who are qualified to be registered as voters for the purposes of elections or elected members of the House of Assembly are citizens of the Kingdom of Swaziland. Under this Act the Returning Officer and the Electoral Officer should ensure that the person they register is a citizen. According to the information at hand...the Returning Officer at Siteki was informed immediately that Mr. B.T. Ngwenya who was not a citizen had been registered and the Returning Officer referred the matter for consideration and directive to the Electoral Officer in Mbabane...If it is true that the officers in charge of the smooth conduct of the elections were informed that a person believed to be a non citizen had been registered as a voter, what reasons made these officers not tackle the matter?(1).

Kuper has also claimed that one of the defeated candidates, Prince Mfanasibili, complained to the local Electoral Officer that Ngwenya, although a Swazi, was born on the South African Side of the border(2). Nevertheless the Returning Officer, Mr. E.M. Hlophe, claimed that:

> There were no objections received to the registration of Mr. Ngwenya as a voter or as a candidate prior to the polling day; nor on the day when ballot papers were counted and elections announced. A message of objection came on polling day from the Polling Officer at Vuvulane that the Imbokodvo Agent was objecting to Ngwenya's voting. I, as Returning Officer telephoned the Chief Electoral Officer for a directive. The directive was that so long as Mr. Ngwenya's name appeared on the register and has not been removed as a result of any objection lodged in accordance with the law, he was entitled to cast his vote(3).

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1. "M.S. Matsebula, Minister of State, Department of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Justice, the Honourable Senator P.L. Dlamini", (2 April 1973), S.N.A., DFA. Matsebula continues: 'In view of the gigantic efforts made on this matter thereafter by the Deputy Prime Minister and Chief Immigration Officer, the huge sum of money from public funds used in this matter and the image of Swaziland in Africa and the world, what actions did your ministry take against these officers?'.

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.322.

3. "E.M. Hlophe, District Commissioner Hhohho, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice", (9 April 1973), S.N.A., LAH C/2/15.

With no official statement made, or objection lodged on the records, there was very little further action that the state could take. Nevertheless, the huge effort, time and money spent on the Ngwenya affair, had precipitated a constitutional crisis. When Parliament met in April, the Prime Minister introduced a motion:

> The constitution has proved to be the direct cause of many difficult and sometimes insoluable problems in that:
> ...many unwarranted restrictions are placed on the executive powers of Ministers and the King-in-Council resulting in the incapacity of the Executive to govern the country properly and without continuously encountering irksome and completely unjustified obstacles...
> It permits of particularly undesirable political activities, bordering on the subversive and completely foreign to and incompatible with, the normal and peaceful way of life of the citizens of our country(1).

The motion was unanimously passed on 12 April, and called on the King to devise ways and means of dealing with the crisis. MP's from both Houses of Parliament then went to the King's Kraal at Lobamba, where the King officially announced that the constitution would be suspended. Before the King spoke, a senior counsellor on the SNC, Chief Sifuba, said that the Swazi nation desired to be entirely sovereign, and rejected the 'Father Christmas type of independence'(2) which it had inherited from Britain.

In a sense, these moves were not entirely surprising. Before the elections, the King had said 'We still have to see whether in practice it (the Constitution) properly serves our needs...but Swazis always keep their word. They are a soft-spoken people and do not believe in

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1. Times of Swaziland, 20 April 1973.
2. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.335.

. shouting and in banging and upsetting tables'(1).

He went on to warn of the dangers of 'foreign influences' which would 'try to show that the Swazis have nothing worth preserving'. He concluded by saying that 'our people nearly lost their identity as a result of the confusion purposely sown by evil elements'(2). That the King and Cabinet considered the NNLC victory as a threat was underlined in the Prime Minister's victory message, following the elections:

> To my adversaries I have nothing to say but to point to the indisputable verdict of people...They should now search themselves very carefully. Their road leads but to the wilderness. But the doors of the movement are ajar...they are welcome like the prodigal son. A word of caution may be necessary. Their activities purport to divide the nation and this is an ill wind which benefits no one...(3).

But the verdict of the people was a bitter pill for the INM to swallow. When Mr. Bhekindlela Ngwenya took his seat in Parliament in October, next to Dr. Zwane and the other NNLC member Mr. M. Masilela, they did so in an empty house. The INM MP's were in the building, but they boycotted the sitting which was eventually postponed by the speaker through lack of quorum. When the speaker left the House, large numbers of spectators in the public gallery jeered, shouting 'Africa!, Africa!'(4).

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1. Times of Swaziland, 10 September 1971.
2. Ibid.
3. Times of Swaziland, 26 May 1972.
4. Times of Swaziland, 20 October 1972. These were presumably NNLC supporters chanting Pan-Africanist slogans.

But above all, the King himself had become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned by the Parliamentary procedure. He felt a growing disillusionment at the manner in which important matters were dealt with by Parliament, without his knowledge. Decisions were taken which he and his councillors disapproved of, and the King found himself trapped between conflicting viewpoints inside and outside of Parliament. As he put it: 'You appoint bafana (boys) thinking they will help each other remove the thorns from each other's feet. Instead you find each trying to get more for himself'(1). In announcing the suspension of the constitution, the King gave the following reasons:

> (a) ...the constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good government and for maintenance of peace and order;
>
> (b) ...the Constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country...
>
> (c) ...the Constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly undesirable political practices alien to, and incompatible with the way of life in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political activity...
>
> (d) ...there is no constitutional way of effecting the necessary amendments to the Constitution...
>
> (e) ...I and all my people heartily desire at long last, after a long constitutional struggle, to achieve full freedom and independence under a constitution created by ourselves for ourselves...(2).

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.313.

2. Statutes of Swaziland, Constitutional Law: King's Proclamation, 12th April 1973.

The King then announced that he had assumed supreme power in Swaziland, and that all legislative, executive and judicial power was to be vested in himself and exercised in collaboration with a Council constituted by the Cabinet Ministers. The Attorney General, Mr. David Cohen, then read out a number of decrees which were designed to facilitiate the continued administration of the country. These included a clause giving the King-in-Council power to order the detention of any person for a period of sixty days. The detention order could be renewed 'as often as deemed necessary in the Public interest'(1) Political parties were banned along with all political meetings, processions and demonstrations.

Fransman has attributed these changes to the growing contradiction between capital and labour in Swaziland. Hence shortly before the constitution was repealed, in early April, a strike broke out at Havelock. Workers demanded a 30 per cent wage increase in lieu of food rations. This strike took place shortly after Tibiyo had acquired 40 per cent of the mine's equity from Turner and Newall. This move both served to aid and abet comprador accumulation, while strengthening the alliance between indigenous capitalist forces and foreign capital. In March 1973, Sobhuza had met representatives of the Federation of Swaziland Employers in order to discuss how to 'avoid the labour efervescences which have bedevilled less fortunate

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1. Ibid.

parts of the world more recently'(1). The King pointed out that:

> There had been considerable growth in the Kingdom...but something had happened - the spate of strikes in the world which made people wonder if Swaziland could escape this phenomenon...The meeting had been called...to meet the problem and prevent damage to Swaziland through 'strikes or sit-down'. Sometimes strikes were used for other reasons, apart from settling grievances. Sometimes they arose from frustration and people damaged themselves, and the very things which benefitted them, out of frustration(2).

Indeed as Fransman has accurately observed, these developments took place against a background of `resurging worker militancy in Soutn Africa which saw roughly 100,000 workers involved in strikes originating in the Durban area in 1973. But while arguing that the moves undertaken by the King and the comprador bourgeoisie could not in themselves remove the antagonisms implicit in the dominant social relations, Fransman tends to reduce the field of contradictions solely to the economic level of society. That is he does not go far enough in elucidating how the King and his allies aimed to neutralise the contradictions of Swazi society at the political and ideological levels. Thus while capitalist relations of exploitation were very much a part of the reasons leading to the changes in the Swazi state, it is necessary to specify more rigorously their combination and articulation with political and ideological developments.

Firstly we should note that, popular ideologies do not necessarily have

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1. Times of Swaziland, 2 March 1973.

2. Ibid.

any 'class belonging', especially in a country like Swaziland, where social reproduction is dominated by a capitalism whose uneven development has ensured that emergent capitalist class forces have existed only in embryonic form. This has meant that 'popular ideologies co-exist with, and are articulated by non-class forces. What the radicalism of Dr. Zwane's petty bourgeois-led Congress Party and the King's INM had in common were their appeal to nationalism and national sentiment, which have no class connotations when considered in isolation. Thus, whereas the latter linked nationalism to the retention of a hierarchical, authoritarian, hereditary indigenous power structure, the former established this link through a more vocally anti-European, Africanist and socialist type of rhetoric. This enabled the NNLC to mobilise working class support as well as that of the petty bourgeoisie in various parts of the country. The NNLC claimed that it was a 'party that draws its authority and its authenticity from the masses of people...we are a party of dedicated freedom fighters...'(1). According to the NNLC, 'the Imbokodvo and its advisors have formed an alliance with South African political and commercial interests. The real wishes of the Swazi people have been denied...by a constitution which will permanently shackle them to the forces of feudalism and racialism'(2).

But what King Sobhuza and his advisors were able to do in this struggle over the process of the formation of a national identity, was to

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1. Amaqhawe Akangwane, NNLC leaflet, S.N.A. 32.54, (undated).
2. Ibid.

develop the state/people antagonism through a popular ideology that blocked its orientation and development in any revolutionary direction. The legitimising basis for the King's drastic actions in April 1973, was provided by the ideological raw materials of indigenous non-capitalist Swazi society. Hence the constitution was deemed unfit for the Swazi way of life. According to Prince Makhosini in his 'Philosophy, Policies and Objectives of the Imbokodvo National Movement',

> ...the approach of the INM is positive...to build on what is known and proven. To do otherwise would be to adopt a negative approach of first destroying and then building. This method was tried by our past rulers without success. Our institutions survived not without scars of battle which, now, it is our duty to nurse, heal and improve by injecting the dynamics of growth and development. Our institutions have proved that they have resilience. They did not succumb to this day to the onslaught of our previous rulers. It is on this staying power of our institutions adapted to modern Swaziland that the INM wishes to capitalise(1).

The ideological distortions which were part and parcel of INM strategy ultimately facilitated a restructuring of the state form to allow for what was in effect becoming a highly authoritarian form of populism. When the King opened parliament following the 1972 elections, he commented that the advent of an opposition was new to Swaziland, and had been inherited from the British Colonial Adminstration. He did emphasize though that the 'ultimate decision in any major controversial issue lay with the Swazi people who would indicate their will through a national referendum'(2). The promise was never kept, and authoritarian populism was implemented from above. An appeal

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1. Philosophy, Policies and Objectives of the Imbokodvo National Movement, op.cit.

2. Times of Swaziland, 2 June 1972.

was made to the people to abandon elements of what was the King believed threatening to become the dominant ideology in Swaziland - bourgeois or 'Western' ideology.

This did not imply a wholesale abandonment of bourgeois or 'Western' politics and ideology, but rather elements of it such as party politics, the protection of the freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; all of which were enshrined in the independence constitution. Other elements, such as the protection of private property were retained alongside the indigenous system of land tenure, so that the King's efforts actually involved the attempt to combine a disparity of perceptions of the world in a way that would serve to neutralise potential antagonisms. The dominant alliance in Swaziland required a greater flexibility in dealing with points of conflict and the structures of the Westminister-style state proved to be too rigid to secure, for instance, the conditions of existence of capitalist relations, which in peripheral societies such as Swaziland require a high mass and rate of surplus value extraction. This has characteristically resulted in the emegence of the state as a highly antagonistic force with respect to the mass of the Swazi population. It was therefore of little surprise when Minister of Finance, R.P. Stevens, gave countenance to the King's actions, claiming that:

> Swaziland was on the brink of severe industrial strife as a result of the activities of politicians, political parties and outside influences which had contacts financially and otherwise with countries such as Russia and Tanzania. The position was becoming unbearable and the King acted quickly, effectively and timeously (sic)[1].

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1. Times of Swaziland, 20 April 1973.

The way in which the King and his strategists were able to 'deconstruct' the capital/labour contradiction, and reconstruct it as a state/people contradiction caused by the 'unSwazi' colonial inheritance, is highly instructive of the role of ideology as a 'practical material force'(1).

In the years following the suspension of the constitution, the state has become increasingly centralised, and state power has been personalised, centering on the King, who came to occupy a special place in the hearts and mind of the people of Swaziland. As an editorial commenting on the repealing of the constitution in the Times of Swaziland put it:

> Were it not for the very high personal regard in which His Majesty King Sobhuza II is held, and the fact that he is seen to be at the very core of the present executive and legislature, the events of the past weeks could have an adverse effect on Swaziland's investment prospects(2).

The 60 day detention order was used to stifle the NNLC. In April and May 1973, Messrs. S. Myeni, M.M. Motha, B. Mbuli, T. Ngwenya, J. Groening and M.M. Mathonsi along with Dr. Ambrose Zwane fell victim to the measure provided for by the King's April Proclamation. This left the state free to devote itself to the task of drawing up a new constitution 'more suited to and compatible with the Swazi way of life'.

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1. See S. Hall, 'Popular Democratic Vs. Authoritarian Populism', in A. Hunt (eds.) op.cit., p.174.

2. Times of Swaziland, 27 April 1973.

The Development of the State Form in Swaziland

In September 1973, the King appointed a Constitutional Commission to deal with the problem of devising a new constitution for Swaziland. Its members included: Senator Polycarp Dlamini (Minister of Justice), Prince Sifuba Dlamini, Mr. J.F.G. Troughton, Senator George Msibi, Mr. R.P. Stevens (Minister of Finance); Councillor Mdeleni Gwebu, Councillor Makhoba Gumede and Mr. David Cohen, (the Attorney General as professional adviser). The Commission was to report to the King on all aspects of the principles which were to underly the new constitution and was to consult with anyone whom they deemed fit to advise the Royal Commission. Their terms of reference included:

> To enquire into the fundamental principles on which the Kingdom of Swaziland's Constitution should be based, having regard to the history, the culture, the way of life of the people of Swaziland, and the need to harmonise these with the modern principles of constitutional and international law(1).

The problems of the Commission were compounded by the fact that the pre-colonial state on whose 'model' the new constitution was to be based, had developed in articulation with a combination of tributary and lineage relations. The state of the 1970's, however, no matter what form it took, was irretractably saddled with the imperatives of the capital relation in its complex articulation with various forms of social discourse which were indigenous and non-capitalist as well as capitalist in quality.

Although the work of the Commission ultimately took nearly five

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1. Times of Swaziland, 21 September 1973.

years before the country was presented with a new constitution, an idea of the type of political process which the Commission would try and combine with the independence constitution was given by Polycarp Dlamini. Speaking to students at the William Pitcher Teacher Training College in Manzini, in July 1973, the Minister of Justice outlined his concept of 'Swazi Democracy':

> ....We have the Swazi National Council whose members include all adult males and females in the Country. At the head of this is the King and Ndlovukazi (Queen Mother) at which council everybody is free to speak his mind. Then below it the Tinkhundla where you have a regional authority over a number of areas, Chief's areas the average being six to ten chiefs and being members of that Inkhundla each chief brings his own committee who constitute the Inkhundla Council. Below it you have the Chief's council which is constituted by members who represent the area committee. In the area committee you have the Indvuna who preside over a meeting of a number of families within his jurisdiction and those families, since they cannot all attend, send their representatives.(1)

Indeed when the "Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland" was gazetted under the King's Order-in-Council No.28 of 1978, much of the institutional apparatus of the state remained unchanged and continued to function unimpeded. The aims of the modified state were to ensure that the domination of the King and the compradors remained unchallenged even if this entailed the deployment of the administrative state apparatuses against their own class allies. Executive power was vested in the King, who was empowered to appoint the Prime Minister from amongst the elected or appointed members of the House of Assembly, along with the remaining Cabinet

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1. Times of Swaziland, 6 July 1973.

members. The King was to be consulted and informed on all matters relating to the government of the country:

> The King may require the Prime Minister and other Ministers to consult with him on any matter relating to the Government of Swaziland, and the Prime Minister shall keep the King fully informed concerning the general conduct of the government of Swaziland and shall furnish him with such information as he may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the government of Swaziland(1).

But it was chiefly through a reformed electoral procedure that the King and his allies were to ensure their continued dominance within parliament. Part III of the Order-in-Council stated that the King could 'establish or confirm the existence of all Tinkhundla by public statement to be made by him at a Sibaya or in such other manner as to him may deem fit'(2). The formalisation of the Tinkhundla or local authorities is traceable to the colonial period, when after World War II, the colonial state attempted to elaborate a system of local government. Their origin, however, can be traced back further to the development of Mswati's state. Here, Mswati established royal villages in various parts of the country in order to facilitate greater control by the centre of the Kingdom over the periphery. Inkhundla means 'an open space, usually a meeting place or courtyard'.

The Tinkhundla

The Tinkhundla were developed in the post World War II period, following the inauguration of the enyakatho (up north) fund, which was levied on the emasosha (soldiers) age-regiment(3). This fund was

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1. Statutes of Swaziland, Constitutional Law: King's Order-in-Council 22/1978.
2. Ibid.
3. A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.193.

intended for development activities of the Tinkhundla which was given a field to cultivate. Each indvuna appointed by the King to run the Tinkhundla was empowered to extract surplus labour from the chiefdoms attached to his Inkhundla. According to Mavela Shongwe, these early initiatives by the King were opposed by the colonial authorities, who feared that a decentralised Swazi administration would help to strengthen the powers of the King(1). Nevertheless, as colonial strategy changed in the 1950's, the colonial state began to take an active interest in developing the Tinkhundla. One reason for this was that ex-members of the African Pioneer Corps had been chosen to serve on Tinkhundla committees. In 1958, one colonial official noted that:

> It is too early now to indicate the direction these committees will finally take. It is hoped, however, that with guidance, a form of local government authority will be established, which will provide the people of the areas concerned with a real service and will lead to de-centralisation and a delegation of authority from the central body...and at the same time on the lower district level, to provide for an element of centralisation making for a more economic and worth-while use of existing facilities(2).

According to this official:

> Individual chiefs at first looked upon the formation of these committees with suspicion and felt that many of their functions were being usurped. This initial suspicion, however, appears to be disappearing and chiefs and people now welcome the fact that government, in many of its forms, is being taken to them(3).

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1. M.V. Shongwe, 'Tinkhundla: A study of local government in Swaziland', (Mimeo 1983), Uniswa S.S.R.U. Doc. Centre, pp.1-2.

2. S.N.A., File No. 3012 V, (undated, but probably 1958).

3. Ibid.

But the question of the relationship between the authority of chiefs and the Tinkhundla remained a thorny issue. The District Commissioner of Manzini for example, felt that the Tinkhundla system:

> was the brainchild of Mntfwanawenkosi (Prince) Dabede and Mfundza Sukati and that the Paramount Chief had little enthusiasm for it. This system appeared to be doomed for the reason that local chiefs was opposed to it and the appointment of ndvunas was suspect. He suggested this might be improved if the Ndvunas were abolished and the chairmanship of the Nkundla Committee rotated between the chiefs of the area(1).

Brian Marwick was also sceptical:

> Some District Commissioners with whom I have discussed the problem are inclined to think that a system based on districts instead of the smaller Nkundla units might have a greater chance of success. They point out that chiefs' meetings at District Headquarters are usually well attended and chiefs are free of the restraint which they seem to feel at Tinkhundla meetings(2).

This would, in fact, seem to be the most comprehensive explanation for the failure of the Tinkhundla during subsequent decades to develop into an effective local authority system. Thus a researcher of local administration in the 1960's in Swaziland, argued that any ideas of local government were strongly opposed by 'the chiefs and traditionalists who regard it with suspicion and fear, and that the changes involved would reduce their influence and undermine their position'(3). Nevertheless, in the wake of the suspension of the

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1. "Extracts from District Commissioner's Conference" (13th - 14th February 1958), S.N.A., File No. 3012 V.

2. S.N.A. File No. 3012 V, (4 December 1958).

3. B.H. Denning, 'Local Government Trends in Swaziland', Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol VIII, No.1, (July 1969), p.197.

constitution, the King attempted, along with his advisers, to neutralise the state/people antagonism through a carefully controlled strategy of decentralisation. Thus the Minister of Local Administration, Prince Masitsela argued that:

> Tinkhundla are at the core of rural society and the link throught the indvuna; between the King and the people... indvunas, should work closely with DC's. But all men should attend Tinkhundla which should be a 'fountain that never runs dry'. Every form of development scheme should be channelled through the Tinkhundla(1).

Unlike Mswati's royal villages, none of the King's Queens were sent to reside at the Tinkhundla centres. But central control was maintained insofar as the indvuna of each Tinkhundla was a King's appointee. This was formalised in the October 1978 Order-in-Council. The Tinkhundla were henceforth to constitute the legal electoral vehicles. An Electoral Committee was established in order to supervise and assist the conducting of the elections by the Tinkhundla. Those elected at Tinkhundla level do not however take up seats in Parliament, but become delegates to an Electoral College which then elects members of the House of Assembly. The Electoral Committee itself comprises seven nominees of the King, for a term decided by the King, and is presided over by an Indvuna Yetinkhundla, who himself is a committee member appointed by the King. The Indvuna Yetinkhundla has a casting and deliberate vote in the event of the Committee failing to reach an agreement on any particular issue.

Meetings of the Tinkhundla are open to any citizen of Swaziland over

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1. Times of Swaziland, 16 March 1973.

the age of eighteen years in the area where that individual works or lives. According to the 1978 Order-in-Council, each Inkhundla should elect an Inkhundla Committee at a meeting convened by the indvuna, 'Provided that such election be conducted along traditional lines'(1). The Inkhundla Committee then proposes between two and four persons as delegates to represent the Inkhundla at the Electoral College, providing that each nominated delegate receives no less than five votes from those present at the meetings. In practice however, the Inkhundla meeting has come to constitute the 'general election', and candidates for each Tinkhundla have been announced on the morning of the elections, allegedly to prevent political campaigning. Voting has amounted to walking through a gate next to which the candidate of an individual's choice is standing. The two candidates with the highest number of votes then become members of the Electoral College, which is summoned by the Monarch to Lobamba. The Electoral College is presided over by an Electoral Officer appointed by the King, who together with the Indvuna Yetinkhundla and the Electoral Committee supervise the election of forty members of the House of Assembly. These are both nominated and elected by the Electoral College, but between the nomination and the election of candidates, the Electoral Officer and the Electoral Committee are empowered to investigate the eligibility of candidates. Their decision is final and cannot be challenged in a court of law. Once nominations have been approved, elections take place on a secret ballot. 60-day detainees were excluded by law from becoming eligible for election to Parliament.

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1. 'The Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order', op.cit..

Parliament consists of a House of Assembly and Senate. In addition to the forty members elected by the Electoral College, the monarch appoints a further ten members. Ten Senators are elected by the House of Assembly and ten are appointed by the monarch. These are appointed after consultation with bodies considered appropriate by the King:

> ...in an endeavour to appoint such persons who are by reason of their special knowledge or practical experience able to represent economic, social or cultural interests not already adequately represented in Parliament or who are by reason of their special merit able to contribute substantially to the good government of Swaziland.(1)

The 1978 Order empowers the King to prorogue or dissolve Parliament at his pleasure, but it was intended that the life of each Parliament extend for a period of five years. It also enables both the King and Parliament to make laws exercised by Bills passed by both chambers of Parliament. Once passed, a Bill has to be assented by the King before becoming law. Either chamber can introduce a Bill, although the Senate is excluded from introducing money bills. What has changed in Swaziland, therefore, is not so much the form of the state as the mode of representation. Here political forces representing interests which are rooted both in the division of labour as well as in the complex mesh of civil society have established institutionalised channels of access to the state apparatuses. These have been recognised as legitimate by certain branches of the state and sectors of Swazi society, and in this way continuity in the field of government

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1. Ibid.

and administration have been secured. This signifies the establishment of an effective pluralist system in Swaziland. The Tinkhundla have become key to the popular success of the 'new system'. While Tinkhundla are not based on the system of hereditary chieftainship, they are located within it. Here an effort has been made to democratise local decision-making insofar as 'Tinkhundla are a type of grassroots organisation comprising all inhabitants' of a particular area(1). But the formalisation of the Tinkhundla could not in itself guarantee the democratisation of politics, and instead have become the basis of authoritarian populist rule as opposed to popular democratic rule. As Jessop has argued, 'A genuine system of democracy requires not only formal democratic institutions but also a commitment to temper particularistic demands in the light of broad popular democratic objectives'(2).

The very history of the Tinkhundla has tainted their representative image. During the phases of decolonisation, following the formation of the INM, Tinkhundla became the vehicles for the election of INM candidates. Opposition parties were precluded from addressing the Tinkhundla and were on the whole prevented from campaigning in the countryside. When the first Constitutional Committee in the early 1960's suggested the use of the Tinkhundla as electoral vehicles, the

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1. B.R. Prinz, Urbanisation and Political Change : A study of Urban Local Government in Swaziland, Phd Thesis, Los Angeles; University of California, (1976), p.472.

2. B. Jessop, op.cit, (1982), p.250-1.

Swaziland Progressive Party strongly opposed this:

> The selection by acclamation of representatives to the Inkhundla committee will lead to the control of such committees by a few people with vested interests in outmoded tribal privileges. There will be no opportunity for the expression of a free choice by the individual Swazi. It should be remembered that at the present time some chiefs are capable of acting in a completely arbitrary manner to stifle individual expression. This system of election is totally unacceptable, primitive and inconsistent with democracy(1).

The more sinister aspects of the Tinkhundla initiative and the contradictory process of 'centrally orchestrated decentralisation', were seen in a speech made to the Nkaba Inkhundla by Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini, who became Prime Minister in 1983. At the time, Prince Bhekimpi was the Assistant Minister in charge of labour in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office and the indvuna of Nkaba Inkhundla. He stated that the Government intended reformulating labour legislation so that all work seekers in a particular locality would be required to register at Tinkhundla centres(2). This strategy, which bears a striking resemblance to the labour bureaux initiatives of the South African State, would then enable the state to control the flow of labour migration to the urban areas. State thinking here is that the urban centres are the locus of political opposition, while the rural areas insofar as they are under the control of the 'traditional authority', are easily brought to heel. By deploying the Tinkhundla as organs of control over urban migration as well as rural development and

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1. Swaziland Government, Written Comments by members of the Public on the Constitutional Proposals, op.cit., p.89.

2. B.R. Prinz, op.cit., p.466.

administration, the state believes that it 'could slow down the urban unemployment cycle and thereby deter the formation of concentrated pockets of organised opposition(1). As we shall see, however, the formalisation of the Tinkhundla has been an extremely slow process, and aside from the actual electoral process, the other strategies associated with them have remained in the planning stage.

Although the King's measures of the 1970's leading to the legislation of a new constitution were to a certain extent successful in neutralising and absorbing existing antagonisms between the state and the people, they in turn created new contradictions. The actual processes of government often became problematic and paralysed and this necessitated the re-implementation of certain sections of the independence constitution. The latter was thus found to be both 'useful and controversial' as Attorney-General P. Makhanza put it(2). The awesome powers given to the King began to disturb erstwhile apologists of the 1973 initiatives. Douglas Lukhele, who as a senator in the 1972 Parliament had supported the repealing of the constitution, issued a strong warning as Attorney General in 1979:

> ...as principal legal adviser to the King and Government I again advise against the situation that was created by the Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order of 1978 whereby Parliament, on the one side, may legislate by Acts and the King on the other side, may concurrently legislate by Orders-in-Council on

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1. Ibid.

2. Interview with Mr. P. Makhanza, the Attorney General of Swaziland, 20 May 1984.

> identical subjects. This will lead to a conflict between Acts of Parliament and Orders-in-Council...which conflict is difficult if not impossible to solve and may also lead to the practice of urging the King to legislate by Orders-in-Council whenever it is felt that parliament will not pass a certain Act...(1)

As we will illustrate, the underlying tensions of Swazi society have manifested themselves in a number of ways during the 1970's and 1980's. Nevertheless, the foregoing has illustrated how the King, under the guise of popular tradition, has spearheaded a comprador bourgeoisie, who have consolidated their material basis of accumulation and political power through a modified state form. Despite the reservations of certain capitals, the interests of capital-in-general have been safeguarded through the ideological distortions which facilitated the King's seizure of absolute power. This inasmuch as the general conditions for the reproduction of the capital relation have been secured. The question which looms largest on the horizon is: why did the King's strategies succeed?

Swazi Nation, Real or Fictive Community?

On the eve of the independence in 1967, Mabuntane Mdluli composed a praise poem (tibongo) in honour of King Sobhuza. Before a Swazi King makes a public appearance a praise poet (imbongi) comes before the audience and chants his lines in honour of the monarch. Part of Mabuntane Mdluli's poem runs as follows:

> It is he, Bhuza among the high who overshadows all.
>
> Thunderous dancer,

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1. D. Lukhele, Attorney General to the Prime Minister Major General M. Dlamini, (26 July 1979), S.N.A., DPMO 12 A.G. 100/316/56.

Dancer on black shields of jojo

You played on shields of shikane...(1)

They said Sobhuza would not clasp the hand of George King of England

But he clasped the hand with the lightening of heaven

Twice the heavens flashed

Within the palace of the English

They praised you with wonder

'Tnis manhood, so great, whence did it come?'

Rock-thrush of Ngwane, of Mahlokohla,

You said, you inherited it from the navel,

Here, from Ndvungunye,

Here from Somhlolo...

You of the inner circle!

Male elephant of the Swazi!

Old one whom age does not diminish!

Old one of the country of Ngwane!

Bayethe your Majesty!(2)

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1. Jojo is the male widow bird, while shikane is the female. During the summer, the male grows long beautiful plumes. The King here is compared to a miraculous bird capable of growing striking plumes even in winter.

   Black bewildering widow bird
   You grew plumes in winter
   When other widow birds are bare....

2. H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), pp.14-16.

The praise poem reflects a certain percieved ontological truth, an idea which links the Swazi and their language through the King to a variation of divine dispensation. In this world-view, 'human loyalties (are) necessarily hierarchical and centripetal because the rule(r...(is) a node of access to being and inherent in it'(1). During the colonial period, this world view had been steadily eroded. The Swazi nation as created by Mswati had been irrevocably divided by the drawing of colonial boundaries by Britain and the Transvaal Republic at the signing of the Third Swaziland Convention. The colonial period and colonial ideology had come to undermine the concepts of common sense discourse which located human lives in the actual 'nature' of things. Up to the late 1940's, the King's attempts to make sense of the colonial world and to make the colonialists see sense had collapsed in a sea of indifference.

It became increasingly clear to the Swazi (their King included), 'that Progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete, by powers which they could not help by apprehending as foreign or alien'(2). The uneven development of capitalism made elements of the emerging Swazi petty bourgeoisie aware that only a few of them could be incorporated into the new Swazi society on equal terms with the colonists. And when the masses who had been incorporated into the capitalist production processes realised this in the early 1960's they went on strike. With the rise of expectations outstripping the

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1. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso Editions, 1983), p.40. The bracketed inserts are ours.

2. T. Nairn, op.cit., p.338.

development of the productive forces, it became evident that a resort to populism was an unavoidable necessity in Swaziland. The large numbers of settlers in the country posed a serious threat as a polarisation of black and white nationalism hovered menacingly on the horizon. In between, stood the forces of tradition. These desired neither to copy the progress of the 'advanced countries' nor to devise and formulate new social forms. As such, they were only too pleased to take what they wanted from the colonists and cobble it onto their own indigenous inheritance. It was easy for indigenous ruling forces to mobilise an interclass community of both class and non-class forces, which was aware of its own identity in relation to the external forces of domination. Furthermore this task was made so much easier by the fact that no ethnic divisions existed within the single national territorial unit.

But how real was this supposed Swazi Nation which the King was able to unite behind him in waging his various ideological and political struggles? Ben Anderson has defined the nation as 'an imagined political community'(1). It is imagined as limited, since no nation is or desires to be infinite and coterminous with mankind as a whole. It is imagined as a community 'because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible'(2). But unlike most nations, in

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1. B. Anderson, op.cit., p.15.

2. Ibid., p.16.

Swaziland, 'enlightenment' and/ or revolution had failed to seriously rupture the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic regime. Drawing heavily on indigenous, non-capitalist and specifically lineage-based ideology, the King was able to nail fraternity onto the dynastic regime. Addressing the celebrations in 1968, when Sobhuza was officially sworn in as King of Swaziland, he told the 20,000 strong crowd:

> It is the tradition of all African Kingdoms that their Kings are leaders as well as Kings. This is also true for Swaziland. Now rightly or wrongly, some people have mistaken this dual capacity for a dictatorship. I would like to assure you here and now that in our Kingdom the King both leads and is led by his people. I am my people's mouthpiece(1).

At the same time, Sobhuza was able to appeal to the pluralism of Swazi society, by stilling the fires of settler nationalism:

> The cry of many leaders in troubled countries in Africa was 'Get rid of the Europeans; drive them to their homes; let only Africans remain in Africa'. I see no sense in such talk.. There are whites who have been here for generations, and cases where whites formed firm friendships with Africans? What good is there in chasing away our friends?(2)

But in uniting the Swazi nation behind him, Sobhuza had very little to draw on because none of the necessary institutions compatible with the level of development of capitalist productive forces existed within 'traditional' Swazi society. So he had to go on what existed, and during the phases of decolonisation and beyond rituals like the incwala

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1. Times of Swaziland, 25 April 1967.

2. H. Kuper, 'Royal Ritual in a changing Political Context, Cahiers d'etudes Africanes, Vol. XII, No.4 (1972), p.605. Interesting to note is that this comment was made by Sobhuza to Kuper at his residence Emasundvwini on December 8 1967, during the period of Incwala.

and reed dance (umhlanga) were far better attended than they had been for decades and eventually became public holidays. Thus as the masses returned to the stage of history, the script and language of their roles were well understood. But the whole process has been riddled with contradictions. For while the masses have been dancing the incwala, the petty-bourgeois intelligensia have been drawing up the shortcuts to 'progress' and 'modernity', but have found these routes blocked rather cruelly by the rhythms of global capitalist development. At the same time, the inevitable contradictions of nationalism itself have come to confront the imagined community, whose reality has become affirmed by the common problems which the territoriality of the nation state have forced upon it. For nationalism is by its very nature simultaneously progressive and retrogressive: it moves forward precariously on the engines of the past. Yet it works, because the material and cultural reality of these imagined communities are all that they know. Thus the INM in Swaziland chugged forward on a familiar terrain:

> The INM unlike most parties, is not the product of (a) fertile imagination...The body of (the independence) struggle comprised the entire nation...centred around the burning issues of kingship... The INM believes firmly that stability can only be founded in the proven institutions of our forefathers... It is an instrument of the people which defies characterisation apart from the people[1].

In this sense, the Swazi nationalism of the King succeeded in providing the masses with something real and important, which they desperately needed following the decades of negativity of colonial

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1. 'Philosophy and Policies of the Imbokodvo National Movement', op.cit.

ideology- an identity. In this way, the Swazi were able to transcend the limits of the imagined community, as false consciousness bowed before practical material ideology. But nationalism remains Janus-faced, the angel of history whose:

> face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistably propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress(1).

Unlike this angel, however, the Swazi nation is not by definition immortal. And no doubt its members will create fresh images for history to cast in front of their feet having revealed the old as no longer sacred. As long that is, as the angel does not close his wings.

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1. W. Benjamin, Illuminations, (London: Fontana, 1973), p.259.

Conclusion

Nationalism has become such a fundamental phenomenon in the trajectory of African history that it would be a travesty not to analyse its course in Swaziland. It mobilises society for progress, drawing on the myths of the past for its sustenence and legitimacy, but reveals in so doing, its dualistic progressive/regressive contradictory character. Nationalism in Swaziland has been based on revivalism, spearheaded by a King who steadily developed a cult of personality around himself. This was achieved primarily through a recourse to indigenous ideology and its various elements. These had initially faltered in the face of indifferent colonialism, as the early years of Sobhuza II's rule were punctuated by the succession of defeats in his efforts to contest the land partition. A steady degeneration in conditions on the land left to the Swazi Nation, placed Royal hegemony in further jeopardy, so that as the developing mine and plantations within the country profitted from the characteristic ultra-exploitation of the capitalist periphery, the space was created for the emergence of a new political and ideological discourse in the run-up to independence.

It was the NNLC which attempted to develop a new initiative, seizing on the opportunities facilitated by the strike wave of the early 1960's. But Royalty had too much in its favour to be easily defeated. The absence of ethnic divisions in the single national territorial unit; and a King who combined fraternity with dynasty in presenting himself as the father of the nation to a people who revered the Kingship, and who had only known one King in over 40 years; proved to be the decisive components of an emergent nationalist political strategy. Combined with a sound material basis secured through control over the country's

resources, and an alliance with the agents of settler and metropolitan capital, King Sobhuza II was able to preside over the cultivation of a hegemonic project that proved unassailable, and carried Swaziland into the post-colonial era.

One effect of these struggles for hegemony, was the emergence of authoritarian populism in Swaziland, as political power increasingly became centred on the King. Yet the pivotal position of the King as we shall see, has constituted a recipe for the current political crisis faced by Swaziland. One reason for this, is that outside the forces of nationalism, and the revival of the collective unconscious(1) which brought the masses back into history, the practical dimension of ideology has produced little genuine impact on the mass of people. While Swazi subjects have once again gained positive identies, and can view themselves as members of an independent nation state, in reality they have become steadily enstranged from the actual political process. A contradiction has been revealed: while traditional authority and ideology have become the subject of the constitution of the Swazi Nation, these have de facto become enstranged from the mass of the people in whose name they are enforced. As early as 1965, Jack Halpern noted that 'today Sobhuza is probably out of touch with the problems of the rural Swazi, for in the forty-three years of his reign, the broad popular base of national participation in the libandla has withered away'(2). As we will demonstrate, the

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1. The term is taken from T. Nairn, op.cit., pp.384-350.

2. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.368.

regalvanisation of the Tinkhundla has done little to alleviate this problem.

The aim of this chapter has not been to attempt to rewrite the history of the Swazi people. Much of its focus has been on the crisis, transformation and reconstitution of Royal Dlamini hegemony. This has been necessary for a thorough understanding of the political process in Swaziland. Class struggle as has been demonstrated, was very much a struggle over the formation of class forces prior to a struggle between class forces. In order to understand the political process in Swaziland, it has been necessary to introduce other points of reference and principles of explanation. For within both the colonial and post-colonial periods, a major antagonism has manifested itself between the state and the people, rendering the analysis of phenomena such as ideology and nationalism critical to the understanding of development in Swaziland. Failure to recognise this, has led writers of the persuasion of Fransman into a reductionist position with an overemphasis on the role of the working class in Swazi politics. We would not argue however, that class analysis and class politics be rejected in Swaziland. What needs to be established instead, is the relationship between class formation and struggle; and the practical material dimensions of politics and ideology, along with the forces, both class and non-class, which they engender. Class reductionism is flawed not through its focus on class perspectives, but through its exclusive concentration on such perspectives which need to be integrated with other points of reference, contradictions and levels of struggle. The aim of our reflective account of Swazi history in the twentieth century in this chapter, has been to assert the importance of incorporating an analysis of the evolution of the Swazi monarchy into

both a class analysis and a discussion of the development of the capital relation in its relation to the changing terrains of politics and ideology.

Before proceeding to an account of the contradictions generated by events of the 1970's, or perhaps the contradictions which these events failed to neutralise, it is necessary to provide a more rigorous account of the unevenness of the penetration of the capital relation. This would explain Swaziland's inability to break out of the vicious cycle of underdevelopment characteristic of societies on the periphery. It also sets the scene for an understanding of the economic and social impact of the world economic crisis on Swaziland.

4. THE ECONOMICS OF ROYAL HEGEMONY : STATE, TIBIYO AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN SWAZILAND

In the foregoing chapter, it was demonstrated how the transformation of Royal power was partly predicated upon the comprador role assumed by King Sobhuza II and the constellation of forces clustered around the Royal palace. Since independence, Swaziland's economy has continued to be dominated by foreign monopoly capital, resulting in uneven development and economic subordination. Swaziland's regional location has ensured a continuing and deepening dependence on South Africa, materialised through the South African Customs Union (SACU), the Rand Monetary Area, and the migrant labour system. Unable to exercise effective control over fiscal and monetary policies, the state has been left with limited options in the field of economic planning. In an attempt to extricate itself from this all-embracing grip, Swaziland has practised an open-door policy towards international capital, boasting a cheap-labour structure, a weak labour movement, and offered a wide range of generous investment and tax incentives. But Swaziland's unfavourable geographical location has led to difficulties with the marketing of its commodities. It has also been extremely difficult to generate inducements attractive enough to make Swazi industry sufficiently competetive. Foreign investment has therefore flowed into those sectors which concentrate on the processing and export of raw materials. Anglo-American, the CDC, Lonrho, Tate and Lyle, Turner and Newall, Courtaulds and the South African corporate giants, Natie Kirsh and Sol Kerzner (Southern Suns), have been the chief investors in Swazi development.

This reveals a further aspect of Swaziland's economic subordination. With no coherent economic planning policy, Swaziland has allowed itself to become dependent on anarchic international markets for economic growth. Foreign investment has flowed primarily into those sectors and projects which offer short-term profits rather than long-term economic growth. A prime example of this is Anglo-American's investment in iron-ore at Ngwenya. This has led to uneven sectoral development which complements the unevenness within sectors, such as the disparity between the growth of peasant farming and commercial agriculture.

The post independence period has witnessed the development of a complex relationship between the state, domestic capital through Tibiyo and the multinationals. Despite both state and Tibiyo commitment to development strategies aimed at the generation of greater self-sufficiency, Swaziland's dependence on food imports has steadily risen. Far from the dynamic generator of growth which Tibiyo protrays itself to be, we will show how this institution has placed a severe strain on the central budget through its tendency to embark on ventures for which it is clearly ill-equipped. The state has consequently been forced to come to the rescue on account of the powerful forces which Tibiyo - the corporation of the Swazi crown - itself represents. In the field of agriculture, Tibiyo has favoured large-scale estate projects as opposed to support for the peasant sector, so that the mass of the Swazi people in whose name the fund is held in trust, have derived little benefit from resultant development.

These tendencies are seen most graphically in the development of the

sugar industry. The major project during the Third National Development Plan period was the construction of the Third Sugar Mill at Simunye. With the collapse of the world sugar market by the time the mill was completed, and its subsequent failure to recover, the project has been a financial catastrophe while swallowing up huge amounts of state revenue and providing few beneficial spill-over effects - many of the shops in the new Simunye Plaza have shut down and stand empty.

It is in this industry that the effects on Swaziland of the uneven global development of capitalism are most clearly evident. The profitability of sugar-cane rests on the high rate of exploitation of unskilled sugar workers in labour processes of relatively low capital-intensity. Moreover, the unequal exhange of commodities on the world market has led to the massive transfer of value from Swaziland, with diminishing returns from an ever-declining market in recent years. It is this combination of intensive exploitation and value transfer that has had the effect of reproducing on an extended scale, the uneven development and inequalities that are typical of imperialism in the present conjunture.

Uneven Development in the Capitalist Periphery

The post World War II era which has seen massive foreign outlays and investments in Third World deveopment, has involved a qualitative shift in the patterns of global development. For Ernest Mandel, the third technological revolution leading to this epoch of 'late capitalism', constitutes a crucial turning point in world development, characterised by the development of the international concentration of capital into

the international centralisation of capital(1). The elimination of the smaller and weaker international firms through the evolution of capital's value in each major capitalist enterprise, as a consequence of accumulation and competition, was transformed into the international fusion of different capitals under a single common command. It was at this stage that the multinational corporation became the determinate organisational form of big capital(2). This development served to illustrate the social nature of world-wide production, through the eradication of anarchic international markets, and the formation of an international division of labour. Nevertheless, in transcending the historical barriers of the nation state, capital, in its tendency towards international centralisation, has attempted to surmount its own restrictions within the limits of the capitalist mode of production itself(3). This has involved an uneven and contradictory development, whereby world-wide productivity differentials are constantly reproduced on an extended scale. The result is a polarity of development between the capitalist countries at the centre and those on the periphery.

A rising organic composition of capital in the centre (i.e. ratio of constant capital to variable capital (labour power), or capital intensity) has led

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1. E. Mandel. Late Capitalism, (London: New Left Books, 1975), p.316.

2. Ibid.

3. K. Marx, Capital Vol.III, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), p.417.

to declining profit rates, only partially compensated for by a rising productivity. But the relatively low organic composition of capital in the periphery, in conjunction with the articulation of capitalist, and non-capitalist relations of production, has implied vast disparities in profit rates between the Third World and the metropolitan countries. This absence of the equalisation of the rate of profit on a global scale has rendered the investment of capital in the periphery a key source of super profits for the multinational companies(1). Although a significant proportion of multinational investments in the periphery display a degree of capital intensity, this is generally lower than that in the centre. The multinational companies have been able to benefit from the availability of cheap labour power in the Third World, as unskilled, often casually employed workers, have made it possible for them to achieve an extremely high rate of profit.

It is this lack of homogeneity in the global system which has ensured the perpetration of uneven development in the capitalist periphery. Despite the fact that multinational companies have undertaken huge investments and capital exports to the Third World, the production of the means of production and technology as a whole has remained concentrated in the advanced capitalist countries. The consequence is, that in terms of Marx's schemes of reproduction of capital or capital accumulation, Department I (production of the means of

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1. See E. Mandel, op.cit., Chapter 2, passim.

production) has largely remained in abeyance in the countries of the periphery(1). This has proved to be a major obstacle to capital accumulation in these countries, since the productive complementarity demanded by capital for its own realisation, often does not exist within their own national economies. Concommitant with this, is the high rate of exploitation, where virtually all the value produced by labour power is converted into surplus value. This leads to a deepening crisis of poverty while simultaneously preventing the development of a mass market for consumer goods which would justify investment in Marx's Department II or production of consumer goods(2). Thus the objective conditions for the expanded reproduction of capital (Department I and II) are greatly inhibited in the periphery, where countries are continually dragged down by an export led growth, unable to transcend the barriers which obstruct the progressive development of their own productive forces.

These problems have been compounded by the unequal exchange of commodities on the world market. Despite the controversy surrounding the concept of unequal exchange(3), Mandel has convincingly demonstrated its validity. He argues that there are two

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1. F.E. Cardosa, "Dependency and Development in Latin America", in H. Alavi and T. Shanin (eds.), op.cit., p.121.

2. P. Sweezy, "Centre, Periphery and Crisis", in H. Alavi and T. Shanin (eds.), op.cit., p.214.

3. Much of the controversy surrounds the work of A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study in the Imperialism of Trade. (London: New Left Books, 1972). The important critiques of Emmanuel's work include: C. Bettelheim, "Theoretical Comments", Appendix I to A. Emmanuel, op.cit.; and G. Kitching, Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective, (London: Methuen, 1982), Chapter 6.

sources of unequal exchange(1). Firstly, the labour of the developed countries at the centre of the capitalist system, figures as more intensive, and is therefore more productive of value and receives a higher remuneration. Secondly, there is an absence of an international equalisation of the rate of profit. The value of export commodities produced in countries with low average levels of labour productivity, is therefore not determined by the specific quantities of labour expended in their production, but rather by an international average level of labour productivity(2). The consequence is a massive transfer of value from the underdeveloped export orientated economies on the periphery, to the centre. This transfer of value from the underdeveloped periphery to the core, through the exchange of disproportionate quantities of surplus labour on the world market, helps to comprehend the co-existence of higher profit rates, lower wages, levels of accumulation and productivity in the Third World. It also explains how the metropolitan countries are enriched at the expense of the former. Nevertheless it would be dangerous to conclude that a readjustment of the terms of trade between the developed countries at the centre and those on the periphery in itself would bring an end to the reproduction of global disparities.

The internationalisation of capital, has led to the expanded reproduction of the social and material conditions of existence of

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1. E. Mandel, op.cit., p.351.
2. Ibid., pp.71-74.

global production characterised by a particular composition of dominant and subordinate national economic units, and the reproduction of their specific locations within this global system. The genesis of these relations of domination and subordination is traceable to the very logic of capital itself and was first analysed by Marx in Volume I of Capital(1). Here it was argued that in countries where modern industry was first established, production acquired the ability for rapid extension, unlike in other countries where industries were subsequently established. The latter were transformed into areas for the supply of raw materials, resulting in a fresh international division of labour favouring the original countries of industry. Supported by the political and ideological domination wielded by the imperialist powers, this type of international development fostered the consolidation of class allies in the dominated countries. They could not themselves play an active role in the development of the productive forces in the periphery. For Bettelheim, it is this quality of the world-wide development process that has engendered the progressive obstruction of the productive forces in the periphery, thus aiding and abetting the unevenness of international development: 'It is this specific combination of internal production relations with production relations and political and ideological relations on a world scale that engenders what is meant by the 'blocking' of the productive forces in the dominated countries'(2).

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1. See C. Bettelheim, op.cit., p.289.

2. Ibid., p.290.

This interruption is both a consequence of and contingent upon the international expanded reproduction of capital, and provides a guarantee for sustained imperialist domination. This is why multinational capital continues to monopolise its technology, and further why aid to developing countries generally does not serve to foster in an appropriate way the development of the productive forces. Instead it is funnelled through the dominating classes of a specific country. This on the one hand increases their dependence on the metropolitan bourgeoisie, while simultaneously continuing to bolster their domination. Unequal exchange, therefore, articulates with class relations of domination and subordination and cannot be simply remedied through the restructuring of an exchange relation. This is because the world economy has evolved as an articulation of relations of exploitation within nationally defined territorial units, with an unequal exchange and transfer of quantities of labour-power on an international capitalist market which knows no bounds.

In the case of Swaziland, we have observed how capital penetration led to the consolidation of indigenous dominant class forces and the transformation of their class determination. After World War II, the international centralisation of capital generated uneven development through the rapid penetration by multinational capital of restricted areas in Swaziland, for the production of specific primary commodities for export. This has resulted in the concretisation of the foregoing processes: the developing class alliance between the comprador bourgeoisie and the class forces of international capital, as well as transfers of value from Swaziland to the developed world. The net effect has been a deepening unevenness of development in Swaziland.

But this has unfolded in the context of a tremendous growth of South Africa's economic power in the region. South Africa has become an industrial power in its own right, and in so doing, has dominated the economies of the region, sucking them into a web of dependency(1). It is to this relationship that we now turn.

Deepening links with South Africa

Reference has been made to Swaziland's increasing subordination to the rhythms of development of South African capitalism, and how this transformed the country into a supplier of labour power to South African mining and agricultural capital, and a market for South African manufacturing capital(2). The latter relationship was formalised and concretised through the promulgation of the 1910 customs agreement between South Africa, Bechuanaland, Basotholand and Swaziland (BLS).

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

The 1910 agreement established free trade between South Africa and the High Commission Territories, a common external tariff, and a distribution of revenue, whereby the BLS countries received a fixed share of 1.31 per cent. Swaziland's share of this was fixed at 0.149 per cent. These latter percentages were based on the 1906-8 import levels

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1. The expression comes from B. Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins, (London: Longman, 1983), p.16.

2. See Chapter 2 above.

for the countries, and no machinery was established for the adjustment of these in the event of subsequent changes(1).

The post 1910 period witnessed intensified South African attempts to incorporate the three British protectorates into the Union of South Africa. In the face of continuing British reluctance over the issue, the South African state resorted to economic co-ercion in order to pressurise the BLS territories into incorporation. Quotas, notably on cattle, were imposed upon South African imports from the three protectorates. In open defiance of the free trade clause of the customs union agreement, South Africa imposed total quarantine on veterinary grounds on all livestock, between 1910 and 1923. When this was lifted, quotas were imposed through weight restrictions on all cattle from the three protectorates(2). The consequence in Swaziland was not only a deepening crisis in the reserves, but a large fall in state revenue which depended on duties from the sale of cattle - the predominant form of taxation prevailing at the time. The imposition by South Africa in 1925 of tariff restrictions as a protectionist measure for its infant manufacturing industry meant that the revenue accruing to the BLS protectorates dropped, due to falling imports into the customs union area. It also implied that these countries were subsidising South African manufacturing capital by being forced to buy its relatively expensive manufacturing goods.

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1. P.M. Landell-Mills, 'The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.IX, No.2, (1971), pp.263-4.

2. D. Lowet, Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland., (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), p.113.

This lack of control over revenues, through the fixing of tariffs and alteration of imports by South Africa in its own interests, was a continual source of friction. Hence on the formal acquisition of independence, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland sought an adjustment and refinement of the union which they felt was largely responsible for their economic stagnation. The Post Independence Development Plan of Swaziland, for instance, stated that:

> ...Swaziland belongs to the Southern African Customs Union and used the currency of the Republic of South Africa. This imposes certain limitations on the Government's freedom of action in matters of economic and fiscal policy. The level and incidence of the customs and excise duties are decided by the Republic, and direct taxation must take account of South African rates, allowances etc., in order to preserve incentives for foreign investment(1).

The common grievances of the three newly independent states led to a renegotiated settlement in 1969 which was designed to create better conditions for them. A new formula was devised for the sharing of revenue funds, whereby the introduction of a multiplier meant non-proportional distribution, serving to raise the amount of revenue accruing to each of the three states. In addition, there was to be free interchange of goods, consultation, freedom of transit, freedom of trade with non-members of the union and the protection of infant industries. The 1910 agreement had obliged the BLS countries to issue import licenses only in keeping with South African regulations.

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1. Swaziland Government, Post Independence Development Plan, (Mbabane: Swaziland Printing and Publishing Company, 1969), p.1.

But under the 1969 agreement, imports may be restricted by each party on its own terms, provided that 'the contracting parties shall co-operate in the application of import restrictions with a view to ensuring that the economic objectives of any import control legislation in any country in the common customs area are attained'(1). While the BLS states from a revenue point of view may benefit more from a tariff than from a non-tariff barrier, they do have the opportunity to stimulate particular industries through the provision of free importation of inputs subject to non-tariff barriers in South Africa. Nevertheless, as Cobbe has pointed out, South African actions suggest that 'South Africa will only tolerate such projects if they fit into minor interstices in the South African industrial structure... rather than being substantial disruptions of the South African market in question'(2),

The 1969 Agreement's multiplier enhancement factor, meant that the revenue received by the BLS was equivalent to 1.42 times the value of their imports and dutiable production multiplied by the average percentage duty content of imports and dutiable production for the

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1. Article 11, Subsection 5, quoted by J.H. Cobbe, "Integration among Unequals, The Southern African Customs Union", World Development, Vol.VIII, (1980), p.331

2. Ibid., p.331

entire customs union(1). With South Africa responsible for at least 90 per cent of imports and a far greater percentage of dutiable production, the latter part of the equation was determined almost entirely by developments in South Africa. The 1969 revenue formula also meant that there was a disappointing correspondence between current economic activity and revenues received. Finally there was an unanticipated decline in the rate received by the BLS states on their imports. This lead to a renegotiation and subsequent amendment to the revenue sharing provisions in 1976, resulting in a relatively large income transfer to the BLS states(2). In Swaziland, since 1976, customs duties and excise taxes have become a key component of Central Government recurrent revenue, as illustrated below:

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1. P.M. Landell-Mills, op.cit.; J.H. Cobbe, op.cit. The 1969 revenue-sharing formula may be expressed as follows:

$$1{,}42 \times (A+B) \times (Z/(X+Y)),$$

where A=c.i.f. duty-inclusive value of imports to BLS from all sources,
B= Excise and sales duties including value of dutiable production in BLS,
Z= total customs, excise and sales duty receipts of the whole Customs Union Area.
X=c.i.f. duty-inclusive value of imports to the Customs Union area from outside the area,
Y= excise and sales duty inclusive value of dutiable production in the whole Customs Union Area.

2. J.H. Cobbe, op.cit., p.330. The failure to take cognizance of the 1976 amendment has, as Cobbe points out, to a certain extent rendered rather superfluous the debate between Mosely and Landell-Mills as to the disadvantages and advantages of membership of the SACU for BLS, see P. Mosely, "The Southern African Customs Union: A Reappraisal", World Development, Vol.VI, No.1, 1978, pp.31-43; P.M. Landell-Mills, 'The Southern African Customs Union: A Comment on Mosely's Reappraisal', World Development, Vol VIII, No.1, 1979, pp.83-85.

Table 4.1 Customs Union Receipts as a Proportion of Total Government Revenue

(E' million)

YEAR	VALUE(Em)	% OF TOTAL REVENUE
1976/77	13.153	21
1977/78	38.943	48
1978/79	54.153	55
1979/80	74.237	59
1980/81	86.853	58
1981/82	62.666	47
1982/83	117.600	65
1983/84 (Provisional)	120.700	66
1984/85 (Budget)	130.400	61

Source: 1976/77 - 1981/82 : Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1982).

1982/83 - 1983/84 : Annual Report of the Central Bank of Swaziland, (Mbabane: Central Bank, 1983-1984).

What follows, is that the revenue formula is highly favourable to Swaziland which would suffer greatly in terms of overall revenue if the Customs Union were to break down. Moreover, serious dislocations could occur if Swazi firms that export to the South African market were confronted by high tariffs.

Nevertheless, distinctive objectives and conflicting interests exist between Swaziland and South Africa. Swaziland is concerned almost entirely with generation of revenue since its small domestic market does not favour its pursuing import substitution and tariff protective

policies. This contrasts with South Africa whose chief concern is the protection of South African industry and therefore sets tariffs with little regard for revenue generation(1). One consequence is that Swaziland's consumers have been forced to pay high prices to the benefit of South African development. Although clauses dealing with consultation of all tariff decisions, the right to designate key industries and the right to impose additional tariffs for particular industries, were designed to promote industrial development in the BLS states, consultation in practice has not occured. South Africa has made unilateral decisions and then later informed the BLS states(2). The Customs Union provision that would allow Swaziland to add extra tariffs and discriminate against South African competition is counterbalanced by the fact that an industry thus protected cannot export to the South African market. This enables Clough to conclude that 'Swaziland is in a no-win situation when it comes to the Customs Union. It cannot afford to get out, but it will continue to suffer if it stays in'(3).

Indeed, despite the apparent advantages of the revenue sharing formula, the effects of the Union have been to increase the BLS countries' dependence on South Africa, and reinforce and perpetuate

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1. M.W. Clough, The Swazi Economy, (Mimeo: n.d., October, 1977), p.18.

2. Ibid., p.19.

3. Ibid.

the polarity of development, whereby the more developed areas of South Africa have grown at the expense of the underdeveloped periphery, which embraces Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Swaziland's subordination to South African capitalism is seen, for example, in the stranglehold which the state-owned South African Railways (SAR) has been able to exert over the Swaziland economy through the freedom of transit clause. As a consequence, the SAR has come to dominate and monopolise the transportation of both exports and imports to Swaziland(1). 'Food, machinery and manufactured articles have been supplied to the largely South African-owned subsidiaries and retail outlets of Swaziland. According to Leistner and Smit, 70 per cent of post World War II investment up to the late 1960's was of South African origin(2). Since independence, the proportion of imports from South Africa has steadily risen to over 90 per cent of the total, including nearly all basic consumer goods, manufacture, machinery and fuel, and Swaziland has proved itself incapable of rectifying its significant balance of trade deficit with South Africa. This can be seen in the following table:

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1. J.S. Crush, "The Parameters of Dependence in Southern Africa A case-study of Swaziland", Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol.IV, No.3, (July 1979), p.56.

2. G.M.E. Leistner, and P. Smit, Swaziland : Resources and Development, (Pretoria : African Institute of South Africa, 1969).

Table 4.2 : Balance of Trade with South Africa:

YEAR	IMPORTS		EXPORTS	
	VALUE (Em)	% TOTAL	VALUE (Em)	% TOTAL
1968	30.7	83	5.9	15
1969	32.5	87	8.5	19
1970	38.4	90	10.6	21
1971	43.4	91	9.8	18
1972	49.9	94	10.0	15
1973	61.4	92	18.6	25
1974	82.9	95	17.4	14
1975	122.5	93	20.9	15
1976	157.2	90	32.3	21
1977	186.8	96	28.2	20
1978	244.1	90	41.2	24
1979	334.2	91	45.4	23
1980	436.5	93	82.7	30
1981	433.1	83	108.4	34
1982	466.4	83	122.5	37

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletins, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1975, 1979, 1982).

But the analyses of Swazi trade must take into account the sui generis situation created through Swaziland's membership not only of the customs union, but the Rand Monetary Area as well.

The Rand Monetary Area (RMA)

Swaziland's economic dependence on South Africa has been increased by the monetary union which exists between the two states. Without representation in the South African Reserve Bank, Swaziland has been unable to control monetary policies which affect its own economy. In a key area, the Swazi state therefore finds its field of action and intervention sealed off. Devaluation could, and has had, adverse effects on Swaziland's economy, and when South Africa is itself faced with balance of payment problems as it was in 1971 and as it has been in the 1980's, a tightening up of credit has put the brakes on Swaziland's own development plans and projects.

In December, 1974, the de facto monetary union which existed between the BLS states and South Africa became formalised through the creation of the officially recognised RMA. During the period of on-going negotiations leading to the RMA Agreement, Swaziland decided to issue its own currency. It was not considered to be in Swaziland's interests to establish a fully independent system which may have involved the introduction of exchange controls with consequential deleterious effects on South African investment and

tourism upon which the Swazi state depended so much(1). The dual system, which has existed since the introduction of the lilangeni in the mid-seventies, has had little effect, since the lilangeni is completely tied to the South African rand which continues to circulate freely in Swaziland and interchanges with the lilangeni. Thus although in theory the RMA allows each state to formulate monetary policy independently, South Africa manages the rand, gold reserves and foreign currency in the RMA. Through Article 8 of the Agreement, South Africa is permitted to invoke unilateral decisions without consultations with its RMA partners. The consequence for Swaziland and Lesotho, is that 'monetary policy takes the form of a fait accompli'(2).

The Rand has remained paramount in the RMA zone and monetary policy is established and formulated independently of the Swaziland Monetary Authority(3) by the South African Reserve Bank. The Central Bank of Swaziland remains little more than an intermediate institution in the process of a gradual establishment of a more independent monetary regime. Created with the involvement of South African expertise, the Central Bank provides the potential

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1. Collings, F.d'A. 'The Rand and the Monetary Systems of Botwana, Lisetho, Swaziland and South Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.XVI, No.1, (1978), p.114.

2. D.G. Clarke, (Economic consultant) Economic Linkages in Southern Africa, (Geneva, April, 1982), Uniswa S.S.R.U. Doc.Centre., pp.30-31.

3. Now known as the Central Bank of Swaziland.

for independent monetary policy formulation, although it is difficult to see how Swaziland can become insulated from cross-border monetary exchange(1). Before the 1974 Agreement, one of the grievances of the BLS states had been that funds generated in their countries tended to flow to the more developed capital markets in South Africa. Article 3 of the Agreement provides for the unrestricted transfer of funds within the RMA, apart from those arising from investment or liquidity requirements prescribed for banks and financial institutions(2). This means that theoretically Swaziland may mobilise domestic resources in the interests of economic development, and impose restrictions on exchange control and the outflow of capital to other parts of the RMA, in the interest of local investment and liquidity requirements.

In practice, however, the major banks, Barclays and Standard have operated as subsidiaries of Barclays and Standard in South Africa, which through Article 4 of the Agreement has been able to control the issuing of public securities that qualify as 'prescribed investments and approved securities' for holding by South African based financial institutions(3). Furthermore, no agreement exists for any regular arrangements for South Africa to take up Treasury Bills issued in Swaziland or Lesotho. Special permission is required from the Central Bank to raise capital in Swaziland in aggregate amounts exceeding E100,000 by the issue of bonds, shares, etc., during any

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1. Ibid.
2. F. d'A Collings, op.cit., p.104.
3. Ibid., p.105.

twelve month period(1).

Difficulties associated with the raising of loans for indigenous capitalist forces, led to the establishment of the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank in 1965. It is here that the problems of operating within a currency union whose exchange rates are determined from outside, have been exposed. The Bank soon found itself compelled to pursue the policies of the major foreign banks operating in the country; and found itself supplying loans to settler capital. In 1971, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture remarked that:

> Activities of the Bank will be required to improve in order to induce more and more farmers to use their credit available. Policies now used by the Bank in regard to farmers will need drastic change lest it be called the bank for the title deed farmers whose homes are based in neighbouring countries.(2)

Membership of the RMA has produced contradictions similar to those of the Customs Union. The rand, and consequently the lilangeni, has been devalued when Swaziland has been prospering under consistent trade surpluses. While Swaziland need not concern itself with the problem of foreign exchange shortages, it is often obliged to accept exchange rate policies which are not in its interests. In the case of the Customs Union in particular, South Africa has found ways of protecting its own interests when threatened by the advances of manufacturing industry based in the BLS states. Despite the fact that

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1. NIDCS, A Guide For Investors in Swaziland, (Mbabane: undated pamphlet).

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, (Mbabane; 1971)

firms established in Swaziland are supposed to benefit from access to the South African market, South Africa has been able to exert indirect pressure to prevent companies from the BLS countries from penetrating its market. Thus when Swaziland initially contemplated opening up a fertiliser plant to supply the whole Southern African Customs Union area, South Africa attempted to force the abandonment of the project by simply stating that it would not buy the fertiliser(1). This was in spite of the fact that feasibility studies proved that the fertiliser produced in Swaziland would have been much cheaper.

Labour power

For nearly a century, Swaziland has been one of the numerous labour-power supply pools for South African mining and agricultural capital. The well accepted negative consequences of South Africa's migrant labour system are all manifest in Swaziland. These include poverty, broken families, illegitimacy, malnutrition, declining homestead productivity and the increasing burden borne by women who have become de facto heads of households. The numbers of workers migrating to South Africa have increased somewhat since independence (see Table 4.3), and were it possible for Swaziland to increase yet further the number of migrants, it would surely do so to alleviate the critical unemployment problem confronting the country.

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1. D. Kowet, op.cit., p.140; J.H. Cobbe, op.cit., p.331.

Table 4.3 People Recruited from Swaziland for Mines in South Africa

YEAR	GOLD MINES	COAL MINES	PLATINUM MINES	TOTAL	TOTAL AS % OF TOTAL WAGE EMPLOYEES IN SD
1960	7,894	485		8,379	n.a.
1966	6,420	342		6,762	n.a.
1968	7,505	324		7,829	16,4
1970	8,820	291	215	9,326	n.a.
1973	7,079	231	780	8,090	14,1
1976	18,652	451	1,640	20,743	31,3
1978	11,387	1,336	1,561	14,284	20
1980	9,776	790	304	10,870	14,5
1982	12,081	1,406	203	13,690	17,7

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletins: (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1966, 1970, 1976, 1979, 1982).

n.a. = not available.

But the foregoing indices of Swaziland's dependence on South Africa, by no means exhaust a discussion of the closeness of Swaziland's economic relationship with South Africa. Swaziland's energy requirements, along with its transport and communications network are closely integrated with South African facilities.

Energy

A new hydropower station with a 20 mw of power, has recently been completed in the Ezulwini Valley. Known as Luphohlo, this scheme will offer Swaziland a significant saving on electricity imports.

Thusfar, about 66 per cent of the country's electricity requirements have been imported from South Africa(1). The Swaziland Electricity Board, established as a statutory body in 1962, handles the supply of power to all major residential, industrial and agricultural centres throughout the country. SEB has two stations at Edwaleni and Magudiga, generating 20 mw of power. More important in the context of Swaziland's dependence on South Africa, however, is that Swaziland currently imports all its oil requirements from South Africa in refined form. Transport is by sea from Durban to Maputo, and then by rail and road to Swaziland.

Transport and Communications

Economic growth and access to world export markets, have been predicated upon the expansion of transport links inherited at independence. As has been indicated, the SAR has dominated the transportation of exports and imports to Swaziland. The principal railway line in the country, is the 219 km link to Maputo which was built to handle the iron ore trade from Ngwenya. Established in 1964, the line had feeder services connecting Mbabane and Manzini with 5 South African railheads(2). In 1978, a new 93 km link was added

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1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Annual Supplement, (1984), p.47; see also P.O'Keefe and B. Munslow (eds.), Energy and Development in Southern Africa, Part II, (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984), Chapter 2.

2. Ibid.

between the existing system and Golel to the south on the South African border, thus providing a direct link to Richards Bay on the Natal coast. In the 1980's a new line was planned, which by the end of 1985 will link Komatipoort (north of Swaziland on thè South African/Mozambique border) with Richards Bay via Swaziland. Since the late 1970's, Royal Swazi National Airways has conducted regular air flights to Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. But international air traffic is predominantly via Johannesburg, with daily flights to Matsapha airport. Although the bulk of Swaziland's export cargo is handled by South Africa's transportation system, much of it is destined for export markets outside South Africa.

Indeed, this is one important feature which emerges from the foregoing discussion on Swaziland/South African economic relations. While Swaziland's imports have come predominantly from South Africa, its principal export markets are located elsewhere. This is a consequence of the pattern of capital penetration since World War II, particularly in the post-independence conjuncture. During this period, the circuit of capital was completed through the significant increase of specific commodity and raw material production, primarily for export to the world market.

The Development of the Swazi Economy Since Independence

Foreign investment in Swaziland

Swaziland has proved to be a fairly lucrative area for foreign investment. In 1972, it was estimated that 20 per cent of its national income flowed directly out of the country in the form of profits,

interest, dividends etc., to the foreign firms and individuals who dominate its export sector(1). The 1977 ILO Report estimated that approximately 70 per cent of the profits realised in the private sector go to foreign owned companies and 24 per cent of the wage bill accrues to expatriate employees who number a mere 5 per cent of the workforce(2). In the Third National Development Plan, the state, through the NIDCS, has included in its programme of action the aim 'to attract an increasing flow of foreign investment into Swaziland by providing financial assistance, factories for lease or sale, and liaison with relevant organisations locally based'(3). Investment incentives have resulted in company income being subject to generous allowances in the computation of taxable income, and certain companies in effect are provided with tax holidays in the early years of their operation. Depreciation allowances provide for the following annual deductions in calculating taxable income:

Motor vehicles	20%
Plant & Machinery	10-15%
Furniture & Fittings	5-10%
Industrial Buildings	4-10%
Housing for Employees	20% for the first year, thereafter 10% of actual cost for the suceeding 8 years

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1. A. Seidman and N. Seidman, US Multinationals in Southern Africa, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977), p.176.

2. International Labour Organisation, Reducing Dependence : A Strategy for Productive Employment and Development in Swaziland, (Addis Ababa: ILO/Jaspa, 1977), p.18.

3. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, Mbabane (1977/8-1982/3), p.99

Hotels	10% of actual cost for the first 5 years and 5% thereafter.(1)

Over and above these depreciation allowances, a taxpayer who is a manufacturer can claim a special investment allowance of 30 per cent of the actual cost of new machinery in the first year of use. This allowance may also be extended to industrial buildings as well as certain categories of second-hand machinery. During the first year, an extra 20 per cent of cost is permitted for machinery and plant which qualifies for the investment allowance. In the case of industrial buildings used in manufacturing, a similar allowance of 10 per cent is provided. The consequence is that an investment may be written off swiftly if thus desired. In addition to the above, a new allowance has been enacted to provide incentives for industrialists to train their employees, and to use more labour intensive labour processes. Expenses for training are twice deductible; firstly as normal expenses and secondly as training expenses, subject to the approval of the Commissioner for Taxes(2).

The personal tax system is designed as a further incentive to foreign investors. There is a maximum rate of 50 per cent on the top section of incomes over E24,000, and rebates from payable tax are made in respect of dependents, contributions to provident funds and life assurance premiums. No capital gains tax exists, and in general, income earned outside of Swaziland is free from taxation. Similarly in the case of companies, dividends accruing to or received by a company incorporated in Swaziland are non taxable. The repatriation of

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1. NIDCS, A Guide for investors in Swaziland, op.cit.
2. Ibid.

dividends is freely permitted subject to a withholding tax of 15 per cent or 12½ per cent in the case of share-holder companies registered in South Africa, Botswana or Lesotho. Interest repatriated is subject to a tax of 10 per cent, and individual expatriates employed in Swaziland are permitted to repatriate 33 per cent of gross income, along with gratuity and leave pay on termination of contract. Extra tax concessions can be obtained if the Ministry of Finance deems it fit to declare a certain region a development area, or declares a certain industry a primary industry(1).

Despite these apparently lucrative offers to foreign investors, the size and location of Swaziland has made it difficult for it to compete for foreign investment. One of the main problems lies in the marketing of Swazi commodities. Transport costs remain high, communications are poor and Swazi manufactures have proved to be uncompetetive. This has made it extremely difficult for Swaziland to actually choose the type of investment it desires. Consequently, the prevalent pattern of industrialisation cannot be regarded as being in Swaziland's long term interest(2). As the ILO Report has noted, the state's fiscal policy has favoured industry characterised by a high capital-intensity. Employment growth has lagged behind the growth of output and capital stock in the manufacturing sector, with the capital-labour ratio for this sector rising from E3 900 in 1970 to E5 000 in 1973. The incremental capital-labour ratio for the manufacturing industry as a whole between 1970-73 was 8.6, thus signifying a high level of capital

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1. Ibid.
2. M.W. Clough, Op.cit., p.40.

intensity(1). The cumulative effect of such developments has been the significant cheapening of the elements of constant capital - the part of capital used for the purchase of buildings, machinery, raw materials etc. - in relation to its variable component-capital used to purchase labour-power. The result is both a high rate and mass of surplus value. It is under these conditions, that foreign capital has flowed into the various sectors of the economy. But as the following analysis indicates, this flow has been uneven and disproportionate.

The Major Sectors of the Swazi Economy

On the surface, Swaziland appears to have a buoyant economy. Success in developing export orientated agro-industries in the post independence period, has meant that Swaziland no longer figures as one of the world's 25 least developed countries(2). GDP at current prices doubled between 1968 and 1972, thereafter growing at a rate of 23 per cent per annum to 1975/76. The economy also appears to be relatively diversified. In 1982, the manufacturing sector contributed 23.5 per cent of the coutry's GDP of E393.9 million. Agriculture and forestry contributed 25 per cent and the public sector 18 per cent(3). This is illustrated in the following table:

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1. International Labour Organisation, op.cit., p.93.

2. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Annual Supplement, (1984), p.42.

3. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1982).

Table 4.4 GDP at Constant 1980 Prices by Industrial Origin (E million)

	1980	1981	1982	%
Agriculture and forestry	93.6	104.6	100.1	25.4
Mining and quarrying	14.1	14.6	12.2	3.1
Manufacturing	79.6	88.4	92.6	23.5
Construction	16.2	18.7	13.7	3.5
Electricity and water	4.4	4.7	4.5	1.1
Wholesale and retail	27.0	27.7	26.5	6.7
Finance, insurance, real estate	23.6	26.2	25.7	6.5
Transport and communications	20.5	21.4	21.4	5.4
Government services	61.1	66.1	71.5	18.2
Others	25.8	23.7	25.8	6.6
GDP at factor cost	365.9	396.1	394.0	100.0

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office 1982),

One trend which emerges from the above table, is that the impressive economic growth rate of the post-independence period to the mid-1970's has slowed down. But the statistics serve to mask a number of disturbing patterns which have emerged in the Swazi economy. The 23 per cent contribution of manufacturing to the country's GDP would compare favourably with the performance of fully developed societies. Nevertheless, this figure obscures the fact that the level of industrialisation in Swaziland is low, and that a significant proportion of manufacturing is comprised of the processing of two primary export products: sugar and wood pulp.

Together, these two products constituted 50.3 per cent of the country's exports in 1982(1). Moreover, sugar and timber related products constituted 75.4 per cent of agricultural exports in 1982(2). In the meantime, demand for maize has continued to exceed domestic production, and in 1980-82, this contributed to a 45 per cent increase in the value of food imports(3). Most maize is grown on Swazi Nation Land, but as we shall observe, the contribution of small farmers on Swazi Nation Land to GDP has fallen dramatically since independence.

Two notable features emerge from an analysis of the Swazi economy. Firstly, since independence, Swaziland has displayed a disturbing tendency towards monoculture. Thus the country has become increasingly dependent on sugar exports. The sugar industry is the largest user of land in Swaziland; it is the largest single employer, and it consumes more water than any other source. It is also a major revenue earner for the government, and is the largest earner of foreign exchange. Sugar's contribution of foreign exchange earnings rose from 20 per cent in 1970, to 46 per cent in 1980, although it fell to an estimated 39 per cent in 1983(4). Secondly, this growing dominance of sugar in particular and agro-industry in general in the export sector, has unfolded against a background of a growing alliance between the multinationals who control it, and Tibiyo. Tibiyo, which as we have seen, is 'held in trust' for the Swazi Nation by the

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. The Econimist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review for Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Annual Supplement, (1984), p.44.

4. Swaziland Government: Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane:Government Printer, 1970, 1982); Annual Report of the Central Bank of Swaziland, ((Mbabane. Central Bank, 1983-1984)

monarchy, has made vast tracts of land available for its joint ventures with multinational capital, and has displayed a growing indifference to the plight of the peasantry on Swazi Nation Land. The state, which is committed to a Rural Development Areas Programme on Swazi Nation Land, has emerged as we will see, as a somewhat uneasy partner in the growing Tibiyo/multinational alliance. This latter relationship, in conjunction with the tendency towards monoculture, are important indices of the country's uneven development, and will be examined in detail. Before tackling these issues, however, it is necessary to devote greater attention to the various sectors of the economy.

Mining

The changing role of mining in the Swazi economy can be seen in the following table:

Table 4.5 Value and Proportion of Mining in Swaziland's Exports

YEAR	VALUE OF MINERAL EXPORTS (E'000)	% OF TOTAL EXPORTS
1955	5,215.3	67.2
1960	5,573.0	46.2
1962	4,976.0	32.7
1965	5,793.5	18.8
1968	6,007.1	15.3
1971	18,274.5	33.2
1974	18,221.1	15.2
1978	26,550.9	15.6
1980	20,171.6	7.2
1982	17,419.1	5.2

Source: Swaziland Report for the Year 1956, (London: HMSO, 1956) Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Government Printer, 1970, 1976, 1979, 1982,)

This table reveals that Swaziland's mining sector is at a very critical stage in its development, Whereas its contribution to GDP stood at almost 10 per cent in the early seventies, by 1982 it had dropped to 3 per cent. The sector has been dominated by Anglo American and Turner and Newall. Since World War II, the major minerals mined have been iron-ore, asbestos and coal. During its period of operation from 1964, the mining of iron-ore at Ngwenya which was sold in a 13 year contract to Japan, provided Swaziland with its second most important export. Yet this enterprise provides a cynical illustration of the drain of surplus value from the periphery to the centre of the global capitalist system. The major proportion of its output was exported via a rail link to the Mozambican border, and the whole operation was contracted before mineral rights had been returned to the comprador bourgeoisie at independence. The net effect, as expressed by the one time Finance Minister Leo Lovell, was that Swaziland swopped an iron-ore mine for a railway line(1). Hence fifteen years later, after De Beers had offered to mine diamond deposits at Ehlane, their propositions were rejected by the King, who asserted that the diamonds would still be there in years to come when a more favourable deal for their exploitation could be negotiated(2). The Ngwenya mine was operated by Anglo American which also operated the Mpaka Colliery in central Swaziland until 1985, satisfying both local demands and a small export market. Coal exports for 1980 totalled 139,558 tonnes, 54 per cent of which was exported to France with further

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1. J. Daniel, op.cit., (1982), p.94.

2. Ibid.

exports going to Kenya and South Korea(1). In 1985, Anglo-American sold its interests in Mpaka to Tibiyo which signed an agreement with Gencor's Trans-Natal Coal Corporation. Gencor has invested about E2m in the new company known as Emaswati Coal(2).

The other major mining enterprise, the Havelock asbestos mine at Bulemu was established from the mineral concession granted by Mbandzeni to Messrs Rathborne and Henderson in the north West of Swaziland(3). In May 1929, Turner and Newall Ltd. negotiated an option and shortly after this, purchased the right to mine asbestos ore on a limited part of the concession. The price paid was E480,000, which at the time was the largest amount ever paid for a base mineral proposition in Southern Africa(4). Mining preparation and mill and housing construction commenced in 1936, and production proceeded in 1939. Until 1973, Havelock mine was wholly owned by Turner and Newall, but in April 1973, Tibiyo acquired a 40 per cent share and a new company was formed, Havelock Asbestos Mines (Swaziland) Ltd.. Until sugar and forestry became major revenue earners in the 1950's, Havelock mine was the principal source of state revenue. Yet although now outstripped by sugar and forestry, asbestos remains the third largest earner of foreign currency in Swaziland. In 1979,

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1. Barclays Bank, "Swaziland, An Economic Survey and businessmen's guide", Barclay's Bank of Swaziland Ltd., (1981).

2. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, No.2, (1985), p.61.

3. "Ron Ward, General Manager Havelock Asbestos Mines (Swaziland) Limited to Permanent Secretary A.R. Shabangu of the Deputy Prime Minister's Office", (12 August 1981), S.N.A. D.P.M.C. 2.7.A, .

4. Ibid.

Swaziland's 38,000 metric tons output represented 0.72 per cent of the world's approximate total of 5,278,000 metric tons. Both the Swazi state and Tibiyo have been principal benefactors of this operation as demonstrated by the following figures for the year ended September 1980:

PAID TO TURNER AND NEWALL			PAID TO THE STATE AND TIBIYO	
Net dividends	E2 499,000	1)	Net dividends	E1 960,000
Fees	4,500	2)	Royalties	459,666
		2)	Company taxes	1 577,366
		2)	Taxes on Turner and Newall dividend	459,666
TOTAL	E 2 503,500			E4 456,698

1) Paid to Tibiyo
2) Paid to the State[1].

But with a growing international anti-asbestos lobby, the total paid to the state and Tibiyo in 1980 was E1 million less than the previous year. The diminishing asbestos market has further prompted Turner and Newall to announce their decision to sell the mine and cease operating by 1986. This is despite the recent acquisition by Tibiyo of an adjacent mining concession allowing for the extension of mining operations at greater depth, hence potentially lengthening the life of the mine.

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1. Ibid.

With the winding up of iron ore mining at Ngwenya and the uncertain future of the Havelock asbestos mine, Swaziland will have to look elsewhere for a boost in the mining sector. Small quantities of barytes, prophyllite, silicia and ornamental stone provide a certain amount of potential as do the substantial reserves of Kaolin which could be used to support a local ceramics industry. Five stone quarries are also in operation, and exploration of the potential for exploiting the alluvial industrial diamonds at Ehlane continues(1). Nevertheless, indications are that the mining sector will continue to decline in overall importance in the country's economy.

Manufacturing

The rapid infusion of capital in the post-independence period has witnessed a swift growth in the manufacturing sector. Most manufacturing has involved the processing of raw materials although a certain limited amount of diversification has occured. In the seventies for example, a television assembly plant, a fertiliser plant, a match factory and a zipper factory were established, and more recently in the eighties, a brick factory has begun operations. The trajectory of manufacturing's contribution to GDP is revealed in the following table:

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1. Barclay's Bank, op.cit.

Table 4.6 Manufacturing Industry's Contribution to GDP

YEAR	VALUE (E million)	% OF TOTAL
1967/8	6.7	13.2
1971/2	14.6	16.1
1972/3	22.0	19.5
1973/74	39.0	25.6
1975/6	57.5	22.7
1977	65.3	16.6
1978	69.8	15.7
1979	71.6	16.1
1980	79.6	17.0
1981	88.4	17.8
1982	92.6	18.8

Source: Swaziland Government Annual Statistical Bulletins (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1975, 1976, 1979).

The National Accounts of Swaziland 1976-1982, (Mbabane: Government Printer, 1983).

The table reveals that the inital optimism created by the rapid growth of the manufacturing sphere was tempered in the mid seventies by the relative growth of agro-industry which has come to dominate the Swazi economy.

Both the manufacturing and commercial spheres have been dominated by South African capital. South Africa corporations have established small manufacturing plants including Swaziland Associated Breweries, Turnwrights and National Process Industries. The South African corporate giant Natie Kirsh has established a number of subsidiaries including the Swaziland Milling Company, and has also involved

himself in retail trade. Kirsh Industries control the largest trade wholesaler (Metro) and the largest hardware and agricultural supply stores (Swaziland Warehouse) along with 50 per cent shares in the country's two largest shopping plazas. In addition Kirsh controls the profitable Datsun-Nissan and Mercedes Benz franchise (Tracar Ltd.), a small timber estate and factories for the production of drugs and plastics for export to Africa(1). Collectively known as SWAKI, these concerns have enabled Natie Kirsh to consolidate his own little empire in Swaziland.

Tourism

South African capital has also been paramount in the establishment of the tourist industry under the tutelage of the Southern Suns group, which until recently has been centralised somewhat exclusively in the Mbabane-Ezulwini area. The absorbtion by the Sol Kerzner empire of Rennies has meant that the Holiday Inns group's hotels are now controlled by Southern Suns(2). The Third Development Plan outlined aims to decentralise the industry by encouraging geographic dispersion and diversification of tourist attractions(3). A hotel and casino has been established in Nhlangano while negotiations have been completed for the establishment of a new multi-million casino resort complex in

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1. J. Daniel, op.cit., (1982), p.101.

2. For details of this see J.S. Crush and P. Wellings, "The Southern African Pleasure Periphery, 1966-83", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.XXI, No.4 (1983), p.697.

3. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.119.

the scenic Piggs Peak areas. But tourism has brought attendent evils such as prostitution. Furthermore, the fact that most profits are realised by South African capital, which in many cases owns the hotels as well as monopolises the export of luxury consumer goods to the hotels, makes the Tourist Industry an unlikely generator of genuine development. Nevertheless, the current Minister of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Economic Planning, Mr. Derek Von Wissel has outlined his commitment to the Industry:

> My personal opinion is that tourism is an underutilised resource - we have some of the best scenery in the world, we're accessible to tourists, we have a good climate, nature reserves and wonderful friendly people. In addition, we have another asset in one of the purest (sic.) African cultures, and certainly there are many people who would be interested to see a genuine unadulterated African culture still in existence. One doesn't want it commercialised of course, but it can be put under controlled exploitation(1).

Development along these lines suggests a commitment to the establishment of a tourist village depicting traditional Swazi life, and a greater effort towards promotion of the handicrafts industry in order to increase the expenditure of tourists. But the proposed Piggs Peak casino resort indicates the consolidation of the Las Vegas type of tourist attraction, whose market has been undercut by the South African Bantustans, particularly Bophutswana's Sun City which has already lured away many potential tourists to Swaziland, on account of its close proximity to the Witwatersrand.

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1. Business in Swaziland, January 1984.

Agriculture

Despite the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors of the Swazi economy, agriculture remains the basis of economic development, and has come to dominate the export sector, as illustrated in the following table:

Table 4.7 Value of Swaziland's Agriculture Exports (including Forestry)

YEAR	VALUE (E million)	% OF TOTAL
1960	6.9	57.4
1965	19.4	63.2
1969	30.1	67.5
1972	47.0	76.1
1974	100.4	83.9
1976	117.6	74.9
1978	129.9	76.1
1980	214.1	76.7
1982	226.3	68.1

Source: Swaziland Government: Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1970, 1976, 1979, 1982).

The unevenness of development is illustrated through an examination of agriculture's contributions to GDP. This rose rapidly following independence, peaking at 42.2 percent of total GDP in 1972/3. Thereafter it plummetted to 22.0 per cent in 1975/6 at which level it has more or less stabilised. In 1982, it stood at 20.3 per cent of

GDP(1). What is more disturbing however, is that it is the commercial agricultural sector which has contributed overwhelmingly both to GDP and the export sector. After an initial growth in the post-independence period, agricultural production on Swazi Nation land contributed 14 per cent of GDP by 1971/2. Thereafter it plummetted, its maximum contribution since 1975/6 being 3.4 per cent in 1978(2). This is illustrated in the following table, and a more thorough discussion of developments on Swazi Nation Land will be provided in Chapter 5.

Table 4.8 Agricultures's Contribution to GDP (Market Prices)

YEAR	COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE+		SWAZI NATION LAND	
	VALUE (Em)	% TOTAL	VALUE (Em)	% TOTAL
1967/8	7.8	15.4	6.9	13.6
1971/2	20	22.1	12.7	14.0
1972/3	37.6	33.4	4.1	3.6
1973/4	42.0	27.5	5.4	3.5
1975/6	31.9	12.6	15.2	6.0
1977	64.4	16.4	10.4	2.6
1978	71.6	16.1	15.3	3.4
1979	72.2	16.3	11.0	2.5
1980	78.5	16.9	15.0	3.2
1981	89.0	17.9	15.5	3.1
1982	91.4	18.6	8.6	1.7

+ Includes Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing
Source: Swaziland Government: Annual Statistical Bulletin: (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1974, 1976, 1979).
The National Accounts of Swaziland 1976-1982, (Mbabane: Goverment Printer, 1983).

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1. See Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976, 1979, 1982).

2. Ibid.

The chief investor in agro-industry in the post World War II period has been the CDC. Operating as a profit-making commercial organisation, the British parastatal began its undertakings in the Swaziland lowveld in the 1950's. Here its chief investments have been in the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme, Mhlume Sugar Co. Ltd., the Mananga Agricultural Management centre, The Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation Ltd., and Vuvulane Irrigated farms. Inyoni Yami Swaziland Irrigation Scheme owns some 30,500 hectares in the lowveld which is used for growing sugar-cane, citrus production and the maintenance of beef cattle. Pre-tax profits from the scheme stood in 1982 at E2,020,278 (1981 E2,744,900)(1). The expected profit for sugar-cane production at Mhlume Sugar Co. Ltd. to 30 April 1983 stood at E812,000. The Mananga Agricultural Management Centre runs residential post-experience management courses for agriculturists and others concerned with natural resource projects in the Third World. In 1982, 113 students attended three month and other short courses at the centre, and 206 students attended in-company courses conducted by the centre's staff. The latter consist of six permanent members and a number of visiting tutors. The Centre is a direct CDC project with total investment at the end of 1982 totalling El,240,283. The CDC invested 1 million, El shares in the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation Ltd, and advanced a £1.9 million loan for its creation (see below). As we noted in Chapter 3, Vuvulane Irrigated farms was a settlement scheme established in

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1. This and data which follows have been obtained from: Commonwealth Development Corporation, Report and Accounts 1982; Commonwealth Development Corporation, CDC in the Swaziland Lowveld; Commonwealth Development Corporation, Mananga Agricultural Management Centre.

the Lowveld with 263 Swazi smallholdings of 3.25 to 6.5 hectares each, planted with sugar-cane, food and cash crops. In 1982, 105,891 tonnes of cane were delivered to Mhlume Sugar Co. Ltd., producing gross revenue for the farmers of E2,521,077.

The CDC has also involved itself in the development of the forestry industry. The Usutu Pulp Co. Ltd. was established as a joint CDC/Coutaulds Ltd. project, each holding 2.5 million ordinary shares of E2. As we noted, the comprador bourgeoisie (in the post-independence period via Tibiyo) have become involved in the venture through the acquisition of 50,000 seven and a half per cent cumulative participating preference shares of E2 each. Usutu Pulp owns a 60,000 ha. pine plantation in the western highveld region, and a pulp mill with 175,000 tonnes per anum capacity of unbleached kraft pulp. 1982 production stood at 170,362 tonnes of unbleached kraft pulp bearing a pre-tax profit of EO.681 million (1981 159,254 and E3.74 million). The CDC has also invested in the Shiselweni Forestry Company, holding 400,000 shares of E1 each (100 per cent). This 9,193 hectare forest in the southern highveld is planted mainly to eucalyptus timber species. In 1982, 53.2 tonnes of eucalyptus oil was produced for export, yielding a pre-tax profit of E354,472.

The CDC has also invested in the pineapple plantation and cannery in the Malkerns region, and advanced loans for a number of ventures. These include the Lugogo Holiday Inn (now the Lugogo Sun), where E500,000 was advanced, as well as the Swaziland Electricity Board which received a £3.6 million loan from the CDC. Finally, the CDC has been involved in the production of corrugated cardboard

containers, mainly for citrus fruit and pineapples, through its investment of E40,452,50 share capital (10.12 per cent) in Neopac (Swaziland) Ltd. 1982 production amounted to 3.7 million linear metres with pre-tax profit of E577,672.

Lonrho is another multinational active in the agricultural sector, through its 60 per cent share ownership of Ubombo Ranches at Big Bend. Lonrho sugar Corporation Ltd. is incorporated in Swaziland and is involved in sugar growing and processing in Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland(1).

South African capital has begun to penetrate the agricultural sector, and Anglo-American now controls 90 per cent of citrus production in the country. The South African-based Zululand Food Producers recently bought out British and Swiss shares in Libbys which produces and cans the bulk of Swaziland's pineapple crop(2). Anglo-American has also been active in the forestry industry through the establishment of Peak Timbers in the north of the country in 1947. In 1981, the CDC and Coutaulds gave notice of their intention to sell Usutu Pulp to Anglo-American for a reported E110 million. The deal was subsequently suspended due to the opposition of the Swazi state which had not been consulted. Tibiyo also demanded an equity share in the new arrangement(3). It is to the relationship between the

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1. See Lonrho, Report and Accounts 1983.
2. Centro de Estudos Africanes, op.cit., p.5.
3. See A. Booth, op.cit., (1983) p.96.

multinational companies, the state and Tibyio which we now turn.

Multinationals, the State and Tibiyo

The State and Foreign Capital - The NIDCS

The state has noted the dominance of South African capital in Swaziland, as well as the regional subordination of Swaziland's economy. In the Annual Report of the Monetary Authority for 1974/76, G. Mayisela, the governor, stated that: 'the policies and projects to be adopted should be those which would transform Swaziland from being a minor sector in the South African periphery, to become a viable independent economy in its own right'(1). In order to achieve this aim, the Third National Development Plan stressed three overall objectives: economic growth, self-reliance and social justice and stability. The Plan aimed to increase GDP by 7 per cent per annum, with an increase of 6.5 per cent per annum in agricultural production, and a 7.0 per cent increase in manufacturing and processing output(2). Self-reliance and social stability were to be achieved by a 'productive and well-served citizenry' through the diversification of economic opportunities and social services(3). An examination of the costing and phasing of state capital inputs in the industry sector, however, shows that the greatest state support has gone to the Third Sugar Mill, a joint state, Tibiyo and multinational project; and the NIDCS, the chief state agency for the attraction of

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1. Annual Report of the Monetary Authority, (Mbabane, 1974-5).
2. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.33.
3. Ibid., p.35.

international capital (see Table 4.9). Indeed taken together, state commitment to the NIDCS and the Third Sugar Mill exceed total costs for agriculture of E54,454,000 for the plan period(1). The E35 million earmarked by the state for the Third Sugar Mill, hardly fits in with the objectives of self reliance, social justice and stability, and represents the largest state commitment to a single project for the plan period.

NIDCS was established in 1971 as an autonomous statutory body targeted towards the promotion and assistance of investment in industry, tourism, mining and agro-industry in Swaziland. Both the state and private sector hold shares in the corporation whose primary emphasis is on the development of the country's industrial sector. Assistance is given to any enterprise which is capable of contributing towards the country's economy, although projects which are favoured are those which generate employment through labour intensive labour processes; utilise local raw materials; promote import substitution or exports; generate linkage effects with the rest of the economy and those which are located outside the Mbabane-Manzini area(2). Four general categories of assistance are provided to investors:

i. feasibility research into the creation of new enterprises;

ii. local liason and co-ordination with state and other agencies;

iii. the construction of factory shells for lease and/or sale;

iv. financial aid, where in appropriate cases the NIDCS may contribute loan or equity capital to a project. NIDCS prefers

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1. Ibid., p.90.

2. NIDCS, op.cit.

TABLE 4.9

CAPITAL COSTS TO GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
(in thousands of Emalangeni)

	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	Total
National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland	2,520	5,250	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000
Small Enterprises Development Company						
Investments	592	622	495	530	482	2,721
Subvention	270	290	310	330	350	1,550
Industrial Estates						
Nhlangano	350	-	-	-	-	350
Ngwenya	250	250	-	-	-	500
Matsapha	1,000	1,000	900	-	-	2,900
Feasibility Studies	150	150	150	150	150	750
Rural Industrial Sites	-	50	50	50	50	200
Trade Fairs	20	500	800	50	50	1,420
Trade Promotion Organisation	75	75	-	-	-	150
Third Sugar Mill	15,000	14,000	5,000	1,000	-	35,000
Handicrafts						
Extension	15	10	10	10	10	55
Ezulwini Centre	100	20	-	-	-	120
Total	23,070	22,217	12,715	7,120	6,092	71,216

Source: Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan 1978/79-1982/83, (Mbabane: Swaziland Printing and Publishing Co., 1978)

to hold equity in the 15-40 per cent range and is usually unwilling to manage enterprises. Total financial commitment should not exceed 60 per cent of total capital cost, and the Corporation will not invest more than 15 per cent of its net worth in one single project, in the form of share capital. In the case of loan and equity, NIDCS will not exceed 35 per cent of its net worth in any one project(1).

In March 1980, NIDCS's current account stood at about E8 million while in property portfolio there was an investment total of approximately E4.4 million, mainly with regard to factory buildings(2). Major projects of NIDCS have included a cotton ginnery and oil seed mill, the development of a ceramics industry, the establishment of an industrial site at Ngwenya and the launching of a cement-bonded particle board. The problems experienced by the NIDCS and Swazi economic development as a whole, can partly be seen through an examination of the development of the cotton industry.

While in the 1963/4 season, a mere 15 per cent of cotton production was imputed to Swazi farmers on Nation Land, the 1976 statistics revealed that Swazi farmers had begun to outstrip settler farmers, with over 4,500 small growers in cotton in the country(3). The first cotton mill was established at Matsapha by a subsidiary of a South African

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1. Ibid.
2. Barclay's Bank, op.cit., p.34.
3. Ibid., p.12.

firm and called the Cotona Cotton Ginning Company. Operating at half its production capacity by 1971, the mill handled E2 million worth of cotton while most of the cotton grown in the country was processed in South Africa(1). In February 1981, the Swaziland Oil Seed Mills (Pty. Ltd.), a combined ginnery/oil mill, was inaugurated in Big Bend. The state through the NIDCS owns 51 per cent shares with the balance being held by Swaziland Cotona Cotton Ginning Company (29 per cent) and Guiness Peat International Ltd. (20 per cent). The aim of the project was for Swaziland to handle all its cotton locally, and to achieve production of 33,000 tonnes by 1985(2).

To facilitate this production, the Swaziland Cotton Co-operative was registered in 1977 and successfully negotiated loans through the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank. Nevertheless, credit availibility has been so tight that many farmers have been forced to abandon production, with production problems being exacerbated by the drought of the late seventies/early eighties. Whereas in 1980, the crop totalled 23,236 tonnes, with 60.3 per cent of the crop produced by small-scale farmers, the 1982/3 figure plummetted to 9,000 tonnes(3). With emphasis on a rain grown crop(4), and the rise of insecticide prices, the future of the NIDCS project and cotton farming as a whole hung delicately in the balance. The co-operative movement itself was

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1. D. Kowet, op.cit., p.135.
2. Barclays Bank, op.cit., p.13.
3. Swazi Observer, 15 July 1983.
4. Irrigated cotton in 1983 accounted for 2-3 per cent of the total crop, ibid..

fraught with difficulties and faced internal bickering within its own executive. The small farmers believed that their cotton had been downgraded in favour of the large producers, and a number of farmers continued to sell their cotton directly to South Africa.

Despite these problems, in mid-1984 Natie Kirsh's Swaki announced its intention to construct a textile mill at Matsapha. A new company called Swatex is to be set up to operate the mill whose construction and equipment costs will amount to E13.4 million(1). Swaki will provide half of Swatex's total equity of E6.15 million, with the CDC and the International Finance Corporation each providing a 17.9 per cent contribution. NIDCS will provide the remainder of the new company's equity capital, while the African Development Bank has approved an E8.35 million loan towards the construction costs of the mill(2). Declining cotton production means that the local ginneries will be unable to provide sufficient lint, so that mill feed will have to be imported from either South Africa or Zimbabwe. In order to alleviate cotton production problems, the NIDCS has inaugurated an irrigated cotton scheme as a majority shareholder of 70 per cent, with Israel's Koor Trade. The scheme at Nkalashane in the lowveld is a 600 ha. project using marginal sugar land, and aims at restoring output at Swaziland Oil Seed Mill at Big Bend which was inoperative during 1983 and 1984(3).

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1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review for Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, No.1 (1985), p.44.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.45.

SEDCO

The state is not committed solely to the establishment of joint ventures with foreign capital, but also aims at increasing the number and improving the quality of local entrepreneurs. The' Small Enterprises Development Company (SEDCO) is a wholly owned subsidiary of NIDCS funded through aid and loans from Britain, ostensibly aimed at reducing the disparities between the 'traditional and modern' sectors of the economy. SEDCO should be seen as a complement to the NIDCS, as a major component of state and metropolitan bourgeoisie strategy to support the accumulation of sections of the local petty bourgeoisie by involving them in small-scale production. A total of nine SEDCO estates had been set up by 1980, and 200 Swazi entrepreneurs had been assisted(1). Production has included leather goods, clothing, window frames etc., and a glass factory at Ngwenya which has begun producing hand blown glass items. On the whole, the progress of small business in Swaziland has been rather slow. The Minister of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Economic Planning, Mr. D. Von Wissel, had the following comment to make on the future of SEDCO:

> I think (the state's) guiding principle would have to be the benefit of the consumer. The presence of a large producer manufacturing cheaply may be to the detriment of a few small enterprises, but could be beneficial to the mass of consumers we are trying to protect and represent(2).

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1. Barclay's Bank, op.cit., p.34.

2. Business in Swaziland, January 1981.

The State and Tibiyo

The state-directed accumulation process has, however, been eclipsed by the efforts of the indigenous comprador bourgeoisie through Tibiyo, to extend their influence in the economy. We have already noted the genesis of the Tibiyo fund. In its 1981 report, Tibiyo listed its achievements:

> Tibiyo has brought back to the Swazi Nation many thousands of acres of land which, together with improvements, cost just on E5 000,000... Every high school in the Kingdom enjoys a grant from Tibiyo for bursaries covering ten needy students per annum. In addition, a substantial scholarship programme is made available for students for overseas studies... Tibiyo has acted as a stimulus and catalyst to progress and development within Swaziland. It was the guiding light behind the establishment of the Simunye Sugar Mill and improvement and expansion of the agricultural sector in Swaziland in order to assist the Nation to become self-sufficient in food and other commodities(1).

Tibiyo's expenditure is not integrated into the state's public sector budget. Until 1978, Tibiyo was capable of financing its capital and operating expenditure from its own revenue sources of E7 million per annum. Nevertheless, large investments committed by Tibiyo since 1978 have exceeded its resources revealing a disturbing new trend. The state has been compelled to redirect substantial funds from the central budget to Tibiyo. In 1981, Tibiyo's financial report of accumulated funds, revealed a total of E46,071,573 and reported income for 1978/9 was E9.4 million of which E9.3 million accrued from dividends(2). Tibiyo is involved in the following ventures, of which it is

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1. Tibiyo Takangwane, Financial Report, 1981.
2. Barclay's Bank, op,cit., p.35.

generally a 20-50 per cent shareholder:

Havelock Asbestos mine (40 per cent)

Ubombo Ranches (Big Bend Sugar)(40 per cent)

Sivunga Estates (sugar)

Swazi Spa Holdings (hotels, tourism)(33.4 per cent)

Mhlume Sugar (50 per cent)

Sihoye Estate (sugar)

Swaziland Meat Corporation

Metalwork Ltd.

Tibiyo Insurance Brokers

Roberts Construction

Royal Swazi National Airlines Corporation (50 per cent)

Simunye Sugar Corporation (32.4 per cent)

Bank of Credit and Commerce International

Tibiyo Fisheries

Tibiyo Dairy Project

Tibiyo Rice Project

Tibiyo Angora Goats

Tibiyo Maize Projects

Sivandze seShiselweni (forestry)

Tibiyo Cattle Project

Beral Ltd. (friction papers)

Swaziland Brewery

Swazi Observer (newspaper)

Inyoni Yami (Swaziland Irrigation Scheme)

Tibiyo Forests

Tibiyo Granaries

Tibiyo Rennies (travel, freight forwarding)

Tibiyo Workshop

Jubilee Printing and Publishing

Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (sugar)

Interfood Swaziland

Tin Project(1).

In the case of a number of these projects where there were no funds available for the purchase of shares or the funding of projects, Tibiyo's management has formulated plans such as the paying out of dividends and securing loan arrangments with partners. In other cases, the 'Swazi Nation' through Tibiyo, provided land for the project or activity and received equity shares in return. As we have seen, King Sobhuza II saw the relationship between the state and Tibiyo as being a complementary one. This view has been echoed by Mr. Von Wissel. Commenting on the relationship between the NIDCS and Tibiyo, the Minister has said that:

> These are two parallel organisations, the one governed through parliament and the other in trust by the Prime Minister and the Head of State. If we focus on the prime objective of the development of the country, and as long as we don't waste resources by overlapping and pinching one another's projects, I don't really see a risk of conflict. In fact one possibility would be for each to take over a sector of the economy - with Tibiyo perhaps concentrating on agriculture and the NIDCS on the industrial side - with the result that we could complement each other. I see our roles as complementary and not at all in conflict(2).

But at present, there appears to be no co-ordination between the activities of Tibiyo and the state.

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1. Tibiyo Takangwane, op.cit.; M. Fransman, op.cit. (1978), pp.288-292; J. Daniel, op.cit. (1982) pp.103-105.

2. Business in Swaziland, January 1984.

In the past, Tibiyo has helped establish projects, but then failed to contribute additional funds when needed. Royal Swazi, for example, is jointly owned by Tibiyo and the state on a 50-50 basis. Yet the state's contribution in the last five years has amounted to E17.4 million against Tibiyo's E0.75 million.(1). Similarly in the case of the third sugar mill, where the state and Tibiyo each hold one-third equity, the agreements specified that when working capital falls below a certain minimum level and a minimum current assets to liabilities ratio; the state will provide funds. In 1982/3, the state was obliged to provide E10 million, and in 1984 a further E6 million, while the other equity partners have not had to contribute at all. The failure of Tibiyo and the state to co-ordinate, has provided a number of stumbling blocks towards the fulfillment of a major irrigation scheme in the central lowveld. The state was negotiating with the World Bank for a small-holder scheme, while Tibiyo negotiated a contract and terms of reference for a similar study with Tate and Lyle. The state agreed to use Tate and Lyle since they had been chosen by Tibiyo, but Tate and Lyle had done a study for a large estate type project similar to the Third Sugar Mill. Tibiyo contributed E300,000 while the state had to add a further £170,000.(2). A major contradiction between state and Tibiyo strategy has emerged here. In an attempt to fulfil the objectives of its development plans, the state feels obliged to invest in

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1. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Econews, January 1984; A.R. Booth states that the airline loses E3 to E4 million annually, a new clothing factory stands idle, and an ocean shipping line has been a 'spectacular fiasco', op.cit., (1983), p.106.

2. USAID., op.cit.

small-holder schemes, while Tibiyo has persistently favoured investing in large estate entities in conjunction with foreign capital(1). Hence when the state aimed to use Canadian aid to establish a cattle programme which would link in with small scale farmers through the distribution of improved dairy cattle, Tibiyo proceeded to establish its own Dairy Ranch. Despite the improvement in the standard of their herd, these have not been distributed among small farmers. In the case of Usutu Pulp, when Courtaulds and the CDC aimed to sell to Anglo-America's Mondi, Tibiyo as we noted objected, insisting on receiving at least 40 per cent of the equity. When Anglo refused, the sale fell through and concurrent improvements to the plant were immediately halted.

The tension in state/Tibiyo relations, stems in part, from the colonial inheritance of a dualistic political structure. During the colonial period, the King and the chiefs presided over ethnic Swazis based on Swazi Nation Land, while the colonial state controlled the 'modern' government of Swaziland as a whole. Following independence, the King became head of state, and as we have witnessed, began to synthesise indigenous structures with those inherited from colonialism. But this synthesis, as we have argued has been provisional, leaving a hiatus between effective state institutions and the mass of Swazi people. A similar situation has arisen regarding the management of the country's economic resources. The land and mineral resources have been placed under the guardianship of the monarch by the

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1. It is interesting to note that the Third National Development Plan does not once refer to Tibiyo by name, but instead continually refers to it as 'the Swazi Nation'. See A.R. Booth, op.cit. (1983 a), p.106 and f.n. p.144.

independence constitution. As such, they have been managed by the King and his councillors, and have remained beyond the purview of control of Ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance. Hence while the latter controls the budget of Swaziland, and raises government revenue, it does not exercise control over the financial assets of the 'Swazi Nation', which are beyond its scrutiny. This has led to a bifurcated system of financial control and management, and is key to an understanding of the position of the compradors(1). But it is also important to note that the hiatus between the mass of the people and the institutions of political power, is paralleled in the control and management of the country's resources. This has led to a creeping indifference on the part of those who control the assets of the 'Swazi Nation', to the plight of the people on Swazi Nation Land.

Investment in plantation and estate-type enterprises necessitates a separation of the peasantry from their land in order to make land available for such projects. Although families are resettled elsewhere on Swazi Nation Land, this land is often inferior. This can only serve to hasten the processes of labour migrancy and semi-proletarianisation. In contrast, the state's commitment through the Ministry of Agriculture to rural development, aims to foster the growth of a vigorous peasant farming sector producing cash crops for export(2).

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1. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.7.

2. The Ministry of Agriculture's Rural Development Areas Programme is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

In a sense, the directors of Tibiyo have targetted their activities towards efforts at accumulation designed to break out of the dependency on foreign capital and launch a more independent nationally directed process of accumulation. What the foregoing suggests, is that Tibiyo has over-reached itself, relying heavily on the intervention of the state in order to bale it out of difficulty. The result has been a serious fracturing of state development strategy with severe drains on the state's budget, thus perpetuating the process of uneven development. Of all joint ventures undertaken by the state, Tibiyo and multinational capital, the Sugar Mill at Simunye has placed the greatest strains on the Swazi economy and in many ways epitomises the form and direction which development in Swaziland has taken.

A Case Study of Uneven Development - The Sugar Industry in Swaziland

The Development of the Sugar Industry

The Swaziland Sugar Industry has evolved to constitute the major productive utiliser of the country's natural resorces of land and water. The importance of the industry can be guaged by virtue of its having become the country's largest direct employer, providing work for approximately 13,000 of the wage earning population, while an estimated 14 per cent of the total population depend on it for their livelihood(1). In its infant stages, tne development of the sugar industry was characterised by a complex network of British and South African interpenetration. It was pioneered by Ubombo Ranches which

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1. Inter Africa Now, Swaziland Today, (Mbabane: African Unity Press, 1982), p.52.

began in 1949 as a cattle ranching and irrigated crop producing enterprise. This was initiated by Dr. H.J. van Eck (later of the South African Industrial Development Corporation), Mr. R.P.W. Adeane and Mr. G. Lloyd (a British Conservative M.P.)(1). The planting of sugar cane began in 1957, and by 1958 a sugar mill was operative. By independence in 1968, the breakdown of the control of capital was as follows: 29 per cent South African, 70 per cent British and 1 per cent Swazi. But in that same year, Ubombo Ranches was taken over by Lonrho which merged its sugar interests in South Africa, Swaziland, Malawi and Mauritius(2).

The genesis of the second mill at Mhlume can be traced back to 1955 when the CDC successfully completed a series of long-term sugar-cane trials at Mananga. Realising the vast potential of the Swaziland Lowveld's arability, the then General Manager of the CDC, Mr. W. Rendell, initiated an irrigation scheme, drawing water from the Komati river via a 65 km gravity canal. Since 1957, Mhlume (SiSwati for 'good growth') water has been operated by the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme from which the company has continued to purchase all its water. In the mid-1950's, the CDC negotiated a partnership with a well established sugar company, and in June 1958, Mhlume (Swaziland) Sugar Company Limited was registered as a joint venture between the CDC and Sir J.L. Hulett and Sons of South Africa, with the latter as majority shareholder. Tne first crushing season in 1960/1

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1. M. Fransman, op.cit., (1978), p.58.

2. Swaziland Milling Company, Annual Report, 1973. See also B. Dinham and C. Hines, Agribusiness in Africa, (London; Earth Resources Research Limited, 1983), p.180.

saw a total of nearly 40,000 tonnes of sugar being produced, and by 1964, Mhlume's own plantings had extended to about 4,000 hectares(1). In 1965/6, the CDC became the sole equity holder of Mhlume through the acquisition of the Hulett shareholding, and soon began to undertake modifications which steadily raised the crushing capacity of the mill.

Originally, the South African Sugar Association was responsible for the marketing of Swazi sugar, and pegged the country's production at 80,000 tonnes a year, a figure which was nearly reached by 1962. A fresh agreement was then negotiated with the South Africans, under which Swaziland was permitted to produce 8.5 per cent of the combined South African and Swazi sugar sales, thus increasing Swaziland's total quota to 90,000 tonnes(2). But South Africa's exit from the Commonwealth terminated the open marriage between the South African and fledgling Swazi sugar producers. From 1965, Swaziland joined the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement independently, and was granted a Commonwealth quota with preferential rights to sell 95,200 tonnes per annum to the UK(3).

The post-independence trajectory of the sugar industry in Swaziland reveals the creeping alliance between the state, indigenous comprador bourgeois forces through Tibiyo, and multinational capital. On the 7th October 1978, King Sobhuza dedicated a memorial stone at the administrative

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1. Swazi Observer (supplement), 19 October 1983.
2. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.393.
3. D. Kowet, op.cit., p.131.

offices of the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation (RSSC), and named Swaziland's third sugar mill 'Simunye' which means, 'we are one'. This action constituted the culmination of five years of intensive planning which was begun in 1973 when the state in collaboration with the CDC began investigating the feasibility of the extension of the sugar industry in the country. Final planning was entrusted to Tate and Lyle Technical Services Ltd., who completed their task in 1975. Tibiyo also played a major part in the systematising of these negotiations. The state and Tibiyo were able to enact a wider partnership with Tate and Lyle which entailed three levels of participation : equity investment and the financial expertise to aid in the raising of equity and loan capital; trading advantages through the agreements with the Swaziland Sugar Association and management and technical know-how for the functioning and construction of the project(1).

On the 3rd October 1977, the RSSC was incorporated with an authorised share capital of E40.1 million, and comprised the following interlinking of capitals, with the balance of finance being made up of loans and export credit finance illustrated in the table below:

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1. Times of Swaziland (supplement), 27 June, 1979.

Table 4.10 : Equity and Loan Finance for Simunye

SOURCE	EQUITY (E million)	LOAN
Swaziland Government	13.0	29.0
Tibiyo	13.0	13.0
Nigerian Government	4.0	
Tate and Lyle Ltd.	3.5	
Coca Cola Export Corporation	1.7	
Mitsui and Co.. Ltd.	1.5	
CDC	1.0	3.0
DEG (German Development Company)	2.0	2.1
International Finance Corporation	0.4	7.0
EIB (European Investment Bank)		10.0
Industrial Development Corporation/ Credit Guarantee Insurance Company (South Africa)		20.5
Barclays Bank/ECGC (UK)		6.6
TOTAL	40.1	91.2

Source: Times of Swaziland, (supplement) 27 June 1979.

The RSSC is directed by a 14-member board meeting every three months. An executive committee comprising members who live locally was set up to deal with urgent decisions arising during the planning and development phases of the project. Significant to note was the strong representation of international capital on the board: the chairman was Mr. G. Szolokay, and the General Manager was Mr. J. Ranger. Nevertheless, domestic capital was evidenced in the above table, as well as through the acquisition by Tibiyo of 40 per cent of the share equity of Ubombo Ranches Ltd., and 50 per cent of issued share capital of the Mhlume Sugar Company Ltd., has evolved to claim a major stake in the sugar industry. This has been further broadened through the establishment of sugar estates by Tibiyo at Sihoya and Sivunga on Swazi Nation Land(1). At Sivunga, management is in the hands of Ubombo Ranches Ltd. and available inputs include cutting and haulage facilities, tractor hire, irrigation water, extension services and seed and fertiliser supply(2).

The Third Sugar Mill at Simunye has involved the development of 9,000 ha of land for the production of irrigated sugar cane. A key element of the project has also entailed the construction of a large storage dam on the Black Mbuluzi known as Lake Mnjoli, the responsibility for which has been placed in the hands of the state. It has been financed by a soft loan of E17 million from the Kredit Enstadt fur Wiederaufbou (KFW) and E3.5 million from the European Development Fund (EDF).

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1. Barclays Bank, op.cit., p.9.
2. Ibid.

The remaining E2.0 million was forwarded by the Swazi state(1). Production began in 1980, and it was then estimated that full capacity sugar production of 126,000 tonnes would be reached in the 1982/3 season.

Despite the fact that Swaziland signed the Commonwealth agreement which prohibited it from trading sugar with South Africa, the country continued selling molasses to the South African firm Pure Nace Molasses of Durban, while official statistics recorded the molasses as having been sold overseas(2). Furthermore, as the above table illustrates, South African credit has been of decisive importance in financing the development of the sugar industry in Swaziland. In early 1982, Credit Guarantee Insurance Company (CGIC) stepped up its export credit to Swazi sugar, by underwriting major extensions to the Ubombo Ranches Sugar Estate. The contract value of the expansion project was given at E7.442 million of which CGIC accounted for 80 per cent. J.J. Bouwer, the executive director of CGIC said that export credit for the scheme would be used for the expansion of the sugar mill and irrigation scheme as well as for the development of additional sugar plantations(3). Indeed, this was the second occasion in less than a year that Credit Guarantee had underwritten export credit to be used for the expansion of Swaziland's sugar industry. In 1981, credit insurance totalling E7. million was used for the

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1. Times of Swaziland, (supplement), 27 June 1979.
2. D. Kowet, op.cit., p.131.
3. Sunday Times (South Africa), 9 May 1982.

construction of two warehouses at Ubombo and Mlawula as well as a boiler for Ubombo. All projects were co-ordinated by Barclay's National Merchant Bank(1).

When Swaziland became a signatory to the Lome Convention in 1976, it committed itself to supplying 116,400 tonnes of white sugar annually to the EEC. With the planning of the Third Sugar Mill in its advanced stages, Swaziland had effectively committed itself to an economy overwhelmingly reliant on sugar production, thus displaying a disturbing trend towards monoculture. Sugar is exported chiefly to the USA and EEC, and by 1982, total Swaziland production had reached approximately 400,000 tonnes per year. In 1976, 91 per cent of Swaziland's production had to be exported, while in 1982, the figure rose to 94.5 per cent of which only 31.5 per cent was EEC quota at a preferential price(2). Hence as the country increasingly tied itself to the world sugar market, it became more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international market price fluctuations. Whereas Barclays Bank estimated sugar sales to constitute 51 per cent of Swaziland's export earnings in 1982, they actually earned E128 million or 48 per cent of export earnings as sugar prices on the world market continued to plummet(3). The growing uncertainty of Swaziland's US markets in particular, has forced it to seek alternative outlets on free markets,

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1. Ibid.
2. Inter Africa Now, op.cit., p.52.
3. Africa Business, August 1982, p.65.

to the provisions of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). The ISA stipulated that Swaziland confine production to a certain quota, and despite the fact that the ISA controls the amount that Swaziland sells, it does not guarantee sales, so that Swaziland has to strive to develop its own markets to accommodate Simunye production.

The World Sugar Market

Swaziland is by no means unique in its dependence on a single crop for export earnings, nor is its reliance on sugar in this respect particularly outstanding. It is one of several countries that survives through selling sugar abroad: indeed, over 50 per cent of sugar production world-wide or 51 million tonnes out of 92 million tonnes is grown in developing countries(1). While the latter constitute the world's major sugar producers, they are also leading exporters. In 1978, they accounted for 70 per cent of world sugar exports with only the EEC (14 per cent), Australia (8 per cent) and South Africa (3 per cent) being major exporters amongst the more developed countries. In the same year, Swaziland's 226,193 tonnes stood at 0.9 per cent of the total of world exports(2).

The international sugar market has evolved as one of the most volatile and unstable of all world markets. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that very little of world sugar produced is actually traded, as most

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1. World Development Movement, Sugar: Crisis in the Third World, (London, 1980), p.2.

2. International Sugar Organisation, Statistical Bulletin, Vol.XXX, No.9/10, London, (September-October, 1979).

sugar producers produce for local consumption. In 1978, for example, international exports totalled 25 million tonnes of the 92 million produced globally(1). On the other hand, not all sugar is traded on the free market : in 1978, 75 per cent of world sugar exports were sold on the free market, with the remainder being sold under special pacts such as the Lomé agreement, to which Swaziland is a signatory.


Compounding the frailty of a market whose prices are so easily inflated or deflated, is the insecure nature of the markets to which Swaziland and other African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) producers sell their produce - Europe and America. While in the case of the former they face growing competition from European beet sugar farmers, in the case of the latter, they have found themselves competing with new and cheaper maize-based sweetners(2).

These foregoing factors have given way to wild fluctuations in the price of sugar, a situation which in the Third World countries in particular has been exacerbated by a spiralling inflation produced by the effects of the deepening crisis of the world-wide capitalist system. Thus the nominal price of sugar has differed from the real price as illustrated in Figure 1.

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1. World Development Movement, op.cit., p.5.
2. B. Dinham and C. Hines, op.cit., p.72.

Figure 1 : Sugar Prices, Current (1980) and Real (adjusted for inflation) 1970-1979



Source : World Development Movement, Sugar:Crisis in the World, (London: World Development Movement, 1980), p.9.

These zig-zag prices which reached an all time high of 47 US cents per pound or £665 per tonne in 1974, induced many countries including Swaziland to invest in sugar, yet the shortage which had pushed up the prices was short-lived. With Swaziland's expansion well under way, in 1976, prices dropped radically as supplies returned to normal and remained low through out the 1970's as illustrated in the graph (Figure 1). High prices in the 1980's were short-lived as they fluctuated from £400 per tonne in late 1980 to £100 in mid-1982, to £154 at the end of

1983. By early 1984, they had dropped to £126 per tonne, and by mid-1985 to £62 per tonne(1).

The ISA was originally signed in 1978, in an attempt by world sugar growers to stabilise the price of sugar within a range of 13-23 US cents per pound. Nevertheless, the anarchy of the market has ensured that the agreement be thus far rendered ineffective. This is not surprising in view of the secular trend of world sugar prices that since 1900 have been prone to cyclical fluctuations leading to supply outpacing demand in 8 out of every 10 years(2). Hence at the end of the 1970's, as prices once again began to soar, sugar export quotas were suspended in January 1980 and sugar resumed its sales on the free market. In 1981, the total world market sales by ISA exporters was limited to a quantity of 14.3 million tonnes, calculated on the basis of annual import demands(3). But surpluses continue to plague the market, a situation brought about partially by the failure of the EEC, the second largest world producer, to become signatory to the ISA.

Thus when other exporters are expected to hold back during a period of low prices, the EEC continues free from any restraint to dump its surpluses on the world market, and in so doing, further depresses world prices. The result is that Third World countries must bear the costs of stocking thousands of tonnes of sugar to cope with the emergency situation. In the words of Simon Harris, an economist at S. and W.

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1. Ibid., see also Swazi Observer, of 23 December 1983, 1 February 1984, and Observer (UK), 7 July 1985.

2. K. Laidlaw, "The Sugar Protocol: Room for improvement", Lome Briefing, No.12, (1983).

3. The Guardian, 18 May 1981.

Berisford Ltd.:

> ...it seems reasonable to assume the world market would not have been able to absorb, apparently without disturbance, an extra 2 million tonnes of Community exports over the 1975/6 level, had it not been for the effects of the 1978 International Sugar Agreement.(1).

The EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has committed the EEC to self-sufficiency in sugar production. This is in spite of the Lome convention, signed mainly at the insistence of Britain, which pressed for maintaining Commonwealth imports of sugar when it joined the Community. After all, the corporate giants Tate and Lyle and Mambre and Garton, which later merged, would hardly have survived without a continued supply of raw sugar cane. The Sugar Protocol of Lomé has theoretically enabled the ACP producers to negotiate the price they receive which is within the range of that set for the Community's best producers. But their expectations have been frustrated, principally as one ACP negotiator put it, due to 'the manipulation on the part of the EEC, mainly in respect of the way in which the ACP guaranteed price is determined'(2).

One problem is that the CAP entails massive community subsidies for exports of surplus sugar, a fact which has not passed unnoticed by British farmers who have also intensified beet sugar production. According to the ACP countries, in the past five years, EEC exports

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1. quoted by World Development Movement, op.cit., p.18.
2. Ibid.

which have reached 4 million tonnes have been subsidised to the tune of US$1,000 million. During the 1981/2 season, EEC sugar surpluses reached a record level of 5.2 million tonnes, which added to the 1.3 million tonnes of the Sugar Protocol, gave it exportable surpluses of 6.5 million tonnes(1). The result is that the sugar exporters of the Third World have lost markets to the EEC, where in Africa alone, EEC exports rose from 442,000 tonnes in 1974 to 1.4 million tonnes in 1978, constituting around 40 per cent of the total of EEC exports(2). It would obviously be far easier for European farmers to diversify production and replace part of their sugar beet production with other crops, than it would for impoverished dependent Third World economies reliant on a single or highly restricted number of export crops, often, as in the case of Swaziland, managed by the multinationals. Yet the future in this respect looks gloomy:

> Although the Community's sugar output is expected to fall in the 1983/4 season by as much as 15 per cent due to reduced sowings, unrestricted EEC sugar exports will nevertheless continue to depress world prices and result in further hardship for the ACP and other sugar exporters in the Third World. There is simply too much sugar chasing too few markets. World production for 1982/3 outstripped consumption by over 4 million tonnes and world stocks expected to reach 38.4 million tonnes, were equivalent to 41 per cent of world sugar consumption.(3)

Britain, the major purchaser of ACP sugar has steadily increased its self-sufficiency in sugar, and Tate and Lyle, finding it increasingly uncompetitive to refine cane sugar in the UK, has moved onto the

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1. K. Laidlaw, op.cit.
2. World Development Movement, op.cit., p.19.
3. K. Laidlaw, op.cit.

defensive both by reducing capacity and trimming down jobs, culminating in the 1981 closure of the main refinery in Liverpool. In the meantime, hopes of the ACP for a fairer price for the 1.3 million tonnes of sugar they export to the EEC have continued to founder on the rock of a progressively tougher EEC pricing policy. In 1983, ACP sugar continued to sell at the 1982 price, at an estimated loss of $2.54 million of export earnings in July and August alone(1). Such losses increase the vulnerability of ACP negotiators to EEC pressure. So as the former pressed for a 9.5 per cent increase, the latter was able to use its clout and virtually dictate a 4 per cent increase as deadlock was reached. It was not surprising when the ACP exporters were eventually forced to accept the 4 per cent increase proposed by the EEC at the beginning of 1984. Ironically, it has been the traders like Tate and Lyle themselves who have been able to exploit the uncertainty. The 1978 Tate and Lyle Annual Report confirmed this view, stating that 'opportunities for trading are, obviously greatest when market prices are fluctuating. Movements up or down enable the trader to apply his expertise: a static situation does not'.(2).

If the future of Swaziland's markets in Europe leave little room for cheer, those in America don't promise much either. This is despite the fact that Swazi exports to the US rose steadily between 1977 and 1981. In 1977, the US imported 61,855 short tons of Swazi sugar, rising in 1978 to 82,456; 124,451 in 1980 and 192,000 in 1981(3). But

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1. Swazi Observer, 26 November 1983.

2. Quoted in World Development Movement, op.cit., p.8.

3. United States Department of Agriculture, Sugar and Sweetner Report, Vol.IV, (March-May 1979).

early in 1982, for the first time since 1974, the US established import quotas to protect local sugar producers from low-cost imports. Since then, US imports have been cut back by 40 per cent annually, with the consequence that 2-3 million tonnes of sugar have been forced to seek alternative outlets in an oversaturated market(1). Moreover, cane sugar markets have become increasingly threatened by the evolution of high fructose corn sugar or isoglucose, which is produced by refining the starch content of maize. This extremely sweet product (twice as sweet as conventional sugar sucrose) undersells sugar wherever produced. Hence isoglucose production surged from 83 tonnes in 1970 to 2.1 million tonnes in 1980 and is set to double by 1985(2), as beverage companies like Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola announced in 1980 that isoglucose would be used in all their soft drinks. Although unable to completely replace sugar due to its availability in liquid form, it has been estimated by the US state department that it will halve sugar imports in 1985 as against the 1979 figures. By 1990, the US could be set to dispense with the importation of sugar altogether. The EEC itself has a production limitation of 198,085 tonnes on isoglucose under the new regulations of 1981, yet there is still a possibility that this may be raised, thus further depressing the world sugar market.

Viewed against the background of increasing self-sufficiency of Swaziland's major sugar markets, the establishment of Simunye and

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1. The effect of this on Swaziland is that the proportion of Swazi exports to the United States of America has fallen significantly from 51 per cent in 1981, to only 9.3 per cent in 1983. The Central Bank of Swaziland, Annual Report, 1983-84, p.24.

2. B. Dinham, and C. Hines, op.cit., p.75.

the consolidation and expansion of the existing mills at Mhlume and Big Bend is rather perplexing. While it could be argued that demand for sugar is set to rise through its potential for processing into petroleum substitutes such as ethanol and gasohol, the experiehce of the Brazilian Proalcool progamme would suggest that fuel from sugar projects are fraught with difficulties(1). In the case of Swaziland, the scale of operations requisite for ethyl alcohol are immense, requiring land resources way beyond its capacity. What is clear, is that increasing dependence on unstable world markets for exports has implied few genuine national benefits for the mass of the Swazi people, but has led instead to the reinforcement of uneven development.

Sugar Production and Uneven Development in Swaziland

The effects of the massive transfer of value from Swaziland can be illustrated through an examination of the 1983/4 budget. The rise in recurrent government maintenance costs during the 1981/2 year, led to a local resource deficit of E24 million, on account of both the drop of Customs Union receipts, and the reduction of the sugar levy which contributed a mere 12.2 million. Despite an increase of Customs Union revenue the following year, the 1982/3 revenue outlook continued to deteriorate significantly. Of key significance here was the revised reference price for the sugar levy which meant receipts of some E1.4 million compared to the original estimate of E8 million(2).

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1. Ibid., pp.87-88.
2. African Research Bulletin, April 1983, p.6810.

Taken in conjunction with the global recession, lower sugar prices had reduced revenues from company tax to an estimated E175 million, E15 million short of the estimated E190 million. With a total revenue forecast for 1983/4 of E183.6 million, an overall deficit of E36 million was estimated on recurrent and capital expenditure of E219.6 million. No further revenue is expected from the sugar export levy until sugar prices recover - a highly unlikely scenario. Current prospects remain gloomy with diminishing revenue contribution to capital, on account of continuing recurrent expenditure growth. The result has been the piloting of legislation to introduce various forms of sales tax which have further inflated prices that have risen steadily over the last decade.

Progressively declining foreign reserves have not been reversed by increased sugar production, with excess import costs over export costs being covered by short-term capital inflows(1). Nevertheless, the disappearance of iron-ore from Swaziland's exports and the rapid decline in asbestos as illustrated in Table 4.11, graphically demonstrate Swazi dependence on sugar, where voluminous increases have brought few rewards in monetary value. While the compensation of the forestry industry is some consolation, the rapid expansion of the fertiliser industry has been short-lived, following the provisional liquidation of Swaziland Chemical Industry(2).

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1. Ibid., p.6811.

2. The demise of the Swaziland Chemical Industry is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

TABLE 4.11

Value of Major Export Products

	1978			1979			1980			1981		
	Volume+	Value**	%	Volume	Value	%	Volume	Value	%	Volume	Value	%
Sugar*	217	59.6	35	224	71.0	36	300	128.4	46	327	125.8	40
Woodpulp	-	27.1	16	-	28.2	14	-	36.9	13	-	46.4	15
Asbestos*	38	18.2	11	37	17.6	9	31	15.6	6	32	17.7	6
Fertilizer	-	6.8	4	-	10.0	5	-	23.7	8	-	36.6	11
Wood & Wood Products	230	8.6	5	340	10.6	5	261	13.1	5	361	15.9	5
Canned Fruit	-	8.2	5	-	9.2	5	-	9.4	3	-	12.7	4
Citrus Fruit*	47	7.2	4	46	9.4	5	40	7.6	3	48	9.2	3
Coal*	105	2.1	1	165	2.8	1	140	2.7	-	103	3.1	-
Iron Ore*	1,046	6.2	4	957	5.3	3	554	1.9	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	15	-	-	17	-	-	16	-	-	16

* Metric tons +Cu.M. **Millions Emalangeni Per cent total value of exports

Source: Swaziland Government, The Economic Review, (Mbabane: Prime Minister's Office, 1983).

One of the most alarming dimensions of sugar production in Swaziland is highlighted through an examination of the relationship between sugar and food production. We have already noted the overall decline in agricultural production on Swazi Nation Land. We have also observed that despite both state and Tibiyo commitment to 'self-sufficiency', projects have shown a bias towards export-led growth. Indeed, the value of food imports has increased fourfold in the seven years between 1975 and 1982, from E11,397,000 to E48,157,000(1). It should be borne in mind that the Tibiyo fund is said to be held in trust for the nation by the traditional authority, a factor which has not gone unnoticed by even conservative critics, who have noted that : 'there has recently been a curious relationship emerging between the multinationals and the King's conglomerate Tibiyo Takangwane which should surely belong more to the traditional sector'(2). Yet the marriage between the state, Tibiyo and the multinationals has not proved to be as profitable as was originally hoped, particularly with regard to the sugar industry. In 1982, the RSSC lost E6.58 million which brought the total losses of the company since its inception to E29 milion(3). While the General Manager, John Ranger, expected further losses in 1983, this was not on account of the drought and irrigation restrictions enforced at Simunye, but was rather attributable to the instability of the world market. Indeed, as the situation on Swazi Nation Land steadily deteriorated, the Mhlume

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1. Central Bank Quarterly Review, (Mbabane: Central Bank, September, 1983).

2. African Research Bulletin, April 1983, p.6812.

3. Times of Swaziland, 6 June 1983.

Sugar Company reported a bumper harvest despite the drought, and the mill crushed 1,124,000 tons of cane to produce 120,423 tons of raw sugar during the 1983 season(1). Yet large sugar harvests cannot overcome the marketing problems, nor can they solve the crisis of food production in the country. In the meantime, reports have indicated that Tibiyo in conjunction with Belgian capital, aim to transform Swaziland into the 'granary of Southern Africa'. Already plans are well underway towards the fulfillment of a major fruit processing project undertaken between a French company, Steg 1, and Tibiyo, which aims to produce jam, baby foods and fruit juices(2). At the same time, work has begun on the establishment of Interfoods, another food factory undertaken by Tibiyo in conjunction with European capital.

Tibiyo makes vast tracts of land available for its joint ventures. In the case of Simunye, Tibiyo provided Swazi Nation land for the project, so that the 'development' of the Ngomane region of the Lowveld involved the resettlement of about 550 families. This was legitimised through the claims that since the Tibiyo fund belongs to the nation, profits accruing to Tibiyo from the project will benefit the community. The state was entrusted with the task of moving the families, and about E1 million was contributed by various aid agencies for their resettlement according to criteria laid down by the state(3). By all accounts, the

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1. Swazi News, 17 December 1983.
2. Swazi observer, 5 January 1984.
3. Times of Swaziland (supplement), 27 July 1979.

process of resettlement was both a highly traumatic experience for the families involved, and was regarded with suspicion and resentment.

While the mill itself created some 3,000 jobs, many of these were for unskilled sugar workers. A study of the minimum wages in the sugar industry facilitates a deeper understanding of the problems faced for this category of worker. Unskilled sugar workers are divided into two categories as specified below:

Minimum Wages (cents per day)

FROM	15.7.1977	11.5.1979	21.7.1980
Grade E general labourers (specified occupation)	122	183	253
Grade F general labourers - others	115	169	230

Source : Legal Notice no.59 of 1980, Department of Labour.

The price index shifts reflecting the change in the cost of living for low wage earning Swazi are as follows:

1975=100

1976 - 104.7
1977 - 126.5
1978 - 136.1
1979 - 158.6
1980 - 188.2

Source: Central Bank, Quarterly Review, September 1983.

In 1976, the ILO attempted to calculate the minimum household consumption requirements (MHCR) in rural and urban Swaziland. Basing their calculations on 1976 food prices, they maintained that roughly estimated, since health and education in Swaziland are privately funded, food constituted 60 per cent of the total cost of private consumption in urban areas, and 75 per cent in rural areas for average-sized families of 5.7 and 8.8 respectively. Calculating on the basis of proportion of food costs, the report concluded that the total annual amount required for providing MHCR in the rural areas was E910; and in the case of the urban areas E738[1]. Now, the consumer price index reveals that the cost of living for low wage earning Swazi increased from 104.7 to 126.5 or by 21 per cent between 1976 and 1977. This means that in 1977, the MHCR was approximately E1 100 and E893 for rural and urban areas respectively.

Yet the wages for unskilled workers in grade E category (see above) who are the higher paid unskilled workers, for 1977, presuming they worked a 26 day month, would amount to E380.64 per annum, or about 35 per cent of the MHCR in the rural areas and 43 per cent in the urban areas, although unskilled sugar workers are almost certainly overwhelmingly based in rural areas. Even if both husband and wife were employed as unskilled workers, the figure would fall below the basic requirements level. In 1977, the average earnings of unskilled female workers in the private sector were E35 per month or E420 per

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1.International Labour Office, op.cit., pp.44-46.

year(1). Thus even if both husband and wife were employed, the collective wage bill of approximately E800, would fall short of the MHCR, and the unlikelihood of this is revealed by the fact that in 1977, males constituted 74 per cent of the labour force(2). This means, that in order to live above the poverty level, unskilled sugar workers and their families would have to rely heavily on agricultural production on Swazi Nation land in order to augment their low wage earnings. This would explain why cane cutters have attempted to secure massive bonuses through employing children to help them in their work. At the end of 1983, the Times of Swaziland revealed that more than 400 boys, some as young as nine years of age, were subjected to gruelling cane cutting. Child labour is not employed by Simunye, but by adult cane cutters, who can net more than ten times the average daily tonnage of sugar cane to obtain generous bonuses(3). It would appear that this practice is widespread throughout the sugar industry, and was also observed on a visit to Ubombo Ranches where some of the child labourers were Mozambicans.

What is clear, is that unskilled workers have, and continue to live below, or on the threshold of, the poverty datum level. This would account both for the sporadic outbreak of working class struggles in the sugar industry, as well the support which the opposition NNLC was able to build up in this region of the country. Viewed in the context of

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1. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane; Central Statistical Office, 1979).

2. Ibid.

3. Times of Swaziland, 1 December 1983.

sub-poverty levels of existence, the struggles of sugar workers have often been literally struggles for survival.

Conclusion

The development of Swaziland's capitalist economy, has unfolded in the context of its dependence on South African and other foreign capital. The SACU and the RMA have been the major institutional mechanisms of South African domination, while migrant labour, energy and transportation are further indicative of Swaziland's subordination to its powerful neighbour. But despite Swaziland's dependence on South Africa for over 90 per cent of its imports, its major export markets are located elsewhere.

This is largely a consequence of the patterns of capital penetration and accumulation which have emerged since World War II, and that were reinforced during the post-independence conjuncture. The country experienced impressive growth rates during the latter period, but the flow of capital into sectors producing primary commodities for export, has led to product specialisation and a trend towards monoculture. Swaziland has pooled its resources in order to develop the sugar industry, but has been made to suffer the consequences. Between 1980 and 1984, Tibiyo Takangwane saw its revenue shrink by E8 million, from E13 million to E5 million(1). This was mainly due to the collapse of the world sugar market, since 75 per cent of Tibiyo's investments have been in the sugar industry.

The unequal exchange of Swazi sugar on the world market has led to a massive transfer of value from the country. Moreover, the 20 per cent

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1. Times of Swaziland, 23 August 1984.

reduction in Swaziland's 1985 quota for the US market, along with the possible termination of major contracts should Portugal join the EEC, augers ill for the country's prime export earner(1). While record increases in volume and output are recorded, sugar exports are steadily on the decline, and it is probable that the industry will soon face a storage crisis.

The post-independence development of the sugar industry has been facilitated by a complex alliance of metropolitan capital, the state and Tibiyo. It is this constellation of forces which is now at the centre of the development of Swaziland's capitalist economy. But co-ordination between the state and Tibiyo has at times been uneasy. This is most clearly evident in the agricultural sector. While both the state and Tibiyo are committed to self-sufficiency, Tibiyo has shown a willingness to provide Swazi Nation Land for estate type projects in conjunction with the multinationals. In cases, this has led to the resettlement of communities. These projects also imply the real subsumption of labour by capital, in labour processes involving the production of commodities for export. While the state also favours export-orientated production, it would prefer that this occur through the development of small-holder schemes that will foster the evolution of a vigorous peasant farming sector. But the powerful interests of the compradors which Tibiyo represents, has meant that the state has been compelled to support Tibiyo initiatives, often at the expense of

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1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, No.1 (1985), pp.43-44.

its own development commitments.

This has compounded the unevenness of Swaziland's economic development. It has also implied that the material conditions of comprador accumulation are fully dependent on capitalist forms of exploitation. Ultimate comprador control over the state through the monarchy has ensured the prevalence of the concrete conditions for the alliance between the forces of international and domestic capital. With foreign capital dominant in this alliance, development has been restricted largely to the extraction and processing of primary export commodities. But the rapid growth in manufacturing and processing capacity which has occured in Swaziland, as in most of the Third World in post-independence conjunctures, has been short-lived.

Swaziland's whole edifice of development has been built on sand. The sustenance of developed enclaves surrounded by oceans of backwardness and underdevelopment has required the formation of class alliances to facilitate the intensive exploitation to which the unequal exchange of commodities on the world market is tied. This has necessitated a political repression which has unfolded in the context of qualitative shifts in the trajectory of global capitalism that have ushered in a protracted world recession. It is to this process of crisis which we now turn.

5. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CRISIS TENDENCIES IN SWAZILAND

Swaziland experienced impressive growth rates by Third World standards in the post-independence period to the mid-1970's, but thereafter a sharp economic deterioration set in. This crisis has its origins in the metropolitan centres of capitalist development, and has both structural and historical causes. The long wave of capital expansion succeeding the Great Depression of the 1930's faced a reversal in the early 1970's. It was largely the overproduction of commodities coupled with a dollar-based international monetary system stretched to its limits, which precipitated this crisis whose effects have been felt throughout the capitalist world.

Most of the familiar crisis tendencies of capitalism have appeared in Swaziland since the mid-1970's. These include declining economic growth rates, trade deficits and plunging commodity prices. Swaziland's national debt is steadily increasing and the country is becoming dependent on loans from international institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank to generate development. At the same time, shut downs and cutbacks have seriously reduced the productive capacity of Swazi manufacturing industry. This problem has been exacerbated by a relocation of industry from Swaziland to South Africa's Bantustans. Despite short, weak phases of recovery of the international economy, Swaziland is

faced with an unemployment problem which viewed in the context of a mushrooming population, is growing alarmingly in its dimensions.

State intervention to deal with the mounting crisis has thusfar proved ineffective. The country is also faced with a deterioration of social services. Declining educational performance, health facilities and a critical housing shortage suggest that the political initiatives required to help combat the economic crisis in Swaziland, are not forthcoming. This is most starkly evident in an examination of rural development strategy in Swaziland. Clearly this has been limited by the nature of Royal hegemony and political power in the country, which depends on the sustenance of indigenous political, ideological, economic and social practices. The strategy has attempted to nurture the development of a peasant farming sector producing agricultural commodities, within the confines of indigenous forms of land tenure.

In so doing, it has ignored the existence of a worker-peasantry divided into both gender categories and class fractions. Social reproduction of this complex class, has been geared inter alia to reproducing the commodity of labour-power, and cheapening its costs through the production of the means of subsistence in stagnating labour reserves. Women or farmer-housewives have come to occupy a key role on Swazi Nation Land in contemporary Swaziland. Yet rural development strategy ignores this special role, and accords farmer-housewives no place in its planning and implementation. Thus while the state relies on the rural areas to raise the level of agricultural production, and to alleviate the crisis of unemployment, its strategy faces mounting obstacles.

The worker-peasantry is divided into class fractions as well as gender categories. That fraction which spends the greatest part of its productive time in wage-labour - conveniently referred to as workers - along with their families, have retained de jure control of areas of Swazi Nation Land. But they have de facto become separated from the land, and in no way see themselves as farmers, even in cases where they have been made redundant through dismissal. Despite the persistence of kinship ties binding them to the Swazi countryside, the material reality of their insertion in the capital relation, ensures that the workers adopt political and ideological positions at variance with the worker-peasantry based on Swazi Nation Land.

This has become clear in recent labour disputes, but stringent state interventions in labour relations have ensured that the labour movement in Swaziland remain weak. Strict codes of conduct and state control have led to the slow development of a compliant and fragmented trade union movement. Yet worker dissatisfaction is growing and is evidenced in the sporadic strikes which have erupted in the late 1970's and 1980's. These have largely been in response to declining living standards caused by capital's austerity drive in the face of the generalised economic crisis. In the absence of a strong leadership and favourable conditions of struggle, however, worker struggles have remained provisional, and have never looked like assuming the proportions of the widespread 1963 strikes.

Crisis and Crisis Tendencies in Capitalism

The 1970's and 1980's in the development of world capitalism, have been characterised by a recurrent series of crises. This phenomenon of crisis and crisis tendency is by no means new, and was analysed by Marx, who argued that as the process of capital accumulation resolved itself into expanded reproduction, it formed an 'immanent basis for the phenomena which becomes manifest in crisis'(1). Central to Marx's theory of economic crises, was the theory of the tendency of the falling rate of profit. This came about, it was argued, because of the rise in the organic composition of capital. As the expanded reproduction of capital proceeded, investment patterns led to an increasing substitution of constant capital in place of labour-power. Since it is the latter which was the source of value creation and hence profit, the rising organic composition of capital led to a tendency for profit rates within each unit of expanding capital to decline.

But Marx was not himself a prophet of doom, and described a series of countervailing tendencies that could halt and reverse a profit slide. These included the intensification of the exploitation of workers, the development of world trade and the creation of new foreign investment initiatives which were able to yield 'super profits'.(2) The theory of the tendency of the profit rate to fall, has been adopted and adapted by a number of Marx's epigones, and has been criticised both from within as well as outside of Marxist theory. Within Marxist

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1. K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value: A selection from the volumes published between 1905 and 1910, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1951), p. 368.

2. L. Cliffe, 'Modern Capitalism and its crisis', in D. Coates, and G. Johnston, Socialist Strategies, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 15.

discourse, three major levels of criticism have emerged, focussing on: the rising productivity of labour as a consequence of the increasing organic composition of capital, that counteracts the tendency; the key role that circulation of capital has played in accelerating the crisis; and the over-emphasis on structural causes which underestimates the role of class struggle in the formation of profit rates.(1) This is no place for a thoroughgoing review of the debates surrounding the concepts of crisis and crisis tendencies. This has been done elsewhere. What can be asserted, is that historically, capitalist crises have taken multifold forms, and required drastic social, economic and political as well as technological transformation in order for capitalism to survive.

Precipitating the crisis, is the disjunction between the spheres of production and circulation of capital. A complex interplay evolves, between the production of consumer goods, leading to an underconsumption of the masses and a fall in the rate of profit caused by an over-accumulation of capital.(2) Crises are caused, therefore, both by a crisis of production and of realisation, so that the process of the reproduction of capital constituted by the unity of the spheres of production and circulation itself comes under threat. While the overproduction of commodities is central to the outbreak of crises, the crisis itself may be detonated by one or more mediating links in a causal chain. The objective role of crises, is to create a mechanism through which the law of value can assert itself in the face of capitalist competition or monopoly action.(3) The mediating links

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1. M. Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Society, (Princeton: University Press, 1980), p. 21.

2. E. Mandel, The Second Slump, (London: Verso Editions, 1980), pp. 165ff.

3. Ibid., p. 170.

which are articulated with the overproduction of commodities, include the anarchy of production, the disparity between various branches of production, and a progressively greater recourse to credit as a counter-tendency to the falling average rate of profit.

Indeed, the latter has been a major characteristic of the post-war expansion of capital. This phase of prosperity has been fostered through a growing indebtedness to avert a chain reaction of bankruptcies which could seriously jolt the whole system. Growing credit does not, however, avert the crisis. Instead, historically, it has served to mask and in the long run delay and hence exacerbate the impending crisis. In the post-World War II period, capital was able to transcend its own limits through the massive export of capital and technology to the Third World, a key factor in explaining the massive boom which it enjoyed. However, this internationalisation of production was secured in conjunction with a rising wave of debt through which the Third World has bound itself inexorably and with increasing intensity to the capitalist countries at the centre of the system. This is why it is necessary to view economic crises in their historical global contexts.

Ernest Mandel has demonstrated how long waves of capital are succeeded by periods of contraction, during which the accumulation of capital is unable to continue on the same basis.(6) This leads to a process of restructuring that ushers in a new wave of expansion. The current crisis of the world capitalist system, is that of the long wave of expansion which succeeded the Great Depression crisis of the 1930's.

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1. E. Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development. (Cambridge: University Press, 1980a).

The United States emerged from the breakdown of world trade and the war which followed, as the dominant force in world capitalism. A number of mechanisms combined to ensure this, primarily those relating to the financial and military strength of the US.(1) The post-World War II debate about the creation of a new monetary order for world capitalism led to the Bretton Woods settlement, through which the dollar became the international means of payment. In effect, it meant that the dollar became an instrument of US domination of other economies while simultaneously enabling the US to run significant trade deficits by printing more dollars which other countries were compelled to accept.(2)

Associated with these monetary reforms was the evolution of the multinational companies, which created the opportunity for the intensification of the process of industrialisation. This occurred not only in the capitalist centre, but so too in the periphery, where formal colonial subjugation gave way to neo-colonial domination, whereby the international capitalist class made itself financially and technologically indispensable to their class allies in the Third World. The rapid technological advances which facilitated and accompanied the US-dominated resurgence of capitalism, soon spread to Europe and Japan, whose economies entered booms, as their own multinationals evolved along similar lines to those of the US. Competition was inevitable, and in certain cases, the European and Japanese based multinationals began to eclipse their US rivals. The seeds of a crisis had been sown, and as increasing US military expenditure undermined its productive dominance to the extent that in the early sixties,

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1. L. Cliffe, op.cit., p. 18.

2. Ibid.

external liabilities began to exceed reserves, the dollar-based international monetary order began to crack. But the emerging monetary crisis did not occur in a vacuum: it was accompanied, inter alia by a crisis of development strategy in the Third World. The alliance of repressive and non-democratic regimes with international capital came increasingly under threat, as national liberation movements began to challenge not only the political dominance of their colonial masters, but the system of economic domination as well. The US setback in Indochina was followed by significant challenges to capital in Southern Africa, Chile and Central America. And as the 'dollar overhang' became a persistent reality, the European and Japanese states began to clamour for a new means of international payment. Accordingly, a cluster of all their currencies, known as 'Special Drawing Rights' (SDRs), was conceived as a strategy to replace the declining dollar. But the US retaliated and revoked the dollar's convertibility and restricted imports, amidst a flurry of speculation on the part of the multinationals' financial managers and the multinational banks on the currency market.(1)

With no comprehensive international monetary system, the anti-crisis techniques of the developed capitalist countries - the successive expansion and contraction of credit with their resultant inflationary tendencies - gave way to anti-inflationary measures.(2) Combined with

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1. Ibid. p. 28.

2. E.A. Brett, International Money and Capitalist Crisis: The Anatomy of Global Disintegration, (London: Heinemann, 1983).

the pressures of competition and the anarchy of production, a reversal of the long wave of expansion dating from the 1940's set in. Matters reached a head in 1974, when the 'half-forgotten but familiar features of depression appeared starkly in all the developed capitalist countries'.(1) Overproduction, stagnation, bankruptcies and unemployment accompanied the generalised crisis of profitability which confronted the system. As these tendencies became universalised throughout the system, it became clear that the latter had reached its limits within its own existing mechanisms of reproduction.

While the international monetary crisis might not constitute the core of the crisis, it is highly instructive of the limits of global capitalism. The international banking system has been unable to rescue itself, due to the absence of a comprehensive international state system. The failure to develop such a political initiative is attributed to competing interests which have halted all efforts to create structures which would facilitate the recycling of surpluses from the developed to the underdeveloped world in order to off-set the crisis of uneven development on a global scale.(2) Indeed, as Brett has argued, the immense gains made by capital in the post-World War II decades were facilitated by the absence of controls exerted over its advances at an international level, in sharp contrast to its experience of state regulation at a national level. The consequence is that

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1. L. Cliffe, op.cit., p. 28

2. E.A. Brett, op.cit., Chapter 7.

> ...it now confronts the new crisis which it has created without the support of the interventionist and redistributive mechanisms which the most advanced nation states have created to deal with these problems in the past. Unless the international capitalist class can now produce a major political initiative at the international level...then it is evident that the existing level of international co-operation and exchange cannot be sustained and the system must regress to less extensive forms of organisation with major losses of productive capacity and well-being in the process.(1)

Within the Third World, the effects of the crisis have been uneven. The oil-exporting countries (OPEC), were able to exploit the degenerative tendencies manifest in a world-wide system no longer able to exert control over the whole. In 1973, the OPEC countries engineered a quadrupling of oil prices in the wake of an oil price war in October of that year. While these moves served to increase the severity of the crisis, the OPEC countries themselves were able to glean substantial revenues which served as a buffer from the direct and indirect effects of the recession.(2) But for the rest of the Third World, the effects of the recession for the most part have proved to be devastating.

The oil price hike placed severe strains on already serious balance of payments deficits, making it extremely difficult to proceed with development projects. This was aggravated by the rise in the cost of foodstuffs and chemical fertiliser imports to the Third World, which rose to $10 thousand million during 1973 and 1974.(3) Over and above

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1. Ibid., p. 229.
2. E. Mandel, op.cit. (1980), pp.39ff.
3. Ibid., p. 44.

these tendencies, was the price collapse of significant sections of raw materials on the world market, leading to reduced exports at a time when the foreign exchange reserves of these countries had been worn down as a consequence of import price increases. Indeed, most of these countries had pursued a strategy of export-led growth. But this type of growth has proved to be highly contradictory, leading to an escalating balance of payments crisis through the import of raw materials, technology and managerial skills. These have in turn been underpriced by the multinationals, which have then proceeded to underprice the resultant exports. The net effect is a reduction, if not a total elimination, of foreign exchange earnings, necessitating further borrowing for the purchase of import requirements. This vicious circle means that:

> ...within this framework, the only way they (i.e. Third World countries) can cope with persistent deficits in their balance of payments is to attract still more foreign capital and more loans to finance their deficits. But then the future overflow of dividends and interest, and hence imbalance in the total balance of payments on current account, can only get bigger in an ever-expanding upward spiral.(1)

A further contradiction of export-led growth, is that although it generates employment in itself, multinational activity tends to increasingly disrupt domestically-orientated production and draws more labour to its loci of production that it can effectively absorb. Moreover, as we have seen, export-led growth is growth on unfavourable terms to Third World countries who become prey to the idiosyncracies of the world market, both through their inability to

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1. H. Magdoff, 'International Economic distress and the Third World', Monthly Review, (April 1982), pp. 12-13.

control pricing, as well as through their tendencies towards product specialisation. Hence as the recession deepened, the harsh climate of world trade sent revenues plummeting to record lows.

The cumulative effects of these tendencies has been a decline in the productivity of labour in agriculture. In many cases, industrial production has collapsed, leading to a chronic under-utilisation of productive capacity, as a result of an incapacity to maintain necessary levels of imports of inputs, including raw materials and spare parts. A drastic consequence has been a sharp rise of unemployment, reaching proportions which would not even be contemplated under the most severe of recessions in the developed capitalist countries. One reason for this is the pattern of investment in agriculture. The advance of multinational agri-business has undermined local peasant productive initiative, often leading to a flight to the cities, and a mushrooming of urban slums. But agri-business has also ignored the imperatives of food production, placing a crisis of self-sufficiency in food production firmly on the agenda. As Lionel Cliffe has put it:

> ...whereas crisis in the advanced capitalist economies may be associated with the over-production of commodities (i.e. goods produced for sale that cannot be sold), in the underdeveloped countries it gives rise to the 'underproduction of use-values' (i.e. goods needed for survival are just not produced).(1)

In the case of Southern Africa, the production of use-values was further threatened in the late 1970's with the onset of physical catastrophe, as a protracted drought set in.

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1. L. Cliffe, op.cit.

The political costs of the foregoing crisis tendencies in the Third World, have echoed even in the halls of the US Congress, and the US Senate has noted that:

> ...in many countries there seems to be a direct correlation between economic difficulties and political repression...The problem with these measures to create a favourable climate for foreign investment in the private sector in general is that...they can also lead to greater unemployment, to the reduction of social welfare, and to a lower standard of living for the people...Creditor demands to implant drastic economic austerity programmes...could only be imposed at the expense of civil liberties in the countries that adopt them.(1)

The contraction and stagnation of the comparative annual rates of growth in industry in the major imperialist countries in the 1970's and 1980's in comparison to the 1950's and 1960's, has been accompanied in the Third World by a growing political volatility. In cases, this has led to advances for socialism (sometimes short-lived), but has also been reflected in widespread coups leading to the installation of military and other totalitarian regimes. All too often, the one-party states which have proliferated in the 1970's throughout the Third World have committed themselves firmly to growth through export-orientated production.(2)

It is the absence of any comprehensive global political institutions which have enabled the multinationals to evade the characteristic

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1. Quoted by A.G. Frank, 'Global Crisis and Transformation', Development and Change, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1983, p. 336.

2. Ibid.

constraints imposed on domestic capital by the capitalist nation state. This is why they stand at the centre of the whole process of global inequality, and their actions have begun to undermine the whole system. For the tendency towards crisis faced by the global system in the present conjuncture, has revealed the integrated and hierarchical nature of its economic and political order.(1) Inflation, recession and unemployment have spread throughout the entire system, albeit in characteristically uneven fashion. While crisis tendencies are universalised throughout the system, it is only certain segments which have reached the point of crisis. This refers both to aspects of the system as a whole, such as the international monetary system, as well as individual components - namely particular nation states. These are in crisis. Crisis tendencies have fused in a manner whereby a turning point has been reached, creating the necessity for fundamental restructuring in order for the survival of the existing order to be secured. But the fusion of crisis tendencies also creates the potential for fresh initiatives, which could lead to a socialist alternative, although thus far, the international capitalist class has proved it is by no means short of the requisite adaptive qualities that will ensure the continued survival of the world capitalist system.

Having said this, it is necessary to view the current conjuncture in Swaziland in perspective. Swaziland is part of a world system which is in crisis. But the uneven nature of the crisis means that while Swaziland has been plagued by the familiar tendencies towards crisis on the periphery, the crisis in Swaziland has not assumed the proportions

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1. See E.A. Brett, op.cit., Chapters 4 and 7.

which it has elsewhere. The population of Swaziland is not faced with a crisis of survival comparable to that faced by neighbouring Mozambicans or Ethiopians or Malians. Moreover, the familiar degenerative features of the country's economic, political, idéological and social order does not imply an imminent breakdown and disintegration. Nevertheless, we shall argue that the country's existing social structure allows for fewer possibilities than are necessary to resolve the crisis tendencies that it faces.

Crisis Tendencies in Swaziland - A Balance Sheet of the 1970's and 1980's

Declining Growth Rates

Swaziland's open-door policy for foreign capital, its strategy of generous incentives in conjunction with its cheap labour structure and inactive labour movement, made it a model African state from the perspective of capital, in the post-independence period. This won Swaziland the favour of the major western banks and their governments, as well as the powerful agencies of international finance capital. As multinational capital began to flow into the major sectors of Swaziland's economy, this fuelled in the early 1970's, growth rates generally unprecedented by African standards. In the mid seventies, the country could boast of a growth rate of 23 per cent per annum, but as the effects of the international recession set in, these fell at the end of the decade to zero, and in the 1980's, Swaziland has suffered negative growth rates (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Swaziland and Underdeveloped Countries

Year	Swaziland GDP	In Swaziland %Change	%Growth of Energy importing countries on the Periphery
1978	353.5	+10.9	5.0
1979	354.2	-0.2	5.0
1980	365.9	+3.3	4.2
1981	396.1	+8.2	4.1
1982	393.9	-0.5	1.4

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1979

Swaziland Government, The National Accounts of Swaziland 1976-1982.

F. Castro, The World Crisis, (London: Zed Books, 1984).

Declining growth rates are reflected in Swaziland's visible balance of trade statistics. While these were positive in the early seventies, 1976 was a turning point. Since then, Swaziland's visible balance of trade has steadily declined (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Swaziland's Visible Balance of Trade (E'000)

Year	Imports	Domestic exports	Re-exports	Visible Balance
1972	53,309	61,761	1,215	+9,667
1973	66,624	72,824	1,392	+7,592
1974	93,443	119,619	1,881	+28,057
1975	131,591	143,686	2,037	+14,128
1976	174,084	157,012	2,037	-15,035
1977	194,810	143,114	3,151	-48,545
1978	270,815	170,618	2,178	-98,019
1979	366,034	196,594	6,831	-192,656
1980	468,513	279,157	7,656	-181,700
1981	519,711	318,152	22,128	-179,431
1982	562,845	331,929	19,865	-211,051

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1976, 1979, 1982.

As Fion de Vletter has argued, due to the 'extreme openness of Swaziland's economy, trade is critical to the country's economic performance'[1]. But as we have noted, recent years have seen a change in the composition of Swaziland's exports, whereby the decline in mineral exports has led to a reduction of the diversity of exports which have been confined largely to raw sugar and fertiliser. During the Third Development Plan period, 1977/8 - 1982/3, the value of exports increased at a compound annual rate of 18.3 per cent, but imports grew by 23.6 per annum, with the rapid increase of food imports being a chief factor.

Net inflows of private investment capital, state borrowing to finance development projects and customs union receipts, together constitute the capital account of Swaziland's balance of payments. While the latter two variables help to account for the changeability in the overall balance of payments in recent years, they have also served to off-set large deficits in the trade and services account.[2] In 1983, the sugar industry in particular, borrowed heavily on a short-term basis, thus helping to reverse the previous years' decline in official foreign assets. This helped the country's balance of payments for 1983 to close with a E16.4 million increase in net foreign reserves, and constituted a reversal of the E4.0 million decline during the previous year.[3] The

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1. F. de Vletter, Swaziland's Economy (Article prepared for African South of the Sahara 1984/5, Europa Press - forthcoming).

2. Ibid.

3. Central Bank of Swaziland, Annual Report for the Financial Year 1983-4, p. 10.

increasing reliance on loans to bring official reserves and foreign assets to safe working levels, however, provides little cause for comfort.

Swaziland's Growing National Debt

The last five years witnessed a large increase in the externally held public and publicly guaranteed debt of the Swazi state. At the end of 1983, external publicly-guaranteed debt stood at E198.6 million, a rise of E32.2 million over the 1982 level. The total external debt in 1981 of E127.0 million, represented 23.4 per cent of estimated GNP.(1) In 1981, countries with a per capita income comparable to that of Swaziland, had an external debt that was 36.3 per cent of GNP.(2) Debt service has risen from 2.2 per cent of export earnings in 1978/79 to 6.5 per cent in 1982/83. In 1983/84, capital and interest payments stood at E13.3 million and E9.6 million respectively, representing 6.9 per cent of estimated export earnings. This still stands at less than the debt service ratio of comparable countries, which in 1981 averaged 15.9 per cent.(3) When the ratio rises above 20 per cent, a country begins to run into serious difficulties in order to service external debt. During the Third Development Plan period, significant increases in the level of external debt were experienced during the first year, on account of the third sugar mill and the Southern Rail link, aimed at linking Swaziland to Richard Bay on the Natal coast. Since 1978/79,

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1. Ibid.

2. USAID, Econews, 20 October, 1983.

3. Comparable countries are energy importing countries on the periphery.

the debt has risen by 19 per cent while inflation has averaged 15 per cent per annum during the corresponding period.(1)

During the Third Plan period, domestic debt rose from E19.3 million in March 1979 to E21.0 million in March 1983, although during this period, March 1981 saw a decrease to E12 million. Since 1981, Treasury Bills have been responsible for the increase in domestic debt. These Bills are used in order to meet short-term government requirements between the quarterly custom union receipts, as well as to adjust commercial bank liquidity. Commercial banks hold 83.3 per cent of the Bills, while the National Provident Fund, a parastatal body, holds 57.1 per cent of the Bond, which for the most part consists of 1-5 year maturities.(2)

In 1983, 51.4 per cent of external debt was owed to International Organisations, while foreign governments were owed 40.3 per cent.(2) The balance is generally owed to private lenders, in this case Citicorp, which provided a E16.5 million Euro-dollar loan to finance the state's contributions to Simunye and the Southern Rail link project. In 1978/79, international organisations were owed 32.1 per cent of the debt, while other foreign countries were owed 52.9 per cent. The proportional changes reflect increased drawings from the World Bank and the African Development Bank, which have helped to finance the Swaziland Electricity Board's Luphohlo-Ezulwini Hydro-Electric Project, as well as the state's education and roadworks projects. Indeed, the World Bank has replaced the UK as Swaziland's largest

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. The following data are derived from Central Bank of Swaziland, Annual Report for the Financial Year 1983-4.

single lender. This reflects both exchange rate changes on the existing debt, as well as a slowdown in UK aid and a comparatively vigorous programme by the international donor agencies. As we noted, recent major UK loans have come from the CDC and have been used to finance the third sugar mill and the Swaziland Electricity Board project in Ezulwini. But one important consequence of the shift in the pattern of external borrowing, is that international organisations generally have shorter periods of grace than foreign governments. Swaziland's external debt has, therefore, become less concessionary than in the past, as well as more costly to service.

While debt service requirements have not as yet caused any serious strain on the economy's available resources, the continuing upward trend of the past five years provide some cause for concern. One problem is that projected budget deficits for the rest of the decade will lead to a doubling of the debt and hence increase debt servicing payments. This is because much of the debt will be financed by international organisations and private banks. This could seriously constrain state development projects, by placing severe limitations on state capacity to finance capital projects. It also implies rising state budget deficits and an inability to meet recurrent budget obligations. Indeed in August 1984, Mr. Mhambi Mnisi, who at the time was Minister without portfolio, announced that the government was facing a deficit of over E20 million. This would be combatted, he declared, by the legislation of 'a fresh deal to provide for the imposition of a tax on all transactions involving the sale of goods and services to end-users or end consumers'.(1) One of the prime causes of the 'economic crisis'

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1. Swazi Observer, 4 August 1984.

facing Swaziland, Mr. Mnisi argued, was the depreciation of the South African rand. Speaking on the imminent introduction of a sales tax in Swaziland, the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Economic Planning, Mr. Derek Von Wissel, applauded government intentions of 'moving tax away from the production side onto the consumption side in keeping with modern trends'.(1) He also said that 'we should now be looking at corporate tax and focussing on the actual return an investor receives on his investment. Maybe we would be stimulating employment creation by reducing corporate tax and thus attracting investment'.(2)

The Retreat of Foreign Capital - the Problem of Investment Incentives

The inducement of investment is steadily becoming the 'achilles heel' of Swaziland's development. Mr. Von Wissel himself has noted the absence of a comprehensive industrial growth strategy in Swaziland, with too much reliance being placed on 'footloose industries' which are 'fickle and easily wooed away by financial incentives'.(3) Arguing for a resource based strategy however, he has also noted that:

> The very attractive investment incentives offered by South Africa (which by the way, cannot be matched financially by Swaziland) are having a noticeable and serious effect on Swaziland's economic growth. We feel we are no longer getting our share of investment to the region.(4)

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1. Swazi Observer, 10 May 1984.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Swaziland's competitive position has most certainly been adversely affected by South Africa under its decentralisation policy, which offers lucrative incentives to undertakings which are willing to establish industrial plants in the Bantustans and adjacent areas. In 1983, two businesses employing significant numbers of workers in Swaziland shifted their operations to the South African Bantustans. Swazi Carpets, established by Alexandros Gerondas in 1980, to manufacture rugs in the style of Persian carpets, opted to move to the Transkei.(1) Another firm, Copperland, was reportedly considering moving to the Ciskei. One of the reasons for the move, according to a company spokesman, was the difficulty in obtaining visas for Zimbabwean workers deemed essential for the production process.(2) It has also been suggested that the corporate giant, Natie Kirsh, was contemplating establishing a new plant in the Ciskei rather than in Swaziland as was originally planned.(3)

As we have noted, Swaziland is firmly committed to the inducement of foreign investment. Speaking at a Swaziland Investment Conference in 1983, the Chairman of NIDCS, Prince Masitsela, said that foreign investment in Swaziland will always be secure, because 'Swazis are naturally (sic.) adverse to antagonising other people or countries, least of all their friends'.(4) The Manager of the Projects division of the NIDCS added:

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1. African Business, April 1983.

2. Ibid.

3. Centro de Estudes Africanos, op.cit., p. 13.

4. His Royal Highness Prince Masitsela, 'Private Enterprise in Industrial Development' Swaziland Investment Conference 1983, Uniswa S.S.R.U., Doc. Centre.

> We have a saying in Swaziland which goes thus: that if a visitor arrives at your home at any time of the day or night you offer the visitor any food you can - even if it means your own children not getting enough or none at all. This is because it is a blessing to have a visitor. It is therefore in keeping with this tradition, that Government has always extended a warm welcome to foreign visitors...(1)

Mike Matsebula has noted that Swaziland's tax incentives are tied more closely to attracting capital-intensive enterprises than labour-intensive ventures. Moreover, they do not seriously attempt to lead to the localisation of the workforce. He also argues that 'the only way that the tax incentives offered by Swaziland could be construed as adequate, would be if its non-tax incentives are sufficiently high'.(2) Natie Kirsh, himself underlined this approach, when speaking at the 1984 annual dinner of the Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, of which he is chairman. He called on the state to relax immigration and residence permit laws as a strategy to boost foreign investment:

> Development (in Swaziland) took place when there was no limitation on immigration or work permits...limiting residence and work permits are generally perceived by inexperienced people to be a good method of ensuring work opportunities and promotion for local people, but in fact what does happen is that it works in the opposite direction and only slows down development.(4)

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1. M. Matsebula, 'New Developments in Swaziland', Swaziland Investment Conference 1983, op.cit.

2. M.S. Matsebula, 'A Strategy for Inducing Higher Private Investment in Swaziland: The role of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives', Occasional Paper No. 15 Economics Department, Uniswa, (April 1984), p. 10.

3. Times of Swaziland 5 December 1984

Table 5.3 Tax incentives within SACU

Type of Incentive	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Bophutatswana
1. Investment allowance				
(a) machinery	25%	45%	30%	30% + 30% deducted from tax payable
(b) Industrial buildings	30%	25%	30%	20%
2. Initial allowance				
(a) machinery	None but see 3(a)	100%	20%	25%
(b) Industrial buildings	None	50%	10%	None but see 12
3. Depreciation allowance				
(a) Machinery	Any rate	See 2(a)	10-15% (diminishing balance)	Information not available
(b) Industrial buildings	10% straight line	See 2(b)	4% straight line	
(c) Hotels	10% straight line	See 2(b)	10% for 5 years; 5% for 10 years	

Type of Incentive	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Bophutatswana
4. Employee Housing allowance	R1 000 per dwelling	25% investment allowance and 20% initial allowance	20% of cost in first year (max. E100) and 10% in subsequent years (max. E500 p.a.)	Loans up to R26 000 per dwelling at a subsidised interest of 3.75% below Building Society rates; repayable over 20 years.
5. Employee training allowance	125% of cost	210% of cost	200% of cost	125% of cost
6. Company Tax Rate	30%	37½%	37½%	35%
7. Carry forward losses	5 year limit	Indefinite	Indefinite	Indefinite
8. Tax holiday	Available on application	6 years	None	None
9. Citizen wage allowance	None	110%	None	20-50% of wages deducted from tax payable for first 7 years.

Type of Incentive	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Bophutatswana
10. Preference margin on local tenders	12½%	None	None	3-10%
11. Additional Concessions	Available on application	Available on application	Available on application	Available on application
12. Rental on land and buildings	Market rate	Market rate	Market rate	Equals interest on domestic government bonds plus 0.5% less 1.5 - 4.5%.
13. Interest rate on loans	Market rate	Market rate	Market rate	Equals interest on domestic bonds plus 0.5% less 1.5 - 5.5% with minimum of 4%.
14. Unused Tax concessions	carried forward for 5 years	carried forward indefinitely	carried forward indefinitely	Convertible into non-taxable cash grant
15. Railage rebates	None	None	None	up to 30%

Type of Incentive	Botswana	Lesotho	Swaziland	Bophutatswana
16. Removal costs	No reimbursement	No reimbursement	No reimbursement	Full reimbursement
17. Export rebate	None	None	None	75-100% of marketing costs deducted from tax payable.

Source: Matsebula, M.S. 'A strategy for Inducing Higher Private Investment: The Role of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives', Occasional Paper No. 15, Economics Department, Uniswa, April 1984.

Elaborating on these views after the conference, he stated that he didn't 'go along with the philosophy of pushing people into jobs just because they are local...it was basically immigrants who created opportunities in this country'.(1) This is the dilemma which the Swaziland state finds itself in. If it further opens the doors as investors such as Kirsh would like, its policies of localisation and self-sufficiency must take a serious knock. If it fails to produce the type of incentives which investors demand, the flow of capital in Southern Africa will continue to be diverted away from Swaziland. As Table 5.3 shows, Lesotho as well as the Bantustans offer more attractive investment opportunities than Swaziland.

Swaziland is thus faced with the possibility of further major relocation of industry to the more lucrative areas of Southern Africa, particularly the Bantustans. Worse still, South Africa's incentives in the Bantustans have drawn in new competition for Swaziland's industries on the South African market. Thus Mr. Mike Leu, a member of the senior management team of Metalware Manufacturers, has complained of an influx of competitors into the South African market, who through South African government aid are able to outprice Metalware Manufacturers.(2) When viewed in the context of the austerity measures imposed on capital, as an outgrowth of the effects of the international recession, these trends are certainly a great cause for concern. While the very real possibility of the drying up of new investment hovers menacingly on the horizon, cut-backs and closures have been the order of the day in recent years.

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1. Ibid.

2. Times of Swaziland, 20 March 1984.

In the first half of 1984, more than 14 companies in the country retrenched over 1,000 workers, while a number of significant concerns were forced to close down altogether.(1) These included the Korean Trade Centre, a textile factory Swazi Scene, Swaziland Television and Radio (STVR) and most significant of all, the Swaziland Chemical Industry. In the latter three cases, Swaziland's geographical location played a significant part in the closures.

Swazi Scene was established in 1976, and was involved in the production and export of ladies' outfits. According to the managing director, Mr. Hans Blohm, the shut-down was a case of voluntary liquidation and was caused by three major factors. Dealing solely in exports, Swazi Scene had been severely hit by a shift in the policy of its main importer, South Africa, which had switched to imports from producers in the Bantustans. According to Mr. Blohm, 'manufacturers from the homelands are cheaper because of lower production costs'.(2) Another reason for the firm's closure was the lack of foreign exchange, which had hit other potential importers such as Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Finally, fabric exporters in Italy had made errors in their export papers which resulted in the company paying 60 per cent instead of 20 per cent customs duty. The net effect of these factors was a E1 million loss in 1983.(3)

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1. Times of Swaziland, 25 July 1984.
2. Times of Swaziland, 6 April 1984.
3. Ibid.

STVR originally established as Salora Television in 1976, is a typical example of a 'footloose' industry. The Finnish firm opened operations in Swaziland, following its failure to get a licence to produce in South Africa. Television components were imported by Salora, assembled and then exported to South Africa and Nigeria. Originally, Salora produced only large colour sets, since the volume necessary to make it a profitable operation to manufacture portable black and white sets was unfeasible, operating from Swaziland. Agreements with South Africa, limited Salora exports to South Africa to 22,000 sets per year.(1) One problem with Salora's other outlet, Nigeria, was that Nigeria refuses to accept products shipped from South Africa. Much hope was pinned on the introduction of television in Swaziland for the viability of the company to be ensured, but television in Swaziland has been riddled with difficulties. The whole operation has been run on a rental basis by Electronics Rentals Group (ERG) of London, inaugurated as Visionhire in Swaziland in 1978. By 1981, ERG had lost over E2.0 million and was operating at an annual loss of over E0.5 million. ERG originally intended to operate a television service for a 10 year period, and to give the government 50 per cent of the shares after 5 years free of charge.(2) Projections of revenue and expenditure have proved to be far too optimistic, and the state's failure to fulfil its obligations of paying for advertising and prosecuting persons using illegal TV sets, have brought further strains on television in Swaziland. Both a limited internal market, and limited access to the lucrative South African market soon took its toll on Salora. Even a South African takeover of

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1. M. Clough, op.cit., p. 44.
2. S.N.A., CP No. 107/1981, 3 April 1981.

the firm as STVR, could not reverse the decline. Two years after the take-over, the lay-off of workers began, and as early as 1982, rumours began circulating that the company would ultimately be shut down. Eventually, in October 1984, 139 workers were made redundant and the company announced that it would be closing down on production and henceforth STVR would be converted into a depot. One STVR source said that the company would be called TEX after its conversion into a depot, and that:

> We know that the company is South African and does not want to lose its market in South Africa. That is why they will not allow any other company to take over the production of the same equipment. There has been a story going around that the Japanese wanted to take over STVR but the owners of this company would not allow it. They now tell us that they will be assembling refrigerators.(1)

But the most dramatic closure in 1984, was the Swaziland Chemical Industries (SCI). As we have seen, chemicals and fertilisers in recent years have become a key component of Swaziland's exports. In 1982, they were valued at E55,237,400 or 16.6 per cent of exports, second in value only to sugar. SCI began production in 1975 and was chiefly pre-occupied with the conversion of imported ammonia to ammonia nitrate, which was then used for the production of fertilisers and explosives. SCI was a subsidiary of National Process Industries of South Africa, which is effectively owned by Hanhill.(1) The joint owners of Hanhill, R.O. Hill and J.A. Hahn, had previously owned Sable Chemical Industry in Zimbabwe, but had been forced to sell to the Smith Government when it was declared an essential industry during

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1. Econews, 20 February 1984.

the national war of liberation. During this period, Sable Chemical Industry had a reputation of being a sanctions buster, by helping companies inside and outside Rhodesia to get around the UN-imposed trade blockade of the country.

The viability of SCI hinged on the ability of the Swaziland government to permit a company to import raw materials from outside the SACU, process them and then market them within SACU without paying any duty on the items.(1) This provided SCI with a competitive advantage over South African producers. Since the South African market was protected, the latter were compelled to pay high prices for their raw materials. At the outset, therefore, the SCI operation came to be resented by South African producers, and the South African Fertiliser Board attempted to restrict the access of SCI products to the South African market. Before the SCI operation had begun, the SWAKI-owned Farm Chemicals was the sole retailer of fertilisers in Swaziland itself. But Farm Chemicals was closely affiliated with two of South Africa's fertiliser giants, Triomph and Fedmis, and after the establishment of SCI, Farm Chemicals embarked on a new marketing strategy in Swaziland. The prices of fertiliser in Swaziland were drastically cut, as South Africa's fertiliser fraternity united its efforts towards squeezing SCI both out of the local market and of the South African market. A further set-back was suffered in September 1978, when the South African Road Transportation Board turned down a request by SCI to transport fertiliser to South Africa. The South

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1. Ibid.

African Railways transportation service was only willing to handle SCI's delivery within a 350km radius from the site in Matsapha. While this is in line with South African Railway policy towards South Africa's fertiliser producers, they are better served by rail than SCI.

Ultimately, increasing competition between monopolies in South Africa was a major factor in SCI's demise. In late 1982, the South African giant oil-from-coal company, SASOL, entered the fertiliser market. As talks between Triomph and Fedmis to rationalise production failed, it became evident that 'small producers such as Bonus and Mr. Oliver Hill's activities in Swaziland' were in a decisively weakened position, and that their problems could 'only intensify, not abate'.(1) Added to this new problem faced by SCI was the on-going drought in Southern Africa which had drastically reduced fertiliser sales. In 1983, the South African state eased restrictions on its own producers which were henceforth permitted to import fertiliser inputs duty free. As increases in the value of the dollar sent the costs of SCI's imports skyrocketing, the company was faced with a debt servicing crisis. It was the latter, along it would seem, with gross mismanagement, that ultimately sounded the death knell for SCI. In March, 1984, the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Sishayi Nxumalo announced that the company was being liquidated on account of a staggering debt of E35 million.(2) Speaking in Parliament in reply to questions put to him on the Budget, he said that the company owed Standard Bank E9 million, Barclays Bank E22 million, NIDCS E2

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1. Rapport, 24 October 1982.
2. Swazi Observer, 1 March 1984.

million and other debtors E2 million. The E22 million owed to Barclays included a E5 million debt which the state gave to the company in the form of a guarantee through the NIDCS. Dr. Nxumalo hinted that pressure had been exerted on the banks to secure the loans:

> If you look closely you'll find that the Chairman of all these banks are Swazis, government employees who are vulnerable to threats from big shots who instruct them to continue giving loans to the company. This House should give me the support and let me sack all these people and declare them redundant and replace them with people who are not going to be threatened by big shots that they will lose their jobs, or if they are expatriates, that they will be expelled from the country.(1)

The company only had one full-time Swazi director on its board, Dr. George Msibi with G. Dlamini as an alternate director.

The firm also had a very poor reputation with its workers, who frequently accused the company of refusing to promote or train Swazis for upper or middle-management positions. SCI was seen by many to be an employment agency for white Rhodesians who were unwilling to live in independent Zimbabwe. In March 1983, SCI announced that at least 180 employees would lose their jobs in April, owing to the drought which had considerably reduced the demand for fertilisers. Shortly after this, workers went on strike demanding to know why the company was about to fire Swazi workers while simultaneously employing increasing numbers of expatriates. After state intervention,

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1. Ibid.

the strike ended and 145 workers were retrenched. Thirty subsequently got back their jobs, but factory sources disclosed that 5 white expatriates had been employed. It was also revealed that 'the posts taken over by these new expatriates are the ones formerly held by some of the retrenched Swazis who have not been re-employed...More expatriates are expected to be employed in the company in the near future, most of whom are white Zimbabweans'.(1)

Although the plant was basically an enclave of production with few genuine links to the rest of the country, the closure of SCI is by no means insignificant. The state itself faced significant tax revenue and interest revenue losses, estimated at E80,000 and E2 million respectively. SCI's high share of export earnings has meant an overall decline in exports, as well as a reduction in income to Swaziland Rail who had brought in ammonia for the plant from Maputo, and other raw materials from Richard's Bay. An increase of fertiliser prices that is bound to result can only adversely affect already hard-pressed farmers on Swazi nation land. Finally, the loss of 300 jobs for Swazis, which implies a loss of one source of income for even greater numbers, added to Swaziland's depressing unemployment statistics. Indeed, unemployment is one of the most critical structural problems faced by Swaziland at present.

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1. Swazi Observer, 12 May 1983.

Unemployment in Swaziland - towards crisis

Swaziland faces a serious unemployment problem which has been considerably aggravated by the international recession, a problem which is both cyclical and structural in nature. The increase of the resident domestic labour force is growing at a faster rate than the rate of population growth, so that the number of people requiring productive employment within Swaziland is accelerating more rapidly than the demands of the labour market. A recent Institute of Development Studies Report, conducted by Colclough and Wingfield-Digby, had demonstrated how the active labour force will grow by approximately 7,000 per year in contrast to the 3,000 - 4,000 new jobs created in the formal sector.(1) Barclay's Bank paints an even more depressing picture. According to their account, over the 1975-1980 period, an annual average of 9,140 left school with at least a standard V education of whom about 7,060 would seek work, every year.(2) With an estimated growth rate in work opportunities of 2,200 jobs per annum, this means there was an annual shortfall of 4,860 jobs. The situation, it argued, could only deteriorate, since 'historic trends appear to indicate a continued increase in un- and under-employment'.(3) The following table reveals employment trends in recent years.

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1. C. Colclough, and P. Wingfield-Digby, Skills for the future: Educational Manpower perspectives in Swaziland, (Mbabane: Swaziland Government, 1978).

2. Barclay's Bank, op.cit., p. 28.

3. Ibid.

Table 5.4: Total Employment in the Public and Private Sectors 1976-1982

Year	Private Sector	% Growth	Public Sector	%Growth	Total	%Growth
1976	49,672	2.4	16,543	17.8	66,215	16.1
1977	49,273	-0.8	16,952	2.5	66,225	0.0 1
1978	52,292	6.1	18,964	11.0	71,265	7.6
1979	54,259	3.8	19,508	2.9	73,767	3.5
1980	55,077	1.5	20,047	2.8	75,124	1.8
1981	57,243	3.9	22,496	12.2	79,739	6.1
1982	54,775	-4.3	22,478	-0.1	77,357	-3.0

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976 - 1982)

Since 1982, the slide has continued, and in 1983, the Central Statistics Office's chief statistician warned in his report on the labour market, that worse was still to come. According to his report, total formal and informal sector employment dropped in 1983 from 90,662 to 81,907.(1) Public sector employment, which enjoyed an average growth of 16.8 per cent between 1976 and 1982, is certain to suffer. In November 1982, the Minister of Public Works announced that more than 1,000 workers in his department, who constitute 4.5 per cent of the public sector labour force, would be laid off in 1983.(2) In the 1984 Budget Speech, Minister of Finance Dr. Nxumalo revealed that further redundancies were planned. Speaking of the 'general problems of control of personnel spending' in the public sector, he argued that 'it is

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1. Times of Swaziland, 9 January 1983
2. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p. 14.

hard to justify the size' of the public sector workforce 'in Swaziland as compared to similar developing countries'.(1)

The problem is compounded by a growing capital-intensity in investment patterns in Swazi industry. Derek Von Wissel has noted a tendency towards a decrease in the elasticity of Swazi industry, or the number of employees for each unit of growth in the GDP. Elasticity in Swaziland over the last five years has dropped, he stated, from 1.7 to 0.6.(2) He has also said that 'by the turn of the century, this economy will have to absorb into the informal sector a further 200,000 workers. That's the massive social problem and political time-bomb which has to be defused.(3)

Viewed within the context of Swaziland's population dynamics, there is certainly plenty of room for concern. The 1976 Population Census revealed a population of 494,534 a net change of 119,963 or 32 per cent over the 1966 figures.(4) In 1982, The Futures Group estimated that the population of Swaziland had grown to about 600,000. According to the 1976 census estimates and projections, the 3.3 - 3.4 per cent per annum population growth rate, means that by the turn of

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1. Weekend Observer, 25 February 1984. In May 1984, the Accountant-General, Mr. Andreas Fakudze, disclosed that government was faced with the problem of an excess of workers. He congratulated the Ministry of Works and Communications, but said that the Ministry of Agriculture and Education continued to 'be a problem'. (Times of Swaziland 21 May 1984).

2. Times of Swaziland, 9 April 1984.

3. Business in Swaziland, January 1984.

4. Swaziland Government, Report on the 1976 Swaziland Population Census Vol. I, (Mbabane: Central Statistics Office, 1976), p. 37.

the century the population will be double, reaching nearly 1.2 million persons.(1) The fertility rate is high and in 1976 was 6.9 births per woman. Although on the decline, infant mortality rates are still over 150 per 1000. Life expectancy at birth rose from 34 in 1950, to 48 in 1980, while the death rate fell from 32 per 1000 population in 1950, to about 19 in 1976.(2) The combination of high fertility and declining mortality have given Swaziland a rapid rate of population growth.

As in most countries where fertility has been high over a long period, Swaziland's population is very young, with about 48 per cent of the total population under the age of 15. In contrast to developed countries which have 2 - 3 adults of economically productive age for each dependent child, Swaziland has about 99 dependent children for every 100 adults, a 1:1 ratio.(3) Even if a radical family planning campaign were to successfully take root, the momentum of population growth will ensure that the population will continue to grow for several decades on account of the large number of future births to today's children.

A further index of the problems of unemployment growth is the current pattern of migration from the rural to urban areas. The 1976 Census gave the population of Greater Manzini - a combination of Manzini Town and Manzini Peri-Urban areas - as 28,837, reflecting a

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1. The Futures Group, 'Swaziland: The Effects of Population Factors on Social and Economic Development', Washington, D.C., April 1982, p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 6.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

net increase of 12,731 or 79.0 per cent over the 1966 figures. According to Dr. Van Der Post of the University of Swaziland, 'an estimated 60 per cent of Manzini's population growth in recent years can be attributed to migration, while the present yearly influx of migrants amounts to 5 to 6 per cent of the total population of the town'.(1) He also pointed out that the migrants comprise a preponderance of school leavers in search of job opportunities, and estimated that by 1990, the population of Manzini could reach 100,000. Clearly, such tendencies undermine the coherence of Swazi society, and in recent years have lead to an upsurge of crime, including violent armed robberies, which in 1983 had reached a level of two a week by the end of the year.(2) A new phenomenon, the sidlani - what do we eat - gangsters have emerged in the urban areas of Manzini and Mbabane. Another University of Swaziland scholar, Ms. Gugulethu Gule has warned that:

> Provisions for the future have to be made. And if the present population growth rate is maintained, then the limited resources will not meet the needs of a fast growing population...No one can deny the fact that the emergence of the notorious sidlani gangsters is a result of the already evident high unemployment rate in urban areas, together with the limited number of high schools which are unable to absorb the increasing number of secondary school graduates.(3)

The generalised international recession has, however, placed

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1. Swazi Observer, 2 August 1984
2. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p. 14.
3. Swazi Observer, 1 August 1984

severe strains on state capacity to meet its social services obligations. This can be seen through a brief examination of education, health and housing.

Deteriorating Social Services

Since independence, the educational system of Swaziland has expanded rapidly at both primary and secondary levels. By 1985, the state aims to achieve universal primary education, a goal which many observers believe to have proved elusive. Despite the impressive quantitative expansion of education in Swaziland, qualitatively, the system has been in steady decline. While the pass rates of the Primary and Junior Certificates have shown some improvement since the mid-1970's a more accurate assessment of the system's performance is gauged through an examination of Cambridge Certificate 'O' level results (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5. Cambridge Certificate Results 1976–1982

Year	No. of Candidates	No. of Passes (1st, 2nd & 3rd class)	% Pass
1976	1,251	476	38
1977	1,432	477	33
1978	1,705	536	31
1979	1,707	587	34
1980	1,833	660	36
1981	2,032	544	26
1982	2,239	644	29

Source: Swaziland Government: Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1979, 1980, 1982)

The state is thus not only faced with the problem of expanding existing facilities in order to cope with the rapid population growth rate, but it

must also improve the quality of instruction and facilities, if it hopes to raise the standards of the system within its present framework. Table 5.6 reveals the amounts allocated by the state to education in its recurrent and capital budget in recent years.

Table 5.6 Central Government Recurrent and Capital Budget Expenditure on Education (E'000)

Year	Recurrent	% of Total	Capital	% of Total
1976/77	9,298	21.2	3,035	13.5
1977/78	11,401	15.8	4,519	13.5
1978/79	14,482	11.3	6,429	6.8
1979/80	14,619	21.9	6,127	8.5
1980/81	21,749	25.3	9,183	13.8
1981/82	25,103	23.4	12,590	17.3

Source: Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin. (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office; 1982)

Despite the fact that education is swallowing up significant proportions of state budget expenditure, this has proved to be insufficient to meet current demand. The Ministry of Education has earned itself a poor reputation for its delays in payment of teachers, especially as regards temporary teachers, and newly employed permanent teachers, who in recent years have had to wait up to six months after commencing to teach before receiving payment. In 1984, this reached a crisis point, when it was revealed that more than 400 teachers had decided to quit the teaching service after having not been paid for up to ten months.(1) Headmasters have been forced to

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1. Times of Swaziland, 10 August 1984.

queue up for days waiting for their teachers' cheques. One commented that 'even labourers these days are not treated in this manner, their cheques are given to them without them having to queue like this'.(1) The present Minister of Education, Mr. Dabulumjiva Nhlabatsi has frequently warned of the cash crisis faced by the Ministry, and in early 1985, the ministry was forced to abandon a number of in-service courses owing to the unavailability of finance.(2)

Health services have come under similar strain in recent years. In the mid-seventies the state owned and ran a total of 5 general and 2 specialised hospitals and 31 clinics, while missions provided 1 specialised and 2 general hospitals as well as 34 clinics. This provides approximately 1,521 beds or 318 people per bed, for in-patient care in Swaziland.(3) In 1976, 65 doctors (1 for every 7,608 people) were registered, 39 of whom were in the Mbabane-Manzini area, along with 281 nurses (1 for every 2,238 people) and 66 nursing assistants. With the present fertility rate remaining constant, 1,740 medical personnel would have to be trained between now and 2010 to maintain the current unsatisfactory ratio of population to medical personnel. Health over the last decade has averaged about 8 per cent of total state recurrent expenditure per annum,(4) but this would have to increase substantially if the present population growth rate is sustained.

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1. Swazi Observer, 27 July 1984.

2. Times of Swaziland, 10 January 1985.

3. The Futures Group, op.cit., p. 58.

4. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976, 1979, 1982).

This says very little of the existing facilities, whose adequacy and efficiency is under question. Many rural homesteads are isolated and far away from clinics. According to a survey on health conducted by E. Huppert, a mere 7 per cent of respondents made use of traditional health services only. Fifty-eight per cent used conventional services only, while 35 per cent used both types of service.(1) According to his findings, distance from conventional health centres played a determinant role in the type of health service used. Attempts are being made to alleviate the limitations of existing rural health services, and in April 1984, the German Development Bank issued a loan of E3.3 million for the construction of rural health centres and clinics.(2) But this announcement came when the state was in the midst of a drug shortage crisis which has plagued hospitals in recent years. Indeed in July and August 1984, doctors in the Mbabane Government Hospital went on a series of 'go slows' and resolved to attend only emergency cases. Patients coming for treatment were often turned away or given prescriptions to purchase drugs from pharmacies, but in most cases could ill-afford to do so.(3)

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1. E. Huppert, 'Rural Health', in The Swazi Rural Homestead, Uniswa SSRU, July 1983, p. 306.

2. Times of Swaziland, 11 April 1984

3. Times of Swaziland, 26 July 1984. See also, 'Dental Patients Turned away', Times of Swaziland, 5 August 1984, where it was reported that at least 50 people per day were being turned away from the Mbabane Government Hospital Dental Department, owing to shortages of materials for making dentures, X-ray materials, needles for administering anaesthetics and 'other necessary items for dental treatment'.

Housing is another area of concern and a chronic shortage of housing exists in the urban areas, particularly in Mbabane and Manzini. Available housing is clearly inadequate to meet the demand of the mushrooming urban population, and as a consequence there has been a proliferation of substandard and slum-type dwellings. This poses problems of health, sanitation and social welfare to the state. The rapid population growth rate can only aggravate this growing urban problem. Assuming an average of 4.5 persons per dwelling, at the present fertility rate, approximately 71,000 new urban dwellings will be needed by the year 2010 in order to accommodate population growth. In the case of Mbabane which has about 6,000 dwellings, the need for new houses for the growing population would be 12 times the present number.(1)

The Third National Development Plan noted that there was a lack of 'co-ordination of policy and effort for housing development'.(2) A number of organisations are involved in the housing question, including the parastatal Industrial Housing Corporation, the housing unit in the Ministry of Local Administration and the Ministry of Works which does the actual building on behalf of the state. The private sector's involvement on the whole is designed to meet the demands of the petty bourgeoisie. In 1976, the King decreed that royalty fees previously received by Tibiyo be transferred to a new organisation called Tisuka TakaNgwane, which was inaugurated to provide housing

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1. The Futures Group, op.cit., p. 66.

2. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan 1978/79-1982/83, op.cit., p. 228.

as a priority along with the other investment 'for the nation'.(1) Tisuka has invested mainly in property, and in recent years, new housing estates have sprung up in Matsapha, Moneni and Manzini, servicing middle and upper income earners.

While housing has not featured in recurrent budget expenditure since 1976, it has averaged between 2 - 3 per cent of the capital budget. Nevertheless, this dried up in 1984/5 when housing development ground to a halt. At the end of the 1983/4 financial year, the demand for housing units stood at 12,756, and it was estimated that the number of units supplied to date, represented 7 per cent of demand.(2) In the meantime, the Minister of Natural Resources, Land Utilisation and Energy, Prince Khuzulwandle has warned of an imminent housing crisis. Predicting an increase of urban slums and a deterioration of health and social services, the Minister stated:

> ...It seems we will not be able to stop this threatening menace, not until we have suitable facilities to consolidate and improve the quality of housing for people in this country. The problem of housing has been left too long unattended to by government and is now at a stage where it is very difficult to handle.(3)

The only way out of this crisis, according to Prince Khuzulwandle, is for massive investment by international financial agencies and

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1. Swazi Observer, Trade Fair supplement, 25 August - 6 September 1984, p. 5.
2. Swazi Observer, 2 August 1984.
3. Times of Swaziland, 25 May 1984.

organisations. Without a coherent strategy, however, throwing money at the problem by no means provides a comprehensive solution. This is most clearly seen in what is arguably the most important level of state involvement in the economy - rural development.

Restructuring in the Rural Areas - The Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP)

In the Third National Development Plan, it is argued that:

> The rate at which Swaziland's economy evolves depends on the judicious exploitation of its resources. If the evolutionary process were allowed to proceed without direction the economy would quickly become skewed in favour of the modern sector. However, it is Government's policy, and its foremost policy to ensure an equitable distribution of the fruits of development among all the Swazi people. This policy demands that priority be given to measures which will improve the well-being of people in rural communities, where 85 per cent of the Swazi people live, as well as in urban centres...(1)

Our foregoing analysis has illustrated the growing structural problem of unemployment in Swaziland. The state aims to alleviate this problem through the propogation of rural development in a definitive effort to improve conditions outside the formal sector. The roots of the unemployment problem must be sought within the historical processes of disruption and subsumption of the pre-capitalist mode by the development of the capitalist mode of production, and the conversion of the indigenous mode of production into a form of

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1. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.61.

reproduction of the commodity of labour-power. De Brunhoff has argued that the 'first major field of state economic intervention - whether in the form of economic policy or not - concerns the regulation and management of the particular commodity,' labour-power. This managerial function corresponds to a requirement of capital which capital itself cannot meet'.(1) Changes within existing patterns of accumulation have transformed the conditions of the state's management of labour-power, but this intervention is both inherent in the process of capital accumulation as well as being external to it. As de Brunhoff puts it, the 'exteriority of the state's management of labour-power is the actual precondition of its immanent quality'.(2)

In systematising the general law of capital accumulation in Volume I of Capital, Marx showed how an increase in the productivity of labour constitutes the pivotal point of the expanded reproduction of capital.(3) At the same time, a shortage of labour-power would lead to an augmentation of wages, so that a steady supply, if not an excess of labour-power is a pre-condition of continued valorisation. The capitalist labour market, therefore, operates within the context of an industrial reserve army of labour which is also a pre-requisite of work discipline. Furthermore, an increase in total social capital is marked by a growth in its organic composition which facilitates a greater mass and rate of surplus value production, while simultaneously producing a

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1. S. de Brunhoff, op.cit., p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. K. Marx, Capital Vol. I, op.cit.

surplus population. This crucial condition of capital accumulation - a reserve army of labour - has been managed in peripheral capitalist formations like Swaziland through the sustenance of non-capitalist institutions.

Marx distinguished between three types of surplus population: the latent, the floating and the stagnant surplus. The latent refers to the labour force which is superfluous to the needs of agriculture, resulting in a flow of labour to the towns. The floating surplus population is fully proletarianised labour in the industrial centres, employed or unemployed according to the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. Finally, the stagnant surplus forms a component of the actively employed, but is employed extremely irregularly in the declining branches of industry.(1) The peculiar mix of these tendencies in Southern Africa has given rise to the emergence of labour reserve economies, characterised by a semi-proletarianisation of the surplus population in the rural areas. This semi-proletariat, or worker-peasantry, constitutes the partially proletarianised migrant labour force, 'who have not necessarily ceased to own means of production, principally in the form of land'.(2) In the case of Swaziland, an industrial reserve army of labour was formed in the centres of modern industry, while the dissolution of the pre-capitalist mode led to the reserve army adopting alarming proportions, as increasing numbers of peasants were compelled to enter the labour market in search of cash wages.

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1. See the explanation given in B. Munslow, and H. Finch (eds.), Proletarianisation in the Third World, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 3.

2. Ibid.

They steadily became a component of the absolute surplus population which has evolved with the development of capitalism throughout the Southern African region, created initially in a latent, but subsequently in an increasingly floating form.(1) This process has been outlined in Chapter 3, where it was shown how a combination of capital penetration and a series of physical disasters led to a dramatic decline in peasant production so that by the 1930's, Swaziland was importing around 80 per cent of its basic food requirements. The failure of the post World-War II Land Settlement Scheme initiative by the colonial state was also outlined. Given that Swazi Nation Land covered about 50 per cent of the land surface of the country at independence, it was not surprising that the Post Independence Development Plan complained of land shortages, fragmented and under-utilised arable holdings, soil erosion and overstocking of grazing land.(2) It became increasingly clear to the Swazi state, that some form of rural development strategy was required in order to both combat the rapid decline of conditions on Swazi Nation Land, as well as to reverse the flight to the urban areas.

Rural Development Strategy and Structural Constraints

Rural development strategy in Swaziland is traceable to the creation of the Central Rural Development Board (CRDB) instituted by the King's Order-in-Council Order No. 4 of 1954, to oversee all developments on Swazi Nation Land. The CRDB has continued to play

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1. See M. Legassick and H. Wolpe's discussion in 'The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa', Review of African Political Economy, No. 7, (1976), p. 101.

2. Swaziland Government, Post Independence Plan, op.cit., p. 24.

a pivotal role in rural development to the present day. Membership of the board consists of an indvuna (chairman), appointed by the Monarch, along with 11 members appointed to represent the 11 sub-districts of the country.(1) The CRDB plays a key role in the implementation of major components of rural development strategy, particularly the question of resettlement. Indeed, the Board lists as one of its functions: 'To ensure at all times that the chiefs, their imisumphe and emabandla are involved throughout all the stages of their resettlement programmes'.(2)

Through the CRDB, the Swazi monarchy has ensured that rural development policy remain hinged on the prevalent social relations and system of land allocation on Swazi Nation Land. These, as we have demonstrated, constitute some of the critical determinants for the political and ideological domination of the comprador bourgeoisie, while at the same time constituting important determinants of the living conditions of the worker-peasant and working classes. As Fransman has pointed out: 'the land question on Swazi Nation Land goes to the very heart of Swazi society and politics and this is the reason for the extreme importance attached to discussions of the land tenure system'.(3)

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1. Swaziland Government, Annual Report of the Central Rural Development Board, (Mbabane, 1982/3), p. 2.

2. Ibid., imisumphe are the elders of a particular community, while the emabandla are chiefs' committees. The issue of resettlement is dealt with at some length below.

3. M. Fransman, op.cit., p. 311.

The RDAP in its current form was initiated in 1970 and was supported by bilateral funds provided by the United Kingdom Overseas Development Ministry.(1) In its discussion of the RDAP, the Second National Development Plan stressed that in general, 'progress will be sought by gradual re-organisation of subsistence agriculture and the introduction of semi-commercial production rather than through self-contained commercial projects involving major institutional innovation'.(2) The plan goes on to acknowledge the constraints and limitations which the traditional land tenure system places on the ability for individuals to raise their agricultural productivity, but points out that changes in the existing system would have profound effects which are not 'presently feasible':

> It is true that chiefs retain the right to allocate holdings and to dismiss farmers from their holdings. Their permission is required before an individual can erect fences or buildings or carry out other long-term improvements. In some areas this may give rise to a sense of insecurity for credit. The initiation of far-reaching tenurial changes to remedy these deficiencies would, however, have profound implications for the existing social structure and is not at present feasible. The government's policy is to promote gradual adjustments rather than make sweeping reforms.(3)

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1. Swaziland Government, Rural Development Areas' Programme, Annual Report, (Mbabane: Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, 1982), p. 1.

2. Swaziland Government, Second National Development Plan 1972/3-1977/78, (Mbabane: Government Printer, 1972), p. 56.

3. Ibid., p. 58.

The ILO report on Swaziland, has identified a major shortcoming in the process of decision-making and implementation:

> The establishment of a RDA district or area must be approved by the concerned chief and finally be authorised by the Rural Development Board which oversees all aspects of development on Swazi Nation Land. Where there are 'progressive' chiefs, the operation of the RDA's has been smooth. However, the problem of facilitating the operation of such a programme and even obtaining approval for its establishment could be almost overwhelming when there is an obstructive chief or chiefs. This is of course a problem germane to the type of land tenure obtaining on Swazi Nation Land.(1)

Somewhat ironically, with the benefit of hindsight, the Third National Development Plan implicitly endorses this view. Stressing that the processes of 'responsible planning' involves the 'balancing of resources against benefits', it is argued that this:

> ...assumes a top-down process of decision making, with as yet little involvement of the people on whose behalf the decisions are made concerning the allocation and utilisation of resources. It is recognised that a bottom-up process, whereby the people in the villages would tell Government how they wish the resources to be deployed, would satisfy the theoretical demands of social justice. Given the historical facts which have brought Swaziland to its present point of development, a bottom-up planning process would not now have much chance of succeeding. Traditional patterns of Swazi society obtain in communities where agricultural production for subsistence and the modes of social organisation require no great sophistication, in many

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1. ILO Report, op.cit. p. 84.

> cases not even literacy. At the village level the administrative stucture provided by the chief and his counsellors operate satisfactorily to safe-guard the interest which the villages have in communally owned resources. But when wider economic and social benefits are sought for the villages, people who have had little education or exposure to modern methods are in need of guidance if they are to select projects in which their own efforts, aided by the efforts of Government, will result in improvements in their standard of living...To make it possible in the future to secure greater participation of rural people in the modern sector, emphasis is being put on the training and deployment of community development field staff. The broad aim of community development works is to acquaint people with the possible benefits of available services and productive technologies and to help them to modify the institutions (or create new ones) through which these benefits can be secured. Traditional institutions such as tinkhundla can be adapted to this end. Youth clubs, women's clubs, and co-operatives can help to modernise the outlook of villagers. Better lines of communication can be established between the traditional Swazi Nation Government and the modern Government.[1]

The statement is important, insofar as it illustrates the kinds of tension which exist, and the conflicting interests between the comprador dominated central executive authority, and the petty-bourgeois-controlled administrative apparatus of the state. The ILO report acknowledges the interest with which the government views rural development, and its commitment to planning of the RDAP.

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1. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p. 61, our emphasis.

Nevertheless, the report urges:

> ...an even greater commitment of political will, resources and boldness in terms of initiating the requisite and perhaps long overdue changes on the social and economic fronts. We recommend this not only because of the great potential in the rural sector and the complexities and difficulties of initiating rural development under the best of circumstances, but also because of the serious consequences of a political and economic nature that could ensue in the face of inaction and reticence.(1)

Rural development strategy that is based on new forms of land tenure would undermine the existing legitimising basis of comprador political power, and hence impinge on the conditions which facilitate their continued accumulation of capital. Seen in this light, it is doubtful whether changes can be brought about, as the ILO would have it, merely through the 'exercise of political will and boldness'. The state is not an autonomous homogenous body which can simply be separated from the various sets of material interests which underpin its field of operation. Rather, the state is a complex heterogenous hierarchy of institutions, embracing distinct forms of representation, modes of internal organisation and intervention and sites of struggle (personal, departmental, class, factional, etc.). Relations of class domination exercised by the comprador bourgeoisie in their various pre-capitalist forms have become transformed into important political forces which form an integral part of the social relations of state power in Swaziland. Indeed, as we have argued, these relations have proved functional to elements of capital, particularly settler capital. In the context of questions relating to significant reforms in the field of land

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
1. ILO Report, op.cit., p. 85.

land tenure, settler control of freehold land could come under threat. But for the comprador bourgeoisie, the various forms of petty-bourgeois nationalism which such changes could generate and the potentially militating effects that this could have on the 'worker-peasantry, have made genuine agrarian reform too distasteful to seriously contemplate. As noted, the small scale Vuvulane Irrigation Farms Project initiated by the CDC in 1962, stimulated the emergence of a rurally based indigenous petty-bourgeoisie which proved to be a substantial base of support for Dr. Zwane's opposition Congress Party. This has been noted by the compradors who would oppose any strategies which could undermine the basis of their continuing mode of domination within the state as well as their basis of accumulation. In this way, uneven capitalist development has become a condition of existence for the reproduction of the continued domination by the comprador bourgeoisie of Swazi society.

The RDAP - Progress and Problems

Between 1970 and 1974, following the inauguration of the RDAP, four RDA's - the Northern Central, Southern and Mahlangatsha (see Map 3) - covering a total of 7 per cent of Swazi Nation Land, were created. The Programme was expanded in 1977, with the aim of covering 50 per cent of Swazi Nation Land with a total of 18 RDA's. Apart from the first 4, Britain financed a further 4 RDA's at Ngwempisi, Madulini-Mahlaleni, Mayiwane-Herefords and Ebulandzeni. The 10 remaining RDA's were funded by a consortium of aid donors, and divided into maximum or high input and minimum or low-input categories. The

Map 3 RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREAS



former involved the introduction of more intensive farming systems, land development and improved social services, whereas the latter saw a more restricted development through the introduction of a limited package of inputs and services.(1) All British funded RDA's fell into the maximum input category, while only two of the multi-donor financed projects are part of this category - the Mahamba-Zombodze and the Lubombo-Mpolonjeni.

By 1982, the RDAP covered 26,566 homesteads or approximately 531,808ha; which constitutes 50.8 per cent of Swazi Nation Land. This involved a population of 227,000 people, of whom 77,000 or 34 per cent were actively engaged in agricultural production, while 47,000 or 20 per cent were engaged in wage employment away from the homestead. Total acreage covered by the RDAP can be broken down as follows:

Cropped Land	10.5%
Fallow	1.5%
Other	0.7%
Communal	
Grazing Land	87.3%
	100.0%(2)

1. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p.77.

2. Swaziland Government, Rural Development Areas' Programme Annual Report, (1982), op.cit.

Hunting Technical Services Limited, who tabled their report on the progress of the RDAP in October 1983, claim that between 1976 and 1982, the proportion of cultivated land increased slightly from 11 to 13 per cent. During the same period, the proportion of cultivated land in non-RDA areas fell from 10 to almost 5 per cent.(1) Although indications point to an increase of 1 per cent per annum in the proportion of cultivated land, there is no evidence of a greater uptake of cash-cropping or commodity production, which is one of the key objectives of the RDAP initiative. There has been an increase in areas planted to cotton, but maize cultivation has declined to an even greater degree than predicted, although this was more marked in non-RDA than in RDA areas.(2) The Hunting Report nevertheless concludes that 'Although the impact of the programme in terms of increased crop production is much less than anticipated, we believe that it has probably made a contribution in slowing down what might have been an even greater decline'.(3)

Resettlement

Land use, planning and soil conservation constitute key elements of rural development strategy in Swaziland. It was for this reason that a Land Development Unit was established in the Ministry of Agriculture. This unit has been involved in the physical re-organisation of particular areas within RDA's. This was necessary because homesteads and arable holdings are scattered on Swazi Nation Land. This involved

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1. Swaziland Government, Review of the Rural Development Areas Programme, Final Report (Hunting Technical Services, October, 1983), p. 220.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

the resettlement of homesteads, in order that they stand adjacent to arable land, as well as the consolidation of the latter on the most suitable soils and their separation from grazing lands. This proved to be one of the practical stumbling blocks to the implementation of the RDA's and their potential success. Infrastructural plans are prepared jointly by chiefs, the community members and extension staff involved in a particular area, and are then submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture for processing, based on soil surveys and economic analysis. The refined map is returned for scrutiny by the chiefs and their communities, who then submit it to the CRDB for final approval. The plan is implemented by technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture alongside members of the community.(1) According to the Third National Development Plan, 'such physical changes are considered of greater immediate importance than the introduction of tenurial changes; they provide a rational framework for increasing agricultural production and a basis on which further changes can be added over time'.(2)

In a 1984 field study, one of the questions asked to villagers, related to the resettlement programme.(3) Of the 131 homesteads which responded to this question, 68 homesteads or 52 per cent of the sample were in favour of resettlement, while 63 or 48 per cent were against it. One old man, Paul Gamedze, an Umsumphe of Vikizijula, explained:

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1. Swaziland Government, Third National Development Plan, op.cit., p. 78.

2. Ibid.

3. See Appendix to Chapter 5 for details of the survey.

'We do not want to resettle our homesteads because we fear such a move. We are not used to living one on top of the other. We know what this has led to in town'.(1) Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that homestead relocation does not necessarily mean that homesteads are sited in close proximity to one another. Rather it implies a rationalisation of their locality and usually results in their being sited in a straight line, still at a distance apart. Some respondents were opposed to the idea, since they had recently built houses after having saved for years. One man argùed that it disorganises one's farming project, while another felt that the programme was doomed to failure. Both of the latter respondents were from Ludzeludze, an area encompassed by the Central RDA. Two respondents in Maphungwane (Lubombo-Mpholonjeni RDA) argued that since the resettlement plan was introduced, they had lost substantial parts of their arable land which had been taken to accommodate the construction of new homesteads for other community members.

Nevertheless, all 10 rural extension workers interviewed believed that resettlement was essential to the success of the RDA's. Undoubtedly, within the confines and constraints currently at play in rural development in Swaziland, this aspect of the strategy needs to be encouraged. And it would appear that this is certainly possible. In the words of King Sobhuza:

> In the eyes of the original Swazi, a kraal did not merely mean the residence of one man and his wife. This was referred to merely as a hut. A kraal in the old days consisted of many men and their families: today all

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1. Interview with Paul Gamadze, 6 May 1984.

> kraals in Swaziland are merely single huts, which is contrary to Swazi tradition. (Moreover) the Swazi always used to group their fields in one area, today it is difficult to find any particular area which has not been ploughed up: this is not in accordance with Swazi tradition. In the old days there were defined grazing areas where no-one would dare build or plough...Our forefathers were cleverer than we ourselves are today.(1)

One conclusion which emerges from the foregoing, is that rural development strategy needs to be more rigorously situated within the context of the social reproduction of Swazi society as a whole, something which those who preside over the RDAP have not adequately done. The articulation of modes of production in the Swazi countryside has meant that the worker-peasantry on Swazi Nation Land are not confined to human reproduction and the production of the means of subsistence or commodities and the political and ideological conditions of social reproduction. Social reproduction has evolved historically to involve the reproduction of the commodity of labour power. This has been secured through political and ideological pressures. One consequence, is that a large section of the worker-peasantry do not see themselves as farmers as the RDAP would have it. Clearly a coherent rural development strategy requires major political and ideological inputs.

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1. 'Minutes of Meeting of Paramount Chief and Council', (1 April 1954), S.N.A., File No. 3012 D Vol. III.

As Glenn Magagula has pointed out: 'One observation of the RDAP is that the planners of the programmes seem to mistake agricultural development for rural development'.(1) The result, as Don Funnell has put it, is that the experts have simply thrown money at the problem.(2) Indeed, since its inception, huge injections of finance have flowed into the project from the British Government, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the EEC's European Development Fund, USAID and Swaziland Government Counterparts Funds.

Financing the RDAP

Britain initially aimed at supplying approximately E15.0 million for the programme, but as the Hunting Report notes, records and estimates of actual expenditure between 1970/71 and 1980/81 were not systematically kept.(3) In mid-1981, the British Government announced its intention to withdraw from the programme, and it is estimated that since its inception, total British expenditure amounted to E9.5 million.(4) With multi-donor finance available from 1976/77, expenditure on the programme increased markedly, and between this

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1. G.T. Magagula, 'Rural Development Area Programmes: The Case of Swaziland', Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol.III, No.4, (1978), p. 463.

2. D.C. Funnell, 'Throwing Money at the Problem: A case study of Rural Development in Swaziland', University of Sussex, Research Papers in Geography No. 10, Sussex, (1982).

3. Swaziland Government, Review of the Rural Development Areas Programme: Final Report, op,cit., p. 231.

4. Ibid.

time and 1983, approximately E45 million was spent on the RDAP. Of this, the Swazi state supplied E22 million, while USAID financed about half of the balance.(1)

The RDAP has thus become a factor in Swaziland's rising national debt. The Hunting Report estimated that if all the African Development Bank funds were consumed, that currency exchange fluctuation remained minimal, and that no further World Bank funds were drawn after 1983, the annual debt servicing repayments would decrease from E1.2 million in 1983/84 to E1.0 million in 1987/88. They will remain in excess of E0.7 million until 1997, by which time the loans should have been repaid.(2)

By 1984, external funding for the RDAP had dried up, and the Ministry of Agriculture was awaiting consultant 'experts', in whose hands it would appear, the future of the whole programme lies. With the exhaustion of funds on the horizon, the 1982 Annual Report of the RDAP lamented:

> What is unfortunate about this state of affairs is that development of rural areas such as are found in this country does not conform to five-year funding cycles. Like any typical investment cycle, there is a period of apparent loss followed by an upward trend towards a break-even point and beyond. It is for this reason that the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives will not be deterred by prophets of doom from its commitment towards the programme. On the other hand, the Ministry will continue to modify the programme if those modifications are perceived to be in the interest of the rural masses of this country.(3)

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1. Ibid., p. 232
2. Ibid.
3. Swaziland Government, Rural Development Areas Programme: Annual Report 1982, op.cit., p. 73.

The Future of the RDAP

Debate on the future of the RDAP centres focussed amongst other things, on the question of emphasis on production or infrastructure. The Hunting Report argues that the programme has had 'a significant impact in the rural areas, particularly in the installation of social infrastructure'.(1) In contrast to this view, Senator S. Mokgokong has said that the RDAP has failed to achieve its aims, and has invested huge sums of government money on equipment that is degenerating in workshops. He further argued that money pumped into much of the infrastructural development would have been better used by being made available to farmers to help them produce more food to meet the demands of a growing population. According to Mr. Mokgokong, 'all local farmers needed was enough money and guidance to get out of the static condition they are locked in'.(2)

These views have to a certain extent been echoed by the RDAP Chief Project Co-ordinator, Mr. Patrick Lukhele. In assessing progress thus far, he argued that in future:

> ...more emphasis will be placed on activities directly relating to production than on infrastructure. Project activities will be continually monitored by the monitoring and evaluation unit. We tend to agree...that the monitoring and evaluation unit has done very little monitoring of project activities in the past. Even the little that has been done has concentrated on economic variables rather than some of the social benefits.(3)

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1. Swaziland Government, Review of the Rural Development Areas Programme: Final Report, op.cit., p. 234.

2. Times of Swaziland, 2 August 1984.

3. Times of Swaziland, 28 March 1984.

He also stressed that 'the people in the rural areas will have to play an even greater role than has hitherto been the case'.(1) This appears to be one of the major problems of the RDAP, despite the claims of the Hunting Report that 'The principle of community involvement in planning is now well established'.(2) The evidence for this argument seems to be based on the financial constraints which have forced communities to embark on extensive projects employing their own available resources. Thus in 1982, Poponyane (Northern RDA) community members contributed E10,000 towards a new E30,000 Irrigation scheme, while financial community participation in Kalanga and Magwanyana (Lubombo-Mpolonjeni/RDA) exceeded 35 per cent of the capital costs of their projects.(3) Indeed, Mr. Lukhele has stated that 'communities will now be expected to pay directly at least 25 per cent of certain capital projects in addition to their traditional contributions. In other words, project personnel will not undertake any project unless those funds have been paid in'.(4) But this level of participation in no way implies that the community is in effective control over the processes of policy planning and formulation in the RDAP. Writing in 1982, Mr. Lukhele quoted President Nyerere of Tanzania in arguing that rural people should have the power to participate in rural development projects:

> This power is simply the ability of rural people to formulate control, and direct activities within the

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1. Ibid.

2. Swaziland Government, Review of the Rural Development Areas Programme: Final Report, op.cit., p. 234.

3. Swaziland Government, Rural Development Areas Programme: Annual Report 1982, op.cit., p. 72.

4. Times of Swaziland, 28 March 1984.

> framework of their environment. The exercise of this power has to be within the legal and/or traditional institutional framework. In Swaziland for instance, institutions like Chiefs' Committees (Bandlancane Imisumphe) and the Tinkhundla could be effectively developed for this purpose.(1)

The question is, however, left open. They could be used by the rural people to formulate and control policy planning initiatives. But are they? We have already demonstrated the tensions which exist between the Tinkhundla and the chiefs, and argued that the creation of formal democratic institutions does not imply a genuine system of democracy, which involves a commitment to general popular democratic aims, if need be to the detriment of particular interests. Russell has argued that development projects in Swaziland require both a profound understanding of 'the broadest economic and political changes in which we are trapped by history, and of the minutia of ordinary people's everyday decisions'.(2) Thus she argues that the attempt to induce 'land-holding people' to produce crops for the market as opposed to subsistence cultivation, 'is in fact a call for a radical change in the organisation of the homestead, with repercussions for everybody's economical equilibrium'.(3) This, she would argue, goes a long way towards explaining the shortcomings of state strategy in the rural areas. Magagula would endorse this view, and indeed has effectively

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1. P.K. Lukhele, 'Towards Integrated Rural Development: The Rural Development Area Programme (RDAP) in Swaziland, in Selected Papers from the Workshop on Approaches to Integrated Rural Development in Swaziland, (Uniswa Division of Extra-Mural Studies, March 1984), p. 15.

2. M. Russell, 'Boundaries and Structures in the Swaziland Homestead', Uniswa, Research Paper No. 6. (May 1983), p. 22.

3. Ibid.

demonstrated that most of the people in the rural areas do not consider themselves to be farmers at all. Thus there has proved to be a prophetic note of truth in the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit's prediction made in 1980:

> ...the RDAP will continue to be an infrastucture development programme with little or no production impact unless a change occurs or is made to occur in the economic relationships that currently exists between the traditional farm and modern wage employment sectors in Swaziland.(1)

This is why we have argued that it is essential to view rural development strategies within the context of Swazi society as a whole. As Cliffe and Bush have argued in the context of Zimbabwe, it is necessary to bear in mind the 'labour-producing character' of peasant society in Southern Africa, and to question whether they will retain that central feature: 'Will the peasant sector continue to be a producer of labour power rather than agricultural commodities?'.(2) And to what extent will wage labour continue to be cheapened through its migrant characteristics? These questions can only be answered by situating rural development strategy in the context of the social reproduction of communities on Swazi Nation Land.

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1. 'The Effect of Wage Employment on the Production Impact of the Rural Development Areas Programme', Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, (mimeo) March, 1980.

2. R. Bush and L. Cliffe, 'Agrarian Policy in Migrant Labour Societies: Reform and Transformation in Zimbabwe', Review of African Political Economy. No. 29. (1984), p. 78.

The RDAP and Social Reproduction on Swazi Nation Land

The first question which needs to be asked in order to assess the viability of a strategy aimed at the uptake of cash-cropping on Swazi Nation Land, is to what extent do homesteads on Swazi Nation Land rely on labour migration and wage employment for their reproduction. In 1982, the proportion of the population in paid employment stood at 18.7 per cent, a 1.1 per cent decline from the 1976 figure. De Vletter's sample survey of 1,150 homesteads in 1978, revealed a participation rate in wage employment of individuals of about 1 in 6. He also found that 82 per cent of homesteads had some members in wage employment.(1) Our own findings were that in a sample of 131 homesteads, 101 homesteads or 77 per cent of the sample were partially dependent on external wage earnings for their reproduction. De Vletter also notes that in his sample, 76 per cent of absentee workers were working inside Swaziland, which in 1980, was 'alleged to have the highest rate of domestic labour force employment in developing Africa'.(2) According to his 1978 study, 72.7 per cent of cash receipts came from wages and remittances, while cash income totalled 56 per cent of total income. A decade and a half earlier, Hughes estimated that wage employment accounted for more than 80 per cent of cash income, but that cash income was a minor component

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1. F. De Vletter, 'A Socio-economic Profile of Rural Swazi Homesteads: A Summary of Findings from the Swaziland Rural Homestead Survey', in The Swazi Rural Homestead, op.cit., pp. 18 ff.

2. F. De Vletter, 'Labour Migration in Swaziland: Recent Trends and Implications' South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 6, (April 1982), p. 115.

of overall homestead income.(1) Other studies have painted a far more optimistic picture. Guma's 1978 intensive study of 84 homesteads found wages and remittances accounted for only 31.9 per cent of cash income, although he acknowledges that these figures collected over a three month period were biased by seasonal factors.(2)

Can we conclude, by 'playing the numbers game', that wage dependency is subject to cyclical fluctuations, and that worker peasants are able to respond at will to the relative advantages of the labour market and agricultural production within specific conjunctures? Russell argues that this is in fact so, and that as a consequence, employment is optional. She also asserts that the assumption that capitalism has subordinated rural households is dangerously misleading, and that instead we should view the problem from the perspective of rural domestic production of which capitalism is an integral part: 'A capital-centred analysis is in danger of distorting our understanding of the rural areas, to which capitalism is peripheral'.(3) But is it possible to reverse the effectivity as she has done? Can Swazi cultivators 'use capitalism as much as they are used by it'.(4)

The historical evidence at hand would appear to undermine such an approach. As we demonstrated in Chapter 3, capital penetration in Southern Africa, coming as it did in the context of the land partition

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1. X. Guma, 'Cash Income and Expenditure', in The Swazi Rural Homestead, op.cit., pp. 126 ff.

2. M. Russell, 'The Rural Swazi Homestead in its Context: A Review of the Literature and Thoughts for Future Directions', in The Swazi Rural Homestead, op.cit., p. 319.

3. Ibid.

4. See J.H. Holleman, op.cit., p.262.

in Swaziland and physical catastrophe, led to the rapid undermining of indigenous peasant initiatives. This led to the erosion of self-sufficiency and the resort to maize imports in order to secure the reproduction of the Swazi homestead economy. Thus in the 1930's, Kuper asserted that the rural homestead was dependent both on wages and subsistence crops for its physical reproduction.(1) As noted, by the 1960's, the average male adult rural inhabitant spent 40 per cent of his time, or two years of a five year cycle, in wage employment. This does not imply, as Russell seems to suggest, that the blind forces of capital instrumentally determine the individual choices of every worker-peasant, but rather stresses the limitations, or the structural constraints within which individuals act out their lives. In order to assess the level of choice which individuals on Swazi Nation land do have, it is necessary to question both the viability of the rural areas and the appropriateness of current state strategies to restructure these.

Low and Fowler have attempted to demonstrate the basic economic rationality of growing rather than buying maize: in 1977, the cost of the latter was 4 times that of the former.(2) But the key question is the measurement of return for time invested in producing maize compared to returns from wage labour. It would appear that this issue as we go on to show, has much to do with the existing trend of falling self-sufficiency in food production. De Vletter's study indicates that

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1. See above Chapter 3.

2. A.R.C. Low and M. Fowler, 'Wage Employment and the Development of Subsistence Farming: An Economic Analysis of Farmer Behaviour in Swaziland and Lesotho', (Mbabane: Ministry of Agriculture, (mimeo), 1980).

in 47.7 per cent of homesteads successfully grew all their own maize, while 49.4 per cent partially fulfilled their own maize needs.(1) According to the Annual Survey of Swazi Nation Land of 1978/9, 65 per cent of the crop area under cultivation was devoted to maize growing. With the deepening effects of the recession however, the quantity of maize sold dropped from 1,185 metric tons in 1976/77 to 169 in 1978/79. In spite of this drastic reduction, the percentage of homesteads actually selling agricultural produce increased from 13 per cent to 18 per cent.(2) Indeed, since 1978, the country's maize crop has been in constant decline, although it is true that the protracted drought has played no small part in the process. By 1983 the maize crop was only 38 per cent of its normal harvest figure.(3) If there is a simple choice and economic rationale behind the question of buying or growing maize, are the land resources available on Swazi Nation Land sufficient to allow increased cultivation?

A 1977 World Bank study revealed that 9 per cent of Swazi Nation Land was under cultivation, or 1/5th of a potential 42 per cent arable land. Nevertheless, realisation of this potential would seriously jeopardise the national herd which at the time grazed 87 per cent of Swazi Nation Land.(4) According to Fowler, the technical efficiency of the herd has declined since the mid-1960's as a result of pasture

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1. F. De Vletter, op.cit., (1983), pp. 30-31.

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Survey of Swazi Nation Land 1978/9, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1979).

3. Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Annual Review, (1984).

4. World Bank, 1977, Swaziland Rural Development Project Appraisal Report, quoted by M. Russell, op.cit., (1983), p. 321.

degradation caused by overstocking.(1) State strategies to control the numbers of cattle and increase off-take rates have proved ineffective, and increases have caused increased overstocking through the sale of fewer, but higher quality cattle.(2) This is because, as we argued in Chapter 2, cattle are a self-perpetuating store of labour and hence surplus within the homestead economy. The problems faced by destocking strategies, bring into precise focus the nature of the articulation of modes of production problematic. Articulation brings about a paradoxical situation, whereby the sustenance of pre-capitalist practices is both functional and problematic to capital. Thus Ngubane argues that the homestead assures 'every Swazi a comprehensive personal security scarcely yet available in towns or from employment'.(3) But Sibisi points out that 'it would be foolhardy to say the least, for a Swazi to enter the modern system without ensuring that his rural base is secure'.(4)

This security depends most crucially, given that land is available to all Swazi men, on the availability of women and cattle, just as it always has for centuries. For as we have seen, women are the key determinants in the availability of a labour force, and in lineage society, reproduction of the homestead was secured through the exploitation of pubescent women and their offspring. Women had

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1. M. Fowler, 'Overgrazing in Swaziland? A Review of the Technical Efficiency of the National Herd', ODI Agricultural Administration Unit, (mimeo), (1981), p. 12.

2. M. Russell, op.cit., (1983), p. 322.

3. H. Ngubane, 'The Swazi Homestead', in 'The Swazi Rural Homestead', op.cit., p. 113.

4. H. Sibisi, 'Forty Keen Farmers'. (Mbabane: Ministry of Agriculture, (mimeo), (1981).

neither control over the latter, nor over the surplus they produced which was controlled by men and lineage elders. Little has changed to date whether male household heads are migrant labourers or not. This raises the question of the role of women or 'farmer housewives', whose 'ambiguous role in social production...guarantees the reproduction' of the worker-peasantry, and 'of the whole of the cheap, migrant labour social formations of southern Africa'.(1) Which in turn poses the question of what is the role of women in rural development in Swaziland?

The exploitation of women in Swazi society has unfolded in the context of their restriction and alienation in the patriarchal homesteads of their husbands. Despite their pivotal role in the reproduction of homestead society, involving strenuous work and the management of entire extended families in cases, women remain inferior in status to men. This economic exploitation and gender oppression has meant that on the whole, women have remained outside the institutions in whose fate the trajectory of rural development in Swaziland lies. The indigenous structures of political power which have been harnessed to these ends exclude any significant and meaningful participation on the part of women. Certainly as we have argued, they cannot be construed as the vehicles of mass democratic participation. Thus not only has there been little consideration of the interests of the mass of the worker-peasantry and the farmer-housewife in the formulation of rural development strategy, there has also been little consultation. This, when viewed in the context of the historical trends

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1. R. Bush and L. Cliffe, op.cit., p. 92.

of labour migration (whether external or internal) in Swaziland, it would appear, goes a long way in explaining the failures of the RDAP.

As we have seen, the RDAP have assumed a desire on the part of the worker peasants to indulge in commercial farming through the production of commodities. But this element of the strategy has proved to be a misnomer. One reason for this, according to Don Funnell, is that commodity production cannot compete with the financial security of employment: in fact he demonstrates that even with improved farming methods involving the entire household, the return is not likely to exceed that on one migrant worker on the mines.(1) Our own survey revealed in a sample of 131 homesteads, that 84 homesteads or 64 per cent of the respondents, would rather grow food or means of substinence than agricultural commodities. Sibisi has also shown that commercial farming is often less lucrative than envisaged, and this has led 'keen farmers' on Swazi Nation Land into a range of entrepreneurial activities such as tractor-hire, transportation and trade to supplement their cash crop earnings.(2)

One problem is the whole structure of the market which has evolved in the context of Swaziland's dual Swazi Nation Land/Freehold land agricultural structure. Apart from farmers in the Northern RDA who can sell to Havelock Mines, the adjacent timber plantations, a South African tomato cannery and to Ngonini Citrus, and those assisted by the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission, most Swazi producers can either

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1. See M. Russell, op.cit., (1983), p. 324.

2. H. Sibisi, op.cit..

sell in the retail markets or to small scale traders hitherto supplied by South African farmers and wholesalers.(1) Needless to say, competition is too intense for small-scale producers, a factor most clearly seen in the marketing of maize. The Swaziland Milling Company's price is considered to be too low when set against input costs and the amount of work involved in maize production and Swazi producers resent having to compete with South African producers, who get attractive state subsidies.(2) The Milling Company was able to monopolise the import of maize between 1961 and 1976, in return for which it would purchase locally produced maize at a fixed price. Despite the extension of import licences to other companies on similar conditions, maize quantities purchased have remained very small. The highest domestic proportion purchased was 15 per cent in 1966.(3) This was both a result of a state fixed price on maize purchased from producers, and the maximum price on store purchased maize being closely tied to the controlled South African price. The result is that producers on Swazi Nation Land rarely trade on the formal capitalist market. There is, however, a considerable presence of informal inter-homestead trade.

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1. N.P. Cohen, 'Economic Sections to Socio-Economic Profile: Economic Activities and Sources of Income', (mimeo), Uniswa SSRU DOC. Centre, (mimeo) (21 April, 1983), p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. Ibid.

The problem of marketing has been acknowledged in the Hunting Report, as well as by Chief Projects Officer of the RDAP, Patrick Lukhele. The co-operative marketing structure created by the Ministry of Agriculture has hitherto made little impact, although Hunting acknowledged that recent developments in the use of co-operatives in the collection of maize and cotton showed signs of promise. While a 'comprehensive marketing strategy' is promised for the future,(1) it has also been noted that 'Provision of market outlets in Swazi Nation Land will not in itself stimulate production of surpluses for sale'.(2) Given the competitive restraints of a monopolised market, further restricted in Swaziland by its geographic location, what future is there for a rural development programme based on a strategy to increase commodity production?

The question thus posed, as we have persistently argued, misrepresents the problem. This is because essentially rural development should not solely be a quantitative strategy directed towards the augmentation of agricultural output. Indeed, it could be argued that the whole problematic of rural development in itself is a non-starter, drawing as it does on an aknowledged urban-rural dichotomy, rather than viewing these categories in their mutual articulation. At the heart of the concept of rural development as currently conceived, lies the notion of dividing the worker-peasantry and isolating them into categories of settled workers and settled peasants.

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1. Times of Swaziland, 28 March 1978. This is according to Chief Projects Co-ordinator Patrick Lukele.

2. Swaziland Government, Review of the Rural Development Area Programme: Final Report, op.cit., p. 225.

While the worker-peasantry is undoubtedly divided into those who spend the major part of their productive time on Swazi Nation Land, and those who spend it in wage labour, it is also differentiated along other lines. On Swazi Nation Land, as we have seen, there are major divisions between worker-peasants and farmer-housewives. The latter on the whole are confined to the production of the means of subsistence, and in cases where they produce agricultural commodities, these are generally controlled and appropriated by men. At the same time, although there is no adequate study, it would be safe to assume from participant observation, that sections of the worker-peasantry are successfully engaged in commodity production, and in cases even employ labour from outside their own households. With growing speculation that in future, foreign aid will be directed towards successful commodity producers on Swazi Nation Land,(1) there is a very real possibility, that certain worker-peasant families will find themselves neither workers nor peasants, and thus condemned to total impoverishment. Indeed, this latter process has already begun: in our sample, 8 per cent of homesteads interviewed had no regular source of income, and are confined to the production of the means of subsistence.(2)

As long as rural development strategy in Swaziland remains

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1. This speculation has been given credence in the forthcoming Fourth National Development Plan, where it is argued that 'the beneficiaries of projects must be known in advance'. It also argues for the concept of 'small-holder development in the nucleus estate arrangement' as opposed to the RDA's small plots which are seen as being unviable. See Swaziland Government, Fourth National Development Plan, (Mbabane: Swaziland Printers and Publishers, forthcoming), p. 289.

2. See Appendix to Chapter 5.

hierarchical and undemocratic, the foregoing trends are bound to grow. It is inconceivable that development strategies can succeed without some form of mass participation in the processes of project planning and implementation, even if outside, centrally orchestrated stimuli are required in order to generate this. In rural Swaziland, a whole host of committees ranging from school committees, to women's development committees, to farming committees, to dip-tank committees, to roads committees etc. exist.(1) Nevertheless, there is no single structure or initiative which can unite these disparate organisational forms into a single comprehensive institution to foster development strategy. Even in their present incoherent form, committees have been most effective in communities where the chief has been strongly in favour of development, 'and used his authority to compel people to follow certain measures or to donate money for a project'.(2) Development strategy in Swaziland and its success, hinges on indigenous power structures, presided over by chiefs. This can only serve to stifle mass initiative, a point conceded even by writers like Green, who on the whole are sympathetic to the system of chiefs in Swaziland. He states that 'in their present form, the objectives of chiefs (consolidation of power and personal gain) are incompatible with the objectives of rural development in its broadest sense'.(3) Bearing in mind the role which the power of chiefs, and their control over land allocation, plays in the reproduction of the dominant ideological

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1. E.C. Green, Traditional Leadership, Community Participation and Development Education: Results and Implications of two surveys in Swaziland, USAID, (April 1984), p. 13.

2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 61.

relations which underpin comprador hegemony in Swaziland, what is the future of the rural areas in Swaziland? Are they in crisis, and is major surgery required in order to secure the reproduction of the worker-peasantry? Indeed, will the male's social structural role continue to predominate within the worker-peasantry?

A Crisis on Swazi Nation Land

In Chapter 4, we showed how the value of agriculture on Swazi Nation Land as a proportion of total GDP, had declined from 13.6 per cent at independence to an average of about 3 per cent from the mid-1970's onwards. This decline took place in the context of state attempts to restructure the rural areas on the basis of the RDAP. One reason for this, as we have argued, is that the returns to labour in wage-employment have proved to be more remunerative than the cash-cropping patterns which the RDAP encourages. As Swaziland entered a period of boom during the post-independence period, experiencing extremely high growth rates by African standards, increased employment opportunities diverted labour from rural homesteads. Rural households steadily began to produce less than required for their own consumption purposes, and purchased the deficit. One consequence was that Swaziland became more dependent on maize imports, while another was that the increased flow of wages into the rural sector reduced the necessity to sell cattle to meet cash requirements. With a greater capacity for worker-peasant investment in cattle, pressure on communal grazing areas has grown, leading to a deterioration of these areas, and the escalation of soil erosion. Far

from arresting the tendencies of labour migration, and declining levels of production on Swazi Nation Land, the RDAP has tended to augment these trends. This is because the uptake of new technologies has facilitated greater productivity in these areas, thus releasing greater quantities of labour-power for the labour market. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit explain:

> Of the production-increasing technologies that have been supplied by the RDAP, hybrid maize and tractors have been the most widely adopted. The uptake of these technologies have enabled labour resources to be released from basic food production activities. However the labour released has been allocated to wage employment rather than to the production of crops for sale because wage employment has been the more attractive option.(1)

As a result, although highly variable with rainfall, trend analysis suggests that maize production is on the decline. Crop yields have remained low, and although it has been a state objective to secure self-sufficiency in maize production by 1983, food imports, which consist largely of maize products, have been on the increase. Between 1978 and 1981, these increased by an annual rate of 35 per cent.(2)

The combination of the international recession, declining maize production and drought, fused in the early 1980's to produce a crisis on Swazi Nation Land. This was most clearly felt in 1982 and 1983. Maize production in non-RDA areas, for instance, fell by 29.4 per cent, below the 1981 level, and 65.6 per cent below normal production levels. The corresponding figures for the country as a whole, were 33.8 per cent

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1. Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, op.cit.

2. F. De Vletter, op.cit., (1984).

TABLE 5.7 PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ON SWAZI NATION LAND DURING 1982

REGION	1982 Based on Usual Production				1982 Based on 1981 Production			
	Maize	Ground nut	Beans	Cotton	Maize	Ground nut	Beans	Cotton
				NON RDA'S				
Highveld	-27.1	-	- 55.2	-	- 3.7	-	+ 7.1	-
Middleveld	-18.0	-	+100.0	-	-20.4	-	-	-
Lowveld	-83.4	-50.0	- 98.4	-84.9	-50.6	-14.8	- 99.0	-76.6
Non RDA	-65.6	-50.0	- 94.8	-84.9	-29.4	-14.8	- 74.6	-76.6
				MINIMUM INPUTS RDA's				
Highveld	-23.1	-	- 77.1	-	-11.8	-	- 46.7	-
Middleveld	-59.0	-87.5	- 65.0	-75.0	-55.0	+79.1	- 45.0	-60.0
Lowveld	-55.0	-48.3	+ 66.7	-59.0	-42.4	-81.1	+100.0	-69.1
Min. RDA	-46.3	-78.0	- 35.7	-65.4	-42.8	-80.3	+ 2.5	-67.4
				MAXIMUM INPUTS RDA's				
Highveld	-53.9	- 6.1	- 63.2	-	33.9	+79.7	- 42.0	-87.5
Middleveld	-20.7	-57.7	+ 70.0	+125.0	-30.8	-41.7	- 50.0	+12.5
Lowveld	-56.0	-85.7	-100.0	- 21.4	-51.2	-83.3	-100.0	-
Lubombo	-17.8	-67.6	+100.0	- 50.0	-21.5	-33.9	+100.0	-66.7
Max. RDA	-43.3	-42.6	- 36.3	+ 13.2	-30.5	-21.8	+ 0.3	-24.6
Swaziland	-46.8	-52.8	- 54.9	- 76.4	-33.8	-43.8	- 9.8	-69.0

Source: Swaziland Government: Annual Survey of Swazi Nation Land (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1982)

below the 1981 level, and 46.8 per cent below the normal maize production levels.(1) Table 5.7 sets out in detail the percentage changes in production during 1982, and illuminates the effect of the protracted drought on Swazi Nation Land.

The severity of the drought compelled Swaziland to seek outside assistance from the United Nation's World Food Programme and the EEC. In 1983, the Minister of Agriculture announced that the state had requested food aid for a larger number of homesteads than in 1982. In Shiselweni district, the Mahamba-Zombodze RDA, which in 1982 had a good stand of maize recorded a zero harvest in 1983, while the Southern RDA could only produce 40 per cent of its usual harvest. In Manzini, only Mahlangatsha RDA, Ngwempisi RDA and the Mangcongco areas were able to produce maize, but this amounted to a mere 40 per cent of usual yields. In Lubombo district, only the Lubombo plateau areas were able to produce a crop, at about 30 per cent of the normal level. Similarly in Hhohho district, most areas reported a decimated harvest, with the exception of Motshane-Siphocosini RDA and Ntfonjeni which harvested about 40 per cent of normal yields.(2)

The Minister predicted that in 1983, maize harvests would total well below 30,000 metric tonnes as against a normal yield of about 100,000. The shortfall would thus amount to 70,000 of local production and about 120,000 tonnes of annual national consumption. The whole crisis

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1. Swaziland Government, Annual Survey of Swazi Nation Land 1981-2, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1983), p. 35.

2. The 1982/3 Drought and its effect on the Maize Crop, S.N.A., CO/MA/19, (8 March 1983).

was exacerbated by the complex procedures involved in the processing of food aid: supplies requested for 1982 only began arriving in February 1983. By March, World Food Project supplies received were 3,000 tonnes of maize, 300 tonnes of beans and 150 tonnes of cooking oil. These supplies were adequate for a four month period, and were of benefit to a total of 9,300 families distributed through the four districts.(1) In October 1983, a further 4,000 tonnes (42,000 90 kg bags) arrived.(2)

While rains in the 1983/4 season suggested that the drought was set to break, Swaziland was overtaken by the events of another physical disaster - that of Cyclone Domoina. Domoina struck the country during the weekend of January 29-31 1984, taking the nation totally unawares, as Swaziland has no official meteorological service. Rain fell for a 72 hour period and exceeded that of any period since rainfall was first recorded in Swaziland in 1903. Within hours, rivers had risen as much as 30 metres, bursting their banks and leaving a trail of destruction throughout the country. Bridges and roads were destroyed, and in the immediate wake of the cyclone most of the country was rendered inaccessible by road. Approximately 90 people died from drowning and other flood-related causes and destruction of property and loss of livestock were considerable.(3) Initial estimates put damages at E60 million, although this probably underestimated the

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1. Ibid.

2. Swazi Observer, 16 January 1984.

3. 'The Kingdom of Swaziland', Chapter submitted for 1984 edition of Africa Contemporary Record (forthcoming).

damage when dislocation of transportation routes, especially railway infrastructural damage is taken into account. Indeed, by the end of 1984 the cost of rehabilitating cyclone damaged infrastructure was put at E100 milion.(1)

Despite the immense infrastructural and physical damage caused on Swazi Nation Land, the effects on maize production were ultimately not as decisive as expected. Before the cyclone, maize production was estimated to be in the vicinity of 100,000 metric tonnes for 1983/4. As the damage was assessed, the crop estimate dropped to 90,000 metric tonnes, which would still figure as an average crop. Nevertheless, certain areas faced serious food shortages and required inputs of food aid.(2) Rural water schemes were devastated by the cyclone, and damage to those maintained by the Rural Water Supply Board was estimated at E185,500.(3) Early rains in 1984 once again raised hopes for the 1984/5 crop, but these were dashed due to a subsequent dry spell coupled with a persistent heat wave.(4) The closure of the Swaziland Milling Company in June 1985, left hundreds of maize producers on the brink of financial ruin. Most maize producers depend on the mill to process their maize. Their problem has been made more serious because existing silos are full and maize is already rotting in government silos.

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1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, No. 4, 1984, p. 44.

2. Times of Swaziland, 6 April 1984.

3. Ibid.

4. See 'Drought Scorches Maize', Times of Swaziland, 15 January 1985.

The foregoing has demonstrated that conditions on Swazi Nation Land have displayed disturbing crisis tendencies. While the external pressures of drought and the cyclone have aggravated the crisis, the internal structural contradictions in the Swazi countryside, allow few possibilities for the resolution of existing social conflicts. We have shown how ultimately, the RDAP is hamstrung by the stuctural importance of prevaling social relations on Swazi Nation Land. These constitute both the crucial legitimising basis of comprador political power, and conditions which secure their continued accumulation of capital. On Swazi Nation Land itself, a complex class and social structure has emerged. Capital penetration led to a partial proletarianisation of Swazi men, but it also reinforced and deepened the economic as well as ideological divisions between men and women. Whereas in pre-colonial society, female produce was appropriated by their husbands, under capitalism, female labour was channelled into subsistence agriculture, and was thus critical in maintaining Swaziland's low labour costs. Social reproduction in Swaziland is thus predicated upon the existence of female labour for the production of the means of subsistence, and male labour-power for the supply of income either through migrant labour or the production of agricultural commodities. In cases where female labour-power produces commodities, these are controlled by men, indicating an antagonism between the worker-peasant and the farmer-housewife in the homestead economy. Differentiation within the rural sector on Swazi Nation Land, is thus clearly based on gender, as well as on the nature of the labour process in individual homesteads and the level of income.

The relevance of the abstract conceptualisation of the differentiation of the worker-peasantry into social categories and class fractions is seen when exploring the prospects for change and action in rural Swaziland. Despite the pivotal role of the farmer-housewife in social reproduction on Swazi Nation Land, the structural subordination of this social category has ensured no role for women in the formulation of rural development strategy. With the initiatives of the major protagonists of rural development thus stifled, there seems little chance that the RDAP, imposed as they are from above, will recoup their administrative costs in increased output. It appears likely therefore that unless there is a major rethink and orientation of rural development policy involving greater mass participation, Swazi Nation Land will continue to stagnate as a labour reserve economy.

It should be remembered however, that social reproduction in the homestead economy is not based solely on lowering the costs of labour power. It is also concerned with procuring the crucial ingredient for the operation of the capitalist system - the free labourer. When state development strategists in Swaziland talk of agriculture as the only hope for the surplus population, they point to the increasing gap between the rate of growth of the workforce and that of formal sector employment. In so doing, they both draw the links between Swazi Nation Land and the centres of modern industry, and attempts to separate the worker-peasantry into permanent workers and settled peasants. There clearly is a correlation between the labour market, and the production and marketing patterns on Swazi Nation Land. At the same time, the worker-peasantry is divided between those who spend the bulk of their productive time on Swazi Nation Land, and

those who spend it in wage-labour. This latter class fraction is not separated de jure from its potential means of production on the land. Nevertheless, in general there has been a de facto severance although it must be stressed that kinship ties between this class fraction and family networks on Swazi Nation Land remain strong, and that this has an incisive influence on the political and ideological positions which it adopts. What follows, is that any attempts to assess the crisis faced by the worker-peasantry is incomplete, unless linked to a similar study of that fraction which spends most of its productive time in wage labour. In order to differentiate this class fraction from the worker peasantry based more exclusively on Swazi Nation Land, we shall refer to it as the working class.

The State, Capital and Labour

While the creation of the RDAP can be viewed in the context of management by the state of a part of the value of labour-power, the state has also intervened more directly in the labour process through the establishment of an elaborate negotiating machinery and the regulation of conditions of work. This as indicated, led to the creation of works councils and their integration into the political power structure through the key role allocated to the King's representative or Ndabazabantu in industrial relations. As we have seen, the suppression of the trade unions which these moves involved, were not necessarily in the interests of capital. Indeed, particular capitals which had already entered into agreements with trade unions, found the new negotiating machinery clumsy and unmanageable. Neither did the Ndabazabantu initiative lead to any substantial reduction in

industrial conflict, and major branches of industry continued to suffer from industrial unrest. The Usutu Pulp Company, for instance, experienced an ongoing and simmering labour dispute for almost ten years, dating from independence in 1968. The Department of Labour, the branch of the state apparatus attached to the Deputy Prime Minister's Office, responsible for all matters affecting labour, eventually became so exasperated that it sought settlement of the dispute through independent arbitration by a neutral person from the U.N. Worker demands included increases in all wage rates, the absence of company recognition for long service, discrepancies in pay, privileges and benefits between Blacks and Whites, and discrimination in pay against female workers.(1) Although management had engaged consultants for a job evaluation exercise, the report was never made available to workers, and increases implemented as a result, were met with worker dissatisfaction. The General Manager (incumbent) in 1976, Mr. Harland, refused to negotiate these grievances, arguing that nothing further could be done to improve upon the results of the job evaluation exercise, and 'threatened to close down the mill if the workers stayed away from work'.(2) The Deputy Labour Commissioner himself blamed management, complaining that the General Manager had failed to respect the Ministry of Labour's advice. In 1977, the

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1. Report on the Mission to Swaziland 4th to 10th October, 1978 on the Request of the Department of Economic Planning and Statistics of Swaziland to the United Nations Development Programme in Swaziland. (For the services of a UN Arbitrator to resolve the wage dispute between the workers and the management of Usutu Pulp Company Limited, Uniswa SSRU Doc Centre. (undated mimeo).

2. Ibid.

workers began to raise compromise issues, including withdrawal of the demand to review the job evaluation report, and a reduction in wage demands, but management rejected the latter on account of recurrent losses incurred in 1977, and projected losses in 1978. As deadlock was reached with no solution to the dispute in sight, the state began to seek outside arbitration.

While the Usutu Pulp dispute dragged on, without strike-action and any disruption to actual production, matters came to a head in another lengthy and protracted conflict between capital and labour. In July 1979, large numbers of sugar plantation workers of Ubombo Ranches in Big Bend struck after having made no progress in their months' long endeavour to follow the complicated legal procedure for instituting a strike. The strike, when it did come, ended in violence with a number of fields burnt, and over 100 workers detained. At issue was a pay dispute and the discontinuation of bonus payments to the employees following the appointment of Swazis as directors after Tibiyo had acquired 40 per cent partnership in Ubombo Ranches.(1) Interventions by the Ndabazabantu and the Indvuna yeNkhundla who advised the workforce that 'the policy of Swaziland is that strikes should be avoided at all costs and differences resolved through discussions',(2) failed to bring calm to the situation. In reality, however, workers had been negotiating with management since February the 25th 1979, concerning their intention of going on strike.(3) According to the Permanent Secretary in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office, workers

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1. Times of Swaziland, 27 July 1979.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

actually issued three letters notifying the state of their intention of going on strike, but none of these complied with the relevant section of the Conciliation Act.(1)

It had become increasingly clear to the state, that a fresh initiative was required in the field of labour relations, if Swaziland were to continue to attract foreign investment. Accordingly, work began on the late 1970's on the formulation of new legislation, and culminated in September 1980, in the legislation of the Industrial Relations Act, and the Employment Act.

The Industrial Relations Act and the Employment Act of 1980

Essentially, the Industrial Relations Act was based on the establishment of an Industrial Court with 'exclusive jurisdiction' over labour relations. Its functions are:

> ...(a) to hear and determine trade disputes and grievances;
> (b) to register collective agreements and to hear and determine matters relating to the registration of such agreements;
> (c) to enjoin any organisation or employee or employer from taking or continuing strike action or lockout.(2)

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1. Ibid.

2. The Industrial Relations Act, 1980, Swaziland Government Gazette, 10 October 1980, p. S8.

The 1980 Act also provides for the establishment of employee, staff and employer organisations and federations. These organisations are to 'be confined to one industry'. Here, an 'industry union may have as members, and may purport to represent only persons who are currently or usually employed in the industry in which that industry union is active or who have distinct occupational qualifications for employment in that industry'.(1) Section 19 of the Act outlines the guidelines to be followed in the drawing up of constitutions for industry unions and other industrial organisations, whose compulsory adoption is a pre-requisite for their registration.

Negotiation machinery is provided by Joint Industrial Councils in industries where industry unions or employers associations consider themselves 'to be sufficiently representative of employees or employers interests in an industry'.(2) Where this is not the case, all undertakings employing over 25 workers are compelled to establish works councils with 'equality of representation...for employees and for the employer'.(3) In the event of a dispute, a report must be made to the Labour Commissioner who will attempt to solve the dispute within a 2 week period, failing which he may refer the matter to the Industrial Court. But if strike action or lock-out is threatened or taken:

> ...whether in conformity with this Act or otherwise, and the Minister considers that the national interest is threatened or affected thereby, he may make

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. S20.
3. Ibid., p. S22

> application to the Court ex part for an injunction restraining the parties from commencing or from continuing such action; and the Court may take such order thereon as it considers fit having regard to the national interest.(1)

The aims of the Employment Act have been outlined by the Department of Labour: 'To establish legally enforceable minimum standards of work, including rates of pay and conditions of employment, because there are large sections of industry which left to themselves cannot remedy the hardships of the workers'.(2) Accordingly the Act provides inter alia for the establishment of a Labour Advisory Board, the legal guidelines for contracts of employment, the termination of such contracts, the protection of wages, as well as provisions covering the employment of women and children, which include an equal pay for equal work clause.

Although the Industrial Relations Act and the Employment Act were legislated in September 1980, they only became effective in July 1982, because the state was unable to find a President for the Industrial Court. The comedy of errors which led eventually to the appointment of Mr. Jamil A. Hassanali as President of the Industrial Court, included the issuing by King Sobhuza (II) of a decreee altering the provisions relating to the appointment of judges under Section 98 of the Independence Order Act, in order to allow ageing settler Mr. Colin Bisset to take up the appointment,(3) although he ultimately did not do so.

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1. Ibid., p. S31

2. 'The Machinery of Industrial Relations: The Role of Government', Swaziland Institute for Personnel Training and Management (SIPTM) Uniswa Federation of Swaziland Employers (FSE) Residential Workshop, 3-4 December 1982.

3. See S.N.A., DPMC 7/8 Jus. Conf./2/ Vol. V 188.

The state, through the Department of Labour, has outlined its tripartite strategy of industrial relations, aimed at establishing 'harmonious relationships between the three partners: the employer, the employee and the government'.(1) Industrial relations are viewed as being synonymous with industrial law which is founded on social justice. The latter is not, in the state's view, pedantic and confined to industrial adjudication, but is 'founded on the basic ideal of socio-economic equality'. Its object is to aid in 'the removal of socio-economic disparities and equalities', through the adoption of a 'realistic and pragmatic approach'.(2) Labour Commissioner Ralph Bembe claimed that in most African countries, Departments of Labour are given low priority, and that Swaziland is no exception. The result, he argued, is 'widespread infringement of the law, the perpetuation of sub-standards, exposure of the workers to industrial hazards, and the exploitation of the weak by the strong'.(3) In practice, these conditions have been perpetuated in Swaziland, and state intervention has favoured capital, while the labour Department drags its feet over the enforcement of labour legislation. This can be seen through a brief examination of the development of trade unions and working class struggles in the contemporary period.

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1. R.C.M. Bembe and J.A. Hassanali, "Report on the Study Tour of Kenya and Sri Lanka 11-23 July 1983", S.N.A., DPMC 7/18/46, (1983).

2. Ibid.

3. 'The Machinery of Industrial Relations: The Role of Government', op.cit.

Trade Unions and Strike Action in Swaziland

Following the legislation of the Industrial Relations Act, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), originally formed in 1971, was resurrected. Five trade unions were registered under the umbrella federation. These were the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Worker's Union, the Swaziland Manufacturing and Allied Worker's Union, and the Swaziland Transport Worker's Union. The SFTU has assured both capital and the state that it will not allow itself to be used for 'political aims'.(1) Speaking of the 1963 Havelock Mine strike, the SFTU's General Secretary, Obed Dlamini, said that when striking workers defied King Sobhuza's order to end the strike, this 'marked the beginning of the failure of the labour movement because to a normal Swazi this kind of disobedience was unknown, foreign and unacceptable'.(2) The state's attitude towards the creation of trade unions is epitomised in a statement made by the Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi. Noting the suspicion with which unions had been regarded since their formation in 1963, when they 'abused their powers and involved themselves in politics', the Prime Minister commented to a SFTU delegate: 'A federation like yours is more important even than my job as Prime Minister. You are in charge of a mass of people who are hardly ever satisfied with what they get and it is up to you to keep those people under control'.(3) But despite the federation's aims of maintaining 'orderly conduct of business' and facilitating the

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1. Times of Swaziland, 21 July 1983.

2. 'The Trade Union Movement in Swaziland', Speech by O.M. Dlamini at SIPTM, Uniswa/FSE, op.cit.

3. Times of Swaziland, 21 July 1983.

'continued accommodation' between capital and labour, industrial relations in the 1980's have been far from confrontation free. The legitimacy of the Industrial Court is under question, since workers have on the whole been represented by Labour Department officials. The Department itself, is as a consequence, no longer seen as being impartial, and has complained that the SFTU is 'still crawling', and unable to offer workers representation in the Industrial Court.(1) At the same time, the Federation of Swaziland Employers expressed its unease over the fact that Chief Justice Hassanali was at the same time President of the Industrial Court, and could thus prejudice appeals against Industrial Court judgements, which are heard in the Court of Appeal or High Court.(2)

Industrial disputes have multiplied, although these are very poorly documented on account of a mutual undertaking between the state and capital not to take labour matters to the press.(3) During a strike by 500 daily paid workers at the Matshapha depot of the Public Works

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1. 'Labour Commissioner to Attorney General', (30 August 1983), S.N.A., LAB/DO/1/2/ Vol II.

2. 'F.D. Jelly, Vice-President of FSE to Hon. Minister M.S. Matsebula', (2 March 1984), S.N.A. DPMC 7/9/B.

3. Hence the Permanent Secretary in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office wrote to Mr. D. Von Wissel, at the time President of the Federation of Swaziland Employers: 'In our last two or three discussions in my office trying to resolve problems that may effect workers and employers, you appealed to me and requested that I ensure that labour matters should not be taken to the press. In reply I informed you that it would be a good thing if your members would be aware of the problems that are likely to arise if they go to the press'. S.N.A., DPMC 7/9/B., (21 June 1982).

Department's (PWD) Manzini Building Department, reporters from the Swazi Observer were dragged into an office and warned by the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Power and Communication that 'If you publish anything about this...I will 'sue your paper'.(1) Workers have become increasingly frustrated with the existing framework for industrial negotiations. In October 1982, 2,000 workers at the Usutu Pulp Mill disbanded their 'ineffective' 20-man works council which had failed to secure the dismissal of a senior assistant personnel manager Mr. Ezra Nkambule.(2)

The breakdown of existing negotiating machinery is witnessed in the increasing resort by workers to referring their disputes either to the state, through the Department of Labour or the Prime Minister's Office, or even to the Royal Kraal at Lobamba itself. Thus in June 1983, 500 daily paid PWD workers marched to Lobamba to seek audience with the Queen Regent,(3) while Tabankulu Estates work council paid a 'courtesy call' to Prince Bhekimpi. Work council member John Tsabedze claimed that confrontation 'is the order of the day at Tabankulu', but because the council had respected the peaceful negotiation laid down by the late King, they had 'stomached a lot of overbearing treatment from management'.(4) Prince Bhekimpi could offer little outside a prayer for a peaceful solution to their differences

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1. Swazi Observer, 2 June 1983.
2. Times of Swaziland, 8 October 1982.
3. Times of Swaziland, 3 June 1983.
4. Times of Swaziland, 16 June 1983.

with management, and advised the works council to 'go back and continue consultations with your management...Bear in mind that if you succeed in your deliberations with management, this will ensure the economic stability and prosperity of the Swazi Nation'.(1)

Indeed, ideology has played a major role in state intervention in labour disputes. This was seen most clearly in the strife-torn Lupholo project undertaken by Wimpey International to develop a hydro-electric dam aimed at reducing Swaziland's energy dependence on South Africa. In early 1982, a major strike of employees led by work council member Zebulon Tsabedze demanded worker pay rises, improved working conditions, the dismissal of two members of management and the end to racism and use of abusive language by officials.(2) After being subjected to sustained harrassment, Tsabedze was eventually fired in June, after which at least 400 workers downed tools. Police were immediately rushed to the scene and instructed journalists not to take pictures. When confronted by the Labour Commissioner, the District Commission for Hhohho and senior police superintendent Majaji Simelane, the workers demanded the re-instatement of Tsabedze. When ordered to return to work, leave everything to the works committee and cease behaving in an 'unSwazi manner', the workers replied:

> Is it Swazi to intimidate workers and treat a committee member like this?....Don't try to scare us we're not school-children....What have the white men given you up there in those offices?....You can't force us to work,

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1. Ibid.

2. Times of Swaziland, 24 June 1982

> forget it. Why can't you people negotiate with us? Why do you have to rely on threats all the time? Is that the Swazi way you are telling us about?'(1)

Nevertheless, state intervention brought an end to the strike, and Wimpey resumed operations, but the dispute simmered on and exploded again a year later. This time, Labour Department Officials told the workers that their strike was illegal, to which they replied 'You say this is illegal; is this under-payment legal?(2) They were then advised that 'In keeping with our Swazi tradition of respect you should go back to work, Swazis are a respectful nation. I know that you will behave like Swazis'. The workers responded shouting 'Yes we are respectful and cheap' in reference to an alleged remark from management that Swazis provide cheap labour.(3) As acrimonious allegations filled the air and the strike adopted a potentially violent tone, shots were fired by police, and the project was closed down for almost a week.(4) But the significance of the Wimpey dispute was that in the heat of the

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1. Ibid.

2. Times of Swaziland, 23 August 1983.

3. Ibid. According to the report: 'One of the management men is alleged to make contemptuous remarks such as: Swazi provide cheap labour and he himself is so expensive that the company had to pay a lot of money to bring him here from the UK and that Swazis accept salaries which would not be accepted anywhere else.'

4. Further industrial strife erupted in November 1983 at the site, when more than 100 workers of Thyssens Construction, sub-contractors to the Luphohlo Hydro-Electric Scheme at Ezulwini went on strike over a dispute with management about over-time payments. Their representatives then marched to Lobamba to seek Royal intervention in the dispute. See Swazi Observer, 24 November 1983 and Times of Swaziland, 24 November 1983.

harsh reality of the exploitative relation in Swaziland, and the political forms of state intervention deployed to overcome strike action, workers' statements revealed that the ideological veils used to secure these ends have begun to wear thin.

This is because the effects of the international recession have been greatly felt by the working class in Swaziland. The 1980's as we observed, witnessed an increase in redundancies affecting manufacturing, processing, mining and the construction industry, which was particularly hard hit. The sugar companies, Havelock mine and the forestry industry, while not retrenching staff, adopted a policy of not replacing workers, and the sugar industry embarked on a strategy of not employing people out of season.

The Prime Minister urged responsibility and sensibility on the part of companies intending to lay-off workers, and that retrenchment should be conducted 'skilfully bit by bit'.(1) The General Secretary of the Federation of Swaziland Employers, Mr. Peter Dodds, argued that one way of combatting unemployment was to keep salaries and wages down in order to avoid lay-offs:

> We have to resist increases in the cost of labour and stop the situation found in the UK, Germany and the United States with trade unions striking for higher pay....The popular attitude that everybody has a right to work has changed. What we have today is the resignation to the inevitability of unemployment...(2)

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1. Times of Swaziland, 24 May 1983.

2. Swazi Observer, 24 May 1983.

The above assertion is a typical reflection of the massive attacks on wage-labour by capital brought about by each over-production crisis of capital. Through escalating unemployment and fear of unemployment, the crisis compels workers to accept declining real wages. As Mandel pointed out: 'Since the end of the 1974-5 crisis, we have seen a universal austerity offensive of big capital against wage labour'.(1)

In our discussion of the sugar industry in Chapter 4, we demonstrated how unskilled sugar workers live on the brink of the poverty level. Unskilled workers in Swaziland, constitute over 70 per cent of workers in the private sector, and have the closest ties to Swazi Nation Land.(2) A real issue is the adequacy of unskilled wages. Throughout the Third World, unskilled workers, in the words of Robert MacNamara, live an existence that 'one hardly dares qualify as human'.(3) The ILO Swaziland Report, noted that 'A large number of people, particularly women...work very hard for very long hours, yet their income is considerably less than that required for a satisfactory standard of living'.(4) Pat Macfadden has painted a grim picture of women in wage labour in the agriculture and processing industries, many of whom are employed without being properly registered, in

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1. E. Mandel, op.cit., (1980), p. 193

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, op.cit., (1982).

3. Quoted by E. Mandel, Ibid., p. 146.

4. ILO Report, op.cit., p. 8.

order for companies to avoid paying them minimum wages.(1) Workers at Libby's pineapple plantation and canning factory were described as being 'angry and tired', and cynical about the state's role in industry. When asked about the Labour Department, the response was:

> If you take your case to them, you can be sure that you will lose, even if you know you are right. They never come to see us, only to see the company. You can see by the flag going up that Government people live around, that is all. They don't care where we live, or how we live.(2)

It is the squalid living and working conditions of the working class in Swaziland which explains why, in spite of the offensive by capital and the state, leading to job losses, attacks on wages and fragmentation of worker organisations, that workers have continued to resist their exploitation. In the sugar industry, the three mills have established an Employers Association and a Joint Industrial Council, ostensibly to represent all employees in the sugar industry. But the Council formed in 1983, was confined to the organisation of skilled artisans, leaving the organisation of unskilled workers to the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union. The latter have hit out at the divide-and-rule tactics of management who stand accused of not wanting to recognise the union.(3) This union has in turn been accused by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Mhlangano Matsebula, of working towards 'political gain' instead of for the welfare of workers.(4)

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1. P. Macfadden, 'Women in Wage-Labour in Swaziland: A Focus on Agriculture', in South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 6, (April 1982).

2. Ibid., p. 162.

3. Swazi Observer, 25 July 1984.

4. Times of Swaziland, 17 July 1984; Swazi Observer, 19 July 1984; Rand Daily Mail, 18 July 1984.

The attempts by capital and the state at the integration and incorporation of the workforce, have simultaneously involved their fragmentation. This would explain the overall lack of organisation and cohesiveness in the labour movement in Swaziland. Workers lack both the requisite leadership, and conditions of organisation. The result is that worker struggles have been disarticulate and provisional, remaining confined to spontaneous outbursts in individual enterprises, with no apparent indication that they will adopt the character or dimension of the 1963 generalised strikes.

Conclusion

A contradiction has emerged in one of the pillars of Swaziland's investment strategy. On the one hand, there has been an attempt to attract foreign investment through the existence of a low wage structure and impotent labour movement. On the other hand, the 1980 labour legislation was drawn up to protect workers from unscrupulous capitalist employers. In practice, both strategies have acted as deterrents to foreign investment. The former, since low productivity has accompanied low wages and hence nullified any apparent cost advantages.(1) The latter, since the new legislation has become one of the biggest stumbling blocks in attracting new investors to the country, as indicated for instance, during talks between the German-

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1. M.W. Clough, op.cit., p. 49. According to Clough, who conducted a survey of 33 manufacturers in Swaziland, 25 firms believed labour productivity in Swaziland was lower than in the South African core. Of 50 firms interviewed in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho, only 3 listed labour costs as a motive for their location choice. Salora 'felt that Swazis were only one-third as productive as their expatriate counterparts'.

South African Chamber of Commerce and the Swaziland Government.(1) On the ground, workers continue to struggle for survival, with the overwhelming mass of unskilled workers and their families - 40,000 constituting over 70 per cent of the workforce in the private sector alone - living on the fringe of poverty.(2)

Although these workers spend the bulk of their productive time in the centres of modern industry, they are not 'free' in the classical sense from the means of production, and retain links, however tenuous, to Swazi Nation Land. Here, the combination of the post-independence boom and the implementation of the RDAP, led to increased labour migration and declining levels of production, as the value of Swazi Nation Land's contribution to GDP steadily fell. But as the effects of the international recession spread to Swaziland, the state has increasingly looked towards informal employment in agriculture on Swazi Nation Land for a solution to a rising unemployment problem.

Here a crisis of state development strategy is revealed. The RDAP did not address itself adequately to the wider question of rural development and national development as a whole, but concentrated largely on the question of agricultural production and productivity. Although this is of central importance, rural development should clearly relate to the totality of social reproduction, including its

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1. Times of Swaziland, 21 August 1984.

2. Swaziland Government, Annual Statistical Bulletin, (1982), op.cit.

ideological and political conditions. Success of existing strategy was largely limited to the uptake of new technologies without any corresponding augmentation of agricultural commodity production or a rise in self-sufficiency, as maize imports continued to increase. All indications point, therefore, to a decline in living conditions of both the working class and the worker-peasantry, as industrial growth is arrested by the international recession.

To an extent, Swaziland's membership of SACU and the RMA has cushioned it from the typical effects produced by the global crisis on Third World countries. With the bulk of Swaziland's imports coming from South Africa, although Swaziland has run significant and swelling balance of trade deficits, membership of the RMA and to a lesser extent SACU, has ensured that these are not expressed in terms of a crisis of foreign exchange reserves. Customs receipts have helped Swaziland shore up the capital account of its balance of payments, but there has been an increase in state borrowing, which together with customs duties have offset deficits in the trade and services account. Yet this leaves little cause for comfort, for Swaziland's debt service requirements have become less concessionary, relying as they do on international agencies like the World Bank, and thus providing cause for long term disquiet. Given the instability of the world sugar market, Swaziland's dependence on sugar exports can only intensify the existing tendencies towards greater balance of payments deficits and debt service requirements.

Of further concern is the effects of South Africa's decentralisation policies on future investment prospects in Swaziland. The inducements offered in the South African Bantustans have led to a relocation of industry from peripheral states in Southern Africa to the Bantustans. Swaziland cannot compete with the financial incentives offered by South Africa, while localisation and employment policies have acted as further deterrents to potential investors. The result has been a drying up of foreign investment, leading to an under-utilisation of productive capacity, characterised by cut-backs, retrenchment and a rise in unemployment in Swaziland. These typical features of the international capitalist crisis in the country, have led to the mushrooming of urban slums and an attendent escalation in crime.

This leaves the state with serious concrete problems of the administration, planning and organisation of social services, but as indicated, these are in decline. And as the Swazi state battles to come to grips with these problems, another crisis of no less consequence, has confronted it in the present conjuncture. For Swaziland's geographical location has placed it in the midst of a regional confrontation as the frontiers of white minority rule have been rolled back.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5

Between May and August 1984, I conducted a field survey of rural homesteads in Swaziland. From the mid-1970's onwards, the Swazi homestead has become the object of increased interest for both planners and analysts, although the first comprehensive survey was undertaken by the University of Natal in the early 1960's. This led to the publication of the important work by Holleman in 1964.(1) The resurgence of interest in rural development in Swaziland in the mid-1970's, led to a number of studies being undertaken under UN, USAID and ILO funding. Some of these studies were supervised by the Department of Economics at the University College of Swaziland, and later the Social Science Research Unit.(2) These externally-funded studies have facilitated the collection of elaborate and comprehensive data on the rural homestead. The work of Russell aside, (3) one notable feature of these studies is that very rarely do the people who themselves are involved in rural development - the Swazi worker-peasantry - speak for themselves. This was a primary concern in undertaking the rural survey.

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1. J.H. Holleman, op.cit.
2. See F. de Vletter, op.cit. (1983), pp. 12-13.
3. See in particular M. Russell, op.cit., (May 1983).

Aims, objectives and Methodology of the sample frame

The study covered both RDA and non-RDA areas, and was never designed to be a complete survey itself, which would have been unfeasible because of logistical and financial constraints. Instead, the aim was to test the attitudes to a number of questions relating to aspects of rural development in Swaziland. These questions did not necessarily relate directly towards the RDAP. It was hoped that these would serve as a complement to the wide range of well-financed surveys carried out by Uniswa, as well as to the vast array of available literature and data covering rural development in Swaziland.

The survey did aim to be as comprehensive as was possible within the constraints outlined above. Accordingly, it covered the main topographical regions in the country. Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that ultimately our sample of 131 homesteads broken down into their topographical regions did not correspond proportionately to the distribution of the rural population in the country.

Table 5.8 **Distribution of Rural Population and Homestead Sample by Topographical region**

REGION	1976 Rural Population[1] (as a % of total population)	Homestead Sample (as a % of total of 131)
Highveld	27	48
Middleveld	43	27
Lowveld	25	18
Lubombo	5	7

(1) Swaziland Government, 1976 Population Census, (Mbabane: Central Statistical Office, 1976).

In the Highveld, most of the sample was drawn from homesteads in the Sipocosini Motshane area. In the Middleveld, samples were taken in Masundwini as well as in Mbekelweni which is covered by the central RDA (see Map 3). The Lowveld survey was ' covered principally in two areas: Vikizijula and Sithobela, while the Lubombo study was undertaken in Maphungwane near Siteki. I was aided by a number of teachers, University students and extension workers. In cases, e.g. in Maphungwane, the teacher who did the interviews was a member of the community. The interviewers were urged to try to get the interviewees to talk as freely as possible on the problems which confront them in their everyday lives. The questionnaire was thus very loosely structured, and was of the free response type. It is worthwhile to note that in the Mbekelweni and Ludzeludze areas (Central RDA), already the subject of several Uniswa based studies, respondents were markedly reserved. Where they were outspoken (e.g. in Phonjwane, Vikizijula), they had never been interviewed before, and clearly believed that discussing their problems was the prelude to aid inputs which would help to solve them.

Production and the Reproduction of the rural homestead

In order to determine the various modes of reproduction of the homestead, we asked respondents to discuss their various sources of regular income. Four major variables emerged here: wage labour only; wage labour and production of agricultural commodities and/or handicrafts only. Another variable, which has been subsumed in the table below under the later three categories, was of farmer-housewives who from time to time become merchants. They

sometimes purchase agricultural commodities and sell them at bus stops or in rural markets. In cases, they travel to Durban or Johannesburg where they buy clothes which they resell. Certain farmer-housewives also buy up handicrafts which they market in South African cities, although the licensing for this type of hawking is more complex than the former. A number of households had no regular source of income. These form the nucleus in the rural areas of a marginalised population, who are neither workers nor peasants. One homestead in Masundwini had no source of regular income since 1963.

Table 5.9 **Regular Sources of Income**

Source	No. of Households	% of Total
Wage labour only	80	61
Wage labour & sale of agricultural commodities	21	16
Sale of agricultural commodites only	16	12
Sale of handicrafts only	4	3
Non-production of means of subsistence only	10	8
Total	131	100

This reveals that the overwhelming majority of homesteads in the sample are dependent on the sale of labour power for homestead reproduction.

Table 5.10 Dependence on sale of labour power

	No. of Homesteads	%
Reliance on external source of income through sale of labour-power	101	77
Reliance on commodity production only for income	20	15

The RDAP and Social Reproduction

One of the major assumptions of the RDAP, is that the majority of the population on Swazi Nation Land, view themselves as farmers anxiously seeking the kind of outside assistance which the RDA's can provide. We asked homesteads whether household production was solely for subsistence purposes, or whether there was generally a surplus for sale. A majority of homesteads - 72 per cent of the sample - grew crops for subsistence purposes.

Table 5.11 Purpose of Household Agricultural Production

Purpose	No. of Homesteads	% of Total
Subsistence	94	72
Saleable surplus	37	28

We also questioned people as to whether they would prefer to grow agricultural commodities in the form of cash crops, or whether they would prefer to grow subsistence crops in the

form of food. The terms 'commodity' or 'cash crop' have no simple Siswati equivalent. The result was that the question had to be posed in a descriptive form, exemplified according to the area. Thus in the Lowveld, the question was framed: 'Would you prefer to grow crops for selling, such as cotton, or would you prefer to grow crops to eat?' In the Highveld, the question would often be framed: 'Would you prefer to grow crops for selling such as potatoes, or would you rather grow crops to eat?' The majority preferred to grow food crops.

Table 5.12 **Preferred Type of Production**

Type	No. of Households	% of Total
Commodity Production	45	34
Subsistence Production	81	62
Both(1)	5	4

Note:(1) This was not posed as a question, but certain respondents stressed both types of production as their preference.

This would indicate that the majority of homestead members in our sample do not regard themselves as peasants or farmers. Rather they view production on Swazi Nation Land as a supplement to the wages that they earn as migrant labourers or simply as a means of subsistence.

We also wished to test their attitudes towards state attempts to foster the growth of a peasant farming sector through the RDAP. Although in practice many of the homesteads in our sample were outside the ambit of the RDA's in theory, all but the 21 homesteads in the Masundwini

and peri-urban areas of Manzini where interviews were conducted, were covered. In Vikizijula, for instance, Phonjwana remains untouched by the Programme, mainly because the community has not yet resettled. The result is that inhabitants of the area know very little of the aims and objectives of the RDAP.

We asked respondents whether they thought that the RDAP had helped them to increase their production levels. Excluding the 21 homesteads mentioned above, 28, or 25 per cent of the remaining homesteads, believed that they had. In the Sithobela area of the Lowveld, where the RDAP is operational, and resettlement has taken place, only 1 out of 10 homesteads interviewed felt that the RDAP had helped them to increase agricultural output.

A further question was posed as to how people felt the government could help them to raise their production levels. The question was posed as a free response type of question, but respondents were asked to state their priorities. The results indicate that there is a strong feeling that a more comprehensive set of institutions need to be introduced to facilitate easier access to loans and credit than exists at present through the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank (1). The following table shows how individual homesteads believe the state could contribute to rural development. It was computed according to homestead priority.

(1) For a comprehensive discussion of the Bank's activities, see C. Mercey, "The Swaziland Development and Savings Bank and Credit to Small Farmers in Swaziland: Three Measures of Success", in The Swazi Rural Homestead, op.cit.

Table 5.13 **Homestead Choice of Government Aid**

Type of aid	No. of homesteads	% of Total
Loans	49	37
More extension workers	4	3
Greater level of inputs such as technology and seed	26	20
Better extension facilities	11	8
Irrigation schemes	15	12
Other (includes more land, state aid not desired or expected, state aid is sufficient, and don't know)	26	20

The conclusion which emerges here, is the same as that which we have stressed throughout our discussion of rural development strategy in Swaziland. That is, there is a need for a far greater level of mass participation in the development of specific programmes. While aid stemming from top-down planning and implementation of rural development strategy is often appreciated and helpful, aid resources could be put to far better use if it responded more directly to the needs and initiatives of local communities.

Results and Prospects of Rural Development Strategy in Swaziland

The material progress of the RDAP has been discussed in some detail in the main body of Chapter 5. From the perspective of external aid donors, progress has been slow and disappointing. Nevertheless, the state through the Ministry of Agriculture has stated its commitment to persist with the Programme. We have argued, that one of the major constraints to progress in Swazi rural development is the structural significance of existing relationships in the countryside. These secure the ideological, political and economic conditions of Royal hegemony in Swaziland. The constraints imposed on rural development in Swaziland by the indigenous form of land tenure, is typical of many societies in the Third World. But given the structural importance of land control and allocation by chiefs and aristocrats for the sustenance of Royal hegemony, the problem cannot simply be brushed aside through the introduction of a new system of land tenure. The result has been the attempt to introduce a resettlement scheme operating within the structural constraints of the existing form of land tenure itself. As we have noted, a small majority of 52 per cent of our sample of homesteads were in favour of the resettlement scheme. We also asked homestead members whether they would prefer to concentrate on production on individual plots, or whether they would prefer to co-operate with members of the community in production. A small majority preferred production on individual plots.

Table 5.14 **Individual or Co-operative Production**

Type of Production	No. of Homesteads	% of Total
Individual plots	71	54
Co-operative production	60	46

What was interesting though, was the way in which individuals pondered over and debated the issue. Clearly the worker-peasantry in Swaziland is responsive to new initiatives. But they need to discuss them and probably even experiment with them before they are introduced from above. We would not argue that central planning be dispensed with, but rather that it is formulated with a greater level of grass-roots participation.

A Sample of Rural Extension Workers

It was believed that any analysis of the results and prospects of the RDAP would be incomplete without the views of some of the major participants in the drama of rural development in Swaziland - the extension workers. The survey was limited by time, financial and logistical constraints, and as a consequence, only 10 extension workers were interviewed. Once again, questions were of the free response type. It was agreed that the interviews remain strictly confidential.

Six of the extension workers interviewed had been in the field for two years or more, while the remainder were fairly inexperienced. I asked them whether they felt that the traditional system of land tenure was an obstacle to progress in their area. Only 2 felt that it was not, and both of these had only been in the field for a period of a few months. They all believed that the resettlement scheme was essential to improving the work of the RDA's, and significantly, they all believed that members of the community thought that resettlement would improve development prospects in their areas. Only 3 felt that they had been able to establish a good working relationship with the people in their respective areas. Four extension workers claimed to have a 'fair' relationship with the chief in their areas; 1 boasted of a good relationship; 2 stated there was no co-operation between them and the chief; 1 who had been in an area for 2 years declared their relationship to be 'pretentious'; while 1 who had been an extension worker for 3 months had never met his chief. Only 3 of the extension workers believed the community regarded them as outsiders trying to impose their views on the community.

The extension workers were divided over the issue of whether or not the state should promote the growth of commodity production or subsistence food cropping. Three were in favour of commodity production, 3 for both types of production; while 4 opted for subsistence production.

It was when questioning the respondents on the main problems which they face as extension workers, and their recommendations for action, that the value of the exercise became most apparent. One common theme emerging from the responses, was the absence of a spirit of co-operation throughout the community, especially between chiefs, influential people (e.g. Tindvuna Tetinkhundla, imisumphe) and the community at large. As one put it: 'The influential people tend to be negative towards development'. An extension worker based for 5 years in his area stated that the chief, influential people and traditional beliefs were 'retarding the rate of progress in the area'. He also declared that the chief in his area was a 'stumbling block' towards the enforcement of resettlement in his area, and that lack of co-operation in the community had made it very difficult to form a farmers' association. Over and above the problem of community co-operation, there was a general feeling that the needs of the community had to be monitored before deciding whether to build a minimum or a maximum RDA in a particular area.

All extension workers felt that their services were greatly limited by the fact that they were not provided with transport, a problem which the Ministry of Agriculture itself has acknowledged and promised to deal with. The feeling also was that the infrastructure had been introduced on too small a scale to be really effective. The RDA's were understaffed and needed more technical advisers and mechanical supplies. Clearly the state is going to have to commit greater resources to the Programme if it aims to recoup administrative costs with a greater output.

Conclusion

One extension worker summed up the current state of rural development strategy in Swaziland when he said 'Government priorities should be resettling. They also need to encourage development in the RDA's, uniting farmers by organising farmers' unions. More meetings, seminars and workshops should be organised for the farmers'. Throughout our discussion of rural development in Swaziland, we have stressed that one of its major shortcomings, is the absence of mass participation in the formulation and implementation of policy. Farmer-housewives in particular have no democratic channels of access to participation in the formation and co-ordination of policy. The basic state assumption is that the majority of the worker-peasantry on Swazi Nation Land regard themselves as farmers, but clearly this is not the case. As capital has come to dominate Swaziland over the last century, the Swazi countryside has steadily come to constitute a labour reserve. Its inhabitants have utilised the land as a means of subsistence to subsidise the wages earned by various family members who have migrated to the centres of modern industry in search of work. Social reproduction has thus been predicated chiefly on the sale of labour-power and production of the means of subsistence. In cases, it has been secured through the production and sale of agricultural commodities. The state has elected that the latter form of social reproduction predominate. But if it is to succeed, there is clearly going to have to be a degree of social engineering, whose ultimate success depends on the degree to which the worker-peasantry and the farmer-housewives themselves participate in and direct this process.

Our own study has been based on a very small sample, and we are therefore modest as to the contribution which it can make. Nevertheless, we believe that it has helped to confirm the foregoing assertions. It also points signposts towards the kind of fieldwork which needs to be done in Swaziland. Too much attention has been devoted towards the collection and collation of complicated and elaborate statistics. These certainly have their use. But increasingly, researchers, like the state itself, need to listen to the voices of the actual protagonists of rural development in Swaziland.

6. SWAZILAND AND SOUTH AFRICAN REGIONAL STRATEGY

> "It is...important that the Kingdom of Swaziland should continue to respect every letter of the agreements made with our neighbours. The Swazi people have learned from the greatest authorities that if one is to become prosperous he sould love his neighbour as he loves himself. Regardless of the differences of political ideologies as pursued by your neighbour, you are expected to live peacefully with your neighbour. The Kingdom of Swaziland has had criticisms showered upon her in respect of political philosophy which seems not quite clear to the international forums. Today I want to make it clear that there is nothing wrong with our policy."(1)

In chapter 4, we discussed the economic dimensions of Swaziland's dependence on South Africa. These, however, in no way exhaust an analysis of the relationship between the two countries, which also have close cultural ties. The colonial boundaries drawn up by the Boers and the British at the Third Swaziland Convention(2), left over half of the original inhabitants of Mswati's Swazi Kingdom in South Africa. Accordingly, there are more ethnic Swazis in South Africa than in Swaziland itself. One result is that many Swazis have kin ties across the borders in South Africa. This close relationship, together with the common consumption patterns induced by the customs union, has meant that elements of South African popular culture have spread to Swaziland. The South African media : Zulu and Swazi 'Bantu' Radio; the Rand Daily Mail; Golden City Press; The Sunday Times; Drum and

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1. Swazi Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi in his speech to the 1985 SADCC Council Meeting, quoted by J. Daniel, "South Africa and a BLS State: The Case of Swaziland". Paper presented at a seminar on Dependency Relations and Development Assistance for Economic Independence in Southern Africa, Uppsala, (April 1985).

2. See Chapter 3.

Pace magazines, is consumed eagerly in Swaziland. The South African football giants, Kaizer Chiefs, Orlando Pirates and Moroka Swallows, perhaps enjoy larger followings in Swaziland than its own football teams. But since the 1950's, when Britain introduced a more conventional system of indirect rule in Swaziland and South Africa introduced apartheid, the political destinies and directions taken by Swaziland and Black South Africa have widely diverged.

We have highlighted the devèloping political ties between Swazi Royalty and South Africa: the King's INM was founded partially on the advice of the Broederbonder, Van Wyk de Vries.(1) Following the formation of the INM, Carl Todd, the first European to join the INM, made repeated broadcasts over South African Radio, pleading for South African state support for the economic development of Swaziland, and for the INM(2). As independence drew nearer for the BLS states, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, South Africa's Primie Minister, in a reflection of what was to become the policy of Total Strategy in the late 1970's, pointed to the advantages of South African aid:

> ... these (BLS) territories, as they become politically independent states, would be linked to the Republic, and with the Bantu states it is creating from within its own borders, in a consultative body dealing with mutual political interests, as well as in another co-ordinating body envisaged on the principles of a common market.(3)

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1. See Chapter 3 above.

2. D. Kowet, op.cit., pp.174-75.

3. "The Road to Freedom for Basotholand, Bechuanaland and Swaziland", South African Department of Information, Fact Paper No.107, (1963).

Of the 3 states, it is Swaziland which has proved to be the most receptive to these initiatives. In March 1971, a high powered Swazi delegation which included the Prime Minister visited Cape Town. Prime Minister Makhosini explained:

> There is every reason to meet and discuss matters of mutual interest...We share political borders, and there are hundreds of Swazis in various parts of South Africa... All these combined compel only one thing in either our development planning or Foreign Policy; a policy of friendship and co-operation towards the Republic of South Africa.(1)

It was hardly surprising, therefore, when the South African Government endorsed the King's actions in abolishing the Independence Constitution:

> ... Sobhuza believed that the Swazi system of government was better for the Swazi people. Certainly it is thoroughly (sic.) democratic. The Libandla, the King's Council, is open to all Swazi men or their traditional representatives; and the King gives effect to the consensus the Libandla establishes. The system has indeed been described as a classic example of rule by consultation and consent.(2)

One important outcome of the repealing of the constitution was the establishment of the Swaziland Defence Force (Umbutfo). This was achieved through close co-operation with South Africa and Israel. Indeed, South Africa and Swaziland had a harmony of interests in the creation of Umbutfo. The more militant and socialist orientated policies established by the ANC following its congresses in Arusha and Morogoro in Tanzania in the late 1960's, and its adoption of the 'ANC

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1. Times of Swaziland, 2 April 1971.

2. Times of Swaziland, 20 April 1973, quoted from a statement issued by the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

Strategy and Tactics', stengthened South African resolve to create a buffer zone in its border areas. Observers also believe that these developments led King Sobhuza II's advisors to conclude that a radicalised ANC posed just as great a threat to the Swazi Monarchy as it did to continuing white minority rule in South Africa. The Swazi regime has no formal diplomatic ties with Eastern Bloc countries, and is anti-communist in outlook. The King himself made this clear:

> When a man has to reprimand his wife, often there will be found an ill-intentioned man who will come to the wife and say: "How sorry I feel for you because your husband always scolds you and treats you badly and I would do something better for you." Such a man is a bad man. And we feel that such a man in the political world is Russia and others like her.(1)

It is in the context of a growing political co-ordination between the two states, that Swaziland's role in South Africa's regional strategy must be seen.

The Changing Balance of Forces in Southern Africa

The escalating economic crisis in contemporary Swaziland is set against a background of Southern African regional strife. The genesis of the latter is traceable to the changing balance of political forces emerging from the successful conclusion of the national liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In the case of the former two countries in particular, the new regimes displayed a commitment to some kind of socialist transformation rather than the export orientated 'model' of development which has come to

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1. Quoted by H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), pp.212-13.

characterise uneven developmment in the capitalist periphery. The determined drive for national liberation by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, has led to the internationalisation of the conflict beyond South Africa's borders. With its own troops based illegally in Namibia, South Africa has launched repeated attacks against Angola in conjuction with its surrogate Unita forces. This strategy has been pursued on other neighbouring fronts as well. Through the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and possibly elements of the so-called 'dissident' movement in Zimbabwe, South Africa has pursued a policy of destablisation in the region(1).

This externally-directed aggression has occured concommittantly with increasing repression at home. This arises primarily out of a new intensity in the struggle for national liberation in South Africa. The post-1976 era in South Africa has witnessed a proliferation of ANC military activity and confrontation with the South African regime. This struggle was marked by 'armed propaganda' and a series of often impressive attacks on strategic installations, including a highly successful rocket attack on the Sasol II oil-from coal conversion project, and the Koeberg nuclear reactor in the Cape. Further attacks have been unleashed on military and police installations. The period

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1. See 'Destabilisation in Southern Africa', The Economist, 16 July 1983; M. Plaut, E. Unterhalter, D. Ward, The Struggle for Southern Africa, (London: War on Want and Liberation, 1981) (esp. Chapter 3); A. Callinicos, Southern Africa After Zimbabwe, (London: Pluto Press, 1981), Chapter 1.

has also witnessed an upsurge of black working class struggles and the rise of a progressive black trade union movement. This movement, alongside militant students, have showed themselves willing to involve themselves in community issues. The intensification of community based struggle has become a further feature of resistance to apartheid and crystallised in the 1980's in the formation of the United Democratic Front and the National Forum(1).

This shifting balance of political forces in South Africa has unfolded in the context of an unprecedented economic crisis. South African capitalism in the 1960's and 1970's has been characterised by a growing monopolisation of capital with associated increases in structural unemployment and shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labour-power. During the post-1981 recession, unemployment in Soweto, for instance, rose at 5.5 per cent per annum, while the situation in the Bantustans is almost certainly far worse(2). South African capitalism has continued to thrive on the production and export of primary products, relying on a rising demand from Western industrial economies for primary sector

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1. See J. Saul, and S. Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), for a discussion of political dynamics in South Africa in the post-1976 Soweto era; J. Dela Harpe, and A. Mansen, "The UDF and the Development of Resistance in South Africa", Africa Perspective, No.23, (1983), for a discussion of the UDF; and "The National Forum: 'Seeking Socialism'?"; Work in Progress, No.35, (February 1985), for a discussion of the National Forum.

2. J. Keenan, 'The Recession and the African Working Class', in South African Review Two, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984).

exports to fuel economic growth. Despite the gold boom of the late 1970's, the problems of unemployment persisted, and when the price of gold fell in the 1980's, this led to a balance of payments crisis, rising debt and a spiralling rate of inflation(1).

The response to the economic and political crises outlined above, was an attempt by the state to restructure the totality of the economic, political and ideological dynamics of the system of apartheid. The result was the evolution of 'Total Strategy', first set out in the Defence White Paper of 1977. Total Strategy was defined as 'the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims'(2). The integrated nature of the policy was spelled out in the following terms: 'The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, cultural'(3). One of the most awesome aspects of the strategy is perhaps seen in its foreign policy implications, specified by M.H. Louw, a former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the Pretoria University:

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1. See J. Saul, and S. Gelb, op.cit.; A. Callinicos, and J. Rogers, op.cit.

2. South Africa Defence Force White Paper, 1977, quoted by G. Moss, 'Total Strategy', Work in Progress, No.11, (1980).

3. Ibid. See also Wolpe's analysis in H. Wolpe, 'Apartheid's deepening Crisis', Marxism Today, (January 1983), pp.7-11.

> 'National Security Doctrine is a trilogy of foreign policy, military policy and domestic policy... We must mobilise through its mechanisms and resources a capability (power, leverage or violence) for effective resistance... this means a capacity to withstand challenges to our own territorial integrity and political and socio-economic order as well as to exert pressure on other, mostly weaker states, to make their behaviour consonant with our interests'(1).

The denouement of this thinking, was the formalisation of the concept of a Southern African Constellation of States (Consas) in early 1979. In a parliamentary debate, R.F. Botha, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information, spoke of a new era of closer co-operation between peoples south of the Kunene and Zambezi Rivers which would create a new South Africa based on 'an equitable division of power and land(2). The concept was more clearly articulated in P.W. Botha's conference with leading South African businessmen in November 1979 and involved the cementation and formalisation of the hitherto ad hoc contact between South Africa and its Black African neighbours. Bilateral contact in the proposed scheme would be transformed into a more diverse and comprehensive contact established through multilateral treaty arrangements. The precursors of this new dispensation were the SACU, the RMA, the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and the Utilisation of the Soil (Sarccus) and the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTC) established in 1973 and whose membership embraced

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1. African Communist, No.94, (1983), p.29.

2. J.A. Shaw, 'Functional Co-operation as a Precursor to Confederalism in Southern Africa', Africa Insight, Vol.XIII, No.1, (1983).

South Africa, Malawi and significantly, Swaziland. While this merging of the constellation formula relates primarily to the fostering of 'meaningful' economic development and a 'commitment to the free enterprise system' ideologically 'it should be seen as anti-Marxist and clearly aligned with democracy, human rights and justice for all and self determination (sic)'(1).

The constellation strategy in this way is viewed as a potential mechanism to alleviate the crisis of South African capitalism. Although arguably this is not in essence a crisis of realisation(2), the logic of South African capitalist development has prescribed the necessity for an expansion beyond the limits of the internal market into the potentially lucrative Southern African regional market. Alongside these economic incentives of the proposed constellation strategy, lie the equally attractive political and ideological advantages for the South African state. For the dominant South African class forces, the economic leverage which the strategy could provide, would facilitate the creation of buffer zones in the border area to forestall the armed liberation drive into South African territory.

The regional implications of South Africa's Total Strategy, as concretised in the Consas formula, were soon perceived by South Africa's neighbours as an aspect of the latter's imperialist designs. In

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1. Ibid.

2. For an up-to-date analysis of the crisis in South Africa, see S. Gelb and D. Innes, 'Economic Crisis in South Africa: Monetarisms Double Bind', Work in Progress, No.36, (1985).

May 1979, at a meeting in Botswana of the Frontline States' (FLS) foreign ministers, Dr. Quett Masire described how the establishment of a counter-strategy in the form of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC), would constitute a pre-emptive step to forestall South Africa's plans of regional domination(1). SADCC is faced with very real problems. One of its major aims is to reduce the dependence of its member states on South Africa, yet the very viability of this goal is undermined by the actual character of South African capitalism and the footholds it has established in the region. Another problem is its reliance on Western aid which is prejudice against the socialist states of Angola and Mozambique(2), both of which offer alternative transportation routes to South Africa for exports and imports from and to the SADCC countries. But perhaps most important of all is the disparity of class characters of the nine states which constitute SADCC, and the different political-economic goals which each has(3). Nevertheless,

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1. For information on the formation of SADCC, see A. Nzekela, (ed.) Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, (London: Rex Collings, 1981); see also the discussion in P. Goodison, and R. Levin., 'The Nkomati Accord: The Illusion of Peace in Southern Africa', Department of Political Theory and Institutions, The University of Liverpool, Liverpool Papers in Politics 1984; and M. Plaut, E. Unterhalter, and D. Ward. op.cit., (Chapter 5).

2. A section of aid donors want Mozambique and Angola to be incorporated into Western aid programmes, while another group want isolation and military overthrow via South Africa.

3. See R. Davies, and D. O'Meara, 'The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region', Review of African Political Economy, No.29, (July 1984), p.75.

institutionally, SADCC has taken-off, whereas Consas has foundered on the rocks of apartheid. In the meantime, South Africa has continued to pursue an aggressive and ferocious regional strategy. Apart from regular incursions into Angola, South Africa has led extensive 'pre-emptive' raids into Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique. These do not include the activities of its surrogates the LLA and the MNR, which continued to conduct their own acts of terror. South Africa has also regularly perpetrated violence in neighbouring states. In Swaziland, this included the bombing of ANC houses in Manzini's Zakhele township in 1980, the kidnapping of a refugee in 1981, and the assassination of ANC chief representative Petros Nzima and his wife Jabu in 1982(1). These have occured in spite of the growing political relations between the two states. This poses the question of the place of Swaziland in South Africa's regional strategy.

Swaziland and South Africa's Regional Strategy: The Land Deal

Swaziland occupies a special place in South Africa's regional designs. For several years now, shrouded by mysterious veils of secrecy, the South African and Swazi states have been negotiating border adjustments. For South Africa, the deal is seen in the context of the positive relations existing between the two states, and legitimised on the ethnic grounds of bringing together what belongs together:

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1. C. Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984), p.B846.

> The process of the adjustment of the border between RSA and Swaziland is the fulfilment of a long-cherished ideal of the Swazi people for so long deprived of Swazi citizenship by an accident of history, to be united as one nation under one king in one country. Both governments approach the question of border adjustment in the traditional spirit of goodwill and long-existing friendly relations between the two states and their peoples.(1)

The Swazis have presented the issue in historical terms as one of unification, arguing that the borders of Swaziland were never 'properly settled by the colonial powers':

> There are no internationally accepted boundaries between Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa and therefore the question of 'colonial boundaries' does not arise because Swaziland has never had her boundaries competently drawn, either by the Colonial Office or any other ruler...Both the British and the Republic of South Africa governments have recognised the necessity for drawing proper boundaries between South Africa and Swaziland, these facts are recorded in the Diplomatic Notes of 1961 and 1966 between Pretoria and the British Embassy prior to the Independence of Swaziland.(2)

The Swazi state has strongly resented the charge of 'incorporation' of South African territory which has been levelled against it from certain quarters.


The land areas under discussion include the Kangwane Bantustan and the Ingwavuma district of Northern Natal, which was placed under

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1. Adjustment of Border Between Swaziland and RSA, The Department of Co-operation and Development (South Africa), quoted in Forced Removals in South Africa, The Surplus People Project (SPP) Report, (Cape Town and Natal: Universities' Press, 1983), p.80.

2. Swaziland Government, The Border Adjustment Talks Between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa, (Mbabane: Apollo Printers, August 1982), p.1.

Map 4 THE PROPOSED LAND DEAL



Source : DSG/SARS,
The Land Deal–Incorporating Swaziland

Kwazulu control in 1976 (see Map 4). Ingwavuma contains four communities: the Themba-Thonga, the Nyawo, the Mngomezulu and the Mathenjwa. The latter three communities, it has been argued, were 'Swazi tribes divided by a border that was established long ago'(1). This has been strenuously denied by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the leader of Kwazulu, who insists that the people of Ingwavuma have never been Swazi. The Zulu themselves regard the area as important since King Dingane is buried there. Certain chiefs in Ingwavuma have declared their opposition to the prospect of Swazi rule, arguing that they and their ancestors owe their allegiance to the Zulu Kings, and that 'Through all these times we have never become Swazis. Our language is akin to the Swazis but the Swazis are not going to get our land; they are not going to turn my children into slaves'(2). Any attempt, as Dominy has pointed out, to categorise the people of Ingwavuma as Swazi or Zulu, obscures 'the complexities of their ethnic origins and history'(3). Indeed, it has been argued that 'Ethnicity is a slippery concept, extremely difficult to define, and infinitely malleable in the hands of opportunistic leaders and demagogues'(4).

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1. Argument of I.W.B. de Villiers, counsel for the South African Government, before the Supreme Court, Pitermaritzburg, 5 July, 1982, Natal Witness, 6 July 1982.

2. Daily News, 15 June 1982.

3. G. Dominy, 'From Lake St. Lucia to Delgoa Bay: African Trade Route and European Buffer Zone: The Ingwavuma Dispute in Historical Perspective', University of York, Centre for Southern African Studies, (March 1983), p.4.

4. Development Studies Group (DSG), The Land Dispute: Incorporating Swaziland? (Braamfrontein: South African Research Service, Information Publication, No.7, August 1982), p.20.

When viewed within the narrow constraints of ethnicity, the Thonga people are neither Zulu nor Swazi. According to Shula Marks, the Thonga comprise a group of people of varying origins, speaking dialects geographically related to one another. It is largely this geographical relationship which has led to their amalgamation and which warrants their being labelled as 'Thonga'(1). The Nyawo, Mngomezulu and the Matenjwa according to Matsebula are descendants of the Bembo-Nguni and are therefore Swazi by origin(2). Somewhat ironically, however, the historian David Hedges argued that: 'Nineteenth century Swazi traditions suggest that ancestors of their kings lived near the lower slopes of the Ubombo hills in close proximity to the Tembe and even that the Swazi were an offshoot of the Thonga people(3). It is therefore 'an open question as to whether the three small chiefdoms are descendants of the Dlamini-Swazi or whether they are descendants of a co-lateral line of pre-Swazi Bembo-Nguni'(4). What is certain though, is that colonialism had little regard for ethnic origin in its dealings with the territory.

In 1875, colonial boundary disputes between Britain and Portugal led to the division of Thongaland between the two colonial powers following

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1. S. Marks, African Societies...(1969), quoted by G. Dominy, op.cit., p.5.

2. J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., p.133.

3. Quoted in DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.18, see D.W. Hedges, Trade and Politics in Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1978.

4. G. Dominy, op.cit., p.5.

the intercession of the French president of the day, Marshall MacMohan. In 1891, the British and Portuguese agreed to adjust the southern border of Mozambique to a line between the confluence of the Usuthu and Maputo Rivers and the sea just north of Kosi Bày[1]. In 1895, the southern part of Ingwavuma, the Transpongola territory, was annexed by Britain in order to block the Transvaal Republic's road to the sea. The remainder, 'Thongoland', was made a British Protectorate in 1895, but in December 1897 was handed over along with the whole of Zululand, to the Natal colony. The consequence was that ultimately, Ingwavuma was incorporated into the political economy of South Africa as an underdeveloped, peripheralised labour reserve. Accordingly, it experienced the attendant effects of semi-proletarianisation and the ravages of colonialism. In the process, many of the inhabitants adopted Zulu as their language, and in the case of the Thonga, some men assumed Zulu clan names resembling their Thonga counterparts[2]. The erstwhile wealthy trading kingdom of the Thonga[3], reduced to a poverty stricken labour reserve of about 100,000 people through colonialism, taxation, periodic droughts and ultimately apartheid, seems hardly a likely area to arouse the kinds of intense feelings which it has between the Swazi and the Zulu. Nor is it logically apparent why Swaziland would want such a territory with a potentially dissident population and the great administrative expenses which Ingwavuma with all its problems would imply. And apart from

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1. Ibid., pp.12-15.
2. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.19.
3. See G. Dominy, op.cit., and D.W. Hedges, op.cit.

the issue of nationalism, why would Swaziland want to adjust its borders to include Kangwane?

Geographically, Kangwane consists of two separate areas of land, comprising some 391,000 ha.(1). Following the legislation in South Africa of the 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act, the Swazi were recognised as an ethnic unit, and the first tribal authorities were established in Nkomazi, currently one of four regional authorities. In line with South Africa's apartheid policy, large-scale relocation of people to Kangwane has taken place, especially since 1970. By mid-1981, estimates put the Swazi population of Kangwane at some 350,000 people, an increase of 430 per cent over the 1970 figure(2). This does not include other ethnic groups, particularly Shangane resident in Kangwane. But in terms of South Africa's apartheid laws, Kangwane includes all Swazi, irrespective of whether they reside in the Bantustan or not. This comprises a figure of approximately 750,000 people(3). Taken in conjunction with the population of Ingwavuma, this means that a successful conclusion of the land deal would automatically increase Swaziland's population almost threefold. But what is the relationship between the vast numbers of Swazis in South Africa and those in Swaziland?

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1. SPP Report, op.cit., p.59. Land consolidation has seen the Bantustant grow from some 290,000 Ha in 1971, to 391,000 Ha by 1983.

2. Ibid., p.64.

3. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.24.

Clearly, the relationship has undergone a profound change over the past century. The annexation by the Transvaal before the Anglo-Boer War, the Land Partition, and the threat of incorporation could only have served to draw both groups of Swazis together. This relationship was further cemented as Swazis became more involved in labour migration to the Witwatersrand, 'where they were treated as a single category with the South African Swazi'(1). This would also explain the involvement of the Royal Family in the formation of the ANC, and its financial backing of the Abantu-Batho newspaper(2). In the meantime, regular contacts between Royal kraals which fell in South Africa, such as Mbhuleni and Lobamba were maintained. But following the accession to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, and the realisation by Britain that incorporation of the High Commission Territories was now off the agenda, the paths of the two Swazi groups began to diverge. This was partially a consequence of historical and social reality: as Swaziland moved towards self-government and independence, South African Swazis came increasingly under the whip of apartheid. Already by the early 1960's, the ANC's Chief Albert Luthuli could say: 'I may be wrong, but I seem to sense that..people are clinging obstinately to a dream of a return of the old Swaziland - a dream incapable of fulfillment now'(3). This view has been echoed by Kangwane Chief Minster Enos Mabuza who said 'I don't believe in

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1. H. Macmillan, 'A Nation Divided? The Swazi in Swaziland and the Transvaal, 1865-1982', The University of Zambia, History Department, (June 1983), p.9.

2. Ibid.; see also SNA, "C.S. Mabaso, Manager Abantu-Batho Limited to Financial Secretary", RCS 51.26, (15 August 1927).

3. A. Luthuli, Let My People Go, (London: Faber, 1962), p.144. Chief Albert Luthuli was commenting on a meeting with King Sobhuza held in 1956.

ethnicity at all. I believe we are South Africans first and foremost, and only then Swazis, Zulus, Ndebeles, or others'(1).

There is a pro-unification faction of traditionalists in Kangwane, spearheaded by former Kangwane executive councillor David Lukhele. Nevertheless, it would appear that there are great numbers of South Africans in Kangwane who are totally opposed to the deal. This is why the South African state has persistently refused to put the plan to any kind of popular test(2). Indeed, it has faced protest over the issue from within its own quarters. The Bantustan's commissioner-general, George Botha, a one-time Nationalist MP, resigned his post and quit the party, explaining that 'this plan to hand South African territory over to Swaziland is totally unrealistic, like building grandiose castles in the air'(3). Despite the lucrative offers made to Enos Mabuza(4), he has used the land deal to feather his own nest in emerging as an outspoken critic of the scheme itself, and apartheid in general. He said that:

> I shall never lead the South African Swazis to an inevitable gas chamber. We shall never accept Swaziland citizenship, nor carry Swaziland identity documents. The overwhelming majority of South African-born Swazis are fully aware that through their incorporation into Swaziland they will be in a position where they shall no longer strive for political

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1. Africa News, 11 October, 1982, p.10.

2. SPP Report, op.cit., p.79.

3. Cape Argus, 10 February 1982.

4. According to the Sunday Express, 4 July 1982, Mabuza was offered the Deputy Premiership of Swaziland in exchange for endorsing the deal.

> accommodation within the central constitutional framework of this country, nor have access to the wealth and prosperity they have helped to achieve, in exchange for poverty and misery(1).

When the South African cabinet officially approved the cession of Kangwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland and abolished the Kangwane legislative assembly in June 1982, Mabuza contested these actions in court. Within days, the Natal Supreme Court ruled the dissolution of the Assembly illegal. In July 1982, in the same court, Kwazulu was granted control of Ingwavuma, excised from Kwazulu in late June by a South African state proclamation. In September, the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein rejected the South African government's appeal against the Natal Supreme Court's decision vis á vis Ingwavuma. By November 1982, the South African state had agreed to withdraw the proclamation dissolving the Kangwane Legislative Assembly(2). But this did not mean that the deal was off.

Although it was widely believed that the death of King Sobhuza II might halt the land deal initiative, this view has proved to be wrong. King Sobhuza II was himself totally committed to the land deal, and it was one of his greatest dreams to see the Swazi people united. In 1978, he demonstrated this by calling on the peoples of Ingwavuma to secede from Kwazulu, a move which prompted the flow of refugees from Ingwavuma to Swaziland(3). Pressures stemming both from

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1. Cape Argus, 16 June 1982.

2. See G. Dominy, op.cit., Appendix 1: Chronology of events re: the cession of Ingwavuma and Kangwane to Swaziland, pp.25ff.

3. Ibid.

Swaziland and Kwazulu have provoked a series of faction fights between rival clans and chieftaincies. By 1983, about 6,400 refugees had entered Swaziland and are housed in the Ndzevane settlement in the Eastern part of the country(1). Following the King's death, the 'spokesman' for the Swazi Nation in the border adjustment talks with South Africa, Dr. George Msibi, stated that the discussions would continue unabated, 'and that nothing would stop the Swazi from fighting for the return of what rightfully belongs to the kingdom'(2). At the end of 1982, a Commission of Enquiry under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice F.L. Rumpff was appointed to investigate the dispute over Kangwane and Ingwavuma. While the commission still sat, it was reported in July 1983, that talks between South Africa and Swaziland had been resumed in Pretoria.

The Rumpff Commission sat for about a year and a half. During this time, the Kangwane and Kwazulu leaders sought international legal advice, and prepared comprehensive cases which were put before the commission. The governments of Swaziland and South Africa were, however, notably passive and unable to present similar cases. The commission's task was further complicated by the South African's refusal to permit a popular test of opinion in Kangwane and Ingwavuma. In May 1984, a full Swazi delegation under the Swazi Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, visited South Africa and held a series of comprehensive talks with the South African cabinet. Shortly

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1. Swazi Observer, 10 May 1983.

2. Swazi Observer, 2 October 1982.

after this visit, the imminent dissolution of the Rumpff Commission was announced amidst widespread speculation that South Africa would soon establish the legal basis for the Ingwavuma-Kangwane cession(1). The Commission Secretary, Mr. G.J.C. Myburgh, wrote a letter to members of the commission, in which he anticipated an announcement by the South African government on the issue, in the light of the talks with the Swaziland government. He stated that:

> Members will have noticed that as far as Kangwane is concerned, the Government of the Republic of South Africa is not keen to have the free will of the people concerned ascertained. The reason being that, in its opinion, there will be intimidation or interference. The same situation may arise in regard to the inhabitants of Ingwavuma. Recently there have been significant talks between representatives of the Government of Swaziland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The Chairman is inclined to expect some important statement from the Government of the Republic of South Africa in regard to its attitude as to the Ingwavuma commission and the Kangwane commission. If this does not happen, the chairman will try to have the commissions complete their tasks without further delay irrespective of the delaying tactics of some of the parties(2).

The delaying tactics were never specified, but these events sent Enos Mabuza to Europe to consult the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva. Gatsha Buthelezi said he feared that an agreement between Swaziland and South Africa may already have been concluded, since a 'new bill drafted by Co-operation and Development Minister Piet Koornhof... would block any future court action on the border readjustment issue'(3). Ultimately, the South Africans seem to have

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 9 June 1984.
2. Ibid.
3. City Press, 3 June 1984.

ducked the issue. Immediately after the Rumpff Commission was dissolved, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited Swaziland, and declared that the dispute should be settled by the three parties involved - Swaziland, Kangwane and Kwazulu - in direct negotiations. This placed Swaziland in an awkward position, for as a member of the UN and Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it is impossible to negotiate with Bantustan leaders without giving the Bantustans some kind of implict recognition. This would threaten their UN and OAU membership. Swaziland therefore remains adamant that the issue can only be settled between the South African government, 'and not with the regional administrations of Kangwane and Ingwavuma'(1).

In August 1984, the South African Cabinet decided to grant a request by the Kangwane legislative assembly for self-governing status. This move was designed to enable Kangwane to establish its own cabinet and enjoy greater autonomy like Kwazulu. The move did little to deter Swaziland, and according to the Country's Supreme Council of State, 'Swaziland stands resolved to pursue the King's example in efforts to negotiate with the South African Government to get border readjustments'(2). Within Kangwane itself, a new political party was formed in February 1985, to oppose the Inyandza movement of Enos Mabuza. The main aims and objectives of the monarchist, pro-unification Inyatsi Ya-Mswati National Party are 'revival of Swazi nationalism, to instill cultural consciousness which is dwindling and the

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 22 June 1984.
2. Times of Swaziland 9 August 1984.

final unity of all Swazi peoples in the region divided by years of European colonialism'(1). This follows hard on the heels of the political killing of an executive member of the Kangwane Council of Chiefs, Mr. Mphosi Twala. This was in line with a new pattern of killings within South Africa as a whole, of 'collaborators of the apartheid regime'(2). This provides an example of the kinds of complications which Swaziland would inherit, should the deal go through. The problem of fostering a Swazi identity in Kangwane is illuminated by the words of a man relocated from a Barberton Farm in the eastern Transvaal, to Pienaar in Kangwane:

> Broer, nothing grows here. There simply can be no improvement here... You see, when we came here we were led to believe that this is a free country. We honestly believed that things would be free very soon. That is ten years ago. There is simply no change. I pray everyday that those black power boys from Soweto could come and blow the whole place up...(3).

Yet both Swaziland and South Africa remain determined to keep the flame of the land deal alight.

In October 1984, a South African Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed that top level discussions had been held in Pretoria between Swaziland and South Africa on 'the border issue and matters of mutual concern'(4). This sparked an angry reaction from the white opposition Progressive Federal Party, whose Natal leader said: 'One sees the hand

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1. Swazi News, 9 February 1985.

2. This pattern of events has become particularly widespread since the Botha regime began implementing its new package of reforms in 1984.

3. SPP Report, op.cit., p.86. Broer is the Afrikaans word for 'brother'.

4. Rand Daily Mail, 30 October 1984.

of Foreign Minister Mr. Pik Botha in this. He is having a bad time diplomacy-wise and now he seems intent on recreating the Ingwavuma debacle of two years ago'(1). Indeed, Swazi-South African relations are one area of considerable success for the apartheid regime, and for this reason the South Africans appear determined to keep the land deal alive. It is not too difficult to understand the South African state's motives in proposing the transfer of land to Swaziland in the face of a whole range of popular protest.

Daniel has argued that the primary motivation lies:

> ...in the context of apartheid's grand design to impose 'independence' on its homelands and thereby denationalise the African majority of South Africa. The problem that faces its architects is that certain stubborn homelands refuse to 'play the game'. Two of these are Kangwane and Kwazulu and Pretoria has come up with typically draconian proposals to deal with their resistance.'(2).

It is also necessary, however, to view the land deal in the wider context of Total Strategy. Here we have noted the emphasis on coercing weaker states in the region to behave according to the whims of the South African ruling class, as well as its more overt actions aimed at destablising the region. Both Kangwane and Ingwavuma proved to be strategic areas in the ANC's efforts to intensify the armed struggle. This has been evidenced by a massive build-up of police and military activity in both areas. Between November 1976 and

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1. The Star, 1 November 1984.

2. J. Daniel, 'Swaziland,, South Africa's willing Captive', Work in Progress, No.27, (1983), p.21.

May 1982, seven incidents involving ANC guerilla attacks in the Nkomazi region of Kangwane were officially acknowledged, but this in no way provides an exhaustive list of guerilla activity in the area(1). Swaziland itself has proved to be a highly strategic conduit for ANC activists en route to South Africa. This fact has been highlighted in several ANC trials within South Africa.

Daniel argues that 'it is hardly necessary to take so drastic a step as ceding territory to get a pliable client like Swaziland to fall in line with (South Africa's) wishes'(2). Swaziland's pliancy has been manifest inter alia in the high number of ANC cadre arrested and charged for illegal arms possession, the covert manner in which the organisation has had to operate, and the escalating confrontation between the Swazi state and the ANC discussed below. Nevertheless, the land deal would enable the South African security forces to disengage its troops from policing a highly volatile area containing a hostile population, while simultaneously exporting instability to one of its neighbours. At the same time, by extricating Swaziland from the SADCC and co-opting it into Consas, the whole exercise would generate the kind of propaganda which would give the Consas scheme the credibility that South Africa is trying to inject into it. Better still, from South Africa's point of view, it could be the first step in transforming SADCC into a complementary development project with Consas. The Komatipoort-Richards Bay rail link via Swaziland is the first step in

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1. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.23.
2. J. Daniel, op.cit., (1983), p.21.

this kind of direction which the land deal can only foster. But this poses the question of how Swaziland views and has given credence to its claims.

It was the King's standing in the eyes of his people which enabled him to legitimise and popularise the land deal, largely on the basis of the ideology of unity. Little regard, it would appear, has been given to the negative implications of the issue. The official four-page document on the 'Border Adjustment Talks' between the two countries stresses that 'Land which belonged to the Swazi Nation was the subject of dispute between the Republic of South Africa, Britain and Swaziland long before the birth of apartheid policies of South Africa'. It also states that 'No purpose is served by linking the current negotiations with the apartheid policies'(1). There has at no time been any effort to guage the feelings of the Swazi public on the deal. Indeed, the state placed a blackout on all discussion of the issue, arguing that in order for the Swazi to succeed in the negotiations, it was essential that they present a united front. Nevertheless, members of the Swazi public have

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1. Swaziland Government, The Border Adjustment Talks..., op.cit., p.1. This document can hardly claim to be comprehensive. Five sources are claimed to 'support the Swazi Nations's contention that Ingwavuma has always been part of Swaziland'.

These are (as given in the text of the document):

'1. 'Old Times of Zululand' by Rev Bryant, the recognised authority on Zulu affairs.
2. Mr. Peter Becker's Book, 'Rule of Fear'. Published by Panther Books Ltd., 3 Upper James Street, London W1...
3. The Tomlinson Commission Report of 1955 (Republic of South Africa)
4. The speech by the Minister for Plural Relations and Development made at Barberton on 18th September 1975
5. Blue Books (Colonial Records in the United Kingdom)'.

expressed concern over the fragmented nature of the Kangwane Bantustan. They also wonder what would happen to the major towns of the Eastern Transvaal which fall within the Kingdom once ruled by Mswati including Barberton, Nelspruit and White River(1). The general feeling is that the land deal will leave Swaziland with dry arid land and a surplus unemployable population. As one man said:

> The Swazis in the new area live in a dry arid zone with no agricultural activities. When the adjustments are made, the people mostly poor, will flock into our towns to seek employment and settle since, in the past men have had to travel to South African towns to work. Now the borders will be closed on them and they will have nowhere else but here in Mbabane or Manzini to look for jobs. I hope that the government has thought about this.(2).

There is little evidence that the Swazi state has addressed these kinds of problems: the whole wage structure of the Kangwane civil service for instance, is higher than that of Swaziland. Dr. Sishayi Nxumale maintained that South Africa would provide development finance aid and maintain decentralisation incentives for Kangwane and Ingwavuma(3). But that offers little in the way of employment for the unemployed in these areas, especially when viewed in the context of Swaziland's own unemployment problems. What then, beyond the vision of a long-reigning monarch, are the aims of the Swazi state in securing the deal?

The answer it would appear, lies partially in the acquisition of

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1. This is based on interviews conducted by the Times of Swaziland, 18 June 1982.

2. Ibid.

3. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.24.

Ingwavuma which would de-landlock Swaziland, giving it access to the rest of the world. This, sections of the comprador bourgeoisie believe, would enable them to attract vast injections of foreign investment, while at the same time boosting Swaziland's tourist industry. The acquisition of the potential port at Kosi Bay could provide new options and perhaps diversify the highly constrained forms of domestic comprador accumulation. Certainly the trajectory of Tibiyo's development and the alliances which it has created with international capital, has provided the basis for fresh accumulation initiatives. Thus far, the comprador have been confined to a contradictory role of commitment to industrialisation with a restricted internal market due to the conservation of an unproductive system of land tenure to maintain low wages. It is possible that the belief is that the acquisition of an independent port would create the basis for a free trade zone which would convert Swaziland into the Hong Kong of Southern Africa. The reality is likely to be somewhat different however.

South Africa itself rejected Kosi Bay as a harbour site in the 1960's, and developed Richards Bay instead. It is not clear whether this was done because Richards Bay was a better site. But certainly the costs of developing a harbour at Kosi Bay would be vast, and would include both construction and provision of basic infra-structure, which is currently lacking[1]. Moreover, there already is a surplus capacity in the existing ports in Southern Africa. There has also been talk of a

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1. Ibid.

hidden military option, with the USA providing the capital, expertise and warships. The argument here is that the US may lose their current base in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia(1). Thus far, the US state department has officially denied such involvement, yet obviously Swaziland is in no position to contemplate building a harbour unless it had been promised substantial offers of aid. But above all, it is the political costs of the land deal which Swaziland seems to have grossly underestimated. Already, Swaziland has cultivated the derisory image in the international community of being apartheid's stooge. This is largely on account of its actions vis a vis South Africa, and of deteriorating relations between Swaziland and the ANC.

Relations between Swaziland and the ANC

Since independence, Swaziland has attempted to adopt a 'realistic' posture towards South Africa. This position was summed up by Swaziland's first Deputy Prime Minister, Mfundza Sukati:

> Swaziland believes in the United Nations' principles of rejection of force as a solution to international disagreements and in the promotion of international harmony and understanding by rational discussion. As a matter of principle alone, Swaziland cannot therefore contemplate adopting a hostile attitude towards South Africa...(2)

But we have shown that there is more involved in Swaziland's relations with South Africa than mere 'principle'. The transformation and consolidation of Royal hegemony in Swaziland, has unfolded in the

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1. Ibid.

2. Foreign Policy of the kingdom of Swaziland, SNA, DFA. S60 CO/FNP/4, (23 August 1968).

context of what Halpern has called 'The connections between Sobhuza's Swazi National Council and Dr. Verwoerd's disciples in South Africa'(1). One consequence is that anti-apartheid activists who have fled to Swaziland, have never been warmly received. In the early 1960's for example, Rosemary Wentzel and Dennis Brutus, in separate incidents, found themselves back in South Africa after having fled to safety in Swaziland(2). Before independence, Prince Makhosini denounced South African refugees for subverting the King and the INM, influencing Swazi politicians and depriving Swazis of work. He stated that 'Always they have brought us problems and trouble...Why should we tolerate this position?'(3). Nevertheless, following independence, Swaziland did accept refugees from South Africa.

It was only after the 1976 riots in South Africa that significant numbers of refugees entered Swaziland. These were mainly young people fleeing from the township violence which emanated in large measure from apartheid's educational structures. Once in Swaziland, the youths were exposed to the politics of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), both of which had established a small presence in the country. Some elected to join one or other of the exiled movements, and thereafter left Swaziland for military training. But the refugee population grew steadily and together with those

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1. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.457.

2. Ibid., p.423; and C.P. Potholm, op.cit., pp.107-108 respectively.

3. J. Halpern, op.cit., p.424.

fleeing from Ingwavuma were estimated to number many thousands(1). As ANC military activity intensified in South Africa, Swaziland officials regarded the situation with growing concern.

It is however, against the PAC that the Swazi state first acted. In 1978, about fifty PAC members were rounded up and deported, allegedly for having provided military training to recruits in Swaziland(2). This left Swaziland and the ANC in the arena. In the same year, 2 ANC activists, Joseph Mdluli and Cleophas Ndlovu, claimed to have been kidnapped and forcibly abducted from Swaziland to South Africa. They were both convicted under the Terrorism Act and received sentences of 18 and 15 years imprisonment respectively(3). In 1978, an ANC activist was held in a Swazi jail after admitting that he had undergone military training in the Soviet Union. Shortly after this, 3 ANC guerillas were arrested near the Osheek border post and subsequently charged with possession of arms of war. They were found guilty and sentenced to fines of E400 each and one year's imprisonment. In another trial in 1978 involving PAC activists, their defence lawyer Musa Shongwe argued that in terms of an OAU declaration, to which Swaziland was a signatory, the accused were entitled to pass through Swaziland unhindered. This was because they were freedom fighters en route to South Africa. Two were convicted and received terms of imprisonment and fines(4). In the meantime,

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1. These numbered between 6,000 and 20,000 in 1982, 'depending on the source of information', DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.26.

2. A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.117.

3. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.27.

4. Ibid.

the situation grew tense in the Mawelawela refugee camp near Luyengo.

This is where the forgotten victims of Soweto in Swaziland were housed. In the main, ex-students from the Tranvaal, and numbering some 60, these youths anxiously awaited promises of further education which had been made to them by both Swazi and UN officials. They were not allowed into Swazi schools, as they were regarded by the authorities as 'a security risk if allowed to mix with our own youth'(1). The UN, therefore, decided to finance the building of their own school. Although the Menonites had set up a temporary school for them at the Thokoza community centre in Mbabane, to which they travelled every day in a special bus, they feared that the vast outlay of UN funds for their own school was being squandered.

Towards mid-1978 as tensions and frustrations rose within the camp, a protest march was planned in the capital. Following the protest march, about 60 refugees were arrested, but released soon after. Tough new controls over the movement of refugees were then announced, includinng the prohibition of possession of guns, ammunition and vehicles without permission. At the same time, the Swazi Prime Minister ordered that the trials of ANC members be heard 'in camera'(2).

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1. S.N.A., Soweto Student Refugees, Council Meeting, 16 November 1976.

2. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.26.

These trends intensified during the next three years(1). As guerilla activity increased in Natal and the Transvaal, political trials in South Africa revealed that Swaziland was a major transit route for guerilla infiltration into South Africa. Despite the co-operation which the South African security police and the military were receiving from the Swazis, they decided to act. In June 1980, South African agents blew up two houses in Manzini's Zakhele Township, which were believed to be ANC houses. In the process, two people were killed, one of them an exiled South African youth(2). This attack followed the highly prestigious ANC sabotaging of the Sasol II oil-from-coal conversion plant in the Transvaal, which it was believed, was conducted by way of Swaziland. In February 1981, South Africa once again demonstrated how willing it was to use the stick in closing off its eastern front with Swaziland. An exiled teacher, Dayan Pillay was kidnapped from St. Joseph's mission school near Manzini and then conveyed to South Africa, where he was interrogated(3). In the scuffle accompanying his abduction from the mission, one of his kidnappers dropped a passport. This enabled Swazi police to make arrests, revealing the involvement of MNR agents from Mozambique. Worse was to follow for the kidnappers, when they - or those whom they were acting for - realised that they had kidnapped the wrong person(4).

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1. See for example New African, October 1979, where it states under the title 'Refugees' Plight': 'Some of the (refugees detained) like ANC member Charles Ramusi have died in jail, while others such as Robert Mabusela, now mentally disturbed and Mrs. Nziba are still being held'.

2. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.27 and A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.118.

3. A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.145 (fn 16).

4. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.27.

Under mounting international pressure, Pillay was returned amidst speculation about who the actual kidnap victim should have been. Pillay's brother is an ANC activist, while another teacher at St. Joseph's had recently been charged along with others in Swaziland for possession of arms of war. The passport dropped by the MNR agents enabled the Swazis to make arrests, but it would appear that a deal was made. On the morning that the MNR agents were to appear in court, the prosecuting attorney was instructed not to oppose a bail application. Nothing has since been heard of the case.

In December 1981, the South Africans once again revealed just how cavalier they could be in violating Swaziland's borders, without expecting any official Swazi government reaction. A car containing two men, one Swazi and a South African refugee, was ambushed just inside Swaziland near the Oshoek border post. The car was sprayed with automatic fire and both occupants were killed. It was alleged that the vehicle was carrying weapons and was on its way to South Africa on an ANC mission(1). Local residents who witnessed the incident reported that the attackers spoke a strange language. Johan Coetzee, the South African security police chief denied involvement in the incident. But this was a sequel to the interception by Swazi soldiers of a large band of ANC guerillas who crossed into the country from Mozambique. During the resultant clash, two ANC men were wounded and at least two arrested(2).

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1. A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.145 (fn 16).

2. DSG/SARS, op.cit., p.27.

Swazi compliance and silence in the face of the South African crackdown came in the context of a further tightening of refugee regulations. ANC members were required to carry passes if travelling between districts in the country, but very few of these were actually issued. This made it virtually impossible for ANC members to liaise with headquarters in Maputo, thus providing the leadership in Swaziland with serious logistical problems. In 1981, the ANC chief representative in Swaziland, Stanley Mabizela, was arrested near the Lomahasha border with Mozambique, allegedly for not holding one of these passes. Shortly after this incident, Swazi Prime Minister Prince Mabandla visited Zambia where he was questioned on the incident by ANC leaders(1). It was at this time that the first hints of the land deal emerged, as it became clear that Swaziland, unlike South Africa's other target states within the region, could be lured into the fold through the use of a 'carrot'. However, it is now evident that the land deal offer was contingent on the Swazi state committing itself to a more vigorous crackdown on the ANC. This was done through the signing of a formal agreement relating to security matters between the two countries.

This pact was signed in secret on February 17, 1982. It was three months after this that the South Africans formally announced in Parliament their willingness to cede the two parcels of territory to Swaziland. The security pact itself was signed through the exchange of letters between respective heads of state, and contains four clauses

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1. Ibid.

relating to mutual co-operation in security matters. Article One of the security agreement commits both parties to combatting 'terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively...(and calling)...upon each other, whenever possible, for such assistance and taking such steps as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate this evil'(1). Although the pact was signed in secret, within months, speculation became rife that a security agreement with Swaziland was on the agenda, which would 'allow South African security forces if necessary, to patrol the area'(2). Nevertheless, the pact had more sinister implications than that. In mid-1982, the chief representative of the ANC, Mabizela was ordered to leave the country. His replacement, Petros Nzima and his wife Jabu, were killed in August when their car was ripped apart by a bomb. No investigation was launched into the killing, presumably since it had been exonerated and authorised by Article One of the security pact. This would also explain the official silence following the killing of South African security agents of ANC refugee Zwelakhe Nyanda and Swazi citizen Keith Macfadden in November 1983. It was, however, mainly left to the Swazi authorities to conduct the anti-ANC offensive.

In December 1982, growing tension between ANC cadre and the Swazi Defence Force, resulted in a border shoot-out near Lomahasha in which one Swazi soldier was reported to have died. The Army Chief-

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1. The Citizen, 2 April 1984.
2. Sunday Tribune, 4 July 1982.

of-Staff, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Ndzimandze, flatly denied the incident, but alleged that the ANC had attacked the Swazi army on two occasions that month. This followed the detention of members of the refugee community, most of them ANC members, on Dècember the 16th 1982(1). This police swoop on the ANC came in the wake of the South African massacre of refugees in Maseru. According to the Deputy Prime Minister, the Swazi raid was carried out in response to:

> ...receipt of information to the effect that certain members of the refugee community in Swaziland were in danger of imminent attack from outside our borders...(following which)...Her Majesty's government had to take immediate measures to ensure the security and safety of the refugees concerned.(2)

About 17 of the detainees 'voluntarily' left for Maputo, and the remaining 17 eventually walked out of the Mawelawela refugee camp about a month later. This followed a visit to the camp by reporters of the Afrikaans 'Rapport' newspaper. They were arrested by the Swazi police after photographing the camp, and the ANC believed the visit to be a ploy intended to cover South African surveillance in preparation for a raid(3). So poor was the security in the camp, that the guards simply allowed the walk-out of the refugees, apparently with the knowledge that they themselves would become highly vulnerable in the event of a raid. But Swaziland received assurances that it would not be in the line of fire in any retaliation attacks by South Africa for ANC military strikes. These came shortly after the ANC bomb attack

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1. Swazi Observer, 24 December 1982.
2. Ibid.
3. Times of Swaziland, 18 January 1983.

in May 1983 on the airforce headquarter offices in the centre of Pretoria. Foreign Minister Botha pointed out that Swaziland 'takes active steps to stop terrorism, even if it does not always succeed'(1).

These anti-ANC measures, during this period, were carried out in a rather desultory fashion, with pressure exerted periodically and on the whole after a major ANC operation inside South Africa. This changed after the signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa(2). This Accord delivered another body blow to the ANC, whose members were expelled from Mozambique, with the exception of an official presence of 10 members. It also facilitated the exposure of the Swazi-South African pact, and a renewed assault on the ANC in Swaziland. In April 1984, the Swazi state issued an official expulsion order against the ANC, whose members were then sought out and ruthlessly hunted down. The situation assumed the dimensions of a small-scale war, as ANC guerillas crossed over into Swaziland from Mozambique in their effort to avoid expulsion northwards under the terms of the Nkomati Accord.

Mid-April witnessed a number of serious and bitter incidents. On April the 11th, a series of gun battles took place in Mbabane, although no

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1. Times of Swaziland, 24 May 1983.

2. For details of the Accord, see Mozambique Information Office, News Review No.25, March 1984. For analyses of the Accord, see P. Goodison, and R. Levin, op.cit.; Review of the African Political Economy, No.29, (July, 1984); Inqaba Yabasebenzi, No. 15 September-December, (1984) pp.2-15.

injuries were reported. But that night, a man was shot dead at Siphunga near Sidvokodvo. The man, Mr. Zakhele Shongwe, aged 21, was identified as a member of the ANC, and was allegedly shot by unknown assailants(1). On 14 April, a Swazi security policeman was killed in a confrontation with ANC members in Manzini's Zakhele township; on April 16, an ANC guerilla and a Swazi soldier were killed after a group of ANC men were intercepted by the Swazi Defence Force(2). But the major confrontation came on 19/20 April, in Ngwane Park, Manzini, when Swazi security forces surrounded a house and killed two ANC guerillas. This followed a 15 hour shoot-out which reduced the house to a shell after the use of heavy weapons(3). When the gun-fire died down, the two bloodied corpses were left on show for most of the day. Eyewitnesses claimed that the operation was directed by white men in camouflage uniform. While the Swazi army does have British and Israeli advisers, it does not have as many as were involved in the raid(4). During this time, black men in camouflage uniform were heard talking Pedi and Sotho dialects in Manzini, and Craig Williamson, a well-known South African security agent was seen in Mbabane(5). The South African presence was not only confined to military operations against the ANC, but was apparently also manifest in the cells which began to fill up with ANC detainees, who finally numbered over 90.

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1. Weekend Observer, 14 April 1984.

2. J. Hanlon, and T. Smart, 'Apartheid's new ally', New Statesman, 11 May 1984, p.19.

3. Swazi News, 21 April 1984.

4. J. Hanlon and T. Smart, op.cit., p.19.

5. Ibid.

As some of these were brought to court, they complained of having been beaten and assaulted, some by South African security agents. In May, Mpho Mthombeni was brought before the Manzini magistrate's court on charges of having entered the country illegally. He complained that his bandaged head had been dented by a police knob-stick, and that since his arrest he had been in and out of hospital(1). Teresa Majdle told journalists of how she was beaten during her interrogation, and that she was held for a short time in a room with 5 ANC men, all of whom had bandaged heads and swollen faces(2). In July, Basil Mazibuko, an ANC activist told a court in Mbabane of how police handcuffed him, beat him up and subjected him to intensive interrogation: 'The police would handcuff me, put me in leg-irons and blindfold me then take me on a long drive. They would then remove the blindfold at a place I could not easily identify and the interrogations would start'(3). Refugee sources in Manzini said that between 2 and 4 people died in police custody during the clamp-down(4). Although it is almost impossible to verify these allegations, relations between the ANC and the Swazi state deteriorated rapidly.

One problem, was that the local ANC leadership was detained along with the young militants, many of them new arrivals from Mozambique. At least 15 long-term refugee residents in Swaziland were detained. These were registered with the UN High Commission for refugees, and

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1. Times of Swaziland, 4 May 1984.
2. J. Hanlon and T. Smart, op.cit., p.19.
3. Swazi Observer, 12 July 1984.
4. J. Hanlon and T. Smart, op.cit., p.19.

some were old or ill[1]. With the local leadership in detention, and the Swazi state clearly in no mood to negotiate with them, the atmosphere turned sour in the country. The ANC faced mounting, and unsubstantiated accusations for the increase of armed robberiès in the country[2]. Swazi Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, issued an ultimatum to any of his subjects who might be harbouring ANC members, either to come forward or face the consequences. In a radio broadcast, he said that Swaziland was 'infested with an unprecedented scourge of foreign criminals'[3]. In early May, the ANC tried to bring calm to the situation by sending a delegation headed by Moses Mabhida, the secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, who is in charge of the Mozambique/Swaziland region. Mabhida apologised to the Swazis, saying that 'our organisation has a tradition that we never resist and fight Swazis but we obey their laws. Everybody knows that'[4]. He also described as 'absurd' the allegations that it was the Swazis who had been first to open fire, and the ANC activists had responded in self-defence. 'Swaziland is no enemy of ours', he said, 'and we teach our people to co-operate with the authorities'[5]. But within a matter of days, the situation was inflamed by ANC General Secretary, Alfred Nzo.

Nzo accused the Swaziland Government of 'handing over to the South

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. 'Deportation, death and kidnapping in Swaziland', Africa Now, February 1985, p.24.
4. Times of Swaziland, 2 May 1984.
5. Ibid.

African regime four ANC cadres who had been detained by police at Bhunya Police Station'(1). He was referring to an incident at the police station in mid-April, where four men captured in the Zakhele shoot-out had been taken. Shortly after their arrival, there was a raid on the police station and the four men disappeared. The Swazi authorities claimed that they had been freed by their comrades; the ANC that it had been a set-up. The latter interpretation was given substance by an ANC man who escaped from the same jail. He described how the station commander ordered all his men out on an assignment, following which the raid occured. Very little local publicity was given to this particular jail-break. Furthermore, this police station, 32 kilometers from the South African border, had not been used for the purpose of housing ANC detainees before. All these factors lent credence to Nzo's statements(2). But above all, it was shortly after this that South African Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, announced the arrest of four ANC men 'on the Reef'(3). Bitter and acrimonious accusations followed, as the situation became complicated by a proposed visit by Oliver Tambo to the Kingdom.

During the month of May, the proposed visit created an atmosphere bordering on mass hysteria on all sides. It was a visit that ultimately never occured, but one keenly expected by the Swazi authorities who

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1. Swazi Observer, 7 May 1984.
2. J. Hanlon and T. Smart, op.cit., p.19.
3. Africa Now, February 1985, p.24.

had interned the local ANC leadership. Tambo was expected in early May, and when he did not appear, the Siswati version of the Times of Swaziland carried the headlines: 'Emanga e-ANC angcumu - Oliva Tambo Akaseti', meaning, the ANC's naked lies - Oliver Tambo is no longer coming(1). This was on the eve of the senior Swazi delegation's visit to South Africa, and prompted a fierce public attack on African leaders, the ANC and Tambo himself by the Swazi Prime Minister. According to the journalist, Howard Barrell, 'a number of Swazi leaders had collaborated with foreign agents in a plot to assassinate ANC president Oliver Tambo. Only a tip-off from a senior Swazi diplomat stopped Tambo flying into a trap set in Swaziland'(2). Tambo was unwilling to comment on this latter allegation, but made it clear that the Swaziland Government had at no stage actually offered him a formal invitation to visit the Kingdom. Apparently the two parties had been talking to each other through the press. Of ANC-Swazi relations, he said:

> It is necessary to protect these relations. We shall need them tomorrow. I suggest the ANC and the people of South Africa need these relations now and they shall do so tomorrow. I suggest that Swaziland's best interests will in the long run be served by the defence and protection of the good relations between the Kingdom's government, and the ANC, which have existed for so long.(3)

Clearly, much damage had been done to these relations. The mother of one of the ANC guerillas killed by the Swazi security forces

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1. Tikhatsi Takangwane, 8 May 1984.
2. City Press, 20 May 1984.
3. Swazi Observer, 4 June 1984.

described how she spent two weeks trying to negotiate with authorities to hand over the body of her son. Sally Molefe described her visit as 'tedious and tiresome'. 'All I want is to give my son a decent funeral in the country of his birth', she said, but added that she had made little headway during her visit to achieve this aim(1).

Swaziland was also coming under increasing international pressure. In July, Swaziland's Minister of the Interior came under fire at the second International Conference on Refugees in Africa, held in Geneva. Nevertheless, he emphasised that Swaziland's policy on refugees remained unchanged, and that the country would continue to accept genuine refugees into its territory(2). According to UN sources in Geneva, as early as June, unwanted ANC activists were reportedly being flown out of Swaziland secretly(3). Following intense behind-the-scenes negotiations, the trickle turned into a flood, and by August approximately 100 ANC members had been deported. Large numbers of these had various charges against them dropped under the Arms of War and Immigration Acts. Some had gone on hunger strike in the Swazi cells in protest against alleged police brutality(4). In August, regional pressure brought the ANC and the Swazi government face to face. Talks were held in Lusaka, hosted by President Kaunda, and these facilitated the reaching of a modus vivendi between the ANC and Swaziland. But set in the context of Swaziland's growing

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1. City Press, 15 July 1984.

2. Times of Swaziland, 16 July 1984.

3. See 'ANC men flown secretly to asylum', Rand Daily Mail, 16 June 1984.

4. Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 July 1984.

collaboration with South Africa, this proved to be a fragile peace.

The Swazi delegation headed by George Msibi had scarcely touched down in Swaziland from Lusaka before they were off to South Africa to discuss the land deal. In October, a former Swazi student leader Babalazi Bulunga was deported to South Africa. Bulunga's father was a Swazi citizen and migrant worker in South Africa. He received all of his education is Swaziland and is married to a Swazi citizen(1). As student president of Kwaluseni campus, he led the university into the forefront of relief work in the wake of a cyclone Domoina. This earned him the respect of the University authorities who refused to bow to police pressure to take action against him during the anti-ANC offensive of April 1984(2). After graduating, he was employed by Ubombo Ranches. According to George Msibi,' he was deported for his activities in the sugar industry', and nor for any ANC links(3). Before the deportation order was enacted, Bulunga appealed to the UN High Commission for Refugees, the OAU and the Swaziland Council of Churches to intervene on his behalf. But the appeals were in vain.

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1. According to the Swazi Observer, 18 October 1984, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, Mathendele Dlamini, said that Bulunga was not deported but 'sent home'. This was because while at University 'Mr. Bulunga was not sponsored by the Swaziland Government but he was sponsored by private sponsors. This proves that he is not a Swazi'. Our discussion of the deportation of the victorious MP in the 1972 elections, Tomas Ngwenya, has demonstrated the grey area of citizenship in Swaziland. See Chapter 3.

2. Conversation with John Daniel in April 1984. At the time, John Daniel was the Dean of the Faculty of Social Science.

3. Rand Daily Mail, 26 October 1984. According to the City Press (28 October 1984) there was a deal involved: Bulunga was to be 'exchanged' for a Swazi man, Samual Mkhonta, detained by South African security for ferrying arms for the ANC.

Bulunga was deported and at the border, arrested by South African Security Police under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act(1). Worse was still to follow.

In early December, Superintendent Petros Shiba, the Swazi deputy security police chief, was gunned down near the Mbabane police officers' mess after attending an annual Christmas party. The ANC was immediately blamed for the 'Soweto-style' killing by the Commissioner of Police, Majaji Simelane. The ANC denied involvement in the shooting and issued a statement from Harare saying: 'We have no interest at any stage in killing people in any African country, except the enemy who is in South Africa'(2). But Simelane remained adamant charging that the political wing of the ANC does 'not know what the military wing is doing'(3). He claimed that the ANC's nominal leaders had lost contact with their 'men in the bush', who were answerable to an autonomous sub-committee(4). He also claimed that the ANC had a hit-list of Swazi policemen who were to be 'eliminated', and that 'The ANC has declared war on Swazis as their number one enemy'(5). As the search for Shiba's killers intensified, a man and a woman were arrested and Simelane said that he had to tell the Swazi nation about the 'ANC war'. He warned that 'we have to follow these people and use all means at our disposal to defend the

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1. Africa Now, February 1985, p.25.
2. The Guardian, 10 December 1984.
3. Rand Daily Mail, 10 December 1984.
4. Ibid.
5. Rand Daily Mail, 11 December 1984.

citizens of this country... We don't want unnecessary bloodshed...(But) those Swazis who give them shelter are placing their own lives in danger. They may be hit in cross-fire during operations if they are near them'(1). On December 18, 1984, Andreas Sono Ngcobo of Soweto was cornered and shot by Swazi police. Two passers by, one of them a 12 year old boy, were killed in the cross-fire. The Swaziland police described Ngcobo as a crack ANC 'hitman' and claimed that it was he who had killed Shiba. Once again, a hysterical official reaction was generated. Delivering the Queen Regent's speech at Shiba's funeral, the Minister of Education, Mr. H. Nhlabatsi, stated that the government needed 'the support and co-operation of every Swazi in order to be able to rid the country of elements bent on destroying it'(2).

Within days, the Swazi authorities ordered 23 ANC members still in the country to surrender immediately to the police or face deportation to South Africa(3). Pictures were printed of four of these in the Times of Swaziland. Some of them had been taken a number of years ago, hinting that they might have been supplied by the South African police. It was also announced that the ANC's acting chief representative in the country, Bafana Duma, had been ordered to leave the country where he had spent the last 20 years of his life(4). In July, Duma had been released from detention under a High Court order

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1. Times of Swaziland, 11 December 1984.
2. Times of Swaziland, 17 December 1984.
3. Rand Daily Mail, 22 December 1984.
4. The Citizen, 22 December 1984.

given by Justice Ben Dunn(1). This set the scene for a further warming of South African-Swazi relations.

On December the 27th, South Africa's Foreign Minister and his Swazi counterpart, Mhambi Mnisi, signed an agreement for the exchange of trade representatives between the two countries. Botha said that the trade representatives would 'enjoy the same rights and privileges as diplomats do'. Indeed, South Africa's trade representative, Sam Sterban, is a career diplomat with very little trade experience. He and his staff of seven South Africans are dealing with consular, aid and security matters, which constitute the normal functions of a consulate(2). Under the terms of the new agreement, 'the governments of South Africa and Swaziland are convinced that the exchange of representatives will significantly contribute towards the strengthening of the friendly relations between them and the maintenance and promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in the region of Southern Africa'(3). In January 1985, these sentiments materialised when police commissioner Simelane announced that three ANC detainees held in Mbabane had been freed by their comrades at gunpoint. Within hours, the ANC despatched telexes worldwide denying their involvement(4). In a press statement, the ANC secretary

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1. Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1 July 1984.
2. Africa Confidential, 15 March 1985.
3. Rand Daily Mail, 28 December 1984.
4. The Star, 4 January 1985.

general Alfred Nzo said that 'the ANC is gravely concerned at this latest report, since there are still four ANC cadres in the hands of the Pretoria regime - if they are still alive - who vanished under similar circumstances from the Bhunya police station in Swaziland during 1984'(1). In the verbal battle that ensued, the Swazi authorities denied the allegations, but it would appear that the ANC has good reason for concern.

Swaziland has adopted an increàsingly confident tone in its relations with South Africa. Speaking in January 1985 before filming a documentary with the state-run South African Broadcasting Corporation, Foreign Minister Mnisi said 'We are a sovereign state and South Africa cannot treat us like their little boys'. Talking on sanctions against South Africa, he said that 'If Swaziland tells the world that they would suffer as a result of sanctions, they listen and do not impose sanctions. In this way South Africa survives as a result of Swaziland's stand on sanctions'(2). During the fifth annual SADCC meeting held in Mbabane at the end of January 1985, Swaziland faced criticism over its links with South Africa. In response, Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi said that Swaziland regarded its links with South Africa as least as importantly as those with the SADCC(3). Unashamedly, given the forum, he added that Swaziland still hoped to negotiate the land deal. Moreover, South Africa's first resident envoy in Swaziland, Sam Sterban, was invited with other .

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1. Weekend Observer, 5 January 1985.
2. Swazi News, 12 January 1985.
3. The Guardian, 1 February 1985.

diplomats to the Swazi government reception for the SADCC delegates(1). When the South African Trade Mission was officially opened in Mbabane on February 25 1985, South Africa's Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, disclosed that he no longer needed a passport to enter Swaziland. During the ceremony, Mnisi paid tribute to Botha, saying that the opening of the Mission was a 'prelude of greater things to come'(2). Interviewed after the official opening, Mnisi said:

> We are paid up OAU members in good standing, and if they try to mix my trade with politics then I will say to blazes with them. It is my duty to make sure tummies are filled with food, not with political talk. The OAU must not poke its nose into a place where it is not wanted(3).

In the meantime, the crackdown on the South African refugee community intensified. The Swazi security police detained the director of Ephasus House Bursary fund which has helped many South African refugees. Ms. Felicia Forrest, a British citizen, was held in police custody, 'for questioning' for four days, and was released after the British High Commission had interceded on her behalf(4). The detention itself, like many of the detentions of South African refugees was illegal. When Thabisile Mngadi, a Swazi citizen, was arrested and held by the police for questioning for six days after the police had found an 'arm of war' in her house, the High Court ruled the detention unlawful(5). Chief Justice DD Will ruled that it was

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1. Ibid.
2. Rand Daily Mail, 26 February 1985.
3. The Star, 27 February 1985.
4. Rand Daily Mail, 26 February 1985.
5. Times of Swaziland, 10 January 1985.

unlawful to detain people for questioning unless they were specifically detained under the 60-day detention law. 'I am not aware of any legal justification for holding a person for questioning only, and the Attorney-General was unable to refer me to any authority for such detention'(1). The detention and subsequent deportation of Ms Forrest has revealed a general tightening up by the Swazi state on the refugee community at large, for Ephasus bursary schemes were designed to help refugees independent of the political affiliation of the applicant, or his/her country of origin. What emerges, is that the Swazi state has become an accomplice of apartheid South Africa, profoundly hostile to the progressive forces struggling for change in South Africa. The question is why?

Swaziland's Relations with South Africa: Fresh Duet, Old Tune.

At the outset, it should be asserted that any attempt to provide a monocausal explanation for the recent Swazi crackdown on the ANC and refugee community, is likely to yield unsatisfactory results. It would therefore be inaccurate to assert that the death of the King brought a change in Swazi strategy(2). Indeed, it was King Sobhuza who in February 1982, authorised the conclusion of the security pact with South Africa. It could be argued, that the Swazi Royal family's involvement with the ANC extends to its year of founding in South Africa, and that King Sobhuza was himself a subscribing member of

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 26 February 1985.

2. This argument is presented by J. Hanlon and T. Smart, op.cit., p.19; and T. Lodge..'The African National Congress, 1983', in South African Review Two, op.cit., p.23.

the Congress for many years(1). Nevertheless, there is a wider historical context in which the relations between Swaziland and the South African state must be seen. This stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century when the Swazi first came into contact with the Voortrekkers. According to Bonner, the trekkers 'particular curse of Cain' was their military weakness. Faced by Zulu pressure to the south, the Swazis were driven into the arms of the Transvaal Republic as a client state(2). In 1864, 1865, 1867 and 1876, the Swazis provided armies to the Boers in their struggles against Maleo, Mabhoko, Maghato and Sekhunkhune respectively(3). Following the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1879, the Swazis offered their services for the 'final showdown' with Sekhukhune's Pedi, in exchange for their independence. After the Swazi had won the battle for the British, Sir Garnet Wolsely, the High Commissioner for South East Africa, wrote to the Colonial Office saying that: 'The Commandant of Leydenburg reports the conduct of the Swazis as beyond all praise, and says that the utmost good feeling existed between them...and the inhabitants of the district'(4). As we have seen, British promises to Mbandzeni of independence were broken, and King Sobhuza II often referred to the battle against the Pedi in pressing his claims both against the land partition and for independence.

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1. See A.R. Booth, op.cit., p.117.

2. P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), p.217, but he notes that during this period, 'Swazi relations with the (Boer) Republics were not as one-sided as...treaties and cessions would suggest. For long periods the Swazi were the dominant partner in the relationship, shaping Boer society in the Transvaal as much as Boer society shaped theirs'.

3. Ibid.

4. J.S.M. Matsebula, op.cit., p.61.

In 1946, after Swaziland's soldiers returned from active service in the Second World War, King Sobhuza II said to the outgoing Resident Commissioner, E.P. Featherstone:

> These young men we sacrificed as a nation for the freedom of the world in general and Swaziland in particular, in the same manner as those who served in the Sekukuni War during the reign of my grandfather. Our hope is that through the victory achieved through the great powers with our participation, the promises given to the King Mbandzeni may be stengthened so that we may enjoy the same freedom as other races of the world for which we have fought and conquered(1).

Swazi Royalty had learned the lesson of collaboration with the knowledge that their own interests would best be preserved by avoiding any form of violent confrontation either with colonialism or Afrikaner Nationalism.

We have clearly demonstrated the developing links between the King and Afrikaner elements within South Africa, and their role in the formation by the King of the INM. All this implies that there is nothing new in the warm relations which exist between South Africa and Swaziland. The beginnings of the anti-ANC offensive began long before the King had died, and there is nothing to suggest that his death dramatically affected the trajectory of the crackdown. Once the ANC Youth League under men like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki had come to take control of the ANC executive and transform the ANC into a mass movement, ANC politics diverged rapidly from those of the Swazi kraal. This is why the King's ANC connections should not be over-emphasised. What is possible though, is that King

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1. H. Kuper, op.cit. (1978), pp.162-3.

Sobhuza's diplomacy could have led to a far less painful expulsion of the ANC from Swaziland. But it is unlikely that his presence would have significantly effected the current level of understanding reached between the Swazi and South African states.

Swaziland's economic dependence on South Africa has been offered as an explanation of the strengthening ties between the two countries. Prince Bhekimpi told the fifth annual SADCC meeting that Swaziland has no choice but to co-operate with South Africa(1). Here the argument is that Swaziland has limited options given its structural subordination to the South African economy, underlined through its membership of SACU and the RMA. Swaziland as we have seen depends on South Africa for imports, energy and transportation routes. This obviously has a profound impact on Swaziland's policies and strategies. Nevertheless, Botwana and Lesotho which are in a similar position to Swaziland have stringently resisted South African pressure to sign security agreements(2). In the case of Lesotho, when South African pressure compelled the authorities to act against the ANC and deport some of its members, this was done in full consultation with the ANC leadership. While dependence on South Africa helps us understand Swazi-South African relations, the new level of consensus requires a broader explanation.

The proposed land deal forms part of this explanation, although it

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1. The Guardian, 1 February 1985.

2. See J. Daniel, 'A Comparative Analysis of Lesotho and Swaziland's Relations with South Africa', South African Review Two, op.cit., pp.228-238.

would be highly simplistic to reduce the Swazi crackdown on the ANC to the price which it is paying for the acquisition of the two territories. There has clearly been a qualitative difference in the nature of the operation against the ANC in the pre- and post-Nkomati periods. After Nkomati, the land deal had receded into the background through its referral to the Rumpff Commission. Moreover, as we noted, at the height of the Swazi operation, the South Africans disbandoned Rumpff and declared that it was up to the interested parties to resolve the issue. Nevertheless, we also saw how the South Africans attempted to keep the issue alive, by continuing their talks with Swaziland on the deal. And, as Buthelezi and Mabuza would alledge, by preparing legislation which would make it impossible for the Bantustan leaders to contest the issue in court. Undoubtedly, the South Africans have manipulated the whole issue with consummate skill. Although possibly unwilling to confront the wide coalition of forces which going ahead with the deal would unite against it, it is in the South African state's interests to keep the issue alive. Warm relations with Swaziland do not merely deliver blows to the ANC. They hold wider promises, such as the success of the Consas initiative, which could lead to greater gains such as the recognition by an independent African state of the Bantustans. But the 'carrot' of the land deal cannot in itself explain Swaziland's anti-ANC drive and its warming towards South Africa.

In order to draw the argument together, it is necessary to view the whole question in the light of the class and ideological factors which shape the Swazi state's perception of its options. As we have argued, the comprador bourgeoisie, led by the King, have cemented the unity of Swazi society through the skillful use of lineage-based traditional

ideology. This had been deployed in many instances, to give credence to extremely conservative and autoritarian measures, such as the suspension of the independence constitution. Mass politics under the aegis of the ANC in South Africa, however, have taken an altogether different course. As argued, the radical policies adopted by the ANC in the late 1960's, influenced the King's own decision to form an army in Swaziland. The 1976/77 student riots and the mass action of the 1980's, have deeply transformed the face of South African politics. In this new context, the question of socialism is openly debated as more and more South Africans come to question the capitalist system(1). New rifts have opened between capital and the South African state as the former calls for a hastening of the processes of reform. This does not suggest that changes in South African state power are about to occur, but does imply a further change in the balance of political forces in the region. The new generation of revolutionary politics in South Africa could undermine the class alliances and ideological projects which Swaziland's current rulers have combined to secure their hegomony. This is why the Swazi state fears the ANC's struggle, as well as a change in the current status quo in Southern Africa. Its very existence has in large measure been secured through alliances with foreign capital, much of it South African in origin. Further, it explains why it is necessary to view Swaziland's relations with South Africa as acquiescent. Seen in a historical perspective, both sides are singing the same old song: what has changed are the persons singing it.

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1. See Editorial, Work in Progress, No.35, 1985.

Conclusion

When opening parliament in February 1984, Queen Ntombi said that 'We shall pursue a vigorous policy of active neutrality. The 'Manzana Diplomacy' continues to advocate round-table negotiations where there are disputes'(1). The foregoing has demonstrated how the Swazi state's 'active neutrality' has shown a distinct bias towards South African interests. This has led it into conflict with the popular forces of opposition in South Africa, particularly through its crackdown on the ANC. The result, as one Swazi has put it, is that 'Swaziland has been singled out as a nation of sell-outs', and Swaziland-registered cars have been stoned in South Africa. ANC cadres have been referred to as 'criminals', while the Pretoria regime has been referred to as 'our friends' by leading Swazi politicians(2).

South Africa has in the late 1970's and 1980's, initiated a 'carrot and stick' policy in Southern Africa in order to coerce the independent states in the region to comply with South African designs. These revolve around the formation of a South African-dominated Consas to ensure South African hegomony in the region. The Southern African states have themselves formed the SADCC in an effort to lead them out of their dependence on South Africa. Within Southern Africa as a whole, Swaziland is a tiny state, and its importance in regional politics

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1. "On the Occasion of the Official Opening of the First Session of the Fourth Parliament of the Kingdom of Swaziland by Her Majesty the Indlovukazi and Queen Regent Ntombi", 14 February 1984, (mimeo), Uniswa SSRU Doc. Centre. Manzana are hot springs. The offical state guest house is sited near the Lobamba hot springs.

2. Weekend Observer, 2 June 1984 (letter to the Editor).

remains relatively minimal. Yet important precedents have been established through Swaziland's acquiescent relationship with South Africa. Swaziland was the first independent state to sign a security agreement with South Africa, and is the first direct neighbour to establish what are de facto if not de jure diplomatic relations with South Africa through the establishment of the South African Trade Mission in Mbabane. It is not implausible to suggest at this stage, that Swaziland could be the first state to give official recognition to the South African Bantustans.

This is because of Swaziland's determination to 'pursue all avenues short of war, to have our land returned'(1). This is an unwavering commitment, which goes so deep that Swaziland 'is not prepared to be told by anyone' that they should 'forfeit ownership to an interim occupant'(2). Stubborn pursuit of the land deal, along with the ANC crackdown, has led Swaziland into an embrace with apartheid. It is a stance profoundly offensive to both moderate and progressive factions within the OAU, the wider international community, as well as the majority of black South Africans. In adopting such a posture, Swaziland treads a dangerous political path. Given the changing terrain of South African politics, the costs which Swaziland may well pay in the long run are immense. But above all, sections of the Swazi people themselves are shocked by their government's stance towards the ANC. The Swazi Observer commented:

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1. Queen Regent's speech, op.cit.
2. Ibid.

> There has been too much talk about the ANC being involved in a number of wanton attacks in the country. We strongly feel that if the ANC are to blame for such actions, then the authorities should thoroughly investigate the cases and come up with concrete evidence, to clear the name of Swaziland which of late is featuring prominently to the outside world as having launched an undeclared war against the nationalist movement.(1)

Within the context of the current crisis of Swaziland's internal politics, to which we now turn, the Swazi state's attack on the ANC can only serve to undermine its own legitimacy.

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1. Weekend Observer, 5 January 1985.

7. THE DEATH OF KING SOBHUZA II AND THE CRISIS OF ROYAL HEGEMONY

> ...the most constant thing in the world is change. Consequently it cannot be resisted. It can only be mastered and directed. The tragic thing about many communities and individuals is that they are hardly prepared for change and therefore it hits them very hard. Perhaps, here one could imply that what is happening in the Swazi community is an effect of future shock(1).

In chapter 3, we discussed the trajectory of Royal hegemony, demonstrating how authoritarian populism had emerged, particularly after the Constitution had been suspended in April 1973. Much of the success of Royal hegemony in the post-independence period was owed to the absence of ethnic divisions within the Swazi nation state, the longevity of King Sobhuza II, and the skilful manner in which he was able to weld together fraternity and the dynastic regime. The sustenance and if need be, the distortion of indigenous political, ideological and social practices was crucial in this process, which witnessed the crystallisation of a new political structure comprising a synthesis of colonial and indigenous political institutions. But political power in Swaziland remained highly personalised, depending strongly on the cult of personality which Sobhuza had developed around himself for its continuity and cohesion. The incongruity of Swaziland's political structure was evident in the absence of any correspondence between the country's political culture and the actual historical development and nature of Swazi society under the influence of capitalism. The rapid development of Swaziland's capitalist economy

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1. Bishop Mandlenkosi Zwane, A Man for all People: the Message of Bishop Mandlenkosi Zwane, (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1983), p.89.

in the post-independence period unfolded against a background of political retrogression dominated by the authoritarian populism of King Sobhuza II.

Much of King Sobhuza's success was owed to his powerful oratory. He was a great communicator, who was able to master the very principle of myth: the transformation of history into nature(1), and was adept at portraying reality by analogy. When commenting for example, on the attempts made in the Independence Constitution to combine the British and Swazi systems of rule, he said that:

> ...(the Constitution) had tried to marry two systems, but there was discord in the union because it was difficult to know what was the best to select from both cultures. When the sun is bright and warm it is easy to decide to get into a pool, but on arriving there one becomes frightened in case there may be a crocodile in it or a python or imfingo (legendary serpent), then you change you mind in your initial approach. It is necessary for us now to rectify what we considered wrong(2).

It was therefore inevitable that the King's death would usher in a period of nervous apprehension, as his successors attempted to fill the vacuum created by his passing. Powerful political figures occupying top positions in the various structures and institutions of power created by the late King, began to size one another up as factions started forming. Although Sobhuza II's rule had left a whole host of points of conflict simmering on the surface of Swazi society, these have not become the subject of factional formation. The political

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1. R. Barthes, Mythologies, op.cit., p. 129.

2. Cited in H. Kuper, op.cit., (1978), p.318. Our brackets.

crisis in Swaziland today is not characterised by class struggle. Neither is it a manifestation of struggle between the forces of tradition and modernity. For although these conflicts undoubtedly exist in Swaziland, they have never become the actual subject of the political in-fighting which has surfaced since the King's death. The struggles centre largely on the question of filling the power vaccuum left by Sobhuza II's highly personalised style of rule. As such, the emergent factions have lacked the permanence of corporate groups, although this impermanence does not preclude their persistence for a lengthy time period(1). The factions are not large, and members have on the whole been recruited from within inner Royal circles. With political power constituting the main object of factional formation, the struggles have been highly personalised, and have generally been confined to intrigue and cabal within the Royal palace.

By 1985, a dominant faction comprising Ligogo members Prince Mfanasibili and Dr. George Msibi along with the Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi and Foreign Minister Mr. Mhambi Mnisi had emerged. But this faction lacks a key ingredient which was crucial to Sobhuza II's success: a skilful orator. The wisdom, mythical thinking and analogy which had combined to assure the success of King Sobhuza's ideological strategy, have been replaced by threats, allegations of

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1. See R.W. Nicholas "Factions: a Comparative Analysis", in Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, A.S.A. Monographs 2, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965).

attempted coups and a general intolerance of any form of dissent. These are the hallmarks of Swaziland's current rulers, reflecting a creeping siege mentality which has, in the context of an atmosphere of general restiveness, led to a paralysis in the processes of government and administration in the country.

The mood of tense uncertainty which has overtaken Swaziland and undermined the legitimacy of its political institutions, does have deep-rooted causes. But these are not reducible to the economic or regional crises, although undoubtedly, all these levels of crisis have increasingly articulated with one another. The Swazi people have been aroused from a deep slumber by the death of their King, with the glimmerings of awareness that their political institutions are unsuited to the level of the country's historical development. The failure of Sobhuza II's successors to give continuity to his personalised pattern of rule has seriously jolted the Swazi Nation's restrained expectations, and uncovered a host of points of conflict hitherto simmering beneath the surface of Swazi society. Suddenly Swazis have found themselves living in a world for which they are ill prepared, and the thin veils of tradition have been shattered by bitter inter-factional and personalised power struggles within the ruling power bloc. As a Swazi youth put it:

> We are a traditional people wanting to maintain the old ways, but there is tradition and tradition. Its time for a modernist approach to our system of rule, it must change with the times if it is to survive[1].

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1. The Star (International Airmail Weekly), 29 April 1985.

Themselves unable to intervene in the political power struggles, the Swazi people have merely felt their side effects: road blocks, body searches and an atmosphere of increased political repression. This in the context of an unswerving economic decline and 'regional confrontation, whose deleterious effects require firm political initiatives which are clearly not forthcoming from an embattled Royal palace. The repeated references to tradition made in an effort to hold the country together are having a diminishing impact on a population, almost 70 per cent of whom are under the age of 30 and whose experience of material reality differs so widely from the ideological projects which their rulers cling to.

When a lion is laid to rest

The 1973 suspension of the constitution and accompanying detention legislation, inevitably led to growing internal political repression. Yet this should be seen in perspective. As Daniel has argued: 'When measured against most Third World dictatorships, Swaziland is a human rights paradise. Political opponents do not disappear, terror against the people is not used as a political weapon and most principles of the rule of law are observed'(1). The seizure of absolute power by the King, which saw the emergence of authoritarian populism was largely successful in neutralising and absorbing the antagonism between Swazi officialdom and the people. One notable exception,

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1. J. Daniel, op.cit., (1982), pp.106-107.

was a teachers' strike and the wave of student riots to which it gave rise in 1977(1). The teachers' strike had a number of causes which need to be linked to the deepening world economic crisis and the constraints which it imposed on state revenues(2), while the spontaneous uprising of students in support of their teachers should not be divorced from the ongoing student riots in South Africa at the time(3). The state, through the Ministry of Education, proved incapable of bringing the unrest under control, and ultimately, it was only through the personal intervention of the King, that the volatile situation was defused. The nation was summoned to the Royal Kraal in Lobamba and told by King Sobhuza II that the teachers grievances would be thoroughly investigated. But when for the first time ever, people walked out of the Sibaya(4) before the King himself had left, it became evident that cracks had begun to appear in the mysterious aura surrounding the Kingship.

Sobhuza II undoubtedly occupies a special place in the hearts and minds of the Swazi people. The only really effective opposition to his

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1. For full accounts of the 1977 teachers' strike and student rebellion, see R.M. Levin, Education and Uneven Development in the Capitalist Periphery : The Case of Swaziland, B.A. Hons. Dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, March 1981; and M. Fransman, op.cit., pp.339 ff.

2. M. Fransman, op.cit., p.341.

3. This in no way suggests that the actual riots were the result of South African student 'agitators'. It simply stresses that Swazi students were themselves inevitably influenced by events across the borders.

4. The Sibaya refers to the Royal cattle kraal.

rule was manifest in the NNLC, which was virtually totally stifled following the proscription of political parties in 1973. The introduction of the 60 day detention edict, facilitated the silencing of the major voice of opposition - Dr. Ambrose Zwane. By mid-1979, he had spent a total of 420 days in prison under the Detention Act(1). Eventually, he was forced into self-exile after escaping from detention, but elected to return through the custom of Kwembula ingubo - asking for forgiveness and shelter. The King accepted Zwane's apology and allowed him to return on condition that he steer clear of political involvement. One thing which the manner of Zwane's return underlined, was the success of the King's ideological projects through which a disparity of pre-capitalist and capitalist perceptions of the world were assimilated. But as we have seen, hegemonic strategy of this nature often served to mask what were in effect highly authoritarian measures. The post-1973 state form and mode of representation has offered the Swazi people few avenues of access to democratic political participation, leading in the present conjuncture to increasing frustration. It was on the eve of his death that King Sobhuza made, what has turned out to be the most controversial of all constitutional changes.

In mid-June 1982, the King issued a decree, which re-defined the term Ligogo as set out in the repealed constitution. Henceforth the Ligogo was to constitute: 'The Supreme Council of State whose function is to

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1. See New African, July 1979.

advise the King on all matters of state and which shall consist of members appointed by the King to hold office at his pleasure in accordance with such terms, conditions (including emoluments and allowances) as he may determine'(1). This was a marked break with pre-capitalist polity. As we have seen, during the pre-colonial period, the Ligogo had been an informal aristocratic body, of whose composition Swazi society at large was ignorant. As if with foresight, the new decree also set out the powers of the King and defined the Regency and manner of succession to the throne. The decree was never, however, formally implemented by the King, who died on August 23 1982, within two months of issuing it. Nevertheless, the scene was set for the clashes which followed his death.

Here, a word of caution is in order. As we have stressed, the current political crisis is not best understood through reference to the economic crisis, or the regional crisis in Southern Africa. Nor is it best explained in relation to simmering underlying antagonisms between 'traditionalists' and 'modernists', which the King's presence has served to neutralise(2). While the foregoing processes and forces undoubtedly exist, and have articulated with events, and probably in many cases influenced outcomes, the current political confrontations need to be viewed in a historical perspective. Throughout Swazi

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1. Swaziland Government Gazette, King's Decree No. 1 of 1982.

2. This interpretation of events has been offered by Booth, (1983a) 'In the absence of central authority, the power struggle between the modernists...and the traditionalists...burst into the open'. op.cit., p.130.

history, the death of Kings has provoked a series of princely rebellions. Following the death of Sobhuza I, Mswati's early years were characterised by simmering friction between rival princes. Mswati's own death likewise saw the minority reign of Ludvonga punctuated by the princely uprisings of Mbilini and Mabhedla(1). We have seen how the death of Mbandzeni and Bhunu's succession, provoked a spate of political killings. Two common qualities pervade all these periods of struggle: the first, a set of conflicting personalities; the second, a struggle over executive power. What has changed in the present situation, is the precise nature of the organs of executive power through which princely power struggles have been articulated.

Towards a Tri-Polar Power Bloc in Swaziland

A burning question, often voiced in Swaziland throughout the 1970's and 1980's was 'what will happen when the King dies?'(2) The awesome executive power which the King concentrated in his own hands, was always a recipe for disaster. This became even more true after the issuing of the decree in June 1982. Its lack of clarity and specificity in a sense, epitomised all constitutional law enacted under the King's authority since independence. Before the decree was issued, all powers were concentrated in the King and a council comprising the Prime Minister and his cabinet. But the new proclamation failed to define the relationship between the cabinet and the Supreme Council

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1. See P. Bonner, op.cit., (1983), especially Chapters 4 and 7.

2. J. Daniel op.cit., (1982), p.110. At the time, Daniel believed that the death of the King posed lesser threats to Swaziland's stability than the liberation struggle in South Africa.

of State, the Liqoqo. Through this uncertainty, the conditions were created for the emergence of two potentially antagonistic poles of power, which have surfaced as key sites of struggle in the contemporary conjuncture.

Alongside these two power centres, a third had begun to emerge in Sobhuza's last years. As we have noted, he had spearheaded the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie, particularly through the creation of Tibiyo. This institution actually constituted a material basis for the transformation of the entire social structure of Swaziland. Through involvement in Tibiyo, certain members of the Royal clan and individual commoners found that they were no longer simply aristocrats and plebians, but members of a new elite club of bourgeois class forces. Tibiyo was not however, the sole agency of class formation and transformation. The state and its various apparatuses also constituted a material basis of class formation for various social forces, which were not necessarily drawn from the complex of Royalty and Royal patronage. The relationship which has developed between the state and Tibiyo has been, as noted, uneasy at times. The Ministry of Finance has seen its revenues and budgetary allocations swallowed up by Tibiyo, in many cases on projects which the state itself has not endorsed. What emerges is that there is no necessary uniformity of interests between the compradors and sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie and their bureaucratic class allies. By the same token, the underlying antagonisms between these classes has on the whole remained latent.

One possible explanation is the rich diversity of Swazi society. Here,

individuals find themselves involved in a disparity of social relations, arising from the manner in which pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial Swazi society has merged and coalesced. A rich and successful businessman finds himself at any time paying chiefly dues;' while a sugar plantation worker is heir to a great chiefdom. A senior civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture and a director of Tibiyo both have the common interest of attracting foreign capital, but their attitudes towards the retention of indigenous forms of land tenure and allocation may diverge widely.' Where does a Prime Minister who is both chairman of Tibiyo and head of the cabinet stand? The question is important and largely unanswerable, for individual agents acting within the complex interrelationship between the three poles of power outlined above, often may have no uniform interests. This is why we have argued that the factions which have formed as a result of political in-fighting within the palace do not constitute corporate political groups. Indeed the permanence of the factions has been undermined by the highly personalised quality of the struggles which have succeeded the death of the King. This underlines the danger of trying to identify factions which correspond to the poles of power, e.g. a cabinet faction or a Tibiyo faction(1). For individuals located within the various power centres do not necessarily have common interests. Hence the power centres are not the basis of factions, but rather the site of power struggles.

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1. This has been attempted in the Centro de Estudos Africanos analysis. See Centro de Estudes Africanos, op.cit.

Queens, Regents and Reticent Coups

While Sobhuza lived, a certain degree of equilibrium was maintained between the three poles of Swazi power. After his death, Swazi politics entered a new phase of development. Forces hitherto contained and held together by Sobhuza II were now set free to confront one another. This has led to an on-going saga of power struggles, as competing factions have been swept aside in various bids to assume control over the executive. Thus far it is possible to identify 5 major confrontations, which have either led to important dismissals or to further key or subsidiary conflicts. These are:

(a) The ousting of Prime Minister Prince Mabandla (March 1983).

(b) The dismissal of Queen Regent Dzeliwe (August 1983).

(c) An attempted coup at Phondo (March 1984).

(d) The removal from office of Finance Minister Sishayi Nxumalo, Foreign Minister Richard V. Dlamini, Police Chief Titus Msibi and Army Chief-of-Staff Mangomeni Ndzimandze (June 1984).

(e) The demise of the 'Authorised Person', Prince Sozisa (August/September 1984).

The Ousting of the Prime Minister Prince Mabandla

During the week following Sobhuza's death, a number of legal notices appeared. These provided for the assumption of the Regency by the Queen Mother or Indlovukati; the appointment by the latter of fifteen members of the Liqoqo; as well as for the appointment of an 'Authorised Person'. In terms of the June 1982 decree, the 'Authorised Person', in effect a senior prince, was empowered 'to perform on behalf of the Regent the functions of her office if the Regent is for

any reason unable to perform those functions'.(1)

The first overt sign of inter-factional rivalry came in November 1982, when in a major policy speech, Prince Mabandla announced that he had reactivated the 60-day detention edict which had lain dormant since the King's Diamond Jubilee in 1981. He issued the warning that anyone participating in illegal gatherings would run the risk of being detained. Initially it appeared that the thrust of his speech was directed at ANC exiles to whom he pledged continued asylum, but warned that 'Swaziland cannot afford to allow its territory to be used as a springboard for launching armed attacks against other states'. Nevertheless, it was the last part of his speech which revealed the underlying reasons for his re-introduction of the edict. He stated that: 'Swaziland will continue to be guided by the rule of law and no man irrespective of his social status or position will be allowed to flout the laws of his country'(2).

Mabandla had good reason for concern. Unlike most other cabinet members, he had not been schooled in the Imbokodvo mould - before the dissolution of political parties, he had actually belonged to the NNLC. Hence his promotion to the position of Prime Minister by the King in November, 1979, after the death of General Maphevu Dlamini came as a shock to all. Ultimately, the appointment was seen as a

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1. Swaziland Government Gazette, King's Decree No.1 of 1982.

2. Times of Swaziland, 23 November, 1982.

token of thanks by the King to Mabandla's father Prince Mancibane, a close advisor of Sobhuza's (and present Liqoqo member), rather than as an affirmation of the strength of Mabandla himself(1). Soon after his elevation to Prime Minister, Mabandla enraged comprador elements within Tibiyo in particular, by initiating a Commission of Enquiry into Corruption. Initially, the commission's terms of reference were confined to the civil service, but it appears as if Mabandla used the commission to attack individuals within Tibiyo(2). As the commission began to subpoena the files of Tibiyo, the compradors struck back, persuading the King to intervene personally. This led to the disbandoning of the commission and the King declaring that it was taking over the work of the police(3). The establishment of a commission was, however, a very popular move in Swaziland at the time, and Mabandla described its dissolution as a defeat (4). There were, therefore, deep-rooted tensions between Mabandla and other Royalists located both within the Liqoqo after Sobhuza's death, and in Tibiyo.

In February 1983, two key Liqoqo figures, Prince Mfanasibili and Chief Maseko warned the Queen that Mabandla and the police were

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1. Interview with J.J. Dlamini of Lobamba, the son of Prince Mshelevu and current Trade Attache in London, 28 April 1984.

2. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.19.

3. Drum Magazine, May 1983, p.29. According to the Centro de Estudos account, it was Sishayi Nxumalo who had persuaded the King to terminate the Commission in August 1980.

4. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.19.

planning a coup. This warning occured amidst widespread speculation that Mabandla was attempting to reshuffle his cabinet and isolate Justice Minister Polycarp Dlamini, by sending him abroad as an ambassador. This move, although believed to have been supported by the Queen Regent, incurred the wrath of certain Liqoqo members, who claimed that Mabandla was by-passing the Supreme Council of State(1). Against this background, on February 10, a police detachment cordoned off Mbabane and stood guard over the Prime Minister's residence. Freakish events then followed, as within the space of a week, a number of wild animals including a leopard were found on the loose in the vicinity of the Prime Minister's residence. Liqoqo member Prince Makhungu told a reporter: 'It is strange (sic.) for a leopard to be found in a densely populated area like Mbabane. You better go down to Lobamba and ask for their opinion and what this means'(2).

In March, the rupture burst into the open, as Prince Mfanasibili and Chief Maseko were arrested and charged with sedition. They were refused bail in a hearing on March 10, a decision endorsed by the High Court following an appeal by the accused. The Queen Mother then summoned an urgent meeting of all chiefs at the Royal Kraal in Lobamba, which was addressed by the Authorised Person, Prince Sozisa. Sozisa appealed on behalf of the queen for 'unity', and warned

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1. Ibid., p.21.

2. Swazi Observer, 14 February 1983.

against 'rumour mongers' and 'trouble makers':

> If you are united behind the throne nothing will happen. But if you are disunited there will be many problems. You know very well that this is where we used to gather to hear the wise advice of our late King. Today you are listening to us, the juniors, trying to advise you on the best ways to keep the torch burning in these difficult times(1).

Within a week, the torch was extinguished, when an extraordinary Government Gazette was published, announcing the dismissal of Prime Minister Mabandla. It later emerged that, as Mfanasibili and Maseko were released from custody on the pretext that the Attorney-General had refused to prosecute, behind the scenes jostling led to the Queen Mother being coerced into signing the Gazette. According to Royal sources, when Queen Dzeliwe:

> Expressed unwillingness to sign the Government Gazette, we the princes, princesses and other members of the royal family told her that we would no longer regard her as our mother because she did not have our interests at heart. We also told her that we would terminate our mourning period, for the late King. When the Queen Mother signed the gazette, it was all over for Prince Mabandla.(2)

In an interview with the press, Prince Mfanasibili claimed that the showdown was precipitated by Mabandla who had staged a show of force by entering the Royal Palace accompanied by armed bodyguards in response to accusations by the Liqoqo that he was trying to usurp

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1. Times of Swaziland, 16 March 1983. It is also worth mentioning that around this time, the Swaziland police detained a Ugandan Prince, Robert Kimera, after they discovered a huge cache of arms in his possession, which a state prosecuter later claimed was big enough to destroy the whole of Mbabane. He was eventually acquitted, but a link was suspected between the power struggles and the arms found in Kimera's garage. See Drum Magazine, May 1983.

2. Drum Magazine, May 1983, p.29.

the monarchy. Mabandla, according to Prince Mfanasibili 'broke down and bolted from the meeting leaving his documents behind, and refused to return when summoned again....Mabandla was on a war footing and wanted everyone to know it'(1). Mabandla faced allegations that just before the opening of the parliament for the 1983 session, he had prepared a speech in which it was announced that supreme executive power was being transferred from the Queen Mother-in-Council, to the Prime Minister and cabinet. This speech, according to Prince Mfanasibili, had been intercepted by himself and Maseko, and the Liqoqo had subsequently drafted a new speech. But Mabandla had the original broadcast over the radio and was later summoned to the palace. Following the resultant clash of interests, Mfanasibili and Maseko were arrested and charged with sedition.(2)

Clearly, the precise constitutional status of the Liqoqo was central to the confrontation. This precipitated a clash relating to a dispute over the question of salaries of Liqoqo members. Mabandla had demanded the Liqoqo produce a document signed by the King specifying

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1. Golden City Press, 17 April 1983.

2. There is an alternative account of these events. In a cabinet meeting held on the 1st of March 1983, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ben Sibandze, explained how a summary report of a speech different from that read from the throne by the Queen Regent was broadcast. Although it was not revealed how the 'error' came about, a Cabinet Committee which included the Prime Minister was initiated to seek audience with the Queen Regent to explain the factors responsible for the error. In addition, a departmental enquiry was to be conducted. See S.N.A., CM 9728, (March 1983).

emoluments and allowances for Supreme Council of State members. The exact nature of his motives remain unclear. It is difficult to assess how far Mabandla did in fact wish to curtail the power of the throne, although it is evident that during events immediately following the King's death, the Prime Minister was pressurised into taking a back seat role. But within wider Swazi society, Mabandla's anti-corruption position had earned him a degree of mass support. This was acknowledged to have extended to senior police officers, and at the time, there was much talk of growing tension between the police and the army. The Queen Regent herself was equivocal with respect to Mabandla, and for this reason, it is unlikely that Mabandla intended to embark on any serious assault on Royal power. Later when Dzeliwe herself was under threat, she would attempt to recall Mabandla. It is possible that Mabandla wished to curtail the constitutional power of the monarchy in the interests of modernisation(1), but his methods ensured that his real intentions remain obscure. For Mabandla at no time attempted to draw on his popular mass appeal, by organising and consolidating a political base. Instead, his politics remained at the level of intrigue and cabal within the palace(2).

The dismissal rocked the diplomatic community in Swaziland. In April, it was announced that the Foreign Minister, Mr. R.V. Dlamini, and certain Liqoqo figures, had put pressure on Britain to withdraw its

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1. See A.R. Booth, op.cit., (1983a), p.130. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Mabandla was in any way anti-monarchist.

2. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.21.

High Commissioner, Mr. Desmond Kerr, who had expressed his distaste at the manner in which Mabandla had been ousted. American diplomats also expressed dissatisfaction over the political climate in Swaziland, while nervous investors began transferring funds from Swaziland to the Bantustans in South Africa(1).

Swazi reaction to the removal of Mabandla was on the whole muted although considerably resented, and the ousted Prime Minister fled to South Africa amidst speculation that he might face treason charges. Potential support which the former Prime Minister still commanded remained covert, and in May an anonymous organisation sent out pamphlets to schools, colleges, the University and state officials calling for an uprising of the Swazi masses to overthrow the regime. This occurred concurrently with a bid made by the Liqoqo to purge pro-Mabandla personnel from the civil service and parastatal bodies. Intent on leaving no loopholes, an assault on the media was launched. A Swazi Rand Daily Mail correspondent, Simon Ngwenya, was detained for questioning by the police for reporting on events surrounding Mabandla's dismissal, and towards the end of July, the editor of the Times of Swaziland, James Dlamini, was placed in custody for ten days. This followed a report in the Times which stated that elections would be held in October. Although it was common knowledge that elections would be held in 1983, and indeed this had been announced before Mabandla's dismissal, the actual date had only

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 26 April 1983.

been announced to the Liqoqo, and was not yet public knowledge(1). The source of the leak was believed to be Mfanasibili, who had aimed to test public opinion. But the move seemed to have enraged Queen Dzeliwe, who was struggling to assert her authority over the Liqoqo. At the time, there was widespread speculation that Mabandla had secretly entered the country to discuss strategy with Dzeliwe, who was becoming increasingly frustrated by efforts of the Liqoqo to undermine her authority. This was evidenced by the fact that on a number of important state and ceremonial occasions, Dzeliwe, who was supposed to officiate, was replaced by other figures such as the 'Authorised Person' or the Prime Minister(2).

Mabandla's replacement had been installed by the Queen Regent in April. He was Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini, a World War II veteran and former deputy minister in the Prime Minister's office. An enthusiastic campaigner for the land deal, Bhekimpi, according to Sozisa, was the first to suggest to the King that Swaziland should attempt to 'get our land back from South Africa'(3). In 1963, Bhekimpi had headed the Royal Constitutional team to London, causing a stir when he addressed the conference in Siswati instead of English(4). Many hoped that Bhekimpi would steer the country through the factional squabbling threatening to tear it apart, by pursuing a path of moderation. But

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1. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.23.
2. Ibid.
3. Times of Swaziland, 21 November 1983.
4. Swazi Observer, 12 May 1983.

the new Prime Minister described at the time of his appointment as a 'conservative traditionalist'(1), seen discovered that his own survival would be predicated upon his choosing sides in the ongoing conflict.

The Dismissal of Queen Regent Dzeliwe (August 1983)

The ousting of Mabandla appeared minor in the light of the bombshell which was dropped in early August, when the unprecedented action of replacing the Queen Regent was taken. In an Extraordinary Government Gazette entitled 'Assumption of Regency by the Ndlovukazi Notice', signed by the 'Authorised Person', it was declared that Inkosikati LaTfwala, Queen Ntombi, had 'with immediate effect, assumed the office of Regent'(2). In addition, the 'secretariat' of the Liqoqo released a pamphlet contained in a special edition of the Times of Swaziland, entitled 'Mabandla's Litany of Betrayals'. The pamphlet claimed that:

> On the afternoon of Monday the 28th June 1982, at Lozithehlezi Palace, Mabandla came out in open opposition to the King on the Land Deal issue to such extent, that the King was obliged to later advise him to resign. Mabandla chose to ignore the advice. Technically, Mabandla ceased then to be constitutionally the Prime Minister because he had lost the confidence of the Head of State who had nominated him as member of Parliament and appointed him as Prime Minister(3).

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1. Centro de Estuods Africanos, op.cit., p.22. Drum Magazine, May 1983, p.30, described him as a 'relative moderate and middle of the roader', while the journalist Patrick Lawrence (Rand Daily Mail, 24 August 1983) endorsed the Centro de Estudos Africanos' views.

2. Swaziland Government Gazette, Extra-Ordinary Gazette, Legal Notice No.59 or 1983, 9 August 1983.

3. Times of Swaziland (Special Edition), 10 August 1983, emphasis in the original.

Mabandla, it was alleged, had attempted to 'subvert' the Liqogo and this seriously undermined his integrity as an honest and humble leader. 'Does the image of an honest Johnny-come-lately fired with righteous zeal to eradicate graft and corruption from Swazi society fit Mabandla?', the document asked, and 'what greater Treason has ever been committed by a Prime Minister in the entire history of civilised mankind?' Specific charges of corruption, some without any foundation whatsoever(1), were levelled at the former Prime Minister, enabling Mabandla's detractors to conclude that he was a 'fugitive from the law as opposed to a political refugee'.

It was also officially announced that Prince Makhosetive is the heir to Sobhuza's throne. But this revealed a flagrant customary breach and demonstrated how tradition can be distorted in the interest of political power. By custom, Ntombi, the Nabomntfwana (Mother of the Child) can only assume the role of Indlovukati after the new King is formally installed. According to Swazi law, the future Queen Mother should spend three years following the death of a King in mourning, remaining for most of the time in her hut(2). Consequently, it was of no surprise when Dzeliwe and certain members of the Royal family summoned the Swazi nation to assemble at Lobamba. Prince Gabheni, a direct son of Sobhuza, openly identified himself with opposition to the Queen's dismissal, and stated that 'This meeting will mainly explain to the

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1. One of the allegations was that Mabandla had 'Received financial gifts from a company contracted by the Swaziland Government to build silos' (Ibid). This was denied with apologies in the Times of Swaziland 12 August 1983.

2. See H. Kuper, op.cit., (1980), pp.72-73.

nation how the Queen Regent has been unconstitutionally ousted as Head of State'(1). Gabheni was, at the time, the Minister of Home Affairs and a Liqoqo member, and therefore an influential figure around which opposition to Dzeliwe's removal began to crystallise. Ranged against him were Mfanasibili, Maseko and another Liqoqo member, Dr. George Msibi, who strengthened their hand by drawing both the 'Authorised Person' and Prime Minister Bhekimpi into their fold. The latter appeared on radio and television, appealing to the nation to support the replacement of Dzeliwe and not to attend the 'illegal meeting' which had been called at Lobamba. This was followed by a statement issued by the 'Authorised Person', on behalf of 'the elders', warning the nation to beware of 'contenders to the throne', and that 'no one child of Sobhuza can object to the confirmation made on Thursday unless he sees himself as the future King in place of Makhosetive'(2). This was an obvious reference to Gabheni, who also attempted to enter the headquarters of Swazi Radio and Television to arrange for a message by Queen Dzeliwe to be broadcast to the nation, but was prevented by armed men from doing so(3). Whilst a quiet weekend was reported at Lobamba, signifying a major setback for the pre-Dzeliwe faction, pamphlets attacking the leaders who had deposed her were being distributed. Plain clothes policemen were stationed outside the Television and Radio headquarters in constant vigil to

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1. Swazi Observer, 12 August 1983.
2. Swazi News, 13 August 1983.
3. Rand Daily Mail, 13 August 1983.

prevent the propogation of the pro-Dzeliwe cause through the media.

As the smoke cleared around the events surrounding the Queen's dismissal, it became evident that on August 2, the Liqoqo had presented Dzeliwe with a document surrendering many of her functions to the 'Authorised Person'. The document was in English, and drafted by an especially hired South African Lawyer(1). Herself unfamiliar with legal terminology, Dzeliwe sought the advice of Arthur Khoza, a former interpreter of the late King, and at the time the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture. He advised her not sign, and she reacted by announcing the dismissal of the entire Liqoqo before a hastily convened meeting of certain Princes and Princesses, cabinet ministers and senior civil servants. She also announced the dismissal of Justice Minister Polycarp Dlamini and Attorney General Patrick Makhanza, a Tanzanian citizen(2). It was one week after this that the Liqoqo made their move, by releasing the Government Gazette announcing Dzeliwe's removal.

Dzeliwe herself struck back within a week, by filing an urgent application in the High Court challenging the 'Authorised Person, the

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1. C. Legum, Third World Reports, 9 September 1983.

2. It is difficult to accurately reconstruct the precise sequence of events here: whether it was the dismissal of the Liqoqo by Dzeliwe that led to the Liqoqo co-ercing her into transferring powers to the Liqoqo and Authorised person or vice versa. Certainly the dismissal of the Liqoqo by the Queen Regent only became public knowledge after her own dismissal. See 'The Affidavit', Times of Swaziland 18 August 1983, as well as Golden City Press 14 August 1983.

Liqoqo and Prime Minister Bhekimpi on the legality of her removal from office. The application requested a court order declaring her removal from office null and void, as well as the cancellation of the premature appointment of Queen Regent Ntombi. She stated that the Liqoqo, a consultative body, had no authority to remove her and that she had officially dissolved it, and therefore, by law it had ceased to function. Her lawyer, former Attorney General Douglas Lukhele, pointed out that in terms of Swazi law and custom, Dzeliwe had assumed the position of Queen Regent on August 21 1982, and she had accordingly appointed the Liqoqo on August 24. This raised a question: 'Is there any law, statutory or Swazi custom where a person appointed to serve 'A' turns round and sacks 'A'? Can he sack the person who appointed him?'. Lukhele then concluded that 'According to Swazi Law and Custom there is a dual monarchy in Swaziland. When His Majesty died, powers were vested in the Queen Regent. We have no Head of State now'(1).

In reply, the defence argued that the court had no jurisdiction over a matter under Swazi law and custom. This left the court adjourned for a week, during which time two Assessors and Chief Justice Charles Nathan, a South African only months away from retirement, deliberated the question of the High Court's competence to resolve the case. But the Liqoqo would not wait, and reacted decisively. A decree was issued by the 'Authorised Person', placing the appointment

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1. Swazi Observer, 18 August 1983.

and dismissal of the Queen Regent above the jurisdiction of any court of law. It concluded ominously, stating that 'Any judgement, order or decree or finding whatsoever pronounced by any such court on any of the aforesaid matters, whether or not such matters are pending or not before any such court, shall be null and void in law.'(1) As the nation braced itself for a showdown between the Liqoqo and the Courts, two opposition figures were rounded up. These were Arthur Khoza and Dzeliwe's lawyer, Douglas Lukhele, who was actually detained on the morning of judgement day.

Here, as an anti-climax, Chief Justice Nathan announced his acceptance of the decree rendering his Court incompetent to pronounce upon Dzeliwe's dismissal. Nevertheless, he did warn somewhat blandly that the new decree 'considerably cuts down the operation of the Rule of Law and that this would seriously affect the good name and standing of Swaziland in international circles'(2). He also pointed out that two days before judgement was due, he and Justice Hassanali, one of the Assessors, had been summoned by the Minister of Justice, Polycarp Dlamini, who advised them to drop the case, but he later denied having done this. He claimed instead that the judges had sought his opinion on whether or not to proceed with the case, and that he 'never advised the court what to do, but only advised persons!' In his view, 'it would have been sufficient for their

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1. Swaziland Government Gazette, Legal Notice No.62 of 1983 entitled 'Regent's Decree No.1. of 1983', 19 August 1983.

2. Times of Swaziland, 25 August 1983.

Lordships to refer to the decree and not to me'[1].

The decision to avoid a level judgement, was for many greeted with disappointment and frustration, a factor highlighted by the many abusive phone calls which Justice Nathan later complained of having received[2]. Many were amazed that a non-Swazi citizen on the verge of retirement, should blemish his considerable reputation by tamely surrendering the independence of the judiciary to the dictates of the state. The unpopularity of the decision was demonstrated by two protest marches. The first, on August the 25th, was a quiet procession through Manzini by University students demanding the re-instalment of Dzeliwe and the release from detention of Lukhele and Khoza. But as the students left the town centre and returned to the nearby Kwaluseni campus, the police moved in, arresting 37 students and charging them with conducting an unlawful demonstration. This led to a second protest march in Mbabane, which was joined by students from the Institute of Health Sciences, on August 29. But the students themselves realised that in order to be really effective, they would have to draw in wider support for their demonstrations. They hoped to obtain the support of school pupils, but at the time, schools were closed for holdiays. They therefore decided to suspend further action,

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1. Swazi Observer, 1 September 1983.

2. 'Kingdom of Swaziland', Chapter submitted for the 1984 edition of Africa Contemporary Record, C. Legum, (ed.) (forthcoming).

fearing that the University might itself be closed(1).

The state at this stage clearly feared a repetition of the 1977 unrest, which had stemmed from the country's educational institutions. Prime Minister Bhekimpi issued a statement over the radio and on television, in which he appealed for children to carry on with their schoolwork, and to leave the solution of the country's problems to the elders of the nation. In September 1983, it was announced that the ban on the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT), imposed during the 1977 disturbances, would be unconditionally lifted. The Prime Minister was drowned in a deafening applause, when he informed the Teachers' Consultative Assembly, a body established in order to advise government on the reinstitution of SNAT, of the Government's decision. He pointed out that the state was confident that the organisation would not 'abuse its powers', and that a marked improvement in school examination results was expected by the end of the year(2).

In reality, teachers had little to cheer about. A spate of detentions had followed the judgement on Dzeliwe's case, which included prominent members of the Royal family closely allied to Dzeliwe. Two Princes, Sulumlomo, the Assistant Minister in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office, and Thunduluka, were detained under the 60-day edict, and a detention order was signed by the Prime Minister against

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1. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.24.

2. Swazi News, 10 September 1983.

Prince Gabheni. But the police this time were unwilling to carry out the order, and Gabheni remained at large(1). In September, the state spoke out about the detentions, when Polycarp Dlamini addressed a gathering of the Swaziland Lawyers Association in Mbabane. He alleged that Douglas Lukhele was detained not because he was Dzeliwe's lawyer, but because he was a member of clandestine political movement: 'The details of Mr. Lukhele's involvement in the underground movement are of a security nature and therefore could not be revealed. Suffice it to mention that he was an attorney but became involved in matters with no relation whatsoever to his profession'(2). Similarly vague accusations accounted for the detention of the other three detainees, but these were ultimately belied by the state's failure to provide any evidence that the accused constituted a danger to the country's security(3).

Shortly after this, Prince Gabheni was suspended both as a Liqoqo member and Cabinet Minister. It was also announced that Queen Regent Ntombi had finally assumed the powers of her office having been cleansed and crowned with a symbolic head band. Initially, it was claimed that she had refused to assume the powers of Queen Mother, as she was still in the mourning period prescribed by Swazi custom(4).

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1. Centro de Estudos Africanos, op.cit., p.24. See also Swazi Observer, 27 August 1983. This was possibly because of Gabheni's high standing as one of Sobhuza II's most influential sons.

2. Swazi Observer, 1 September 1983.

3. See below.

4. Golden City Press, 14 August 1983.

The new Queen, according to the Prime Minister, would not wear the true regalia of her office, consisting of a red feather (litulu), a cap and special crown, because she was still in mourning. It was never clear, however, whether or not Dzeliwe handed over the insignia of her office, but it is known that she was removed from Lobamba and transferred to the Zombodze Royal Village some time in mid-September. There she appears to have been placed under virtual house arrest, clinging to her regalia, and she has not made a public appearance since her removal. 'Nevertheless, in the view of the Prime Minister, Ntombi's coronation was fully 'in accordance with Swazi Law and Custom as it happened in the case of Queen Regent Gwamile when Mahlokohla died'(1). He also emphasised that 'nobody shall ask anything, everything shall be got from the elders'(2).

This picture of 'order' was completed when on September 9, the Crown Prince Makhosetive flew home from England where he was studying, to be greeted by ululating princesses and praise poets at Matsapha airport. This was an attempt by the Liqoqo to give credence to their own actions by officially introducing the future King to the nation. This was not an installation or coronation, but an act legitimising the heir's selection. Clearly, the Liqoqo was playing for time, while waiting for the General Elections set for late October, which would afford them the opportunity to purge parliament and the cabinet of potential opposition.

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1. Swazi Observer, 7 September 1983. Gwamile (The Indomitable) was the name which Labotsibeni earned herself.

2. Ibid.

But it was soon evident that calm had yet to be restored to the nation. 'Subversive' pamphlets continued to be distributed, and on October 13, four women appeared before an Mbabane senior magistrate charged with producing and distributing seditious pamphlets. This prompted the state into action. Parliament, dissolved for the impending elections was hastily reconvened to legislate a Sedition and Subversive Activities Bill. This provided for the establishment of a special tribunal which could be set up on the discretion of the Queen Regent to hear and pass judgment on cases involving state security. Offenders convicted in terms of this new law could face up to 20 years in jail, or a E20,000 fine(1).

With Swazi voters poised to go to the polls, spray-painted slogans calling for a boycott appeared on public buildings in Mbabane and the police and army manned nation-wide roadblocks(2). Despite covert opposition to the election, they were, according to the Indvuna Yetinkhundla, Mndeni Shabalala, successfuly conducted. He claimed that a 'record' 166,535 people - over 80 per cent of the electorate - had voted(3). But the South African Rand Daily Mail correspondent, Norman Chandler, painted a different picture, arguing that his figure of a 60 per cent poll was partially confirmed on October 29 by Dr.

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1. The Bill's aim was the amendment of the 1938 Sedition and Subversive Activities Act, and raised a storm when tabled before parliament on the 19 October. Mr. Sangoma Dlamini said: 'Laws are there to protect people. But if a law is made on the emotions of a certain group of people, then it will not carry its functions properly', Swazi Observer, 20 October 1983.

2. Rand Daily Mail, 31 October 1983.

3. Swazi Observer, 31 October 1983.

George Msibi[1]. It was also alleged that police had urged people in predominantly black suburbs in Mbabane and Manzini to get out and vote, while government vehicles were commandeered to transport voters[2]. Residents in Nkomati were warned by their indvuna' to 'Take part in the coming elections or get out of my area. If I do not see you at Enkaba on election day, these people (who go) must come back here immediately and demolish their homes because I will do no more than throw that family out of my area'[3].

In November, the newly elected Electoral College convened in Lobamba to deliberate over the composition of the future parliament and cabinet. As they completed their work, it became evident that a massive clean-out of the previous parliament and cabinet was underway. With the exception of three former Ministers, the entire cabinet was voted out and the Liqoqo used their power of nomination to fill the posts in the new 14 member cabinet. The late King's appointees were replaced by new figures upon whom senior Liqoqo members like Prince Mfanasibili, Dr. George Msibi and Chief Maseko could rely. Prince Mfanasibili's lawyer, Mr. David Matse, suddenly found himself appointed to the Justice portfolio. Only Prime Minister Bhekimpi and Foreign Minister Richard Dlamini maintained their old portfolios, while the former Deputy Minister for Industry, Commerce,

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 31 October 1983.

2. Ibid. The Prime Minister also ordered that all bars be shut so that those who took part in the election were 'sober and in the process keep law and order at the polling gates', Swazi Observer, 27 October 1983.

3. Swazi Observer, 17 October 1983.

Mines and Tourism, Mr. Dabulumjiva Nhlabatsi, assumed the Education portfolio. Tibiyo's Managing Director, Sishayi Nxumalo, was made the Minister of Finance, but the remaining portfolios went to new faces on the Swazi political scene. Second in the hierarchy was Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Mhambi Mnisi, who steadly began to assume the role of 'Swaziland's Roving Ambassador', a position hitherto occupied by Dr. Nxumalo(1).

Another significant feature of the new government, was the restructuring of the various apparatuses of the state. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, which had previously controlled immigration, labour, refugee affairs, information and communications was dismantled. These functions were then devolved to other ministries, or to newly created ones as in the case of Labour(2). An important new Ministry of Defence and Youth was created, reflecting the state's growing concern over matters relating to regional instability and internal security.

Intent on overcoming internal instability, the Liqoqo stepped up efforts to reshuffle the civil service and purge it of opposition to the ruling clique within the Liqoqo. Dr. Msibi told newsmen that it 'is normal practice that after the election there should be a reshuffle of top civil servants'(3). Most significant was the shake-up in the police

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1. 'The Kingdom of Swaziland', op.cit. Mnisi was a one time liaison officer of the King and married to one of his daugters, Princess Ngebeti.

2. Ibid.

3. Rand Daily Mail, 31 October 1983.

force, which the Liqoqo feared still had a strongly pro-Mabandla element. Five senior police officers were axed, including the chief of security, Anthony Dlamini, the head of the CID Sosha Dlamini, and Mabandla's former bodyguard(1). Another important governmental office was created when a special Government Gazette announced the establishment of an Ombudsman's office, with power to probe the conduct of public officials, including the Prime Minister. Speaking during the swearing in of the Ombudsman, Mr. Robert Mabila, Dr. George Msibi said that inefficiency and malpractices in the civil service were the King's greatest concerns before he died(2). These developments occured as the ruling clique became increasingly plagued by a siege mentality.

Before the elections, in early October, Prince Mfanasibili addressing a meeting of chiefs, claimed that hired gunmen were out to eliminate members of the Liqoqo. Promising tough action against the 'hit-men', he warned that: 'Just in case you think you are rocks, we blast rocks with dynamite'(3). Earlier, Prince Bhekimpi had alleged that certain members of the Royal Family opposed to the dismissal of Dzeliwe had sought military intervention from a certain 'white government' to defend the former Queen(4). Shortly after the elections, the Prime

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1. 'The Kingdom of Swaziland', op.cit.
2. Swazi News, 26 November 1983.
3. Times of Swaziland, 10 October 1983.
4. Ibid.

Minister claimed that three Swazi citizens had 'confessed to having conspired to sabotage the elections'(1). He also charged that police were searching for guns and ammunition hidden in the mountains, and that information supplied by the three would lead to further arrests: 'We know all those who are still lurking in the dark. Its just a matter of picking them up'(2). Inevitably, such paranoia led to increasing repression, and another spate of post-election detentions as roadblocks and body searches became common place. By the end of the year, there were 19 people serving 60-day detention orders, including members of the Royal family, a chief and an Anglican priest(3). Twelve of them were charged with High Treason, allegedly having plotted the overthrow of the government by recruiting mercenaries from South Africa to depose Queen Regent Ntombi(4). In a tough Christmas message, Prince Bhekimpi combined Christian theology and indigenous ideology in warning the nation against dissent:

> If people try to twist our hand we will live by the order of the Old Testament. 'An eye for an eye' : If your eyes make you see things and you become too devilishly wise, then we must scoop them out... This nation is ruled by ancestors, and if you try to do it in, the ancestors will do you instead. Somhlolo said there should be no bloodshed here and any trouble maker will be cursed by Somholo. It's not a toy nation to be ruled by beggars.(5)

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1. Swazi Observer, 3 November 1983; Times of Swaziland 3 November 1983.

2. Ibid.

3. Times of Swaziland, 23 December 1983.

4. Times of Swaziland, 31 December 1983.

5. Swazi News, 24 December 1983.

By New Year, it appeared as though opposition to the ruling clique of Prince Mfanasibili, Dr. George Msibi and Prince Bhekimpi had been intimidated into submission. But this lull in the storm, coinciding with Cyclone Domoina, proved to be shortlived.

The Attempted Coup at Phondo Royal Palace (March 1984)

The highly centralised control which the Tinkhundla system afforded the Liqoqo over the composition of Parliament, suggested that the power struggles would dissipate. This impression proved to be wrong, however, and in the post-1983 election period, Tibiyo directly entered the arena of struggle. The appointment of Sishayi Nxumalo, Tibiyo's managing director, as Minister of Finance after the elections, was a move which initially appeared to be aimed at the rationalisation and harmonisation of the interests of Tibiyo and the state. As we have argued, Tibiyo has in the past initiated a number of projects, but relied on the state for the provision of additional funds. This reflected an uneasy relationship between Tibiyo and the state, since Tibiyo remained above governmental scrutiny. In mid-1983, Tibiyo attempted to negotiate loans for development purposes with the African Development Bank, and therefore applied to the state for official designation as a National Development Agent. The Ministry of Finance made it clear that it was unwilling to sanction such designation. This was primarily because the Finance Minister would be required to secure Parliamentary approval for a Government guarantee for any external loans while having no effective control over Tibiyo's projects. Indeed in the past, the state has not authorised external loans unless there was a measure of state control and supervision through the directive of a government minister. Over and

above governmental evaluation of project proposals, the state requires adequate security for any amount guaranteed. Tibiyo's bid for National Development Agency status was therefore blocked by the Ministry of Finance, on the grounds that Tibiyo was 'not a statutory body under the control of a minister, and it has no legal persona which could be the subject of litigation(1). Shortly after Nxumalo's accession to the Finance portfolio, the Principal Secretary of the Ministry wrote to the African Development Bank to announce that Tibiyo had officially been designated as a National Development Agency(2).

However, far from an attempt at increased co-ordination between Tibiyo and the state, it would appear that Nxumalo's appointment as Finance Minister was a calculated attempt to remove him from Tibiyo. Increasingly, Tibiyo had become his brainchild along with a clique comprising of former Private Secretary to the King, Martin Mdziniso, legal advisor Robert Friedlander, legal consultant Charles J. Lipton and chairman of the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation, Gosh Szolokay. In February, 1984, Nxumalo was removed from his Tibiyo post and replaced by former Justice Minister, Polycarp Dlamini, who had crossed swords with Mabandla and had emerged as an ally of Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi. While Nxumalo's new appointment acknowledged his important role as agent par excellence of international capital, and the man commanding the confidence of

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1. Centro de Estudos Africanos, Southern African Dossier, Maputo, 18 June 1984, p.3.

2. Ibid.

foreign investors (it was also a role that earned him both the respect and fear of the Liqoqo), Nxumalo is known to have resented considerably the loss of his base at Tibiyo. But as events unfolded, it became clear that Nxumalo's removal from Tibiyo was not merely a challenge to his control over that empire; rather it was the beginning of a showdown struggle between factions led by Prince Mfanasibili and Nxumalo himself. Nxumalo for his part attempted to parry Mfanasibili's offensive by championing a new anti-corruption drive. Shortly after becoming Minister of Finance, he spoke out against the 'rats' who were misappropriating public funds, and asserted that he was 'prepared to make a lot of enemies' in order to flush out these rats'(1).

In early January 1984, Nxumalo claimed that he had been driving from Manzini late one night, when he suddenly came upon some logs which had been scattered all over the road. He said that his car had overturned, but he had escaped unhurt, and was 'puzzled how the logs had been scattered on the road and left there, without other cars being affected by them'. He considered himself 'lucky' to have survived(2). When SCI's collapse was announced in March, Nxumalo attributed this to 'corruption in high places', and referring to the January accident, said that he might 'find himself in trouble' if he were to attempt to combat corruption on his own(3). On March 17, Nxumalo once again

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1. Swazi Observer, 26 November 1983.
2. Swazi News, 7 January 1984.
3. Times of Swaziland, 1 March 1984.

took the opportunity of painting himself as the white knight waging a bitter struggle against corruption. He warned that if the nation did not attempt to check this 'national cancer' soon, the country would be 'totally destroyed'. Exposure, according to Nxumalo, and à 'national consciousness on public morality is probably the answer to fight this disease'(1). This was because 'corruption flourishes well in communities where people are too intimidated to talk about it'(2). Hindsight has enabled us to determine that a major confrontation was clearly on the cards.

This came, according to Prince Mfanasibili, on March 20, when he and Prime Minister Bhekimpi foiled an attempted coup, which climaxed in the palace at Phondo. Prince Mfanasibili described how a 'Gang of Four' had attempted to wrest executive power from the monarchy. He claimed that had the plot succeeded, he, Prince Bhekimpi and prominent members of the Police force would have been incarcerated if not 'permanently neutralised or eliminated'(3). He alleged that:

> For some time now I have been aware of midnight meetings and clandestine moves by a Gang of Four - two cabinet ministers, one parliamentarian and a prince. The grand strategy of this gang has been to sow the seeds of mistrust within the political leadership of the country and thereby bring about friction and division. To achieve this they have lied, misled and compromised the elders of the nation... to destabilise the country's internal position so much that they can easily and without much resistance wrestle (sic.) the executive authority(4).

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1. Weekend Observer, 6 March 1984.
2. Ibid.
3. Times of Swaziland, 2 April 1984.
4. Ibid.

Mfanasibili's disclosures came in early April, and initially appeared as inflated rhetoric, which observers were reluctant to take too seriously. One reason for this was that previous attempts to sustain court cases against those charged either with reticent coups or sedition were foundering. In December 1983, Justice Dunn had rejected crown counsel's opposition to bail applications by those accused of High Treason, following Dzeliwe's dismissal. He did so because he was 'not satisfied that there is a strong case against the accused'(1). In January 1984, Dudu Dlamini, a bank employee, was acquitted of sedition by Justice Dunn, who said that there was 'no evidence linking the accused with the pamphlets' which the state alleged she had distributed(2). In April 1984, 35 students were acquitted of charges relating to their Manzini demonstration the previous August. Around the same time, the Queen Regent ordered the release and 'pardon' of 60 detainees interned after the ousting of Dzeliwe, including those charged with High Treason and detained having been granted bail in December. Ultimatley, however, the 'pardon' was a thinly veiled ruse to divert attention away from the fact that the state's case had collapsed due to lack of evidence.

Prince Mfanasibili's allegations were further diluted as the April 1984 confrontation between the ANC and the Swazi police began to intensify. Nevertheless, the fact that they contained some substance

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1. Times of Swaziland, 23 December 1983.
2. Swazi Observer, 28 January 1984.

was revealed at the end of that same month, when Prince Dumisa left the country for the U.K., after having been taken to Matsapha airport under armed escort(1). Prince Dumisa as we observed, had aligned himself with Dr. Zwane's NNLC and had been prominent in the organisation of the 1963 working class struggles that led to British military intervention. Nevertheless, in a volte force he later defected to the King's INM, although his charisma and powerful oratory led to his becoming the first member of the Royal Family to be detained under the 60-day detention order in the late 1970's. On his release in 1980, he went into exile, where he worked for Tiny Rowland's Lonrho company in Glasgow, but returned to Swaziland for the King's funeral in 1982. He resurfaced on the political scene around election time in 1983, when there was speculation that he was set to take-over the reigns of Prime Ministership from Prince Bhekimpi(2). In the event, this was not to be, but it does appear as if he began to align himself with Nxumalo. Indeed as noted above,(3) Nxumalo and Dumisa are relatives, and Nxumalo, at the time himself a former opposition politician who had joined the INM, played a part in facilitating peace negotiations between the King and Dumisa in November 1966. Under the circumstances, the Dumisa-Nxumalo alliance was a natural one, but Dumisa's removal still left Nxumalo and Mfanasibili in the arena.

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1. Times of Swaziland, 24 April 1984.
2. Rand Daily Mail, 29 October 1983.
3. See Chapter 3.

The Removal from Office of Nxumalo and his Allies (June 1984)

That the struggle was on-going and unresolved, was revealed on June 4 when senior Royal Councillor Vusumuzi Bhembe, flanked by Commissioner of Police Titus Msibi and Army Chief of Staff Colonel Mangomeni Ndzimandze, held a press conference in which they claimed that the Queen Regent had decided to remove Mfanasibili and Msibi from the Ligogo[1]. Within hours, the Queen Regent denied having given authorisation to Councillor Bhembe's announcement[2]. The following day, Nxumalo announced that he had ordered investigations into a partly Swaziland-based E13 million customs fraud, apparently carried out by 'businessmen and certain influential individuals in the country'[3]. It appears that Nxumalo had received a 'tip-off' from South African customs officials, and revealed the scandal in a final bid to thwart his main adversaries, Mfanasibili and George Msibi. He claimed that 'powerful elements' had threatened his life following his revelations, but despite the fact that he faced 'grave dangers', he had 'taken the decision to make the sacrifice'[4].

Reaction to Nxumalo's allegations was swift, and Ombudsman Robert Mabila warned Nxumalo that he risked imprisonment if he continued to 'hedge and hue' about allegations of corruption involving public

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1. Times of Swaziland, 5 June 1984.
2. Ibid.
3. Times of Swaziland, 6 June 1984.
4. Times of Swaziland, 7 June 1984

funds(1). He argued that in terms of the Regent's Decree No.2 of 1983, it was the office of the Ombudsman which was required to investigate allegations of corruption involving anyone other than the monarchy. Mabila claimed that Nxumalo was 'hiding behind phrases such as 'parliamentary privilege' while failing and refusing to provide' his office with the information it required(2).

At the end of a tense week, the Mfanasibili clique acted decisively. On 8 June, a brief terse statement by the Prime Minister announced the dismissal of Nxumalo, Foreign Minster Richard Dlamini, Police Chief Msibi and army chief of staff Ndzimandze. It was only on June 11, however, that any official explanation of the dismissals was offered. George Msibi claimed that the 'Gang of Four' had earlier order the Queen Regent to 'sign the dismissal instrument of two Liqoqo members or face a bloody revolution'(3). According to Msibi, Nxumalo and his allies had persistently attempted to 'alienate' the Authorised Person from the Liqoqo: 'The Authorised Person was told that the Liqoqo was bewitching him; he was told that certain members of the Liqoqo wanted to kill him'(4). Nxumalo, according to Msibi, was

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1. Weekend Observer, 9 June 1984.

2. Ibid. Mabila added that Nxumalo had provided just enough information to 'besmirch the good name of this country without exposing the culprits. He has been asked to assist this office in investigating these allegations. I must stress...that this office functions without fear or favour. The minister must respond expeditiously to the demands of the Ombudsman or he risks immediate imprisonment'. By the time Mabila's statement had appeared in the press, Nxumalo was no longer the Minister of Finance.

3. Swazi Observer, 12 June 1984.

4. Ibid

the chief orchestrator of the 'Gang of Four's' strategy, and viewed himself as a 'super politician and past master at political manoeuvres'(1). Nxumalo's major aim, Msibi declared, was to have himself re-instated as Managing Director of Tibiyo, and he had also attempted to remove Tibiyo General Manager Sipho Dlamini on 'trumped up' charges, and persuade the Authorised Person to appoint Prince Dumisa in his place. To achieve this, Sozisa was 'made to sign many instruments and letters including one dismissing the Prime Minister'(2). Stressing that Nxumalo's corruption allegations had nothing to do with the sackings, Msibi emphasized that those dismissed, fell victim to their own 'collusion' to 'illegally remove executive powers from the Head of State'(3). No immediate arrests were made following these allegations, but Nxumalo's passport was seized by the police to prevent him from leaving the country and to ensure that he 'assist in investigations on corruption charges he made before he was sacked'(4). According to the Ligogo, Nxumalo would be a 'material witness in these enquiries. No government can allow an individual to smear the good name of this country without cause'(5). Shortly after this, Princess Mnengwase, an aunt of Dumisa and a purported ally of Nxumalo and Richard Dlamini, fled the country and

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Times of Swaziland, 12 June 1984.
5. Ibid.

sought refuge in Kwazulu. She had been co-opted into the Liqoqo following Dzeliwe's dismissal, but her co-opted membership had since been terminated(1). Despite indications that a major cabinet reshuffle was imminent, it took approximately ten weeks before the key posts of Foreign Minister and Finance Minister were filled by Mhambi Mnisi and Barnabus Dlamini respectively. The stringent reaction which the sackings evoked, demonstrated the limiting parameters within which Swaziland's court intrigues take place. South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, angrily threatened that unless an acceptable enquiry was instituted into Nxumalo's fraud allegations, South Africa would reconsider the entire structure of the Customs Union(2). This sent Ombudsman Mabila to Cape Town to negotiate for a Swazi-run enquiry. The apparently bewilderingly inept dumping of Richard Dlamini, chief Swazi negotiator in the land deal, enabled South Africa to defer the whole question of the transfer with the winding up of the Rumpff Commission, and to instruct Swaziland rather bluntly to negotiate directly with Bantustan leaders Gatsha Buthelezi and Enos Mabuza. If South Africa had a hand in Nxumalo's machinations, by revealing the Customs fraud to him personally, their commitment to him hastily dissipated. Relations were soon smoothed over, and the more urbane Mnisi proved to be just as agreeable as his predecessor Richard Dlamini. The latter soon complained of heart problems, and eventually died in a South African hospital.

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1. Times of Swaziland, 28 June 1984. Princess Mnengwase is an aunt of Princess Mantfombi, a daughter of King Sobhuza's who is married to the Zulu King Zwelethini. It is believed that the Zulus approached Pik Botha, asking him to raise the issue on one of his visits to Swaziland.

2. Financial Mail, 15 June 1984.

But Nxumalo remained anxious to stay in the fray. On June 24, a South African newspaper published an internal minute sent by Accountant-General A.M. Fakudze to Nxumalo when he was still Finance Minister. The document revealed that 7 members of the Liqoqo had been receiving double salaries since August 1982. This meant that by the time of exposure, an amount in the region of E100,000 had been paid out gratis by the Swazi Treasury. Dated 7 June, the day before Nxumalo was dismissed, the minute asserted that 'the principle that a person can only be paid once from public funds for services rendered during specific periods was contravened'(1). According to its author, Andreas Fakudze, five Liqoqo members were seriously overpaid. They were: Dr. George Msibi, who was paid both as an MP and as a Liqoqo member, and was allegedly overpaid by about E2,900; Prince Mfanasibili, who was paid as Chairman of the Civil Service Board and as a Liqoqo member, receiving nearly E25,550; Chief Mfanawenkosi Maseko, who was paid as an Assistant Superintendent of Police as well as a Liqoqo member, allegedly receiving approximately E145,145 in over-payment; Prince Makhungu who was paid both as a member of the Civil Service Board and as a Liqoqo member, receiving an alleged sum of almost E5,540 in overpayments(2). It was also revealed that the Swazi Auditor General, Mr. G.P. Dlamini, had refused to certify the Treasury Annual Accounts because of 'enormous discrepancies' in the public accounts(3).

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1. City Press, 24 June 1984.
2. Ibid. also Rand Daily Mail, 25 June 1984.
3. City Press, 24 June 1984.

He had been forced to table his report late for the year ending 31 March 1982, because although the Finance and Audit Act required the Accountant General to submit public accounts within 8 months of the end of the financial year, he only received the Treasury Accounts on March 9, 1983. His report ultimately revealed gross financial irregularities, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, as 'Swazi envoys enjoyed the good life' abroad(1). In the 1981/82 financial year for instance, the Washington Embassy overspent its budget by E70,284. Two former diplomats based in Washington received loans from the Embassy without any security, and when they were recalled to Swaziland they left without repaying the loans(2).

The Liqoqo reacted strongly to the 'double-pay' allegations, and Dr. George Msibi promised that 'heads will roll', dismissing as untrue the main charge that Liqoqo members had been overpaid in contravention of government regulations. He conceded that some of the five men had been paid twice from public funds, but denied that this contravened regulations, professing that 'Not a single Liqoqo member received two salary cheques'(3). Prince Mfanasibili, for example, had until March 1984 received a salary from the Civil Service Board, and an allowance from the Liqoqo. Thereafter, he had received an allowance from the board, and a salary from the Liqoqo, Msibi insisted, stressing the difference between 'allowance' and 'salary'(4).

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Rand Daily Mail, 25 June 1984.
4. Ibid

Accountant General Fakudze apologised to the Liqoqo for what had happened, emphasizing that he had not himself leaked the minute to the South African Press. He did say, however, that it was his 'unshakeable duty to rais questions, even dumb ones at that, whenever apparent anomolies involving public funds' came to his attention(1). He strenuously denied having any political motives when writing the minute.

Msibi blamed the revelations on Nxumalo, who retorted by saying that 'My first statement when I took office as Minister of Finance was that I was determined to attack corruption. I saw it as my duty then and I would do it again'(2). His next move came in early July, when he said he would sue Msibi for defamation of character. He declared that he had made no treasonable threats to the Queen Regent and that his devotion to the monarchy was well known: 'Those who have falsely accused me will now be put to the task of justifying in open court what they have said. As there is no truth in their accusations, I will be vindicated and they will have to retract'(3).

This reveals the highly personal nature of the power struggles which have plagued the Swazi leadership since the death of King Sobhuza. Essentially, George Msibi was correct when asserting that Nxumalo

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1. Times of Swaziland, 25 June 1984
2. Rand Daily Mail, 25 June 1984.
3. Swazi Observer, 4 July 1984.

was attempting to manipulate corruption allegations as a political cudgel against his adversaries. Nxumalo's strategy was to present himself as the shining white knight at war against corruption in the Kingdom, but it should be stressed that when in 1980, Mabandla had attempted to investigate Tibiyo's files, Nxumulo had persuaded the King to bring an end to Mabandla's commission. Indeed, as observers have pointed out, in a country like Swaziland, 'where patronage is a tool in manoeuvres for support and power, there are few who are not vulnerable' to corruption charges(1). Hence the Ligogo was soon able to counter Nxumalo's efforts at launching an anti-corruption crusade, by placing him in the dock with the revelation by Ombudsman Mabila that Nxumalo was being investigated in connection with an alleged E809,000 fraud(2). Mabila claimed Nxumalo siphoned-off the money in his capacity of Managing Director of Tibiyo and chairman of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). A sum of E730,000 was alleged to have been loaned to Nxumalo by BCCI. This was a transgression of 'company law which prohibits any director or chairman of a company from obtaining substantial loans from that company or institution'(3). A further E72,000 was 'possibly abused' by Nxumalo as Managing director of Tibiyo, while the remaining E7,000 according to Mabila, Nxumalo was alleged to have obtained from a representative of SCI. This latter sum was given as an inducement to Nxumalo to use his influence to assist the ailing company through its

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1. Financial Mail, 15 June 1984. The mood in Swaziland at the time of Nxumalo's dismissal was not one of sympathy for Nxumalo. People were rather opposed to the manner of the dismissal, and its timing, co-inciding as it did with the corruption allegations. The coup accusations were largely discredited by the state's failure to make any arrests.

2. Swazi Observer, 13 July 1984.

3. Ibid

difficulties. With Nxumalo, at least temporarily placed on the sidelines, the Liqoqo could concentrate its attention on the Authorised Person, Prince Sozisa.

The suspension of the Authorised Person Prince Sozisa (August/September 1984).

As was noted, the Authorised Person had played a key role in the dismissal of Dzeliwe in August 1983. Indeed, it was her refusal to hand over signatory powers to Sozisa which had finally triggered off her removal from office. When Queen Ntombi acceded to the throne, she had delegated 'powers of signature on certain national issues', to be exercised at Her pleasure by the Authorised Person'(1). Following the events at Phondo Royal residence in March, the Liqoqo decided that signing powers be reverted to the Queen Regent. At this time it was said that Sozisa had gone into hiding under heavy guard at Siteki(2). Sozisa it would appear had neither ambition, nor was he a skilful manipulator intent on shoring up his own status or position in the kingdom. Rather it would seem that he had become a tool of various factions, who for a disparity of reasons at different times had prevailed upon him to act in their interests. But having been identified by Msibi with Nxumalo's 'Gang of Four', it was only a matter of time before Sozisa would be brushed aside.

The first hints of this came early in July when the police and army

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1. Swazi Observer, 2 July 1984.

2. Drum Magazine, May 1984.

escort given to the Authorised Person was withdrawn(1). Then, towards the end of August, a letter of suspension was served on Prince Sozisa by policemen. Details of the letter were released on the eve of the Reed Dance (Umhlanga) ceremony, for which the Crown Prince had returned, in early September. Three main reasons were given for his suspension. These were related to several attempts to wrest power of signature from the Queen Regent; the signing of a letter indicating that the Queen Regent had been wrongfully appointed; and his attempts to overthrow 'constituted authority' by issuing instructions to the armed forces in June 1984(2). The suspension was signed by Ombudsman Mabila on behalf of the Liqoqo, and also prevented Sozisa from entering the Royal Kraal at Lobamba, and the Queen Regent's Royal residence at Phondo. This was widely acknowledged to be a move aimed at preventing Sozisa from having access to the Crown Prince, and possibly persuading him to purge the Liqoqo. At a meeting for chiefs in October, one chief asked who had taken over the chairmanship of the Liqoqo in Sozisa's absence, and was told that the Queen Regent had assumed the role 'and that is that'(3). Prince Mfanasibili told the chiefs that a clandestine group was planning to assassinate members of the Supreme Council of State in collusion with foreigners, reflecting the perseverence of the siege mentality syndrome from which the contemporary Swazi leadership suffers.

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1. Swazi Observer, 2 July 1984.
2. City Press, 2 September 1984.
3. Times of Swaziland, 29 October 1984.

But few loopholes remained for effective opposition, as the Ligogo continued to treat all resistance and legal requirements with contempt as they secured their own interests. In mid-September, a new decree was issued by the Queen Regent granting immunity to members of the Ligogo from being sued for matters arising from their official activities(1). The effectiveness of the decree was backdated to March and was generally interpreted as a measure taken to shield Msibi from Nxumalo's legal suit. Prince Mfanasibili later admitted that the timing of the decree was contentious, but that this was merely co-incidental and had nothing to do with Nxumalo's efforts to sue Msibi(2).

Nxumalo was effectively paralysed by these actions, and towards the end of November, he was arrested along with the dismissed former chief of staff of the armed forces, Mangomeni Ndzimandze, and his aide, ousted Chief of Logistics, ex-major Barnabus Dlamini. Msibi denied speculation that they were being held in order to prevent them from influencing the Crown Prince during a visit to the Kingdom. Rejecting the idea that they were prominent opponents of the government, he said that they 'were powerful because of the positions they held, they are not powerful any more. Now they are just ordinary people(3). He also refuted the inference that the men were being 'detained', asserting instead that the men were being held in custody in

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1. Swaziland government Gazette, Regent's Decree No.4 of 1984, 5 September 1984.

2. Times of Swaziland 28 November 1984.

3. Ibid.

connection with security matters. 'If you are held' Msibi said, 'you are not a prisoner. You have not been deprived of your freedom. But you should be available at times if the police want you to assist them'(1). At the same time, Prince Gabheni and the King's former Private Secretary, Martin Mdziniso, had their passports withdrawn.

As police 'investigations' proceeded, Nxumalo, held at Piggs Peak police station, fell ill and was rushed to hospital in Manzini with a 'severe bronchial condition'(2). He was later transferred to Sidvokodvo police station, but at the beginning of January 1985 was readmitted to hospital in Manzini and was then later taken to Mbabane clinic under police guard(3). More arrests followed, as the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Edgar Hillary, and its former Commissioner, Titus Msibi, were held at different police stations. Titus Msibi had been implicated with Nxumalo's 'Gang of Four' in June 1984, while Hillary, a career policemen, had arrested Prince Mfanasibili and Chief Maseko in March 1983 under the orders of Prince Mabandla. Between the 21st and 23rd of January 1985, in a display of bewildering ineptitude, Titus Msibi, Hillary, Ndzimandze and Barnabus Dlamini were shuttled between the Mbabane Magistrate's Court and the offices of the Hhohho Police Region. District Police Commander Stanley Bhembe, in whose custody the four men were, was as much in the dark as the Director of Public Prosecutions and the magistrates before whom the men should have

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1. Ibid.
2. Times of Swaziland, 3 January 1984.
3. Times of Swaziland, 13 December 1984.

appeared. They issued a joint statement saying that 'We don't know what the position is regarding those four. Nobody told us anything so we are as ignorant as the public'[1]. But eventually, instructions came through, and the comedy of errors was ominously terminated when the four were charged under the 1983 Sedition and Subversive Activities Amendment Act. It was alleged that the accused had held a meeting 'on or about' June 8 1984, in which they conspired to arrest the Prime Minister, Prince Mfanasibili, George Msibi, Police Commissioner Majaji Simelane, an unnamed cabinet minister, Major Patrick Motsa and to have Titus Msibi re-instated as Commissioner of Police. The 1983 Act under which they were charged, provides for the appointment of a four-man tribunal to deliberate the charges in camera. Crown Counsel, Shiyumhlaba Dlamini, successfuly applied for the bail application to be held in camera, in order 'to protect the public against itself'[2], and shortly after having been granted E300 bail each, the four were detained under the 60-day detention order. A similar order was served on Nxumalo, who had earlier brought an application to the High Court for his release on the grounds of ill-health. Justice Dunn then called on the Attorney General to respond by providing adequate reasons explaining why Nxumalo should not be released from custody[3]. When the four top security men ultimately appeared in

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1. The Star (International weekly edition), 4 February 1985.

2. Times of Swaziland, 24 January 1984.

3. Contrary to the official line that Nxumalo was being held in custody to help police with their investigations, Nxumalo alleged that he was being kept in solitary confinement, having only being questioned once in Piggs Peak. He claimed he was asked if he was mobilising worker support to have himself re-instated in Government. Times of Swaziland, 24 January 1984.

Court in April 1985, the original charges were withdrawn in favour of newly drawn charges of High Treason, thus bringing the case back to an open court. Nxumalo remained in preventive detention, and was later charged along with the four.

The State and Student Protest

As we have noted, following the dismissal of Queen Regent Dzeliwe, students in Swaziland's tertiary institutions demonstrated their opposition to the Ligogo's actions. Although covert protest ended after their anti-Government marches through Mbabane and Manzini in August 1983, the conflict between the state and students continued to simmer. Eventually, it burst into the open in August 1984. The root cause of the conflict was a visit to Kenya during the 1984 winter vacation by six students, ostensibly as representatives of Swaziland. These students were not members of the Student Representative Council (SRC), and the visit was seen by students as a contravention of the SRC constitution, and an attempt by the state to set up an alternative student body, in the wake of the pro-Dzeliwe stance adopted by students in August 1983. Indeed, subsequent events revealed that a group of students had met the Minister of Education, following which it was agreed to establish a Swaziland National Association of Students (SNAS), in place of what they themselves regarded as a 'moribund' Swazi National Union of Students (SNUS)(1). With Education Minister Dabulumjiva Nhlabatsi firmly in the camp of Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi, the influence of the Ligogo was

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1. Swazi News, 22 December 1984.

certainly discernable in the establishment of SNAS.

This created a volatile situation when the University opened in late August 1984. The SRC declared the six students who had visited Kenya 'dissidents', and this ultimately provoked a series of confrontations between members of the student body and the six, between 21 and 23 September 1984. There were a number of altercations, and one of the 'dissidents' had his room broken into and later set on fire, although the fire was soon put out without serious loss or damage. The police intervened, and detained the whole SRC along with the Chairman of the Kwaluseni University campus SNUS branch. This triggered-off a series of boycotts embracing the Swaziland College of Technology and the William Pitcher Teacher Training College, and revealed a determination by Swazi students to reject all state endeavours to impose a 'puppet leadership' upon them. Calm was brought to the situation following the release of the SRC members from police custody and a visit by the Prime Minister to the University campus(1).

This peace proved to be short-lived, however, and the situation once again became tense when the 1983/4 SRC president, Babalazi Bulunga was detained by the Swazi Police(2). Students boycotted classes, and ultimately staged a march in Manzini following Bulunga's deportation(3). Riot police baton-charged the demonstration and

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1. Ibid.
2. Swazi News, 20 October 1984.
3. See Chapter 6.

repeatedly beat the demonstrators, some of whom were left with blood streaming from gaping head wounds(1). Two students were admitted to hospital with serious injuries while seven were detained by police for questioning. The Vice-Chancellor announced the closure of the University, and the students were sent home. Thereafter, the government appointed a Commission of Enquiry into the campus disturbances, whose mandate included the investigation of whether and what 'outside influences' were contributing to an atmosphere of unrest within the University.

In December 1984, the Commission which had sat under the chairmanship of Justice Hassanali issued their report. It revealed that the Commission had found 'an unhealthy student pre-occupation with the philosophies, aims and objectives of the African National Congress'(2). There was, according to the report, strong evidence of the frequent presence of the ANC representative in Swaziland, Absalom Duma, on the campus, and 'The Commission did not find it difficult to see that the interests of those who espouse the cause of the ANC could be advanced by collaborating with those who promote antagonism with the government of Swaziland and the Ligogo'(3). Foreign lecturers and particularly 'long-term expatriates' were not the subject of adequate security and interim checks, and the commission further stated that 'the introduction of a disaffected lecturer into the

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1. Swazi News, 20 October 1984.
2. Swazi News, 22 December 1984.
3. Ibid.

University holds considerable peril for Swaziland'(1). It was also argued that the proportion of foreign students to local students was too high, and that the number of South African students was too large, 'particularly as it contains too great a proportion of students who for political reasons, seek tertiary education outside the Republic'(2). The commission also found that the student tour of Kenya was initiated by the students themselves, although it was conceded that it did progress with the encouragement and support of the Liqoqo and individual cabinet members in their personal capacity(3).

The state accepted the findings of the report, and instructed the University Council to fire in the region of 12 lecturers and expel about 100 students(4). This the council refused to do, and it led in early January 1985, to another closure of the campus, while the council and the cabinet were locked in a series of meetings in an effort to find a settlement. The council argued that the lecturers had not been found guilty of any professional misconduct, and that the commission's report contained no substantial allegations which would justify the firing of any individual. Eventually, however, the council conceded some ground, agreeing to expel 21 students and to request the resignation of two staff members on condition that their contracts

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Personal correspondence with John Daniel, 7 February 1985.

were paid out in full. These were Chief Dambuza Lukhele, the Assistant Registrar, who had filed a legal suit on behalf of Dzeliwe and subsequently been detained for 6 months(1); and Dr. John Daniel, who was the only foreign lecturer to have been subpeaned before the Hassanali Commission(2).

Accordingly, letters were dispatched to all students who were to be re-admitted, but this was made conditional on acceptance of 8 conditions laid down by the council. These included the dissolution of the current SRC, and the acceptance of all regulations governing student conduct, including no further boycotts or demonstrations. When the University re-opened in early February 1985, students inevitably went on strike almost immediately in protest at the firings and the expulsions, amidst speculation that the university would be closed for the rest of the academic year. The cauldron was further stirred by a strongly worded statement from the University Academic Staff Association condemning what they referred to as the contravention of the University Act and University Statutes(3). Rather than close the University, the state decided to act on its own initiative, and assumed responsibility for security at the University. All meetings were banned on campus, and armed police were deployed on standby near both the Kwaluseni and the Luyengo campuses. It was

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1. At the time, Government had applied pressure to have Lukhele fired, but the University refused to comply.

2. Following a 90-minute grilling before the Commission, it became evident to Daniel that Pretoria had applied pressure on the University and the country to have him leave. This was probably on account of his political views and work with refugees.

3. Rand Daily Mail, 7 February 1985.

these tactics which saw the student boycott stutter towards an end, with a drift back to class that led to the collapse of the strike. But it was clear that the autonomy of the University had been smashed and its integrity as an institution of higher learning seriously undermined.

Commenting on the student unrest, Dr. George Msibi stated that 'we are not unduly concerned about students being critical. The man-in-the street is much more critical. The students are merely more vocal and receive more attention'(1) Indeed, the high-handed formation of SNAS and the destruction of SNUS opposition to it has at least for the time being brought students in Swaziland to heel. But the cavalier dismissal of Mabandla, Dzeliwe, Sozisa and Nxumalo and his associates has left discontent simmering at grass-roots level. The timing of the ousting of Nxumalo's 'Gang of Four', coming as it did shortly after the E13 million customs fraud allegations, went a long way towards discrediting all talk of an imminent coup by Nxumalo et al. Pamphlets and leaflets have continued to circulate in the capital, and towards the end of December 1984, an organisation calling itself the 'People's United Democratic Movement' called for unity among all groups opposing the regime. Spray-painted slogans appeared on walls, bus shelters and tar roads denouncing the Ligogo, calling for the 'right leaders' and also for the release of Ndzimandze, Titus Msibi, Hillary and Barnabus Dlamini. In January 1985, there were a wave of bomb threats on government buildings and the Prime Minister's office and residence(2). The fire was further fanned by exiled Prince Dumisa,

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 5 December 1984.

2. Times of Swaziland, 12 January 1985.

who announced the formation of the Swaziland Liberation Movement (SLM) to restore democracy to Swaziland through the introduction of democratic elections. Claiming that the present government is illegal, Dumisa called for the protection of the Royal family from its use and abuse by Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi(1). It has been claimed that the SLM has the support of leading figures in Swaziland as well as neighbouring countries, including an 'even more charismatic' leader than Dumisa(2). Dumisa himself has argued that the nation, including the royal family, bureaucrats and businessmen, has been demoralised by recent events, particularly the corruption scandal(3). Thus far, however, there has been little mass response to these initiatives to mobilise and harness opposition to the current regime, but by the same token the Liqoqo has clearly failed to achieve the grass-root support enjoyed by King Sobhuza II. Repression has steadily increased since the King's death, but one must question the morale whithin the ranks of the apparatuses of state repression following the removal of top-ranking commanders. This also raises the issue of the long term stability of the Kingdom, a problem best dealt with by situating the interfactional struggles within the Swazi power bloc in context.

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 8 January 1985.
2. Africa Confidential, Vol. 26, No.2, 16 January 1985, p.4.
3. Ibid.

The Political Crisis in Perspecitve

The foregoing struggles have witnessed the emergence of Prince Mfanasibili and Dr. George Msibi as the dominant Swazi politicians in the present conjuncture. George Msibi is the major architect of the strategy, but whatever legitimacy they have, is derived from Mfanasibili's influence within Royal circles. Mfanasibili, whose name means 'Real Boy', has a long political record which as we observed was nearly ended after his defeat at the polls in the country's last general election under the Westminster Constitution in 1972(1). A new Ministry of Commerce and Co-operatives was then created by the King, and Mfanasibili was made Minister, a position which enabled him, inter alia, to establish himself as a major shareholder in the first dog-racing track in Southern Africa(2). In connivance with the then Deputy Prime Minister, Zonke Khumalo, Mfanasibili as we noted, contrived to deport one of the three victorious NNLC members of Parliament, Thomas Ngwenya, a move which ultimately led to the repealing of the constitution. He has earned himself patronage through his positions as Chairman of the Civil Service Board and President of the Swaziland National Football Association. Within the aristocracy he is held in awe, not least for his impressive physical stature, but also because he is the son of Makhosikhosi, who according to Swazi oral history, was the true heir to Mahlokohla's throne, and not Sobhuza II. His interests, therefore, lie firmly within the resuscitation of popular traditions as well as within the development of capitalism

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1. See Chapter 3 above.

2. See J. Longman, 'The Swazi Coup', South African Outlook, 103, (May 1973), p.86, as well as The Sunday Times, 11 August 1975.

Swaziland. He drives a Mercedes Benz bearing the registration number 007, and runs a bus company known as Tekatakho - 'mind your own business'. He is also a director or Tibiyo and has been implicated in the E13 million fraud allegations through the disclosure that he is a shareholder in a company which came under investigation for the alleged fund called Liberty Investment. He has defended himself by stating that he is a purely nominal shareholder of a El share and has denied all knowledge of the company's involvement in the fraud(1). Nevertheless, there are many question marks which continue to hover over his head. These include widespread speculation that he was involved in an incident in which a Swazi soldier guarding over the late King's grave is said to have lost his life(2).

Msibi is more of a 'dark horse' of Swazi politics, who has been held responsible for having exiled South African Dennis Brutus, repatriated by the Portuguese authorities to South Africa in the early 1960's, after he had fled the country via Swaziland and Mozambique(3). He dissolved his Mbandzeni National Convention and then joined the INM, of which he was a one-time secretary. He was appointed by the King to the Senate and after the suspension of the constitution, he became a member of the Royal Constitution Commission, which was entrusted

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 27 June 1984, printed Mfanasibili's defence without naming the company. Centro de Estudos Africanos Southern African Dossier refers to the fraud as the 'Liberty Investment fraud' (18 June 1984, p.7). The Star (1 March 1985), names the company with which Mfabasibili was associated as Ocean Distributors.

2. See Stan Motjuwadi's article in Drum Magazine, December 1983. According to Motjuwadi, this explained Mfanasibili's limping around election time in 1983. Motjuwadi interviewed the surviving soldier who had stood guard over the King's grave on the night when the alleged incident took place. The guards allegedly opened fire on figures they saw approaching the cave where the King's body was buried.

3. C.P. Potholm, op.cit., pp.107-108.

with the task of drawing up a 'suitable' constitution for Swaziland. He was the sole Swazi director of SCI, but rejected as 'absolute rubbish', Nxumalo's allegations that people in 'high places' had pressured the banks to grant loans of some E30 million to SCI(1). He said that he was the only person who could have done this, but by the time he joined the board, SCI already had the loans. The only time he became involved, was when Standard Bank wanted to foreclose at the end of 1983. By that time, SCI was beginning to sell more fertilizer, and according to Msibi, all he did was to 'ask the bank to give SCI more time to pay off the loans. If that had not been done, the banks would have lost more than they have'(2). Since the death of Sobhuza, Msibi has emerged as a leading spokesman of the Liqoqo.

It is possible to identify two major impulses towards executive power. These are personal interest and national interest(3). Increasingly aware of discontent at grass-root level, the ruling clique has attempted to locate their actions within the national interest. Inevitably, this has been done through reference to King Sobhuza II. In a meeting of chiefs, addressed amongst others by Prince Mfanasibili and the Prime Minister, the Indvuna Yetinkhunda, Mr. M. Tshabalala, said that on the eve of his death:

> King Sobhuza II called his Libandla and senior aides to give them a list of names of trusted strongmen who would help the Queen Regent to hold the reins of power because he realised that his death would cause a fierce

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1. Financial Mail, 20 July 1984, p. 53.

2. Ibid.

3. R. Miliband, Class Power and State Power, (London: Verso, 1983), p.69.

power struggle. The King asked himself the Question: 'Should I leave the nation in the hands of the cabinet or should I do something to rectify the situation?' The King had foresight and he foresaw all that is going on today. The King said to his aides: 'I give you these men, they will have to die before anyone hijacks the nation'. Mfanasibili is one of these men and because he 'is always on the lookout, many people would very much love to get their hands on his throat. If he dies, he will be dying during the course of an assignment he was given by the King. The King realised that if he did not give the Ligogo enough power it would be hi-jacked(1).

It is in such fashion that the current holders of state power in Swaziland have attempted to persuade both themselves and the masses, that their continued monopolisation of state power is in the national interest, whose service underlies all their actions. In Swaziland, the concept of the national interest has been married with the notion of the 'King's will'. But a Swazi Observer editorial has warned:

> It is very disturbing and degrading to see that in all that is done or said, everyone claims to be doing or following the teachings of the late King...If our beloved King had to come back, most of us would be...guilty of unpardonable crimes for using his name for our own selfish ends...we shall have no peace and stability if we continue to defy with impunity the firm foundation laid down by the late King...and continue to choose a path of incorrigible village delinquents who have ruined many African countries(2).

As Miliband amongst others, has pointed out, people in power generally wish to maintain it, and it would be naive to think that self interest is not high amongst the motivations of those in power(3). The state is the major institution which facilitates the exercise of great power and

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1. Times of Swaziland, 29 August 1984.
2. Swazi Observer, 4 August 1984.
3. R. Miliband, op,cit. p.69.

in the case of Swaziland in the post-Sobhuza II period, it has been the key site of power struggles. The actual structure of political power, has ensured that the mass of Swazi people remain excluded from the arena of struggle, a situation which has led to mounting mass discontent. As the editors of the Times of Swaziland have stated, 'Swaziland belongs to a population of more than 600,000 people with a King or Queen...who rules by tradition'(1). After the King's death, however:

> ...certain princes, princesses and others who erroneously believe that they were born with their umbilical cords attached to power and public coffers went wild. These people are still growling at one another over our country and our property like dogs fighting over a juicy bone. And these internicine feuds seem to be perennial. One then begins to wonder what is the difference between these struggles and party politics? These struggles are much more deadly than party politics. A privileged few are allowed to enter the arena and the masses become helpless bystanders who watch in awe...If this sort of thing continues there will no longer be any valid reason for banning political parties and we, the masses, will start demanding that they be legalised again so that we can enter the debate through our parties. We have been silent for a long time, but the provocation is becoming unbearable(2).

It is this very lack of access to the state apparatus which the mass of the Swazi people experience which is endemic to the ongoing political crisis in the country.

We have seen how in the wake of the suspension of the constitution, the King attempted to regalvanise the Tinkhundla, in an effort to link local and central political systems. It is through the Tinkhundla

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1. Times of Swaziland, 26 June 1984.
2. Ibid.

according to George Msibi, that the mass of Swazi people are absorbed into the political process: 'This broad-based political structure demands and permits accommodation of different political opinion. Such political opinions are debated openly and freely within the system and the result of such debates is consensus voiced by the executive monarch'(1). Justice Minister David Matse has voiced his concern over what he has called 'poor lines of communications in Swaziland, and has pointed out that the Tinkhundla constitute the legal form through which the grievances of the people can be discussed(2). What is in question, however, is not the abstract legality of the Tinkhundla, but the concrete institutional mechanisms which will facilitate the transformation of the Tinkhundla from meeting points at which Electoral Colleges have on two occasions been elected, into forums of democratic participation of the masses. It is the machinery regarding the actual functioning of the Tinkhunda, or rather the absence of it, which has ensured that the Tinkhundla have failed to bridge the gap between the state and the mass of the Swazi people. A major reason remains the scepticism of chiefs, whose influence on Swazi Nation Land continues to be of considerable importance. As Mavela Shongwe has noted, 'some chiefs argue that they are looked down upon by Tindvuna (Tinkhundla heads) and by members of the Electoral College. For instance the Electoral College (members) received monthly allowances while chiefs do not. Tinkhundla indeed seem to

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1. Swazi Observer, 12 June 1984.

2. Swazi News, 2 February 1985.

undermine the status of chiefs'[1]. Unless this basic conflict is resolved, the people of Swaziland will have to seek other avenues should they wish to intervene in the on-going personalised power struggles which have characterised Swazi politics since the death of King Sobhuza.

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1. M.V. Shongwe, op.cit., p. 34.

Conclusion

As in all historical conjunctures when a Swazi king has died, the death of Sobhuza gave rise to a series of power struggles. In the contemporary era, three organs or institutions of power emerged: the cabinet and parliament; the Liqoqo or Supreme Council of State; and Tibiyo. The presence of the King facilitated a degree of harmony between these institutions, but after his death, conflicting personalities transformed these power centres into the site of on-going power struggles.

While the Prime Minister at the time of the King's death, Mabandla, enjoyed widespread mass support, his anti-corruption stance earned him the enmity of new figures contending for power and influence within the Royal circles. Mabandla soon found that his own survival was predicated upon cabinet remaining the major council of the Swazi crown. Although his forward looking disposition is well known, the traditionalist/modernist antagonism never became the actual subject of the confrontation between himself, Prince Mfanasibili and Chief Maseko. This was because Mabandla made no serious attempt to transform his mass support into a political base, and the struggle thus remained at the level of personal intrigue within the palace, a level at which Mabandla always appeared a loser.

At no stage was the Queen Regent Dzeliwe at ease over Mabandla's dismissal, and this created animosity between her and the new force within the Royal clan, Prince Mfanasibili, whose hand was strengthened considerably through his alliance with the shrewd medical practitioner turned businessman, George Msibi. Steadily they

began to ride over Dzeliwe's head and push her into the background, exploiting the constitutional privileges accorded to the Authorised Person, senior Prince Sozisa. Frustrated by the effective usurpation of her power, Dzeliwe contrived to rid the Liqoqo of Mfanasibili, George Msibi and chief Maseko, and the cabinet of the new Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi, just as the latter constellation of forces attempted to co-erce her into handing over powers to the Authorised Person.

This showdown saw Prince Mfanasibili and his allies ride roughshod over tradition and convention in dismissing the Queen Regent and dragging the heir apparent's mother, Ntombi, out of mourning to take over Dzeliwe's role. With the malleable notions of traditional law and custom firmly re-invented and remoulded, Prince Mfanasibili's Liqoqo cast their eyes towards cabinet and Tibiyo. Through the General Election of October 1983, a massive reshuffle took place, and leading figures who had depended on Sobhuza's patronage began to feel the teeth of a new Royal administration. The late King's cousin and confidant Sisahayi Nxumalo, the architect of Tibiyo and Swaziland's major link with foreign capital, was removed from Tibiyo and placed at the head of the Finance Ministry. Angered by this 'demotion', he posed as a gladiator in combat against corruption, while conspiring with other major figures now out of favour, notably Prince Dumisa, Princess Mnengwase and Richard Dlamini. They attempted to consolidate their position by drawing the Authorised Person into their fold, but in the final analysis it was Prince Mfanasibili and George Msibi who spun the master web of intrigue and Royal cabal.

But while this duo had for the meantime won the struggle at the top, their actions served to rejuvenate the underlying antagonism between the state and the mass of the Swazi people who remained enstranged from the ongoing struggles in the power bloc. In this wày, these struggles activated by the death of the King, have served to expose the underlying contradictions of state power in Swaziland, hitherto welded together by the populism and nationalism of King Sobhuza II. Ensnared between the past and the future, Sobhuza II's political and ideological strategy had left Swazi society slumbering in time-honoured customs and narrow expectations, leaving a whole multiplicity of points of conflict simmering at the level of grudges and personal complaints. But the death of the patriarch has brought about a rude awakening, as increasingly it becomes evident that Swaziland lacks a political culture which is both functional, and corresponds to the actual historical development and nature of Swazi society which his successors have to govern.

We have rejected a necessary connection between the economic and regional crises and the current political confrontations. This is because they were sparked off by the death of the King, whose highly personalised style of rule left a power vaccum which could not easily be filled, given the amorphous synthesis of political institutions which Sobhuza II had attempted to weld together. Nevertheless, it is recognised that there is a rich diversity of determinations which are articulated in the making of actual events. The Royal power struggles have diverted attention from the very real political initiatives requisite if Swaziland is to come to terms with the regional and economic crises. Ironically, Prince Bhekimpi himself warned towards the end of 1983, that 'Any country which has political disturbances will

not receive foreign assistance in any form. If a country is experiencing domestic problems, these problems must be solved peacefully, not in a manner which would scare away potential donors and investors'(1). When Natie Kirsh announced plans to go ahead with investment in a new textile mill in mid-1984, he stressed that implementation of the project was contingent on the country's political stability. With no clear indication that power struggles have dissipated, and as tentative moves are taken towards organised opposition, political stability, it would appear, is a long way off. This augers ill for a country now faced with generalised, highly diverse crisis tendencies.

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1. Rand Daily Mail, 17 October 1983.

8. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS BREAKDOWN IN SWAZILAND?

> Pious and sanctimonious utterances in defence of the old life-style of the Swazi community are not going to help us. In fact, the rate at which the physical development of this country is running is already threatening the Swazi life-style. We can no longer go back; there is already a gulf between Swaziland yesterday and Swaziland today.(1)

Over a decade and half since gaining independence, Swaziland heads rapidly towards a crossroads. One of our principal aims has been to show how Royal hegemony was reconstituted by King Sobhuza II through his capacity to redeploy indigenous and specifically lineage-based ideology. Operating in a territorial unit where nation is coterminous with tribe, he ensured that fraternity remained combined with the dynastic regime, and thus secured the legitimacy of the divinely ordained Kingship. This would probably never have been possible, were it not for the able qualities of the Queen Regent Labotsibeni, who dragged Swaziland out of the uncertainty of the concessionary era of Mbandzeni. For all her attempts to reconstitute Royal hegemony however, she was unable to reverse the land partition which left the Swazi with control over a mere third of their own country.

King Sobhuza II ascended the throne, pledged to restore Swazi control over this land, as well as independence at large. As his early deputations to Cape Town and London proved, this would be no easy task. Swaziland was never officially gazetted as a Protectorate,

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1. Bishop M. Zwane, op.cit., p. 78.

although it was regarded as such by Britain, which dwelt on the idea of Bechuanaland, Basotholand and Swaziland being incorporated into the Union of South Africa. When D. F. Malan's Nationalists came to power in South Africa in 1948, it became clear that reform of the latter's race laws was no longer on the agenda, and this prompted Britain into taking a greater interest in the High Commission Territories' development. The 1950 Swaziland Native Administration Proclamation strengthened the 'indirect rule' of the Swazi aristocracy who intensified their efforts to regain control over the land, this time not merely by exacting monetary levies on their subjects in order to buy it back, but by allying themselves with foreign capital, which had begun flowing into the country after World War II. This marked the beginning of an important alliance, and helped facilitate the transformation of the aristocracy into a comprador bourgeois class force. This proved to be a significant factor in the reconstitution of Royal hegemony.

As Swaziland edged towards independence in the 1960's, the workers in Swaziland's plantations and asbestos mine struck in unison for better wages and working conditions. This struggle between labour and capital found common ground with the independence movement, thanks to the efforts of Prince Dumisa and the forerunners of the NNLC. When the British troops were called in from Kenya, however, this threatening unity was decisively shattered, and provided the signal for King Sobhuza II's entrance into the political arena. With powerful backing ranging from foreign capital, to the Afrikaner Broederbond, and most significantly, Swazi chiefs and notables, Sobhuza was able to ensure that the independence struggle remained on the terrain of the

antagonism between the colonial state and the Swazi masses, who were excluded from all central political participation. Relying on the popular traditions of pre-colonial Swaziland, Sobhuza's nationalism resulted in resounding successes for his INM in successive elections leading up to independence.

Nonetheless, the independence constitution did little to alleviate the conflict between the state and the Swazi people, who on the whole remained outside the political process. With much of the benefit of Swaziland's post-independence development accruing to foreign capital and their comprador and bureaucratic allies among the Swazi, the post-independence election saw the opposition capture three seats in the Mpumalanga constituency, thus bringing opposition politics to Parliament. This constituency consisted of a large number of sugar plantation workers as well as some small-holder farmers, and demonstrated that class politics had yet to be fully eliminated from Swaziland. The King acted decisively, and crossed the Rubicon by suspending the independence constitution and assuming full executive and legislative authority. Once again, the guiding ideological forces were those of traditional pre-colonial society. Unable to draw on anything but that which was known through inheritance, a new constitution was devised, based on the Tinkhundla regional councils. In effect, the King maintained all powers, and with cabinet as his major council, traditional politics was super-imposed over Parliament which could do little more than merely endorse Royal directives.

This period also co-incided with the strengthening of comprador involvement in economic development, through the growing influence

of Tibiyo, the corporation of the Swazi crown. Itself legitimated as being 'held in trust' by the monarchy for the Swazi people, Tibiyo engaged in enterprise with foreign capital and spread its tentacles throughout the Swazi economy. It soon became evident, however, particularly after the reserves of iron ore had dried up, that Swaziland's dramatic growth rates were unfolding against a background of a disturbing trend towards monoculture. And when the world price of sugar began to plummet in the late 1970's, Swaziland found itself engulfed by the world economic crisis. This meant amongst other things, massive losses for Tibiyo which had invested so much in sugar, and eventually revealed growing tensions between Tibiyo and the state. Tibiyo's development trajectory was nourished on joint ventures with multinationals in the form of huge estate farms, involving a partial separation of the worker-peasantry from the land. By way of contrast, the state has tended to favour the fostering of small-holder schemes in an endeavour to coax the growth of a peasantry, and thus augment the success of its own commitment to a rural development strategy on Swazi Nation Land.

The latter has steadily become a key element of state effort to alleviate one of the most pressing problems induced by the economic crisis now engulfing Swaziland - unemployment. Together with declining growth rates, rising debt and deteriorating social services, these constitute some of the chief symptoms of Swaziland's current crisis tendencies. The RDAP has failed to engender significant growth in the level of production on Swazi Nation Land and there is little evidence of a greater uptake of commodity production to which the programme is committed. At the same time, Swaziland's working

class is faced with the material reality of capital's measures which have led to important cut backs and closures. This problem has further been exacerbated by South Africa's decentralisation policies which have led investment to be diverted away from Swaziland to the South African Bantustans. Thus far, working class response has been at times angry, but largely provisional and disarticulate, and the growth of trade unionism remains hamstrung by the absence of coherent leadership and direction, and unfolds under the watchful eye of the state.

It was against this background of economic recession, that the reality of Swaziland's integration into the political economy of South Africa began to compound the country's growing problems. The successes of African nationalism in its struggle against white rule in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, has left South Africa alone in the arena as the sole survivor of minority rule. Political opposition and protest, along with military sabotage steadily mounted within the country, and South Africa's rulers devised a Total Strategy in response to the oppressed majority's determined drive for national liberation. A significant element of this strategy was a regional 'carrot and stick' campaign of destabilisation which in the case of Swaziland has proved to consist rather more of the 'carrot' than the 'stick'. With a land deal on the negotiating table, South Africa enticed Swaziland into the signing of a security pact in secret, which led to a comprehensive crackdown on the ANC within Swaziland. Swaziland's acquiescence in curbing ANC activity within its borders, reveals its growing concern over the trajectory of the struggle for democracy in South Africa, as much as it does the nature of its rulers' own hegemonic character.

When King Sobhuza II repealed the independance constitution, he found himself in no-man's-land, with nothing but his own inheritance to combine with the political structures left by the departing colonial power. Inevitably, the regime became both highly centralised and personalised. The constitutional upgrading of the Liqoqo on the eve of the King's death, was a prescription for the power struggles which succeeded it as Prime Minister Prince Mabandla, and princes of Mfanasibili's persuasion, sized up their claims to executive authority. The power struggles in themselves were not surprising, since historically, the deaths of Swazi Kings have invariably led to princely succession intrigues. But these highly personalised power struggles have once again exposed the hiatus between the mass of the Swazi people and the process of political participation. The current leadership has shown no lack of firmness, but appears ill-equiped to produce the necessary political initiatives requisite in dealing with the regional and economic crises. Question marks also hover over its capacity to sustain Royal hegemony in the tradition of the late King Sobhuza II.

As we have argued, hegemony is constructed not only through political leadership, but through the development of moral and intellectual leadership as well. Moral and intellectual leadership constitutes a collective will, which evolves from an ideological articulation of diverse social forces and historical experience. It is around a common perception of the world that hegemonic projects are built, and through ideology that such a perception binds together the multiplicity of structures which are constitutive of society. In Swaziland, the role of ideology has been of seminal importance in securing and maintaining

Royal hegemony. For despite the great legacy which King Sobhuza II left behind, the actual political institutions and culture which he synthesized and preserved after independence, have led to a disjunction between economic and political development in the country. The political structure which he attempted to mould lacks a firm foundation, because ultimately it owes everything to his highly personalised style of rule. The success of the King's ideology which bound Swazi society together, was predicated upon the cult of personality which Sobhuza II was able to build around himself. In so doing, he relied heavily on mythological thinking which presented reality by way of analogy.

This was always a precarious course, for in following it, the King piloted his nation against the current of history. Hence when he died, a nervous nation awoke to discover that the dream was reality, and that before them lay not the Promised Land, but a growing economic and regional crisis which required firm and coherent political leadership in order to combat its destructive effects. Sobhuza II's analogous thinking gave way to threat, allegation and intrigue, thus placing in serious jeopardy the collective Swazi man which Sobhuza II had welded together from the dispersed wills and conflicting aims manifest in Swazi society. This is why Sobhuza II's successors face the prospect of a delegitimisation of Royal hegemony.

The foregoing underlines the importance for historical materialist discourse of looking beyond the concept of class and the process of class struggle in analysing Swazi society. Nevertheless, we would not call for a rejection of class analysis, for undoubtedly, the class

forces within the Swazi state and within Royalist circles, have articulated with the diversity of political, ideological and social forces in the development of Swazi history. In emphasising the crucial role of ideology in the construction of Royal hegemony, we have demonstrated the interrelatedness of the multiform structures which together make up 'the field of the social' in Swaziland. In rejecting class reductionism, we have dismissed all attempts to reduce the trajectory of Swazi social development to the logic of a single relation or set of relations as embodied in the social relations of production.

Having made the case throughout this thesis, for the indeterminacy of social events, it would be somewhat ironic to end on a note of determinacy. Swaziland's internal politics is now characterised by the threat of the existing simmering conflicts, grudges and personal complaints bursting aflame in one of their various sources. Yet there is no evidence of the emergence of a coherent hegemonic formation which could harness these forces and provide the moral and intellectual leadership which would pose a threat to Royal hegemony in its present form. Rather if changes are to come about, it appears as though these will stem from the intensification of the liberation struggle in South Africa, and/or the heightening of global economic crisis and crisis tendencies, and the effects they produce in Swaziland. This Swazis themselves understand, for it is explained in the mythical thinking which Sobhuza II strove so hard to foster. The Swazi have a saying: utshani lobulele buvuswa wumlilo - the grass which is sleeping is awoken by fire. It takes an outside stimulis to produce an uproar, which once begun is not easily controlled, and can lead to massive upheaval and transformation. Perhaps this is the kind of counter myth

which the people of Swaziland will offer as they themselves begin to demythologise the legacy of King Sobhuza II's rule. But should the political disintegration which has succeeded the King's death continue, then ultimately, fact will speak for itself.

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